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The Introduction identifies a representative host of ob- 
jections that have been brought against Marx's theory of historical 
materialism, and organizes these objections into a definite, complex 
problematic. The rest of Book 1 provides the solution to this 
problematic while, more broadly, systematically disclosing a precise 
and integrated theoretical framework underlying Marx's labyrinthine 
work. 
(This framework is developed in eight chapters: the first 
six of which explain its central categories in the "ascending" order 
that follows, and the last two of which explain the central relation- 
ships (called "economic determinism" and "technological determinism") 
held by Marx to obtain among the referents of these categories. ) 
Chapter I ascertains and delineates Marx's hitherto undisclosed 
theory of human nature implicit in his post-1845 work. This dis- 
interred theory yields what has often been held as the crucial 
"missing factor" in the mature Marx's thought, and at the same time 
defines a new foundation to the structure of his world-view. 
Chapter II then explicates Marx's concept of the historical 
materialist actualization of this human-nature, and the chief causal 
factor in his theory, the forces of production: in such manner that 
Marx's notion of the latter is rendered clear and schematic, and 
shown free of sundry claimed flaws. 
In Chapter III, the most erkmatic and important category in 
Marx's entire corpus - the relations of production/Economic Structure, 
which he holds to be the "essence" of any and all historical society 
-- is made lucid by an original characterization induced from Marx's 
work. Resolution to a matrix of attendant problems to do with his 
concepts of "alienation", "class". "laws of motion" and so on follows. 
Chapter IV concerns itself with the precise nature of Marx's 
idea of the. legal and political superstructure: particularly its 
distinction from the Economic Structure and the grounds for holding 
it. E. uperstructural, both of which critics have judged impossible to 
secure. 
Chapter V argues from Marx's texts for a new and more rigorous 
concept of ideology: which it is shown enables refutation of the 
most influential criticisms which have been brought against Marx's 
theory in this connection. 
Chapter VI introduces to Marx's general theoretical frame- 
work a previously undiscerned distinct category, forms of social 
consciousness and delineates it. 
Chapter VII works out a novel explanation of the pivotal 
Marxian doctrine of "economic determinism" which renders the latter 
immune to the standard objections issued against it. And Chapter 
VIII provides the first systematic account of the principles of 
"correspondence" claimed by Marx to hold between forces and relations 
of production (the theoretical essence of his "technological deter- 
minism"): from which principles the primacy of the forces of pro- 




Having secured the precise structure of Marx's world-view 
in Book 1, the enterprise in Book 2 is to achieve its Aufhebung: 
with respect to the focus of Marx's own concern, domination and 
liberation. Marx's general principles of domination and liberation 
are ascertained, and then shown to be multiply inadequate both in 
the consistent range of their application to spheres of sociohis- 
torical intercourse, and, as such. Growing out of this analysis 
emerges a new and higher order theory of domination and liberation, 
which introduces such basic concepts as fladult/youth structure of 
domination", "psychological means of life", "forces of destruction", 
"term ownership" and, most importantly, "formal domination" in its 
sublating metamorphosis of the Marxian paradigm. 
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Karl Marx's philosophy of human history is perhaps as cel- 
ebrated for the charges made against it as for the claims it advances. 
Four generations of Western economists, philosophers, historians, 
sociologists and political scientists -- to name but a few -- have 
questioned, criticized or vilified its formulations. But perhaps 
the most persistent formal reproof issued against 
it 
-- a reproof 
which must specially interest the student of philosophy -- is that 
it is conceptually confused. Marx, it is held, articulated his doc- 
trine ambiguously and loosely, if not incoherently. Thus the well- 
known commentator, H. B. Acton, concludes his book The Illusion of 
the Epoch with the somewhat ungenerous decision that Marx's theory 
is, simply, "a philosophical farrago". 1 In much the same vein, 
Professor Sidney Hook, who now challenges Marx's doctrine as ardently 
as he once defended it, advises that: "Rigorous examination is one 
thing Marx's ideas will not stand because they were not rigorously 
formulated" .2 -Even the very sympathetic C. Wright Mills laments 
that Marx's theory is "full of genuine murk" and "contains much that 
lH. B. Acton, The Illusion of the Epoch (London, 1955) p. 271. 
2Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists (N. Y., 1955) p. 35. 
1 
2 
is ... ambiguous or inadequate". 
3 
The above writers are by no means the only scholars who 
censure Marx for fuzziness and muddle. The explicit charge of 
"ambiguity", for example, ýis laid against Marx's conceptual scaf- 
folding by such various figures as Raymond Aron in his,. Eighteen 
Lectures on Industrial Societv4, Bertram D. Wolfe in his One Hundred 
Years-in the Life of a Doctrine5, Peter Sorokin'in his Contemporary 
Sociological'Theories6, and any number of other academic commentators. 
Economist M. M. Bober. utters much the-same objection when, he, holds 
that Marx's work is "obscure, careless'in expression an&contradictory'17; 
while the historian Karl-Federn voices his criticism more forcefully 
still: "the vagueness and'indistinctness of Marxian terminology", 
he remarks, is "deplorable'v8. In short, there exists a very broadly 
established opinion that ý14rx's theoretical--framework ruinously wants 
3C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (N. Y.,. 1962) p. 102 and 136 
respectively. 
4Raymond Aron,, Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society ýtran's'. 
T. B. Bottomore (London, 1967) p. 48. 
5Bertram D. Wolfe, One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine 
(London, 1967) p. XXIII. 
6p"bm Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (N. Y., 
1928) p. 39. 
7M. M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (Cambridge, 
1950) p. 297. 
8Karl Federn, The Materialist Conception of Historv (London, 
1939) p. 61. 
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in clarity and-precision. 
This opinion seems at least partially justified by the enor- 
mous nuaber and variety of interpretations of Marx's work. Perhaps 
no corpus since the Holy Scriptures has been so kaleidoscopically 
construed. Thus-, though a large-proportion of social and'political 
thought since Marx has taken a stance on, or-from, his "historical 
materialist" theory, most of it seem -in important disagreement 
with the rest. on what in fact the theory involves. This hermaneutically 
volatile situation has led to a proliferation of specific disputes. 
There are very-substantial differences of opinion, for ex- 
ample, on what Marx's position actually is on ontology (is he really 
a philosophical materialist? ) epistemology (is he a naive realist, 
pioneering pragmatist or what? ), ethics (what is its place, if any, 
in his system? ), methodologyý(positive or normative? ), the dialectic 
(metaphysical or heuristic? ), political theory, (anarchist or totali- 
tarian? ), and so on. Then (perhaps giving rise to many of the'general 
disagreements alluded to above) the focal categories of his historical 
materialist theory -- "forces of production"i "relations'of'production", 
"superstructure" etc. -- are themselves subject to widely various 
interpretations (as we shall presently show). The student of Marxian 
thought cannot help but be bemused by the situation in which he 
thus finds himself. On the one hand, the texts with which he is 
concerned are said to be full of conceptual muddle while, on the 
other, the interpretators are in systematic disagreement about what 
the muddles are. In approaching Marx's theory, hence, one might be 
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excused for feeling somewhat like a worker at the building of Babel. 
A confusion of tongues seems everywhere. 
To a philosopher, such uncertainty of sense is of course 
particularly galling. It is for this reason perhaps that Marx's 
work has been rejected by many philosophers as unworthy of serious 
attention. When one hundred years of examination andýargument have 
failed to ascertain what its central categories mean or what its 
stance on the most basic philosophical issues is, it may well be 
because the corpus in question is too ill-conceived to sort out. 
On the other hand, Marx's work has been subject to such persistent 
manipulation by both its antagonists and defendants9 that itýis 
possible its confusion exists more in the minds of its interpreta- 
tors than itself. 
But whatever the grounds of the problem in question, Marx's 
work invites an effort to distill from. its rich and powerful sweep 
a clear and cogent framework which is both unconfusing and faithful 
to Marx's writings. This shall be my enterprise in Book I of this 
essay. What will emerge from this exposition will be (in attempt 
at least) the conceptual substance of Marx's system, stripped to 
its most skeletal form and organized into the cohesive structure which 
9Examples of manipulation of Marx's work would ýe the effort 
of Western commentators to make Marx's theory out to be, -anti-democratic and the complementary effort of Soviet commentators to make it out to 
be a legitimation of Communist Party rule. Interestingly, such dis- 
tortion seems-to aptly exemplify one of Marx's central principles -- 
that a society's ideology is always determined by the interests of its 
ruling class. 
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his works directly and indirectly imply. What Marx once called his 
"guiding thread"'(LPE, -Preface) -- and what I have called "the struc- 
ture of his world-view" -- will thus be delineated, if my essay 
succeeds, in a simplicity and clarity of form which avoids some if 
not all of the conventional basic objections to, and distortions of, 
the sense of his overall theory; In short, I am out to ascertain 
and clarify the general and underlying Logos of Karl Marx's vision, 
which has for one reason or another been so*evasive to so many in 
the past. 
When I have completed this endeavour- which I*shall pursue 
as economically and decisively as possible, at the risk of 'boldness 
-- I shall consider the adequacy of this general-framework with respect 
to Marx's own greatest concern, namely domination and liberation. 
&, Oka This critical section, Gwwewbý will persist in the modus vivendi 
of my entire essay -- which is the quest for general and connecting 
principles and world-view shape, whether expositionally or critically 
construed. 
2 
Before the German Ideology (1845-6), it is widely and correctly 
held that Marx's general theoretical-framework was, still in a pell-mell, 
formative stage. The now famous Economic and Philosophical Manu- 
scripts -- written in 1844-5 when Marx was 26 years old -- is the most 
instructive case in point. Though these writings offer the reader a 
fascinating insight into Marx's developing thought and some of the 
6 
most poetic and suggestive remarks in his entire corpus, they are 
in the end just manuscripts and are full of all the loose ends and 
conceptual vagary one might expect of such a form. Even with. The 
German Ideology and -- within the next three years -- The Poverty 
of Philosophy and The Communist Manifestot the reader is still con- 
fronted with a somewhat unfinished theory: still primarily concerned 
with refuting others, still in composition collaboration with Frederick 
Engels, still in the stage of sweeping new principles not yet firmly 
set. 
I think it is generally recognized that the Preface to, A 
Contribution to Political Economy - published in 1859 -- gives us 
the framework of Marx's overview in the most compressed and lucid 
form it ever assumes in his work. At this point, Marx's theory 
could be said to have, attained a thoroughgoing maturity. It is 
worth citing more or less in full: 
The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, 
continued to serve as the guiding thread in my studies, may be 
formulated briefly as follows: In the social production which 
men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indis- 
pensable and independent of'their will; these relations of pro- 
duction correspond to a definite stage of development of their 
material powers of production. The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the. economic. structure of society -- 
the real foundation, on which "legal and political superstruc- 
tures arise$ and to which definite forms of social consciousness 
correspond. The mode of production of material life determines 
the social, political, and spiritual processes of life in general. 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, 
but, on the contrary, their social being determines their con- 
sciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material 
forces of production in society come in conflict with the exist- 
ing relations of production, or - what is but a-legal expression 
for them -- with the property relations within which they had 
been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of 
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production these relations turn into their fetters. Then occurs 
a period of social" revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less 
rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, the distinction should always be made between the material trans- formation of the economic conditions of production which can be established with the precision of a natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical -- in 
short, ideological -- forms in which men become conscious of 
this conflict and fight. it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we 
not judge of such a period of transformation by its own con- 
sciousness; rather, this consciousness must be explained from 
the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict 
between the social forces of production and the relations of 
production. No social order ever disappears before all the 
productive forces for which there is room in it have been de- 
veloped and new, higher relations of production never appear 
before the material conditions of their existence have matured 
in the womb of the old society. Therefore, mankind always sets 
itself only such problems as it can solve; since, on closer 
examination, it will always be found that the problem itself 
arises only when the material conditions necessary for its 
solution already exist or are at least in the process of for- 
mation. 10 
The general theoretical framework or "world-view structure" 
which-emerges from this passage is, I propose, constituted of the 
3-0a)This translation, with minor alterations (e. g. I have 
changed Bottomore's improper translation, "the general character of 
the social, political and ideological processes of life" in the fourth 
sentence) is from*Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and 
Social Philosophy, ed., T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel (Penguin: 
1967), p. 67. 
b)It will be observed that I have deleted Marx's few sen- 
tences on the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois modes of pro- 
duction. I have done so for two reasons, the second encouraging the 
first: i) the remarks in question are not relevant to my stated en- 
terprise, ii) the notion of history falling into four progressive 
stages of production - what Popper mistakenly thinks is the postu- 
lation of an "inalterable, predetermined path" of history (Poverty of 
Historicism (London: 1955), p. 50) -- is one Marx only tentatively 
suggests here and, as he explicitly insists elsewhere, does not in- 
volve the postulation of a "general path every people is fated to 
tread". (S. C. 379) 
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following fundamental categories: 
1) forces or powers of production (Produktivkrfffte 
2) relations of production (PioduktionverhHltnisse or, speaking 
holistically, Economic Structure (8konomische Struktur) 
3) legal and political superstructure (juristischer und politischer 
Uberbau) 
4) ideology. (ideologiscbe formen 
5) forms of social consciousness (gesellschaftliche Bewusstseins- 
formen) 
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that: 
a) I have placed, in line with Marx's usage, relations'of pro- 
duction and "Economic Structure" in the same category: though, 
strictly speaking and unremarked by Marx, they are logically dis- 
tinct. (Marx says: "The totality of these relations constitutes 
the economic structure" (my emphases)). I will henceforth refer to 
these terms in the unitary form "relations of production/Economic 
Structure. " 
b) I have distinguished "ideological forms" or "ideology" from 
forms of social consciousness": a distinction that is not conven- 
tionally made by commentators on Marx: though Marx himself makes 
it and though it is, I think, of important significance (see Section 
VI) 
Marx also draws attention in the above passage to several 
crucial relationships (relationships which he discusses and elab- 
orates in one way or another throughout his work) which obtain among 
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the five identified classes of phenomena: 
i) the relations of production/ Economic Structure correspond 
(entsprechen) to a definite stage of development of the forces of 
production: except in pre-revolutionary periods when they "fetter" 
these forces. 
ii) the forms of social consciousness correspond (entsprechen) 
with the relations of production/ Economic Structure: as do (as Marx 
says elsewhere and suggests here) the legal and political super- 
structure and ideology. 
iii) the '! mode of production" (that is, for Marx, the forces 
and relations of production together) determines the social, po- 
litical and spiritual processes of life (presumably, the legal and 
political superstructure, ideology and forms of social conscious- 
ness). 
For the purposes of economy and simplicity, I will reduce 
without loss, these three relationships to two: 
1 Relationship (i) plus that aspect of relationship (ii) which 
applies to productive forces alone shall together count as one com- 
plex relationship between productive forces and the rest of the 
categories of phenomena identified.. in Marxts overall framework: 
which complex relationship I shall subsume under the name Techno- 
logical Determinism (See Chapter VII). 
2 Relationship (ii) which with respect to the influence of re- 
lations of production/Economic. Structure seems merely repeated in 
(iii), shall count as the second major complex relationship in 
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Marx's general theoretical framework: that is, -the relationship 
between relations of production/Economic Structure and the rest of 
the general categories of phenomena indicated above. This second, ' 
equally important relationship I shall call. Economic Determinism 
(See 'Chapter VIII). 
Now the resolution of the socio-historical process-into the 
above five factors and the two fundamental relationships held to 
obtain between these factors constitutes the essential substance 
of Marx's historical materialist theory or, in my-terms,, the "struc- 
ture of Marx's world-view". However, precisely what Marx means 
by each of his seminal categories and exactly how he construes the 
two basic relationships are matters which have aroused a. century 
of unresolved questioning and controversy. In keeping with the 
overall criticism we have already noted of Marx's putative muddle 
and confusion, every one of these central categories has been at- 
tacked by commentators as ill-conceived while the basic relation- 
ships held to exist between their referents have been more vigor- 
ously criticized still. Very briefly stated, the more'telling ob- 
jections which have been urged against Marx in these connections 
are: 
I The notion of "forces of production" is confused. To begin with, 
they seem to be inseparable from the relations of production. For 
example, if we consider a force of production like a fishing vessel, 
we can see that it not only involves a complex of technical instru- 
ments and skills but very definite relations as well among the 
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people required to run it -- among that is, helmsman, cabin-boy, 
crew, captain and so forth. Apart from such organizational relation- 
ships, the fishing boat is not really-a productive force. at all, but 
a chaotic collection of tools and skills. But if forces of pro- 
duction must in this way involve relations of production, then 
Marx's idea of the former as a separate factor in the social pro- 
cess is obviously untenable. " 
On the other hand, there seems to exist almost as great a 
difficulty in prying apart the productive forces from the institution- 
al and ideological superstructure as there is in distinguishing them 
from the production relations. For since the productive forces re- 
quire laws to safeguard their operation and since they require ideas 
by virtue of their very existence as agencies of purposive fabri- 
cation, they would seem thereby ultimately inseparable from the laws 
and ideology of the superstructure12 (see (3) and (4))., In sum, 
Marx's "forces of production" category collapses in the end into 
intolerable conceptual amorphousness. 
2 What the term "relations of production" means is more proble- 
matic still. It could mean technological relations of the type 
indicated in (1), ownership relations, (as is suggested in the Pre- 
face by Marx's remark that "property relations" are but a "legal 
13-This is a paraphrase of H. B. Acton's argument in The 
Illusion of the Epoch, p. 159 ff. 
12See ibid., p. 164-7, for an example of this form of 
criticism. 
12 
expression for" production relations), market place relationsý 
several of these at the same time or nothing clear at all. 13 
If itmeans the first, the problem outlined in (1) arises. If 
it means the second, the distinction between the "essential" pro- 
duction relations and legal superstructure falls to the ground. 
There is no textual evidence to indicate that it means the third 
and if it means several relations at the same time or is just ob- 
scure, then Marx is guilty of having either confused or bluffed 
us. In short, the most crucial category of Marx's theory -- the 
relations of production -- is a cipher. As Acton puts it, Marx 
leaves us here in "the devil of confusion". 
3 What is meant by the "legal and political superstructure" is 
also unclear. on the one hand such a superstructure overlaps with 
the relations of production in the manner described in (2) -- that 
is, the property relations prescribed by the superstructure seem 
indistinguishable from the production relations constituting the 
economic base. 
14 On the other hand, the institutional superstruc- 
ture penetrates so deeply into the operation of the productive 
13john Plamenatz (Man and Society 
, 
(London: 1968) 111, 
p. 280 ff) argues that Marx's production relations must be equiv- 
alent to property relations; H. B. Acton that they also include 
market place relations, Irving Zeitlin (Marxism: A re-examination 
(Princeton: 1967), p. 64) that they involve both work and property 
relations and Patrick Gardiner (Theories of History (Glencone 
Illinois: 1960), p. 132) that they are simply "not clear". 
14PIamenatz develops this point most successfully in Man 
and Society, p. 280 ff. 
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forces -- every-production process is subject to some-rules and 
laws of a non-technological sort -- that it is difficult to con- 
ceive how the two are properly separable. 15 Inasmuch then as the 
legal-political superstructure is involved in some way in both the 
productive forces and relations, Marx's view of it as a distinct, 
social factor is difficult to make sense of. 
4 The notion of "ideology" or "ideological forms" is no less 
muddled. It could mean all. ideas, just unscientific and/or false 
ideas, those ideas which favour the ruling class or both these 
latter. 16 If the first sense-is, the one-Marx intends, then there 
is an obvious'difficulty in. understanding the character of the 
productive forces which would seem'thereby to be construed as, 
arising and functioning in some-mysterious manner without the me- 
diation of ideas. If the, second, narrower sense still the problem 
of conceiving how the productive process could carry on without 
some "unscientific" ideas--of good and-bad, for instance- ac- 
companying, guiding and motivating the actions of theýmen concerned. 
15This point is made by each of C. Wright Mills (p. . 106), 
Raymond Aron (p. 48) H. B. Acton (p. 167) and G. H. Sabine (A History 
of Political Theory (London: 1963) p. 786). 
16R. N. Carew-Hunt (The Theory and Practice of Communism' 
(London: 1962) p. 48) holds that Marx locates all ideas in the 
ideological superstructure; Marxist (e. g. Louis Althusser, For 
Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: 1969), p. 231, generally de- 
fine ideology by distinguishing it from science; and John Plamenatz 
(p. 323 ff) claims that Marx variously describes ideology as ideas 
in general just normative or unscientific ideas, false ideas, and 
ideas favouring the ruling class. 
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If the third sense is meant, then there is the task of determin- 
ing what criterion is to be. employed in ascertaining whether-or not 
an ideological form "favours" the ruling class (e. g. under what 
criterion is the "Love thy neighbour as thyself" commandment to 
be construed as a ruling class idea? ). And if. it is the final sense 
that Marx has in mind, there isýthe difficulty of showing that an 
idea which favours the ruling*class-is necessarily false and/or 
unscientific too. 17 In brief, Marx's concept of ideology is (in 
Professor Plamenatz's words) "extraordinarily confused"., 
5 What are "forms of social consciousness"? No one-so far as 
I know (in the English speaking world, at least) has subjected this 
concept to critical scrutiny: doubtless because it has, been as- 
sumed to be synonomous with "ideology". But Marx suggests that it 
is distinct from the latter'(GID, -37), though he never explains how 
or, indeed, gives us any-explicit characterization of it at all. 
So what is its meaning? It may, unlike the other categories, have 
escaped the censure of critics: yet as we remain without precise 
sense for it, it just as much invites elucidation. 
6 The complex relationship denoted by "Technological Determinism" 
is no more illuminatingly conceived. For example, the nature of 
the "correspondence" between productive forces and the relations 
of production/Economic Structure -- a correspondence which bears 
17Carew-Hunt makes the first of these objections (p. 48), 
Acton the second'(p. 178 ff) and Plamenatz (p. 330 ff) the last. 
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the main burden of what I have called Marx's "Technological Deter- 
minism" -- is unclear. If production relations are interpreted 
as purely technological relations'obtaining between men at work, 
then there is indeed a correspondence between such relations and 
the productive forces, but only because the former are included in 
the latter. Since under this interpretation the claim in question 
is mere disguised tautology; Marx must mean something else. But 
if he means-that'production relations in another sense -- i. e. 
the sense of property relations -- "correspond" to the productive 
forces, he may escape the Scylla of'tautology only to end in the 
Charybdis of error: for, as Raymond Aron among others has argued, 
"there may be exactly the same technical organization of agricul- 
tural production whether the land is the individual property of a 
great landowner, the collective property of producers' co-operatives 
or the property of-the state. "18 Then there is the still further 
difficulty of which of the two "corresponding" factors Marx really 
thinks owns the status of primacy: there seems to be sufficient 
ambiguity to his position on this question for critics to have 
adopted quite different interpretations. 
19 In other words, here 
yet again the general theoretical framework of Marx's work seems 
18Aron, p. 47. 
19Sidney Hook, for example, ing of 
Karl Marx, (London: 1933) pp. 126 and 156) firmly plumps for the 
primacy of the production relations, whereas Georgi Plekhanov (Me 
Development of the Monist View of History, (Moscow: 1956) p. 207) 
just as firmly opts for the productive forces. 
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shot through with confusion. 
7 Finally, the "Economic Determinism" relational complex -- that 
is, relations of production/Economic Structure determining the legal 
and political superstructure, ideology and forms of social conscious- 
ness among other things -- is problematic in the extreme. Indeed, 
one can say without much hesitation that no area of Marx's work 
has earned so much and-so sustained critical attention. To cata- 
logue the manifold objections that have been made in this regard -- 
that, for example, the relationship network in question involves a 
naive monocausality, a denial of human freedom and moral responsi- 
bility, an uncompatibility with actual history,. and so forth -- 
would require a study in itself. Suffice it to say; here that this 
aspect of Marx's theory abounds in reported difficulties (for more 
detailed account of these putative difficulties, see Chapier VII. 
I have cited this formidable array of objections in order to 
indicate how considerable are the problems confronting any expo- 
sition of the structure of Marx's world-view. However, there is 
yet another crucial difficulty -- very prominent in the critical 
literature on Marx -- which I have not mentioned. That is, Marx's 
mature world-view or general theoretical framework seems to be 
altogether devoid of a position on the nature or properties of man 
himself, the ultimate historical agency whose inherent or consti- 
tutional needs, capacities and so forth would seem necessarily 
to underlie everything else to which Marx refers. This is the area 
of what is conventionally called"'human nature" and Marx's inquiry 
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into the "material foundations" of history is said by many -- hos- 
tile and sympathetic to his work -- to completely extrude from pos- 
itive consideration such a factor: the position here being that 
Marx held that man has no constitutional properties at all but is 
utter plasticity being exhaustively formed by his sociohistorical 
conditions. Louis Althusser (a self-described Marxist) approvingly 
names this Marx's post 1845 "theoretical anti-humanism" in his Lire 
le Capital and elsewhere20 while Robert Tucker (an anti-Marxist, 
who disapproves) says in his Philosophy and Mvth in Karl MarxV "the 
very idea of man has seemingly gone out the window". 21 Much the 
same sort of view can be found throughout commentary on Marx's 
later works: both pro- and anti-Marx interpretators agreeing that 
Marx denied there was such a thing as a "human nature" -- a set 
of constitutional properties of man -- in his mature writings. 
22 
20Lire le Capital, Vol. II (Paris: 1967), p. 32-4; For 
Marx, p. 255 ff. 
2lPhilosophv and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: 1961) p. 166. 
22Eugene Kamenka (in his The Ethical Foundations of Marxism 
(London: 1962) p. 130) says that "since Marx's new underlying reality 
is to be society and no longer man, he is forced ... to treat man 
as no more than a mere reflection or product of social relations". 
But, Kamenka goes on to say (p. 162), "what things are is prior to 
their possible adjustments --" and hence the nature Marx, in ig- 
noring the "positive character" of human beings underlying socio- 
historical "adjustments", is left with a "servile" vision of man who 
is, and is no more than, a passive reflection of his social circum- 
stances. As so many others who interpret Marx in this way, whether 
or not they object to his view (like a Kamenka) or concur with it 
(like virtually all orthodox Marxists), arises from Marx's famous 
sixth theses on FAerbach where he says: 
But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each contd 
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Now if there is such a denial and theoretical extrusion of 
the constitutional properties of man in Marx's mature work, it seems 
indeed a significant deficiency. Some of the more obvious and close- 
ly related specific difficulties which seems to follow are (aside from 
the sheer unintelligibility of imagining man as having no inherent 
characteristics at all: a position that seems to arise from the 
fallacy of inferring amorphousness from development): 
a) Marx's "forces of production" are left without any explanatory 
base whatever: as Norman Carew-Hunt puts it, "We are left to sup- 
pose that with Marx the productive forces somehow arise and develop 
automatically". 23 
b) All motivation and enablement must in Marx's theory be accounted 
for in terms that never involve or presuppose any property of human 
nature: so that, say workers submitting to or revolting against 
their masters through history must be satisfactorily explained with- 
out ever identifying or presupposing r-Qja$tlt-t4tiqrlalýEretfutrements of man 
deteft-017; or, again, the oppression of ruling classes through history 
cont'd... single individual. In its reality (Werklichkeit) it is 
the ensemble of social relations (EID, 632). However, all that Marx 
is claiming here is (in a crude form) what he claims throughout his 
subsequent work: that is, that the "base", "form", "structure", 
"anatomy" or (as here) "essence" of human affairs is the totality 
of social relations. He is not opposing a notion of human nature 
simpliciter I but is objecting to an 
idealist version of it. And he 
is not depriving inherent human properties of explanatory status 
altogelher, but is saying that "in its reality" (in practice) the 
"human essence" is social as opposed to atomistic. 
23The Theory and Practice of Coumunism (London: 1962) 
p. 48. 
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can never be construed as such in terms of violation of inborn human 
needs and capacities for variety of movement or material self-re- 
alization. Either Marx allows some status to such constitutional 
properties of man, or his theory fails wherever social conditioning 
cannot explain all (i. e. continuously). 
c) Since there is no human nature, then the capitalist society 
Marx opposes has no fault other than hindrance of productive forces 
and the communist society he envisages has no human point other than 
growth of such forces. Hence Marx's vision is wholly technocratic, 
compatible with a communist society of robots. (This view is not, 
it should be added, a "difficulty" for everyone: orthodox Marxists 
who hold Marx has no notion of human nature are unavoidably committed 
to defending just such a view, which seems often to precisely suit 
their dispositions). 
These kinds of objection invite the postulation of a new 
primitive category in Marx's general theoretical framework. But 
they do not in them elves justify it. We require what Marx himself 
says and implies on this matter, and in the next pages I will try 
to provide just this. When I have done so, it will be clear I think 
that a category of "human nature", constituting the very underpin- 
nings of his world view, is amply indicated in Marx's mature writ- 
ings. Thus, from here on in, we will be considering a six factor 
framework, with "Human Nature" as its new first category. Demon- 
stration of the legitimacy of this inclusion of a further general 
factor in Marx's theoretical framework follows, in Chapter I. 
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I have now come to the end of the more fundamental and well 
known objections that have been raised over the years against various 
features of Marx's theoretical framework: and I have postulated a 
new general category of this framework, "Hinnan Nature". I will now 
proceed to an exposition of this six-factor framework which I think, 
shall meet the objections in question as well as provide in outline 
the underlying structure of Marx's profuse corpus. Though I will 
at times venture somewhat beyond the letter of Marx's texts in this 
exposition (mainly to surmount ambiguity), my enterprise will not 
violate any of Marx's own claims. Any elaborations will complement, 
not subvert. 
The order in which I will examine the major general catego- 
ries; and relationships constituting what I have titled "The Structure 
of Marx's World-View", will be as follows: 
Chapter I Human Nature 
Chapter II Forces of Production 
Chapter III Relations of Production/Economic Structure 
ChapterIV Legal and Political Superstructure 
Chapter Vr Ideology 
aprer 1rMs4zf coiial. Consciousness 





Needless to say, my exposition will have to remain in general 
terms: that is, the application of these categories and relation- 
ships to specific historical epochs will be avoided except insofar 
as the embracing concepts in question are meaningfully illuminated 
by examples drawn from particular periods (e. g. the epoch of capi- 
talism). However, inasmuch as we are dealing with the conceptual 
foundations of a philosophy of history, with the basic schema of an 
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overview that takes in all periods of man's recorded time on earth, 
the maintenance of a high level of generality is unavoidable. But 
if philosophy is to be distinguished from other sorts of inquiry by 
anything, it may be by precisely the high level of generality that 
expediency compels us to remain on here. Some virtue thus may be 
perceived in our necessity. 
CHAPTER I 
HUMAN NATURE 
The final objection to Marx's general theoretical frame- 
work cited in our introductory chapter was that there was nothing 
at all about "hinnan nature", about the properties of man himself, 
in Marx's post-1845 work. Since this objection suggests a radical 
blank in Marx's overview of the sociohistorical condition, I shall 
cater to it first. When I have shown that he does in fact sponsor 
in his mature work a definite and substantial position on this 
ontological substructure of society and history, human nature 
which position has not before been systematically exhibited - 
shall as I have said count this position as constituting the prim- 
itive factor in the structure of his world-view. 
It is first of all worth noting that Marx implies a "human- 
nature"'factor by his very concept of the forces*of production. 
Of the forces of production we may say, in advance of the section 
devoted to this category, that for Marx they necessarily involve 
developed labour-power competences and they are by definition cap- 
able of making material use-values. But labour-power competences 
and material use-values themselves must presuppose, respectively, 
definite capacities and needs of man himself out of which they are 
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developed and to which they are useful: ergo forces of production 
presuppose such needs and capacities, and a notion of human nature 
in these respects seems implicit in Marx's theory from the start. 
Hence he says such things as "Man develops his slunbering powers" 
(CI, 177) and "No production without a need" (G, 92). 
In short a notion of human nature involving at least needs 
and capacities seems postulated, if only implicitly, in Marx's the- 
oretical framework by his very idea of the forces of production. 
As we shall soon discover, such needs and capacities of human nature 
are not only so presumed by Marx's category of productive forýes, 
but form the explicit substance of his concept of human nature too. 
But let us advance straightway to what he actually says in this con- 
nection. 
. 
In a too rarely observed passage in Capital, Marx suggests 
to us a program for dealing with the human nature factor of history. 
Polemicizing against the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham who, Marx 
opines, has a grotesque "shopkeeper" view of man, he says: 
To know what is useful for a dog, one must study. dog nature.... 
Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, 
movements, relations etc. by the principle of utility, must 
first deal with human nature in general and then with human 
nature as modified in each historical epoch. (CI, 609) 
What is of special interest to us in this passage is that Marx 
quite in opposition to what so many of his critics have claimed 
clearly accepts the legitimacy of a notion of human nature. Indeed 
he proposes such a notion as necessary to certain systems of thought. 
It may in fact be held that since Marx himself "criticizes human 
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acts, movements, relations, etc. by the principle of utility" (i. e. 
most of his polemic against the capitalist order arises of the lat- 
ter's systematic dedication to exchange-value rather than use-value), 
he himself commits his theory to the project of "dealing with" man's 
nature in both its "general" and "historical" aspects. Certainly 
his remark in. The German Ideology that "one of the most vital prin- 
ciples of communism" is its "empiric view, based upon a knowledge 
of man's nature" (CID, 593) justifies such a conclusion. Not only 
then does Marx's aside to Bentham, as well as other remarks, indicate 
that he accepted the validity of a concept of man's nature, but that 
he insisted on it for anyone employing a utilitarian approach in his 
work (i. e. himself)'. 
Working now according to the frame of his own program, we 
will attempt to outline what Marx's ideas on man's "general" and 
"historical" nature in fact are. But before engaging with what he 
has to say in these respects, it is important to make clear the dis- 
tinction between "human nature in general" and "human nature as 
modified in each historical epoch. The former refers to the prop- 
erties of man conceived generally and independently of particular 
historical forms (e. g. man's species need for food or nutrition), 
whereas the latter refers to the same properties conceived in a 
lMarx is not, of course, a utilitarian in the Benthamite 
sense; but the "principle of utility" -- without Bentham's "shop- 
keeper" calculus et al -- is central to his work, providing indeed 
the ultimate rationale of his cardinal emphasis on the forces of 
production. 
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definite historical context (e. g. the nineteenth century European 
man's cultural need for food or nutrition that lives up to the 
specific established standards of his society). Hence the former's 
referent is general and constant, whereas the latter's referent is 
particular and changing. 
1. 
Human Nature in General 
When he talks about man as a species, Marx is fond of pur- 
suing the traditional philosophical strategy of distinguishing him 
from the animal. In one well known passage from the German Ideology, 
for example, he tells us that men can be distinguished from animals 
by virtue of their "consciousness", their "religion", or "anything 
else you like". But, he goes on to say, man actually raises him- 
self above the animals only when he starts to produce his own means 
of staying alive: "They (men) distinguish themselves from animals 
I 
as. soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence 
(GID, 31). Since for Marx the differentia specifica of human be- 
haviour is that man alone produces his means of life, it would seem 
to follow that what he construes as the special capacity enabling such 
productiveness must be for him the. differentia specifica. of man's 
nature. 
In a nuclear discussion in Capital on the labour process, 
Marx clearly implies what this special capacity is. It is man's 
creative intelligence. Again in this passage, Marx pursues the 
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traditional procedure of distinguishing man from animal: 
We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively 
human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a 
weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the con- 
struction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst of 
architects from the best of bees is this: that the architect 
raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in re- 
ality. At the end of every labour process, we get a result that 
already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commence- 
ment. He not only effects a change of form on the material on 
which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that 
gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subor- 
dinate his will. (CI, 179) 
It is important to emphasize that in this paragraph Marx 
explicitly demurs from making his distinction between man and animal 
merely in terms of behaviour, as in his earlier passage in The Ger- 
man IdeoloSI. Indeed he says that in terms of actual behaviour, the 
spider and the bee carry out as complex "operations" and "constructions" 
as an architect. But their activities are mere executions of nature 
given "instinct", whereas man's activities express a mentally struc- 
tured "purpose" or "plan" that is raised by his own "imagination" 
and then realized in project-commanded activity. In other words, 
the differentia specifica of man that Marx proposes seems to have 
moved from an outward, behavioural difference (In The German Ide- 
ology to a difference in intrinsic being itself (g, 'aRital). Con- 
trary to conventional interpretation, the later Marx here appears 
to grant more rather than less status to the immanent nature of man 
in explaining the human condition. It is certainly true that on the 
whole Marx writes far less, quantitatively speaking, in this regard 
than in hispl: e-1845 work, but he by no means contradicts his early 
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"humanist" position: rather he presupposes it for the most part as 
a given. In the passage above from Capital, we simply encounter 
this given made more or less explicit. 
I shall call this special property of human nature which 
for Marx enables man uniquely to "raise a structure in his imagina- 
tion and execute it in reality" the capacity of projective conscious- 
ness. This phrase is meant not only to draw instructive connection 
between Marx and Sartre, as well as to represent by the phrase's 
literal meaning the sense of Marx's position itself,, but to link 
Marx in some way with others in the past, like Aristotle and his 
notion of man's elevated faculty for poiesis (which is more sug- 
gestive of Marx's position here than the Greek praxis, which with 
Aristotle meant "doing" as opposed to "making": 1140a2 Nicomachean 
Ethics). Of course, the kinds of similarities between Marx's concept 
of a distinctive human capacity to "raise a structure in the imagina- 
tion" and then "erect it in reality" and the whole Western philo- 
sophical tradition of mind as the unique feature of man (his "divine 
element", his "pilot", his "light of reason" and so forth) are too 
manifest to labour upon here any further. But what does deserve 
attention, what perhaps does mark Marx off from most of this main- 
stream tradition is his emphasis on the creative dimension of mind 
(not a Democritean atom system2 nor a Humean "association" mechanism); 
2Marx, it is interesting to note, in his 1841 doctoral thesis 
on Democritus and Epicurus, favoured the latter's theory because it 
allowed for a free "swerve" in atoms in contrast to the cont'd 
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as well as, at least equally important, his anti-dualistic emphasis 
on its giving the law to action (not essentially contemplative as 
with the ancients, nor retrospective like Hegel's Owl of Minerva 
which "only takes flight when the shades of twilight, have fallen"). 3 
This species-distinctive capacity for "projective conscious- 
ness" which Marx postulates in man is the legislative-executive agency 
informing all the latter's uniquely human productive feats. It is 
the human-nature cognate of homo faber. However, -it is limited, - 
curtailed, perverted or otherwise determined-(in ways the rest of 
this essay will attend to), it still is what specially enables man 
to be a "toolmaking animal": to be so "many sided" in his construc- 
tions, to wield nature as "one of the organs of his activity"; and- 
cont'd... former's notion of atomic motion which was strictly 
mechanistic. Marx makes it clear in this place that he preferred 
Epicurus's theory, even though it, was less consistent and more dog- 
matic than Democritus's, solely because it permitted on the atomic 
level some "subjecthood" to matter, some "energizing principle" 
which could provide a theoretical basis to human freedom or, more 
specifically, the "freedom of self-consciousness". (See Normal D. 
Livergood's Activity in Marx Philosophy (The Hague: 1967) for the 
complete. version of Marx's thesis). 
3Marx adopts an intransigently "anti-dualistic" position 
in two important respects. First, as I have just indicated and as 
he declares more forcefully in the famous theses on Feuerbach, mind 
is to be considered as having "objective truth" or "reality" only 
insofar as it is realized in practice ("The dispute over the reality" 
or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a 
purely scholastic question": his emphasis). Secondly, and more 
fundamentally so far as an anti-dualistic stance goes, he refuses 
any distinct ontological status or realm for mind (against the 
tradition manned by Plato and Descartes) and seems to regard mind 
merely as a way of talking about highly developed "matter which 
thinks". We might characterize the first of these positions as an 
anti-dualist. epistemology and the second as an anti-dualist metaphysics. 
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to perform all the other constructive negations of the productive 
forces impacting on the world as it is (to cite a heady proclamation 
of his early work: "the history of industry is ... the open book 
of man's essential powers, the exposure to the five senses of human 
psychology.. " (EPM, 109, his emphases). It is, in short the ulti- 
mate, if not sufficient, source of what Marx, elsewhere calls man's 
"positive freedom" (thus he says, again in his pre-1846, writing, that 
"freedom is thoroughly the essence of man"; otherwise put, man's 
freedom owns an intrinsic, human-natural base). 
But a few further explications are in order. First of all, 
it is instructive to consider this special human capacity of "pro- 
jective consciousness" as a capacity which achieves its "trulyýhumqn" 
expression for Marx in what we would call-creative'art: here both 
the inventive and implementive aspects of this capacity are in his 
view most freely and integrally expressed (G, -611)5. In such creative 
A.. 
. Kamenka, 
The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, p. 30. 
5There may however be the objection here that Marx's distinction 
between the "raising the structure in imagination" phaselof human 
production and the"erecting in reality" phase can plausibly work 
with the architect's blueprint and the actual building following 
therefrom, but manifestly not with the more thoroughgoing art forms 
of literature, music and painting: each of the latter's project and 
execution phases are not typically separate, but part of one integral 
activity. At this point, we need to get clear what Marx means by 
"erecting in reality". Marx, like Feuerbach, counts as a criterion 
of something being "erected in reality" the social character of its 
materialization. Given this, we can see that the suspected problem 
does not then arise. The division between a structure "being raised 
in the imagination" and "being erected in reality" can aptly fall 
between manuscript and publication or, again, between musician's 
score and the playing of it, between studio canvas and its cont'd 
30 
art (Marx's example is the "composition" of the writer), both the 
project and its execution are unconstrained by extrinsic dictate 
and united in the same productive agent, unlike the "antagonistic" 
and "unfree" forms of almost all historical production. The ulti- 
mate end of post-historical communist society is in fact, Marx im- 
plies here and elsewhere, to provide those technical and economic 
conditions whereby all men's productive activity can achieve precise- 
ly this status of creative art, whereby all men's projective conscious- 
ness or "creative dispositions" can seek "absolute elaboration -- 
without any preconditions" (Pre-C, 85). Man-the-Producer is in the 
end for Marx, Man the Artist. 
Secondly, Marx's description in the Capital passage above 
by no means rules out the possibility of collective plans or proj- 
ects and collective execution. The operation of such collective 
projective consciousness can take either of two extremes for Marx: 
production where the "head" and the "hand" of the social organism 
altogether "part company" (extreme division of labour) and become 
"deadly foes" (LI, 508); or production where the collective labourer 
is exhaustively communist and the plans and execution are performed 
cont'd... public exhibition. In brief, it seems that the two-phase. 
logic Marx imputes to the operation of "projective consciousness" 
can be maintained intact whatever the productive activity in question 
may be. The first phase is the creative preparation period as a 
whole -- whether the artist preparing the finished form of his can- 
vas or the factory master preparing his final production plans -- 
and the second phase is the actual production of the project in 
material, social form. 
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together: the "tribal community, the natural commonbody" (Pre-C, 
68) of man's being dialectically fulfilled in the so to say concrete 
universal of communism. The former of these forms occupies all 
previous, class-divided history and the latter is the "realm of 
Freedom" (CIII, 821), the post-historical utopia. In this latter, 
the "heads" and "hands" of all unite in thoroughly co-operative and 
unantagonistically integrated production. Here a social architect, 
everyone planning and acting in full community, projects and imple- 
ments as a completely integrated whole, as the original architect 
writ huge (though it would be foolish to think that Marx imagined 
the operation of this collective projective consciousness as the 
only form in which men could realize themselves in the future so- 
ciety: the individual enterprise assuredly does not disappear here 
-- though some detractors of Marx's vision would have it that way -- 
as Marx makes quite clear in his talk about the "absolute elaboration 
of creative dispositions without any preconditions" in his Grundrisse 
description of the creative possibilities of post-bourgeois society). 
Thirdly, and most fundamentally, the special projective 
consciousness of man which marks him off from the other species 
presupposes for Marx man's status as a "social animal" (not, of course, 
in the sense above, but rather in the sense that consciousness of 
any human sort presupposes social intercourse whereby its currency 
of language may come to exist). ', 'Consciousness", he says, "is from 
the very beginning a social product and remains so as long as men 
exist at all". (GID, 42) Hence, for Marx, to say that man has 
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consciousness, productive or otherwise, is to imply also his so- 
ciality -- his situation (if only, as Robinson Crusoe, in the past) 
amidst the interpersonal connectives of language, conventions, tools, 
co-operative labour and so forth from which stably formed unities of 
conception can arise. 
This is not, of course, to say, as some have interpreted 
Marx as saying, that man is inherently "social" in'the sense of al- 
truistic; social relationship does not, clearly, imply social be- 
nevolence: though it is for Marx a necessary condition of its ` 
possibility and though there is, in the early Marx, good'evidence 
he believed (with Feuerbach) that man's power to conceptualize others 
as members of the same species rendered human or "species" beings 
(Gattungswesen) intrinsically empathetic (I think it is his later, 
rejection of this belief in a sort of conceptual communism that 
constitutes the principle difference between Marx's early and ma- 
ture views of human nature). 
Now the theme of man's differentia specifica residing in 
(what I have called) "projective consciousness" persists throughout 
Marx's work. Over twenty years before the above passage in human 
labour appeared in Capital, he says much the same thing -- more 
turgidly -- in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts: while 
discussing, again, how man differs in nature from the animal: 
... Free conscious activity is man's species character .... The 
animal is immediately identical with its life-activity .... Man 
makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and con- 
sciousness .... Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes 
man from animal life-activity .... Admittedly animals also produce. 
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They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, 
ants, etc .... But man in the working up of the objective world 
... duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellec- 
tually but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contem- 
plates himself in a world he has created. (EPM, 75-6) 
Elsewhere Marx talks more perfunctorily of man's special "ability 
to think" (GID, 315) "intellectual faculties" (KC, 73) and "natural 
thinking 'rocess" (SC, 315) and so forth. And he is quite explicit p 
in Capital and other places that the forces of production are the 
"materiaiization" of the sovereign workings of this distinctive men- 
tal capacity. "Man ... is... a living conscious thing, 
" he says, -"and 
labour, is the manifestation of this power residing in him" (CI . _, 
202) 
or, in the Grundrisse: 
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric 
telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc .... These are organs of the 
human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, 
objectified. CG, 706) 
The capacity then of "projective consciousness" seems then 
to be for Marx the essential feature of human nature: the long 
hidden key to understanding his concept of man from the Manuscripts 
to Capital. Why has it been so often overlooked by those (pro and 
anti-Marxist alike) who ascribe to Marx a crude behaviourist position, 
a position which putatively construes man as only a passive reflexive 
product of socio-economic conditions? Let me, very briefly, suggest 
three reasons. First of all there is a strong tendency in scholar- 
ship on Marx to wrongly interpret what he says about "ideology" 
being a "reflex" of the forces and relations of production as state- 
ments on human consciousness as such (see Chaliten V). Second, Marx's 
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great emphasis on the influence of specific material conditions-, 
upon men and his correspondingly great scorn for wholly "abstract" 
conceptions easily. but mistakenly leads to the conclusion that he 
rejected general conceptions of man, conceptions of human nature, 
altogetherý (The second error, as one can see, tends to ground the 
first. ) And thirdly, reinforcing both of the above, Marx simply 
has very little to say of a systematic or sustained sort, on human- 
nature in his post-1845 writings: not because he denies-the exist- 
ence or causal status of such but because (as I have said), he pre- 
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supposes it for the most part as a given. Hence even in his fature 
work where he says little of a direct sort on the category in ques- 
tion, the notion of a human nature ---with the essential "species 
character" of projective consciousness -- seems to underlie his 
most fundamental concerns: seems to underlie, for-example, his calls 
for "conscious plan" in social production, his indignation at, the 
reduction of human work to dictated and "mindless detail-task", his 
preoccupation with the profit imperative of the capitalist system 
"blindly" governing human productive activity, his disdain for ideas 
and thoughts not carried into praxis, and so on. - Indeed I think 
it is impossible tomake sense of the very vocabulary of Marxýand 
its unremittent use of such terms as "brutalizing", "alienating", 
"monstrous", "inhuman". "savage", "ghoulish", "bestial" and so on 
unless one acknowledges in all such usage a presupposed concept 
of human nature: unless one discerns an underlying positive notion 
of what man intrinsically is which makes these terms meaningful and 
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not merely senseless diatribe. To call something "inhuman" presumes, 
of necessity, an idea of what is "human". And it is difficult to 
miss Marx's tendency to employ such terms as the above whenever he 
sees capitalist circumstances as having robbed men of the exercise 
of their creative intelligence. 
But Marx does not only construe the nature of man as char- 
acterized by an essential capacitv to construct a project and command 
its fulfillment in reality, but by a corresponding essential need 
to do so too. This need is suggested one way or another from Marx's 
earliest to his latest writings. Hence we find such phrases as 
man's "need for his own realization" (EPM, 112) or "need for uni- 
versality" (PofE, 125) scattered throughout his work; and similarly, 
statements indicating that men are driven to liberate themselves from 
oppressive social conditions by a "definite need" to achieve the 
freedom for material self-realization (GID, 331). When this emanci- 
pated social situation is secured, he makes clear on several occasions, 
then (and these words are taken from his post-1845 work), creative 
work will be allowed its proper status as "life's prime want" (GP, 
17) and the untrammelled realization of "what lies within" will in- 
cite men as "an end in itself" (Pre-C, 85). Men's socioeconomic 
circumstances will, at last, "be worthy of human nature. " (9111, 
821). 
In the Grundrisse (as elsewhere) Marx attacks the common 
conception that productive work must somehow be a "sacrifice", must 
be something one does merely instrumentally to secure the means of 
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staying alive: 
It seems quite far from [Adam] Smith's mind that the individual 
'in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, fa- 
cility, ' needs a normal portion of work .... Smith has no inkling 
whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is itself a liber- 
ating activity - and that, further, the external aims become 
stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, 
and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits 
-- hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, 
hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. 
(G, 611) 
"He is right of course", Marx goes on to say: 
that in its historic forms as slave-labour, serf-labour and 
wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, always as 
external forced labour; and not-labour, by contrast, as 'free- 
dom and happiness'. 
But work in which man is not thus constrained, but freely realizes 
his subjecthood in creative praxis, this "unadulterated" form of 
work is what man needs qua man: it is "life's prime want" for the 
truly human existence. 
The "essence" of man's nature for Marx, thus, is not only 
the species distinctive capacity of projective consciousness, but 
the cognate need of man to realize such consciousness in free pro- 
duction. This capacity-need conjunct constitutes the basic -- if 
generally unseen -- substance of his notion of man and, as such, 
comprises the very underpinnings of his world-view. 
However, Marx's position on "human nature in general" is 
not confined to this essence-conjunct. He also makes numerous 
fleeting references to man's constitutional needs for 
(and these seem 
to be distinct, discrete needs for him): food, clothing, habitation 
(GID, 39), sexual relationship (EPM, 101), and less banal, fresh 
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air and sunlight (CI, 265,426,465) adequate living and working 
space (CI, 482 and 657-91), cleanliness of person and surroundings 
(CI, 232 and 381), rest from exertion (g. I, 232 and 527) ) variation 
of activity (EI, 363 and 341,360,440,484-8), aesthetic stimulation 
(S-VI, 392 and CI, 232) and play (qID, 459 and WLC, 77)6. And 
hardly surprisingly, he alludes frequently to the more obvious human 
mechanical capacities associated with the five senses, limbs, organs 
and so forth (the "bodily instruments"). This cluster of other 
human capacities and needs fleshes out, as it were, his view of 
man conceived "in general". It is worthwhile, I think, casting 
this view in a summative schematic form: not only because it deserves 
61n The German Ideology, Marx says: 
life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a 
habitation, clothing and many other things. The first histor- 
ical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these 
needs. 
What I have tried to do above is derive from Marx's texts the needs 
for the "many other things" he mentions in the above passage: needs 
which, as those he identifies above, are ontologically prior to man's 
"first historical act". In most cases, the phraseology he uses -- 
it necessity", "very roots of life", "essential", etc. -- indicate the 
constitutional quality of the needs in question. But I must acknow- 
ledge here that the so to say f2doyme-n_t needs I have imputed to Marx's 
notion of man -- the needs for sexual relationship 
(as opposed to 
species-reproduction as such), for aesthetic stimulation, and for 
play -- are probably overdrawn in my account. On the whole 
Marx's 
notion of man seems importantly blind to erotic intercourse, contem- 
plative pleasure and playfulness as intrinsically satisfying and in- 
deed needed forms of human life. There is a somewhat chilling stern- 
ness to his view of man -- typical of the Western philosophic tradition, 
especially the German -- which I have softened-by a 
kind of exegetical 
legerde-main in the above cases. Though I shall not mention this 
issue again I regard Marx's general indifference to such Joyful facets 
of human existence as one of the more lamentable shortcomings of 
his world view. 
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considered pause for itself, but because nothing like it has been hi- 
therto reported in literature on Marx: 
Human Nature In General 
Essence or apacit 
Species-Distinctive 
YJ 
for material self-realization 
Feature need 
(or "to raise a structure in 
imagination and then erect 
it in social reality") 
Other pacities 







fresh air and sunlight 
adequate (living and working) space 
cleanliness of person and surroundings 
rest from exertion 
variation of activity 
aesthetic stimulation 
\, play 
This schema of "human nature in general" (deliberately drawn almost 
entirely from his post-1845 writings) works out, as one can see, to 
be a remarkably comprehensive one: especially considering the common 
view that in his post-1845 years he "threw man out the window", saw 
him as a "passive reflex" of economic conditions, was a "theoretical 
antihilmanist", and so on. Here indeed we see the underlying dynamis 
of Marx's system, the generating power behind all man's technical, 
economic, legal, political and ideological activities. How this 
Promethean agency (and I use "Promethean" advisedly: Prometheus was 
"the first saint of the philosophical calendar" for Marx; Promethean 
imagery of "fetters bursting" is his favorite mode of describing 
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social revolution; and the word "Pro-metheus" means literally the 
fore-sight which he counted as man's constitutional e'ssence), how 
this agency is and has been bound in Marx's view upon the rock of 
socio-historical conditions will be the subject of most of the rest 
of this essay. But, although Marx certainly saw man's nature as. 
coercively "determined, even "drained", by such material conditions 
it is precisely his view of man's nature which underlies his thundering 
denunciations of such "inhuman" constraints. To miss this is, simply, 
to miss the ground of his entire Weltanschauung. 
What is undoubtedly most striking about Marx's concept of 
human nature is the inherent generative force it imputes to man. 
Man is, for Marx, by the very needs of his nature impelled to ever 
more productive undertakings, which his special, intrinsic capac- 
ities are uniquely able to prosecute. Not only are there the nu- 
merous needs for biochemical replenishment and protection to incite 
him into action, but the many needs for various forms of activity 
as such: the essential one of these latter being, as we have seen, 
the need to raise a project in the imagination and execute it in 
reality, the need to "produce" as an end-in-itself. Hence man for 
Marx is by his very constitution continually excited into activity, 
forever pressed by intrinsic demand into vital material-expressive- 
ness whose most truly human form is work in its "unadulterated" 
form, or a productive activity akin to creative art. Now it is 
assuredly the case as I have noted that historical labour for Marx 
-- slave, serf or wage -- has only been permitted by technical and 
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economic circumstances to exhibit "transitory and inferior forms". 
But it is exactly because it has frustrated man's intrinsic drive 
for "truly human" work that Marx considers it "inferior" and re- 
quiring sublation, given the appropriate material circumstances of 
non-scarcity and social collectivity, in the projectively and ex- 
ecutively unconstrained production of the "Realm of Freedom". This 
"Realm of Freedom" permits the activity of material self-realization 
"without preconditions" and yields thereby, in the young Marx's words, 
the "reappropriation of the human essence" (EPM, 102). Once this 
state of affairs is achieved, man cannot cease his restless "elab- 
oration of what lies within", even though all his sustenance require- 
ments are increasingly fulfilled by a "self-acting" or automated 
production apparatus. (g, 704-6). On the contrary, man is for 
Marx impelled by the very essence of his nature to go on creating, - 
materializing his projects -- from, contra Kamenka, his material 
security as springboard -- with the "most intense exertion" (G, 611) 
of the driven artist he seems for Marx ultimately to be. Indeed 
the satisfaction of his "mundane needs" releases man to truly realize 
his "creative dispositions": the "mere bodily needs""having been 
the source of "Adam's curse" all along (i. e. the demander of toil 
and the lever of exploitation). In sum, Marx's concept of man -- 
as his great emphasis elsewhere on production, on revolution and on 
the epistemology of praxis suggest -- is above all. activist: man 
for him can no more relinquish his enabled drive for material self- 
realization than he can cease to be man. The entire theoretical 
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construct. of Marx rests on this human-natural premise. 
Considering together all that Marx suggests about "human 
nature in general, " the overall shape we have is of a dynamic nexus 
of capacities and needs whose essential spring is the capacity 
need conjunct to raise a project or plan and then realize it in 
production. The needs of man's nature are what impel him into 
action ("no-one" says Marx "ever does anything without doing it for 
the sake of one or other of his needs"(GID, 276). The capacities 
of his nature are what enable him to act. The primary historical 
expression of these impelling needs, and enabling capacities, in turn, 
are the forces of production which in one for another fulfill (and 
shape) both. Therein the bridge between potentia and actualization, 
between subject and object is forged. With the forces of production 
the nature of man is confronted in its historically objectified form, 
and the convential nub of historical materialism emerges into view. 
We now move, thus, from the more or less presupposed dynamic in 
Marx's general schema, human nature, to the explicitly stated motor 
force, the productive system itself -- the server, and expressor, 
of the former in materialized form. 
2. 
Man's Nature as Historically Modified 
As we earlier discovered in his remark on Bentham, Marx's 
program for the analysis of "human nature" prescribes not only a 
treatment of this factor "in general" but of it "as modified in 
42 
each historical epoch. " In many places in his corpus, Marx makes 
it clear that he regards this historicization of man's nature as 
continuous and substantial. Hence before he suggests how man's 
nature is uniquely capable of creative production in the Capital 
passage cited at the beginning of the last section, he says of man's 
productive activities: 
By thus acting on the external world and changing it man at the 
same time. changes his own nature". (CI, 178) 
Then, in The Poverty of Philosophy, he remarks: 
All-history is nothing but the transformation of human nature". 
(PofP, 128) 
Because man's inherent properties are so viewed as in an increasing 
process of historical modification, Marx refers in the third volume 
of Capital to man's having "a second nature" (CIII,, 859). (It is, 
of course, remarks like the above which have tempted the erroneous 
orthodoxy about Marx having viewed human nature as a sort of complex 
conditioned reflex. ) 
There are a nunber of points to be made straightway about 
Marx's idea here of an historicized human nature: 
a) The "modification", "change" or "transformation" of "human 
nature" of which Marx speaks is never conceived by him as alteration 
with respect to general content: as emphasized earlier, "human- 
nature in general" remains the same, all modification of it being 
in terms of its determinate particulars (e. g. the general need for 
food is, qua general, transhistorical: but its determinate partic- 
ulars of quality, range, mode of satisfaction and so on are determined 
I 
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by the sociohistorical conditions in which it is contextualized). 
Otherwise put, historical alteration of human nature is always with- 
in certain universal parameters. 
b) (relatedly) As with "human nature in general", "human nature 
as modified in each historical epoch" is considered in terms of 
capacities. and needs (the essential capacity and essential need re- 
maining, of course, the capacity and need to raise a structure in 
the imagination and execute it in reality. ) 
c) Man's capacities and needs are seen to modify primarily through 
the influence of the forces of production via -- to compel a treatise 
into a few phrases -- the skills they demand, the material products 
they provide, the human connections they involve, and the alter- 
ation of physical environment they effect: which complex influence 
in affecting both capacities and needs simultaneously-cause these 
to modify in a more or less corresponding manner. , 
d) The forces of production are viewed by Marx as developing 
historically in the general direction of increasing complexity and 
quantity of output (the basis, in Marx's case, of the so-called 
"illusion of progress"): hence the capacities and needs of human 
nature which they modify are seen to be modified in a correspond- 
ingly progressive direction (to be more specifically characterized 
in the remainder of this section). 
e) Since the productive forces are themselves of man's making, 
their influence on man is ultimately man's influence on himself: 
the historicization of human nature is in a sense, therefore, the 
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self-creating of man ("man contemplates himself in a world he has 
created" EPMP p. 76). 
Let us now, more specifically, consider the historical mod- 
ification of what Marx regarded as the essential capacity of human 
nature -- the capacity for (what I have called) "projective con- 
sciousness". 
As indicated in (c) above, the historical modification of 
this (or any other) capacity obtains for Marx primarily through the 
influence of the forces of production: or, more precisely, in 
accordance with the development of the productive forces. Hence 
Marx says: 
In reality this [any] barrier to consciousness corresponds to 
a definite degree of development of the forces of material 
production. (G, 541) 
Now the principle of modification which Marx implies here, and 
elsewhere, is that of limitation of consciousness, extending its 
domain of permission with the development of the productive forces. 
That is, in our terminology, the capacity of projective conscious- 
ness is historically modified for Marx in terms of its functionable 
range, which "functionable range" increases with technological 
advancement (i. e. development of the forces of production). Such 
historicization -- which is not in terms of mental content (e. g. 
scientific know-how, which belongs to the productive forces them- 
selves; religion, philosophy et al., which belong to ideology), 
but in lower order terms of underlying capacity itself and its 
"domain of permission" or "functionable range" -- would be exemplified 
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in the following paradigm. The rural Indian Hindu has the natural 
mental capacity to master the cognitive moves involved in, say, the 
technique of butchering and preparing cattle for food. However this 
underlying capacity has been "blocked" or rendered unable to func- 
tion in the appropriate manner as a result of the miserable forces- 
of production of the society in which he lives. That is, cattle are 
virtually the only source of technologically utilizable non-human 
power available: consequently cattle cannot be slaughtered for 
food without ruinously damaging already meagre forces of production. 
Because, then, of the severe limitations of the latter, an "ideo- 
logical reflex" -- a taboo against killing cattle -- is raised: 
which taboo in natural capacity terms is (though not necessarily) 
an historically imposed "limitation" on the functionable range of 
I the Indians intrinsic capacity of consciousness. Because of this 
so to say mind-barrier blocking his mental potential the Indian 
peasant is unable to operate in the direction of learning the said 
technique; the state of his society's productive forces has given 
rise to cognitive boundaries beyond which he cannot normally go. 
If, however, the technical onslaughts of British Imperialism pro- 
gressively eliminate the material conditions formerly inhibiting the 
peasant's ability to utilize the relevant mental powers, then the 
latter's old "frame of mind" on the issue (and many others) is 
likely to broaden and the constitutional capacity to learn the 
technique in question will to that extent be freed to operate in 
the appropriate way. In such a case, the Indian's inherent mental 
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powers will have increased their "functionable range". Later, the 
peasant may actually cash in on this mind historicization, on this 
extension of the mind's functionable ambit, and actually learn the 
technique of killing and preparing cattle for food. In other words, 
there are three conceptually distinct stages to our paradigm narra- 
tive: 
a) capacity of projective consciousness somehow blocked (i. e. 
retardation) 
b) such capacity released from the block in question (i. e. 
readiness) 
C) possible new formulations of consciousness (i. e. learning) 
Marx himself provides us with most of the material for such 
a paradigm in an article in the New York Daily Tribune, 1852 (OB, 
397). Here he argues that a "vegetative" mode of production and 
'ýmiserable" natural resource conditions, among other things, bottle 
up the rural Indian's consciousness: in his own words, "restraining 
the human mind within the smallest possible compass ... enslaving... 
depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies". It is largely 
because British imperialism -- despite all its cruelty, greed and 
hypocrisy -- removes these thought-shackling conditions and allows 
the mind to range more freely, that Marx regards it as a "Civilizing 
force". It is civilizing because it effects a great development 
in the productive conditions, a change which results in the liber- 
ation of mental "energies" which have long been "restrained", "en- 
slaved" and "deprived". Further examples of this motion of mind 
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barriers imposed and/or dissolved through the influence of productive 
conditions are found throughout Marx's work. Thus a "too lavish" 
natural environment may "keep man in hand, like a child in leading 
strings", preventing the utilization of his powers -- mental and 
otherwise -- by its anaesthetizing, Lotusland-like abundance (CI, 
513). Similarly, conventional productive tasks may contain the 
mind's powers within a narrow compass - by the "barbarian egotism" 
of individual plot tillage, (OB, 397), by the "craft idiocy" of the 
medieval guild (PofP, 125). or by the exclusive "detail tasks" of 
manufacturing capitalism (CI, 363). Advances in the forces of 
production, on the other hand, can liberate consciousness from its 
old barriers: "revolutionizing people's minds" (CI, 483). Thus 
the productive forces as they develop and progress from ancient to 
modern forms more and more allow an "imagination freed" from, among 
other things, mythology (CPE, 216). In all such cases, historical 
modification of man's intrinsic capacity of projective conscious- 
ness has to do with the raising and removing of blocks (or "limita- 
tions") to its functionable range through the influence of develop- 
ing forces of production. 
In other places, Marx places complementary emphasis on the 
role of the production relations/Economic Structure (which "cor- 
respond" to the productive forces) in influencing the "function- 
able range" of man's consciousness. Just as much as productive 
forces, the economic base is for him (despite his occasional ex- 
clusive emphasis on the former) responsible for the limitations 
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involved in the historicization of the capacity in question. Thus 
though the capitalist era is remarkable for its enormous develop- 
ment of productive forces, its economic order imposes other limits 
on the reach of men's consciousness, on -- specifically -- their 
capacity to apprehend the "contradictions" and irrationalities of 
the obtaining social formation. Thus Marx refers throughout his 
work to the narrow "bourgeois horizon"l- the ". limitations of bourgeois 
consciousness" (e. g. CI, 14 and 18thB, 11 and 37) and suggests the 
literal restriction in "brain function" that is here involved (CI, 
258). And thus he observes over and over again how even the most 
outstanding theorists in the capitalist era are unable even to con- 
ceive of an end or alternative to the capitalist order: their 
capacity of "projective consciousness" has for Marx been blocked 
from operating in the most crucial area of thought of all, consider- 
ation of the ubiquitously dehumanizing ruling-class economic system. 
Indeed it is implicitly Marx's own most important purpose to break 
past these cognitive barriers -- imposed on the minds of capitalist 
and working man alike through the influence of the massively en- 
sconced production relations/Economic Structure within which they 
all live -- through the writing and propogandizing of his new science 
of society (See Chaoter, VI, Forms of Social Consciousness 
Marx regards such restrictions by the production relations/ 
Economic Structure on the functionable range of consciousness as 
present, in one form or another, in all historical societies. In 
ancient Greek society, for example, he suggests that the obtaining 
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economic order -- whose major characteristic was master-slave re- 
lations -- prevented even a "genius" like Aristotle from compre- 
hending the labour theory of value: 
There was however an important fact which prevented Aristotle 
from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely 
a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and 
consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was 
founded upon slavery and had, therefore, for its natural basis, 
the inequality of man and of their'labour-powers. The secret 
of the expression of value ... cannot be deciphered until the 
notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a 
popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society 
in which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form 
of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation 
between man and man is that of owners of commodities. The 
brilliancy of Aristotle's genius is shown by this alone, that 
he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, 
a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society 
in which he lived alone preve ted him from discovering what, 
"in truth" was at the bottom of this equality. (CI, 59-60) 
However, it is important to point out here that Marx regards this 
so to say mind-fencing effect of the production relations/Economic 
Structure on the consciousness of men in a particular historical 
epoch as defeasible given sufficient development of the productive 
forces. Thus in capitalist society, once the productive forces ' 
have "outgrown" their economic form, a scientific and revolutionary 
theory of society (e. g. Marx's) is capable of conception. In other 
words, though the production relations/Economic Structure imposes 
certain limits on the "functionable range" of human consciousness 
in any historical era, these limits are eventually subvertible by 
the more primary influence of the forces of production (see C4apter 
VIII, Technological Determinism . 
Now in this whole process of various barriers being imposed 
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on and removed from men's inherent powers of consciousness by the 
influence of productive forces and relations lies part of the sub- 
stance of Marx's famous remark that men's "social existence determines 
their consciousness". That is, the "functionable range" of conscious- 
ness is in all historical societies constrained within some bounds 
(and in this sense "determined', )by virtue of the technical and ec- 
onomic conditions within which they live. The latter provide the 
literal frames of reference to which men's mental powers are more 
or less confined. The cognitive barriers involved here remain, 
however, quite consistent with the human mind's raising, and execution 
of, creative projects: such barriers simply restrain projective 
consciousness within certain limitations of range, as opposed to 
prescribing its operations. 
Having furnished an outline of how Marx mainly construes the 
essential capacity of human nature -- "projective consciousness" -- 
undergoing historical modification, we might want to consider how 
he construes the "bodily instruments" themselves -- the limbs, or- 
gans and senses -- undergoing such modification. But Marx almost 
never gets into a discussion of this sort. About all he says in 
this respect is in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (108- 
9). Here he talks about a human "sense" being in certain material 
conditions " a. restricted (or "caught up") sense", and we can see 
here the clear homologue to his idea of consciousness being "re- 
strained within a compass". In both cases there seems to be this 
principle of what I have called a "functionable range" to natural 
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capacity, whose ambit defines the latter's main form of historical 
modification. However though I think this line of thought might 
be pursued fruitfully with respect to the historical modification 
of the so-called "bodily instruments" -- the senses and the limbs 
(if not the organs) increasing like projective consciousness their 
functionable range with the development of the productive forces 
and so forth -- to do so would be needlessly inventive. Instead 
let me resummarize the schema with which Marx seems to work in 
describing the historical modification of the general human-nat- 
ural capacity for projective consciousness and leave open the 
question as to whether or not he would want to subsume the mod- 
ification of all human-natural capacities under the same set of 
principles (though, I must add, suggesting all the while the pro- 
bity and fertility of just such an integration): 
1) The natural capacity x is common to the members of all his- 
torical societies (i. e. potential - 
2) This natural capacity x is confined within a certain "func- 
tionable range" through the influence of technical and eco- 
nomic conditions (i. e. blocked potential or retardation 
3) This natural capacity x is in some way or to some extent 
released from its former "functionable range" through the 
influence of technical and economic conditions (released 
potential or readiness). 
4) This capacity x, now freed in the above respect, may manifest 
itself in some new, definite competence (i. e. as determinate 
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historical skill, to be distinguished from mere potential 
or capacity). 
(1), ', '(2) and (3) refer to the domain of human nature itself; 
while (4), of course, is outside this domain as, say, a definite 
labour-power ability (i. e. part of the productive forces). As far 
as the "historical modification" of human nature goes, it is con- 
strued in terms of (2) and (3): with (1) belonging to the sphere 
of human nature "in general". Principles (2) and (3)., in short, 
provide the logic of the historical modification of the capacities 
of human nature so far as Marx describes this phenomenon. 
Most of Marx's discussion of man's nature as "historically 
modified", however, does not focus on man's capacities at all. 
Much the greater part of his attention is directed towards the 
historicization of man's needs. Here as well, his remarks are 
cursory and scattered, but a similar general pattern emerges: 
namely, that the scope of needs -- parallelling the "functionable 
range" of capacities -- expands with the development of the forces 
of production. As Marx says: 
The scope Rimfangl of man's so-called necessary needs, as also 
the mode of satisfying them, is itself the product of historical 
development and depends therefore to a great extent on the 
degrie of civilization of a country... ". (LI, 171)7 
In this passage from Capital, Marx alludes to the "degree of 
71 have changed the English translation of Umfang here 
from "number and extent" in the standard translation to the more 
accurate "scope" (i. e. range). 
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civilization of a country" as the factor upon which the extending 
compass of needs depends. Elsewhere he is more explicit: 
Needs, poor in the original, only develop with the productive 
forces. (GIDL 39) 
How Marx sees men's needs as amplifying their scope with 
the development of the productive forces is as follows. The specific 
objects of such needs extend their range in accordance with the 
growth of the production system that supplies them: 
The object of a need is not an object in general, but a specific 
object ... whose specificity is imposed by production itself. (g, 9 2) 
Marx proffers an example here. The need for food is, in general, 
always a need for food ("Hunger is hunger"); but its specific object 
broadens its scope (though not necessarily its absolute amount) 
from the very simple diet of the "savage" to the much more extensive 
fare of the modern European, pari passu with the development of the 
productive forces of the society in question. That is, historical 
modification of the need for food is in terms of its determinate 
need-object, extending its range as the productive forces become 
more and more fecund in-their material yield. It is essentially 
in this sense for Marx that "production establishes the need of the 
consumer", not only in the case of the need for food but -- where 
appropriate all other needs as well (with some human needs in the 
Marxian schema of course -- for example, the need for clean air -- 
the notion of increasing scope of need-object would not seem ap- 
posite). ' In other words, men's constitutional needs and men's 
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productive forces are for the most part in a dialectical relation- 
ship with one another. Needs incite production: "No production 
without a need" (G, 92). But production, in turn, establishes for 
need its determinate object, in the direction of a progressively 
wider compass as a society's technology historically advances. In 
this way for Marx the need aspect of human nature is "historically 
modified", while itself impelling that which modifies it. 
Given this general schema of historical modification of 
human natural needs -- which is significantly analogous in principle 
to Marx's concept of the historical modification of human natural 
capacities -- we are now in a position to make some further, more 
specific points with respect-'to Marx's idea of need historicization. 
Thus in the following remarks I shall very briefly consider Marx's 
explicit or implied stance on such questions as standards of living 
and needs versus wants in man's sociohistorical development: 
1) Marx emphasizes the social dimension of need-object deter- 
mination. It is not merely the case that need-objects increase 
their scope in step with the productive forces that make them, but 
that at the same time these need-objects (though not, of course, 
need-gratifications) distributively comply with a certain social 
standard). For example, Marx says, a person will feel "uncomfortable, 
dissatisfied and cramped" in a home which is "y to 
compared to the homes in the surrounding society, even though the 
home in question might be adequate in other respects. (WLC, 56 ff) 
2) Marx occasionally remarks that the quality of need-objects and 
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the modes of consumption of such needs also modify with the develop- 
ment of the productive forces. Hence with the need-for-food example 
cited earlier, Marx not only alludes to the modification in scope 
of the object of this need, but he notes also the change(s) in 
quality of this need-object (e. g. from "raw" to "prepared" meat) 
as well as the-change in mode of satisfaction (e. g. from "torn apart 
with the bare fingers" to "eaten with the aid of a fork and knife"). 
These other dimensions of historical modification of men's needs 
would seem from, Marx's gist here and elsewhere to obtain in all 
cases where modification of range or scope of need-object obtains; 
so we might properly admit into Marx's notion of this sort of his- 
toricization two further general facets of change -- namely, change 
with respect to quality of need-object and change with respect to 
mode of need satisfaction. But there is very little in Marx's 
writings to go on here. Typically, his concept of human nature 
in this area never advances beyond suggestive probe. 
3) Though Marx does not directly give any criteria whereby his- 
torically modified needs can be distinguished from the "depraved 
fancies", "morbid appetites" etc. that spring up most of all with 
capitalist production -- that is, more generally put, criteria 
whereby needs can be distinguished from wants -- his writings would 
seem clearly to yield these two simple principles of distinction: 
a) The "object" of a need is, or is useful for producing, one 
or other of the need "objects" catalogued earlier (i. e. 
food, habitation, clothing, clean air and surroundings etc. ); 
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whereas the object of a want (e. g. "lust for capital", 
"caprice of fashion" etc. ) is not. 
b) A need cannot require what is in excess of the established 
social standard (i. e. "luxury"); whereas a want can. 
4) 'The historically modifying influence of production relations/ 
Economic Structure on men's needs has not been treated above because 
Marx himself seems to regard any impact it has on human motivation 
to be a matter of stirring mere wants -- "depraved fancies", "ca- 
prices", "morbid appetites" etc. -- and not needs in his sense at 
all. 'Hence in the case of capitalist production relations/Economic 
Structure, its major impact on human motivation is with respect to 
encouraging an "unnatural greed" for capital, which greed is po- 
lemically heralded by Marx over and over again from his earliest 
to his latest works. In no case that I can think of -- whether he 
is talking of dominating this "lust for capital" or the more minor 
swarm of "inhuman, refined, unnatural and imaginary appetites" 
(EPM, 116) which accompany the former -- does Marx construe the 
production relations/Economic Structure as influencing need as he 
conceived it. It is always, it seems, in terms of non-need cravings 
of some sort that he talks of such influence. Though one may be 
tempted here to try to fit Marx's schema of historical modification 
of human-natural capacity onto this influence by the production 
relations'/Economic Structure on human natural need -- that is, 
construe motivation by mere wants as constituting historically 
modifying blocks to men's motivation by intrinsic needs; blocks that 
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are analogous in principle to those retarding limits placed on the 
functionable range of man's capacities -- such a "fit" into ready 
schema may only properly attain the status of suggestion, not claim. 
I think the fit works and is theoretically integrating, but there 
is little or no explicit evidence from MarxIto support it. 
5) As needs are historically modified in the direction of Sn- 
creased scope, they demand more production of a stipulated sort 
(e. g. man's need for food requires progressively more food pro- 
duction as it develops through the ancient, feudal and capitalist 
eras)., Hence in this sense, the historicization of. needs intensi- 
fies the history-old conflict between the "mundane" needs of man's 
nature and the "essential" need for material self-realization; that 
is, inasmuch as more production of a prescribed sort is enjoined 
by the expansion of "mundane" needs, -Just so far as man's "essential" 
need to work constrained to fulfill itself in a stipulated or 
unfree way. (E. g. man must work at food-production and not, some 
other thing of his own choosing). Thus Marx says: 
With civilized man's development this realm of phvsical necessity 
expands as a result of his wants Lread "needs"J. 
But, Marx immediately adds, 
I 
at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these 
wants [read "needs"] also increase (gIII, 820). 
So even though the "realm of necessity expands" with the histor- 
ization of needs, the forces of production also "expand" and thereby 
one of the fundamental contradictions of human history for Marx -- 
between the demands of material survival and the need for free 
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self-realization -- is continuously meliorated by technological 
advance (if also, less so, promoted by it). 
Progressively, Marx believes, the forces of production 
with-an increasingly automated content and planned utilization 
will reduce the necessary working day and, pari passu, yield a 
"kealm of freedom"' CCIII, 820) where "human energy becomes an end- 
in-itself". This "realm of freedom" is beyond "the realm of ne- 
cessity", beyond the dictate of "mundane" needs altogether. Because 
it allows completely free reign. to man's need to work, "it is worthy 
of human nature". Man only achieves his fully human status-for 
Marx, then, to the extent that the requirements of his historicized 
needs (týat is, his non-essence needs) cease to command and instru- 
mentalize his work. For him, all such-needs are to be materially 
"conquered", to be divested of their imperiousness by the growth 
of technology. Change in material circumstances, thus, truly gives 
rise to a new man who (in Hegelian phrase) "contains within his 
present all the moments of his past", who remains with all his 
historically amplified needs while at the same time transcending 
them in liberated activity by virtue of automated, communist forces 
of produc tion which provide his material base, his platform of 
subjecthood. 
It is clear from all that has been said above that the 
widely held view that the mature work of Marx altogether lacks a 
position on the nature of man is radically mistaken. Accordingly, 
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difficulties which are said to follow from this putative "blank" 
in his theoretical framework do not in fact obtain. 
First of all, the "productive forces" obviously do own an 
explanatory base in Marx's schema. He sees them as motivated by 
needs and enabled by capacities which are inherent in human nature: 
especially, the essential human need and capacity to raise a pro- 
ject in the imagination and execute it in reality. As well, ob- 
viously, there is no question of Marx's having to account for human 
motivation and enablement in wholly social-conditioning terms. Then, 
again, the problem of Marx's communist vision operating only in 
terms of technological imperative - what I called "robot" com- 
munism -- clearly does not obtain in his writings (though it seems 
to in the works of his orthodox disciples). Marx patently does 
have a substantial notion of human nature and while it avoids (i. e. 
by its emphasis on the bodily and the historical) the mere "ab- 
straction" which he deplored in the concepts of human nature of 
Feuerbach, Proudhon et al, it also avoids the absurdities and 
dangers (i. e. man as product) following from a denial of human 
nature altogether. 
Finally, several of the specific and apparently intrinsic 
human dispositions which Marx is conventionally said to deprive of 
any place in his theory - man's creativity, for example -- are 
explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by him. on the other hand, those 
he is correctly said to have denied natural status to -- say, 
man's desire for power or instinct for aggression or power -- he 
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does so on the grounds of alternative, more parsimonious explanation. 
That is, he does not as others infer from man's historically persis- 
tent power-seeking and aggressive behaviour corresponding peculiar 
natural drive(s) for such behaviour but - in perhaps proper recourse 
to Ocnam's razor - regards these sorts of behaviour as explicable 
in terms (e. g. material scarcity and economic laws) requiring no 
such multiplication of entities. Whether or not Marx is right in 
this stance seems still an open question. 
Having demonstrated that the category of "human nature" 
does indeed have considerable - if hitherto unnoted -- significance 
in the structure of Marx's mature world-view, we may now reiterate 
with slight addition our revision of the outline of this structure: 
1) Human Nature - "in general" 
- "as modified in each historical epoch" 
2) Forces of Production 
3) Relations of Production (or Economic Structure) 
4) Legal and Political Superstructures 
5) Ideological Forms 
6) Forms of Social Consciousness. 
A final word here. Marx's view of human nature may give 
the clue both to his persistent normative remarks in a putatively 
positivist corpus and to the moral indignation he - an apparent 
despiser of all moral positioning - continually evinces. The 
entire normative and moral content of Marx's work (and despite the 
objections of his orthodox apologists, there is such content in 
abundance) is I think based on a first, major ethical premise, 
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which is roughly this: men ought to reproduce and express them- 
selves as fully as possible. Given that Marx sees the nature of 
men as constituted of the many historicized capacities and needs 
we have outlined, this basic moral premise -- which would seem to 
place Marx in what we today call the "ethical naturalist" school -- 
means that anything which promotes or interferes with the satisfac- 
tion and realization of such needs and capacities represents to him 
good or evil respectively. Hence whenever Marx approves, blames, 
ascribes duties or even talks of the "necessity" of revolution, 
at the bottom of his remarks there stands this foundational ethical 
imperative and the generally ignored concept of human nature which 
gives it flesh. 
CHAPTER II 
FORCES OF PRODUCTION 
As I have already suggested, the forces of production are 
motivated and enabled by, respectively, the needs and capacities 
of human nature. Their function of embodying or yielding use-value 
presupposes human need, both as inciter and beneficiary. And their 
intelligent construction presupposes human capacity, both mental 
and physical. They are in these ways for Marx the objectifications 
of human nature. They are related to the latter, in traditional 
phrase, as realization to potential. 
Marx never directly defines a "force of production" and he 
uses a number of terms like "conditions of production", "instruments 
of production" and '! means of production" which make it difficult 
to know whether the intended the formulation in question as a cover- 
ing term or as one more restricted in meaning (e. g. just labour- 
power and tools). I will assume -- there being no persuasive tex- 
tual evidence to the contrary -- that he intends it as a covering 
term. 
Considering all that Marx says on forces of production, and 
construing the term in its coverIng sense, an adequate definition 
would -- to come straight to the point -- be the following: a force 
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of production is anything which is/can be used to make a material 
use-value (see CI, 177 ff). Obvious candidates for forces of 
production are, hence, tools (from hand-implements to machines), 
human labour-power (from manual to scientific), and natural re- 
sources (from coal deposits to fish). However, a more systematic 
and detailed account is required here, which I shall give presently. 
Before doing so, it is important to explain the force of my "is/can 
be used" predication in the above definition. The reason I employ 
the double auxiliary "is/can" here is to ensure that the definition 
picks up not only any force of production which is in fact used to 
make material use-value, but any force which can in fact be so used 
but is not on sheerly non- technological account: that is, those 
forces of production -- for example, unemployed labour-power and 
unused factory capacities -- which for Marx are impeded from pre- 
sent utilization merely by economic obstacles (e. g. in capitalism, 
insufficient effective demand or profit opportunity). These latter 
forces of production are for Marx no less valid as such because of 
extrinsic impediment. They thoroughly qualify as forces of pro- 
duction inasmuch as their immediate utilization for the making of 
material use-value is frustrated solely by non-technical barriers 
raised by the relations of production/Economic Structure: sop 
that they are not so used but are (to use Marx's phraseology) 
"wasted", "destroyed", "suppressed" by virtue of economic "fetters" 
does not one whit detract for him from their status as forces of 
production. Furthermore, because the ground and index of all social 
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revolutionary possibility is in Marx's schema the emergence and 
growth of just these forces of production which can be used to 
make material use-value but are not entirely on account of non- 
technological impediments, it is especially important to include 
such forces in any delineation of his general concept that pretends 
to interpretative adequacy. In short, the "is/can" wording of our 
definition of the forces of production is not only amply justified 
but required by Marx's emphasis on usable but unused technical powers 
in his analysis of social production, particularly the latter as it 
is "fettered" in the mature, pre-revolutionary period of an histori- 
cal epoch. 
Another point that should be made about the definition of 
forces of production which I have sponsored above is that it meets 
certain objections raised against Marx's schema by effectively 
ruling out all human natural, economic, superstructural or ideo- 
logical phenomena from its domain of reference. That is, a natural 
capacity or need (as opposed to a definite productive capability), 
an ownership relation (as opposed to a technological relation), 
a superstructural law (as opposed to a physical law), an ideologi- 
cal formulation (as opposed to a practical-science formulation) -- 
of none of these may it properly be said that it "is/can be used 
to make a material use-value". None ran qualify, therefore, as 
a productive force. One or other may indeed by necessary conditions 
of some sort for forces of production to arise (i. e. natural ca- 
pacity and need) or -- with the rest - to be appropriated, exchanged, 
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socially apportioned, justified or in some way appropriately. Son- 
textualized; and one or other may be used to make something of some 
sort. But none is or can actually be used-to make a material use- 
value. In this way, then, the definition above successfully secures 
the required conceptual discreteness of Marx's forces of production 
category; and in so doing answers those critics who have claimed 
an inherent amorphousness to the category in question. 
Marx's general concept of productive forces now more or 
less clear, we may proceed to specific elaboration. 
There are for Marx two basic classes of productive force: 
1 labour-power (Arbeitskraft) 
2, means of production (Produktionsmittel 
(1) constitutes the "subjective factor" of production and (2) con- 
stitutes the "objective factor". (2), it should be noted, is often 
further distinguished into natural and man-made means of production, 
with these latter sometimes being further subdivided into "general 
conditions" of production (transportation and communication systems)l 
lThese "general conditions" ot production -- transportation and 
communication systems -- may at first seem to fail to meet our definition 
of productive forces as "anything which is/can be used to make a ma- 
terial use-value". But Marx regarded changing the place of something 
as changing its material use-value: 
here a material change is effected in the object of labour -- a 
spatial change, a change of place --. Its spatial existence is 
altered and along with this goes a change in its use-value, since 
the location of this use-value is changed (S-VI, 399). 
Since to change something from use-value A to use-value B is clearly, 
to be used to make use-value B, transportation and communication 
systems do not in fact prove refractory to our definition. 
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as opposed to "instruments" of production (tools and machines). 
But in general terms Produktionsmittel is the covering category for 
all non-human productive forces, whereas Arbeitscraft is the category 
for all human productive forces. In both cases, the force in question 
is something which is/can be used to make a material use-value or 
product -- whether it be a human skill, on the one hand, or a nat- 
ural resource, a public utility or a technological instrument on 
the other (see CI, 177 ff and 384). 
Of these various sorts of productive force, the primary -- 
because presupposed by and far the most part, immanent in, the other 
forms of productive force -- is labour-power. Marx, defines labour- 
power in Capital as: 
the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities 
[Fahigkeiten] existing in a human being, which he exercises 
whenever he produces a use-value of any description. (LI, 167)' 
There are several points which should be made clear about this 
characterization of labour-power: 
1 "Capabilities" of labour-power are to be distinguished from 
"capacities" of human nature. The difference between these two is 
that a "capability" is the ability to perform a specific work task 
whereas a capacity is not: the former are indeed only possible 
because of the prior existence of the latter (for example, the 
technical capability of designing bridges presupposes the prior 
existence of the natural capacity to think), but are distinct from 
them inasmuch as a capacity requires some sort of training or edu- 
cation before it has developed into a well-formed skill. There may 
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be cases where natural capacity is at the same time a technically 
usable competence - for example, man's natural capacity to move in 
certain ways may be at the same time the technical competence to, 
say, beach-comb - but such cases are merely borderline. 
2 Marx's use of the adjective phrase '1mental and physical" before 
locapabilities", should not mislead us into supposing that he conceives 
of mental and physical capabilities as different types of competence. 
On the contrary, there can be for Marx no purely physical labour- 
power abilities inasmuch as the latter always involve (technically) 
rule-governed activities i. e. activities requiring some form of 
mental mediation; and there can be no purely mental labour-power 
competence inasmuch as the latter must terminate in some physical 
performance if they are to be usable in material production. In 
other words, the '! mental and physical capabilities" of labour-power 
are for Marx something like forms of know-haw involving both mental 
and physical content in any given case. 
3 The formal content of such labour-power "know-how" is practical 
scientific knowledge which latter is, for this reason, referred to 
by Marx as the 'ýnost solid form of human wealth" (G, 540). This 
Point deserves special emphasis inasmuch as It demonstrates that 
Marx did not - contrary to wide interpretation - place technological 
science in the sphere of "ideology", but seated it rather at the very 
core of the productive forces. Unlike the ideas of philosophy, 
religion, politics and so on - which are, of course, ideological 
for Marx - the ideas of practical science very much are/can be used 
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to make material use-values: indeed such science for him is, in 
one form or another, the force of production par excellence in all 
eras, especially the capitalist. And because of its cardinal status 
as a force of production in all eras, its effective ownership, -- 
by Egyptian priesthood, or modern business -- provides economic- 
power leverage of the very first order: a fact that Marx emphasizes 
over and over again in his work (e. g. CI, 509 and 514). 
4 There are two different types of human labour-power -- unskilled 
and skilled. Unskilled labour-power is labour-power which "apart 
from any special development exists in the organism of every ordinary 
individual" of a society (CI, 44). Exactly what set of capabilities 
is involved in such unskilled labour-power depends on the society 
in question and its level of civilization; but "in a particular 
society it is given". (Such a set of capabilities would presumably 
be the abilities to perform a standard range of technically useful 
operations considered "normal" to the society in question -- for 
example, in present society, knowing how to read, write, use everyday 
tools, etc. ). On the other hand, skilled labour-power is "multiplied" 
unskilled labour-power: that is, labour power which involves more 
intensive work capabilities than the social standard, "a given quan- 
tity of skilled being equal to a greater quantity of simple labourtt2 
2Marx1s contention that skilled labour-power can-properly be 
calculated as a multiple of unskilled labour-power is, I believe, not 
only subject to knotty mathematical difficulties with respect to 
identifying a common unit of quantification, but -- on the social 
side -- gives rise to problems of distributive inequity in cont'd 
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5 Labour-power which "produces a use-value of any description" 
includes not only labour-power which directly produces use-value, 
but labour-power which indirectly produces use-value: that is, 
labour-power which is required to produce, train, develop, main- 
tain or reproduce directly productive labour-power itself. Thus 
Marx says: 
Productive labour would therefore be such labour as produces 
commodities or directly produces, trains, develops, maintains 
or reproduces labour-power itself (CI, 44) 
Such "indirectly" productive labour-power -- which is no less pro- 
ductive for its being indirectly so: it still "is/can be used to 
make a material use-value" -- would, it seems clear, include medical 
and. educational labour-power. Just as labour-power which services 
or adapts machines must be counted as productive, so with Marx 
labour-power which maintains (medical) and develops/trains (educational) 
human labour-power must count as productive. Indeed Marx's language 
in the above passage would seem to permit -- among other things -- 
child-bearing capabilities to count as productive inasmuch as they 
too are necessary to "produce" and "reproduce" labour-power. 
It is important here to appreciate fully this embracing 
referential range of Marx's concept of productive labour-power: not 
only to achieve more adequate understanding of the concept in question, 
the "transitional stage" of socialism where each is paid "according 
to his work" (i. e. a skilled worker is paid x-times more than an 
unskilled worker): a distributive inequity which has been notoriously 
exemplified in modern "Marxist" societies. 
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but -- of both systemic and contemporary relevance -- to yield the 
conceptual underpinning for possible Marxian explanations of such 
currently familiar phenomena of school/university upheavals (an 
instance of the forces of production -- educational labour-power 
and its "natural resource" student material -- "bursting" the re- 
lations of production? 3), health big-business (doctors' monopoly 
ownership of medical labour-power and special facilities as qual- 
ification for ruling-class status? ), women's liberation (another 
instance of the forces of production -- here "reproductive" labour- 
power -- "bursting" relations of production "fetters"? ), etc. 
6 Means of subsistence for labour-power are forces of production 
in the same way as fuel and storage facilities for machinery are 
forces of production (To use the language of the immediately pre- 
ceding point, they are "indirectly" productive). But, as we have 
earlier suggested, such means of subsistence for labour-power under- 
go historical development; or, otherwise put, the needs of labour- 
power which they meet undergo historical development. Hence insofar 
as the means of subsistence for labour-power forces of production 
grow with "the degree of civilization of a country" (CI, 171), it 
is possible -- contrary to popular criticisms of Marx -- for labour- 
power to suffer "immiserization" even as its absolute consumption 
of means of subsistence increases. (CI, 645)4 
3See my "Student Revolt: Marxism in a New Dimension", 
Commentator, Vol. 13, No. 11 (November 1969) pp. 17-23. 
41t has, of course, been a favorite claim of critics cont'd 
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Having elaborated Marx's concept of labour-power -- the 
historical articulation of the hilman-natural essence man's capacity 
for projective consciousness -- we may briefly consider the "objective 
factor" of production -- namely, the man-made and natural means of 
production. As has already been indicated the former are of two 
main types -- "general conditions" of production (i. e. transportation 
and communication systems) and "instruments" of production (i. e. 
tools, including machines). With the latter, natural means of. pro- 
duction -- or, in current terminology "natural resources" -- Marx 
proffers no such division into type. But of both these main sorts 
of "objective" productive force the following principles are of 
general significance: 
I Both are seen by Marx as in some sense. external organs of man. 
Thus of natural resources, indeed of the whole of Nature, Marx says: 
Thus Nature becomes one of the organs of man's activity, one 
that he annexes to his own bodily organs, adding stature to 
himself in spite of the bible (g. I, 179). 
And thus of the man-made instruments of production -- tools in the 
of Marx that his theory is obviously mistaken because his repeated 
prediction of worker immiserization has not in fact taken place: 
a claim that has usually drawn for its only support upon the rising 
real wages of workers since Marx's original projection. Such a 
rebuttal, typically of the critical literature on Marx', misses his 
point entirely. He emphasizes that whether the worker's "payment 
be high or low', his "lot must grow worse" (CI, 645) not just be- 
cause his means of subsistence fail to keep pace with historical 
development, but -- more fundamentally -- because the capitalist 
class owns a greater and greater share of the total material re- 
sources of society (i. e. by accumulation) and thus, the working 
class relatively less and less. 
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broadest sense -- Marx invokes much the same picture: 
Darwin has interested us in the history of Nature's Technology 
i. e. in the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which 
organs serve as instruments of production for sustaining life. 
Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs 
that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve 
equal attention? (CI, 372) 
Elsewhere Marx talks of these forces of production as the "objective 
body of man's subjectivity" (Pre-C, 69), as "a prolongation of his 
body" (Pre-C, 89) and so on -- persistently identifying natural and 
constructed forces of production as organic extensions of man, of 
human subjecthood. From this principle of characterization a number 
of things seem to follow: 
i Since labour-power is for Marx the explicit content of man's 
subjecthood, the relationship between man and his "external organs" 
of tools and natural resources is at the same time -- on an explicit 
level -- the relationship between labour-power and such "external 
organs". Hence in the general connection of man to his means of 
production, we can discern at the same time the more specific tech- 
nological connection of the "subjective factor" (labour-power) to 
the "objective factor" (tools and natural resources) of production. 
The latter connection is to a large extent the former connection 
merely cast in more determinate terms; which not only helps to 
illuminate the nature of this latter connection for Marx, but indi- 
cates how and why he often tends to construe man's relationship with 
his "objective" world in terms of productive forces alone (i. e. with 
no mention of human nature). 
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ii Inasmuch as Marx construes the objective means of production 
of a society as the "external organs" of man, private property ap- 
propriation of these means of production would seem for him to be, 
correspondingly, the dismemberment of those whose "external organs" 
are thus removed by such exclusive appropriation: a kind of ongoing 
legitimized mutilation of men's objective lives. In this tearing 
asunder of the social body which private property seems to imply 
lies perhaps the ultimate ground of Marx's concern to eradicate the 
capitalist order. 
iii Insofar as Nature is an "organ" of man, it possesses no in- 
dependent value and is wholly human #strumentality. Marx's position 
seems thereby ultimately one of absolute anthropocentrism, with the 
totality of non-human life and matter on earth apparently confined 
to the status of real or potential human adjunct (this point shall 
earn critical attention in Book 2 of my essay). 
2 Forces of production -- "objective" and "subjective" -- are 
"accumulated" throughout history -- each generation retaining and 
building upon the productive. acAevements of the last (fofP, 156). 
No principle is more emphatically and repeatedly treated by Marx: 
one might even claim that in this principle lies the nub of his 
"historical materialist" doctrine (as the phrase itself suggests). 
Because the productive forces are so accumulated from one generation 
to the next, a number of very important things follow for him: 
i history exhibits progress of a technological sort and, from this, 
other sorts of progress too (hence arises what has been called Marx's 
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"illusion (sic) of progress"). 
ii men "are not free to choose their productive forces" (PofP, 
156) because each of them is always born into, and depends for his, 
survival on, a technology that is already more or less formed (hence 
arises what has been called Marx's "denial (sic) of free will"). 
iii the present, in the above sense at least, always, contains 
(in Hegelian phrase) the "moments of its past" and can only be fully 
understood in terms of this past (the substance of the idea which 
has been pejoratively dubbed "historicism"). 
iv men must or "are obliged to" (LofP, 157) preserve their forces 
of production -- "the gift of thousands of centuries" -- "in order 
that they may not be deprived of the result attained and forfeit the 
fruits of civilization", (the law-like ground of Marx's belief, in an 
"inevitable revolution" against the counter-productive structure of 
mature capitalist society). 
Before concluding'this exposition of Marx's concept of the 
forces of production, it is important to note that though these 
forces must be conceived as distinct from, and the material base of, 
the relations of production/Economic Structure -- together with which 
such forces from the overall "mode of production" -- they are by no, 
means unaffected by the latter. Not only do the relations of pro- 
duction/Economic Structure dialectically relate with the productive 
forces as both "stimulus" (e. g. the profit-seeking "law of motion" 
of capital motivates ever more production) and "fetter" (e. g. the 
feudal relations of production bind production within "fixed, 
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-fast-frozen" limits), but they importantly distort the forces of 
production both in intrinsic function and mode of operation (ren- 
dering them, as it were, "destructive forces" GID, 76). That is: 
1 they -- with "human nature" itself -- stipulate the material 
use-values which it is the function of the productive forces to make 
(e. g. in capitalism, only those use-values which sustain or increase 
profit for the capitalists: for instance, cosmetics and weapons). 
2 they -- along with, and overlaying, purely technological re- 
quirements --. stipulate the mode of operation of the productive 
forces (e. g. in capitalism, only such mode of operation which, again, 
sustains or increases profit for the capitalists: for instance 
"riveted" division of labour and resource-exhaustion). 
Now the distortion-effects on the intrinsic function and mode 
of operation of productive forces which such requirements of the 
relations of productibn/Economic Structure give rise to are fre- 
quently and passionately observed by Marx -- though the full impli- 
cations of such distortions seem not altogether appreciated by him. 
(That the productive forces could become so deformed in these aspects 
that they are no longer capable of-providing the material grounds 
of and propulsion towards a revolutionary communist society (as opposed 
to mere centralization of control) never seems to seriously occur 
to him5). In any case, of the distortion by economic influences of 
5Though I shall not pursue this point any further in this 
essay, I must record my suspicion that it is a point which may well 
undermine Marx's entire systematic projection of the progressive cont'd 
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the use-values occurring from the productive forces, Marx has this 
to say: 
a) their content is trivialized (e. g. "the munderous, meaningless 
caprices of fashion" (CI, 494) or in some other way "depraved". 
b) their. quality is debased (e. g. adulterated foodstuffs, inferior 
dwellings and clothing articles, unsafe factories, etc. ). 
On the other hand, of the distortions by economic influences 
the mode of operation of the productive forces, Marx has this to say: 
a) They are destructive of labour-power ("murdering", "exhausting", 
"riveting", "brutalizing" and otherwise detracting from its pro- 
ductive potential). 
b) They are destructive of natural resources ("sapping", "de- 
spoiling", "polluting" and otherwise wrecking the very elements 
themselves (e. g. "the soil" CI, 507). 
c) They are inefficiently utilized (social coordination of pro- 
ductive forces is "anarchic", labour-power is squandered in "hordes 
of unproductive workers" (§-VI, passim , and outright unemployment 
of both "subjective" and "objective" factors of production is con- 
tinuous and, periodically, critical). 
The importance of these several distortions of the productive 
course of human history. When one considers the increasing tendency 
of capitalist productive forces to produce the "use-values" of 
human killing-machinery and status commodities, and to apply the 
methods of resource exhaustion/pollution, exclusive detail-task, 
administrative policing -- it is not easy. to see how such a per- 
meatively distorted productive system is capable of "bursting" any- 
thing but our hearts. 
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forces bV the influence of the production relations/Economic Structure 
deserves further emphasis here insofar as it indicates how Marx's 
concept of forces of production, or technology, is able to avoid a 
crucially significant error of modern social philosophy. The error 
in question is this: that technology (in Marx's language, "the 
forces of production") is inherentlv deleterious with respect to, 
among other things, uncontrolled growth, person-imprisoning division 
of labour, and the necessity of hierarchy. To take these in turn, 
it is quite clear that with Marx "Technology" is in itself responsible 
for none of these problems: 
a) Uncontrolled growth is a function of the "laws of motion" of 
capital which systematically enjoin its own self-amplification (i. e. 
"profit") without cessation. It is this economic -- not techno- 
logical -- imperative which drives technology in the direction of 
"uncontrolled growth". 
b) Person-imprisoning division of labour is a function of the 
relations of production/Economic Structure which requires the tech- 
nologically unnecessarv exclusive confinement of individuals to 
production places (e. g. the technological necessity to position 
labour-power x in place y for tl .... tn -- which could 
be ful- 
filled in any number of other ways (e. g. taking turns) -- is econ- 
omically constrained to be in fact the riveting of just this person 
to just this job for all of tl .... td 
c) The necessity of hierarchy is non-technological insofar as 
of no component of hierarchy can it properly be said that it "is/can 
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be used to make a material use-value" (i. e. that it is productively 
necessary)6. On the other hand, there is a "necessity of hierarchy" 
insofar as the practical protection of economic class-power arrange- 
ments is to be successfully secured and maintained. 
Other putatively "inherently deleterious" features of 
"iechnology" as such -- for example, trivialized and debased use- 
values and destructive modes of operation -- have already been shown 
to be economically rather than technologically effected in the 
Marxian schema. Such a discrimination between the etiological do- 
mains of these two factors is, I repeat, of importance not only for 
understanding Marx's concept of productive forces, but for discerning 
the mistake in an increasingly influential tradition in social phi- 
losophy which presumes or declares the intrinsic defects of "tech- 
nology" as such (a tradition which Marx himself confronted and, 
criticized in various forms -- Carlyle, Proudhon, Guild Socialism 
etc. -- in his own day). 
Despite this restriction on the (negative, at least) influ- 
ence of the forces of production, Marx on the whole -- and here I 
conclude my sketch of this fundamental category of his general 
60therwise put, no technological requirement -- including 
productive-force coordination -- implies a ranking or grading of 
the producers into levels of , 
command (i. e. hierarchialization). 
Though it is a common mistake to assume, for example, that "managers" 
are a technological necessity for all modern forms of production, 
what is a technological necessity is not "managers" at all, but 
such-and-such coordination of productive forces: which coordination 
could be achieved (Las to be achieved, I think Marx holds) by worker 
self-government. 
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theoretical framework -- grants sovereign status to such forces in 
his world-view. For him, the productive forces are in the end the 
foundations of human existence and expression: 
As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, 
therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they 
produce and with how they produce. (qID, 32) 
They raise men above the animals and objectify his potentia. They 
answer to and shape the objects of human needs, and they actualize 
and extend human capacities. They are the basic medium of human 
activity, and they determine the routines of work and the context 
of behaviour generally. They set limits to, and ultimately subvert, 
production relations and the economic order. They, through the 
latter, condition the legal and political superstructure and inform 
ideology with their content. They provide the praxis foundations 
of human knowledge. They progressively conquer the fundamental 
limitation of nature and historical life, scarcity, and correspond- 
ingly liberate man from the necessity of conflict and the struggle 
for "survival'. '. They inexorably release society from the necessity 
of labour and so lift "the curse of Adam" from the shoulders of 
mankind. They constitute for Marx, in brief, the basic substance 
of human history -- generating truly a cumulative Second Creation, 
a new cosmic order. Technology is, as it were, the Marxian Provi- 
dence. 
But to show precisely how the forces of production relate 
to the other factors of Marx's model, I reserve a later section, 
Technological Determinism. - 
CHAPTER III 
RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION/ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Relations of production, as a totality, constitute the 
Economic Structure: which latter Marx refers to in varying con- 
texts as the "essence", the "form" and the "base" (or "hidden basis") 
of all historical human society. Although this relations of pro-.. 
duction/Economic Structure category seems thus the theoretical 
linchpin of all Marx's analysis, its precise meaning has been-a mat- 
ter of continuing and unresolved controversy for almost a century. 
Marx himself, as with every one of the basic categories of his 
CL 
Weltanschuung, never proffers a precise definition. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to elicit one from his work inasmuch as his usage 
is so rich and elliptical at the same time. Despite these difficulties, 
however, I think a philosophically satisfactory characterization can 
be secured: though one must venture so to speak beneath Marx's texts 
to achieve it. Again then, underlying principles are our quarry. 
The first thing which must be made clear in explicating 
Marx's concept of production relations/Economic Structure is that- 
he does not mean -- contrary to some interpretations - to refer to 
the technological relations connecting various human and non-human 
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forces of production to one another. It is worth illustrating this 
point with an example. In a modern factory, technological relations 
are those relations which must obtain between the various instruments 
and labour-powers in order to set these forces into some sort of 
productive coherence: such relations are as integral to this (or 
any other) productive mechanism as, in the microcosm, linking and 
organizing mechanical parts are to a machine. Technological relations 
are, in other words, wholly within the sphere of productive forces 
and are stipulated by them. 
Relations of production, on the other hand, are extra-tech- 
nical relations akin to property relations: "property relations" 
being for Marx, as he says in the Preface to. A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy and elsewhere, just "a legal, expression" 
for relations of production. (They are relations of production, of 
course, because the ownership they denote is ownership of productive 
forces. ) Thus whereas technological relations are the operating 
connections implicit in the productive forces, relations of production 
are the proprietary connections between these productive forces and 
their owners. 
' 
The apparent difficulty with so distinguishing relations of 
production from technological relations is that the former seem 
lIt is worth remarking here that technological relations never 
involve persons as such, but only labour-powers: thus the same tech- 
nological relations would obtain on an assembly-line whether the labour7 
, power places were filled by one set of individuals or by n sets of 
individuals acting in turns. 
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thereby to be pushed into the domain of the superstructure. That 
is, we are now confronted with the new problem of distinguishing 
relations of production from property relations which are part of 
the legal superstructure. 
To advance straight to the point, the saving distinction 
2 here lies in the difference between power and right. A relation 
of production is a relation of a person to a force of production 
such that he has the power to use or exploit it and exclude others 
from doing so. 3 A cognate property relation, in contrast, is a 
relation of a person to a force of production such that he has the 
right to use or exploit it and-exclude others from doing so. Now 
though the power and the right to so employ a force of production 
often and even generally coincide, very frequently they do not. 
The army commander, the criminal chieftain, the upper bureaucrat, 
the religious leader, the political strongman, the monopolist, the 
party machine and so on may all own the power to use or exploit forces 
of production and exclude others from doing so, with no corresponding 
right. On the other hand, the penniless, the conquered and intim- 
idated, the legislatively deceived, and so on may all have the right 
to use or exploit forces of production and exclude others from 
2For the most extended general discussion by Marx of the power- 
right distinction, see GID, 357 ff and 394 ff. 
3The 
overall definition here of a relation of production, of 
an "effective ownership" relation, is, by the way, my own. Its con- 
struction was the single most difficult task of my essay and has 
provided, for me, the single most illuminating path of inquiry. 
83 
doing so, with no corresponding power. 
4 The two are quite distinct. 
Furthermore, it should be noted, even where legal property relations 
and relations of production do "coincide", this may well be a matter 
of right sanctioning power with has been or could be held indepen 
dently of such sanction (e. g. as enforced custom). 
5 This is an im- 
portant point because it suggests a still more thoroughgoing dis- 
tinction between property relations and relations of production. 
Having secured a definition of relations of production that 
pries these relations apart from both technological relations (which 
belong to the forces of production) and cognate property relations 
(which belong to the legal superstructure), we are in a position to 
make some rather more specific remarks about production relations 
as such: 
1 Though Marx never explicitly says so, it would seem that a necessary 
(though not sufficient) material condition of the power to use or ex- 
ploit forces of production and exclude others from doing so is superior 
physical force invokable by whoever holds such power: whether it be 
the armed force of feudal retinue, police or army, hired thugs, or 
whatever. Thus Marx says: 
In actual history, it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder, briefly force, play"the chief part (LT, 714). 
Presumably those situations where it is not clearly established who 
4See, for example, GID, 79-80. 
5"Right", claims Marx "is only the recognition of fact" 
(LofP, 75). 
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can in fact. invoke superior physical violence, who really has the 
power to exclude others from productive forces, are situations of 
open conflict of some sort where the historical testing of economic 
relations takes place (e. g. a robbery attempt, an insurrection or an 
international war). But the results of such "testing" will still 
be such that superior physical force -- and not, say, moral or legal 
status -- will decide who secures effective ownership (e. g. in dis- 
putes between ruling-class and working-class "force decides" CI, 
235). 6 As in the non-human struggle for survival, availability of 
ascendent might resolves contrary claims to the means of life. Even 
where invokability of such force does not seem present as a material 
condition of economic power to exclude others from productive forces 
-- for example, with publicly "sanctioned, ' or "naturally just" or 
merely accepted relations of production -- Marx is properly concerned 
to-strip away the "mask" of such Schein of non-coercive consent to 
reveal either the physical force upon which such effective owner- 
ship can call, and has called, or the latter's "merely illusory" 
quality. Hence his disdain for the traditional concepts of social 
contract, revolution by reason alone and so forth: effective owner- 
ship in virtually all historical situations requires for Marx the 
owner's being able to bring ascendant physical force to bear on the 
6Hence Marx also says: 
Indeed is it at all surprising that a society founded on the op- 
position of classes should culminate in brutal contradiction, the 
shock of body against body, as its final denouncement? (PofP, 
152) 
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situation, usually the organs of violence of the state. 
None of the above, though, is meant to suggest that such 
force is said to be always or even usually visible. On the contrary 
it is for Marx almost always concealed by superstructural "veil" 
and may only occasionally need to be openly exerted. Furthermore, 
none of the above is meant to suggest that invokability of superior 
physical force is ever claimed by Marx to be a sufficient condition 
of establishing or maintaining relations of production. In addition 
to the technical conditions required for such, Marx sees superstruc- 
tural overlay as always required for ownership relations to persist 
(see Chapters IV and V). 
2 Because relations of production not only involve those members 
of society who have the power to use or exploit forces of production 
but those who can be excluded from the same, they are ultimately 
triadic in structure -- relating men to productive forces by virtue 
of their power to exclude other men from them. Thus effective 
ownership by some of forces of production always implies correspond- 
ing "alienation" or "estrangement' of all others from the same 
productive forces. 
This point is of great importance inasmuch as, among other 
things: 
i It points up the objective and historically universal nature of 
"alienation" for Marx: which is not for him (as in contemporary 
usage) some psychological malaise peculiar to modern man, but rather -- 
in varying ways -- a material concomitant of all relations of production 
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in human history. 
ii It indicates why Marx saw all private ownership of the forces 
of production as anti-human: by virtue of every person's or group's 
private ownership of this sort, every other person or group is by 
definition cut off from the possibilities of "objective existence" 
or, otherwise put, from material self-realization through the forces 
so owned. 
iii It allows better sense to be made of Marx's claim about in- 
creasing "immiserization" in capitalism: such growing impoverish- 
ment not being a matter of decreasing money-earnings at all, but 
obtaining "whether the worker's payment be high or low" (CI, 645) 
in simple consequence of more forces of production being privately 
owned by the ruling-class capitalists. That is, since some owner- 
ship always implies others' alienation, some's ownership of more 
must always imply others' alienation from more, and it is in this 
sense most of all that Marx's immiserization doctrine remains apt -- 
contrary to conventional view -- despite worker's rising real wages 
since the mid-nineteenth century. 
iv It abets our understanding of why Marx considered communism the 
"truly human" social formation: because here there is no private 
ownership of the forces of production, there is no corresponding 
alienation from the same. "Personal possessions" may remain, and the 
society as a whole may retain their power to exclude the bodies of 
nature, or indeed of other societies, from the forces of-production 
in question; but exclusive productive relations within the society 
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are dissolved, and communism in these respects genuinely transcends 
the "estrangement" of all previous history and renders man's'social 
circumstances "worthy of human nature" (gIII, 821). 
(It is a mistake to suppose, of course, that Marx considered 
the end of such alienation and estrangement as the end of man of 
dialectical tension altogether: non-antagonistic "contradiction" 
emphatically remains, between -- essentially -- project and matter, 
rather than material interest versus material interest. ) 
3 The power to use forces of production and exclude others from 
doing so is to be distinguished from the power to exploit forces of 
production and exclude others from doing so in this way. The latter 
involves the power to gain unearned revenue or the benefits of other 
men's unpaid labour, whereas the former does not. Such unearned 
benefits may for Marx take the form of rent-in-kind or corvee labour 
(feudalism) or money interest, rent or profit (capitalism): or any 
number of other forms not discussed by him (e. g. remuneration for 
rank in "publicly owned" corporations). On the other hand, the 
power merely to use forces of production and exclude others from 
doing so does not involve the power to secure unearned benefits. 
In cases of purely "independent" producers, for example, -- like 
self-employed farmers, artisans etc; -- no unpaid labour can be ex- 
tracted from other men's labour on productive forces that are in- 
dependently worked, and so no unearned benefit can be yielded by 
productive force ownership (unless it be by peculiar exchange). In 
most or all other cases of men having such power merely to l, ý'us6; 
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forces of production and exclude others from doing so, this "power" 
turns out in fact to be not really a power at all but the means 
whereby one is exploited. That is, for example, the worker's owner- 
ship or relation of production extends only to his own personal labour- 
power (and perhaps some petty possessions) which former must be sold 
to another or others for their profit in advance of his receiving the 
means to keep it and himself alive. Or, in the case of the serf, 
. his ownership extends only to a personal plot and dwelling, on 
sufferance, and only to a portion of his own labour-power (e. g. 5 
of 7 days): relations of production that presuppose he is-exploited 
by virtue of his in-perpetuity grant by feudal contract of two days 
free labour (or its equivalent) to his lord every week. In neither 
case, then, do the relations of production permit the owners in 
question much more than the "use". of their force(s) of production 
for subsistence survival, and in neither case can even this "use" 
be secured without at the same time the sufferance of exploitation. 7 
In short, in the difference between the power to exploit and thý 
power to use forces of production and exclude others from doing so 
lies for Marx the difference between the power of oppressor and 
7jt is worth noting that this sense of exploitation -- one 
party extracting unearned benefit from anothers labour by virtue 
of the power of ownership of forces of production -- is "double- 
barrelled": the power to exploit forces of production being at the 
same time the power to exploit people. But, just as important, 
this sense of exploitation seems to be the only sort of social 
domination Marx ever considered, a severe limitation I shall criticize 
in Book 2. 
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oppressed (excepting slavery, where the slave is not an owner of any 
productive force but is himself owned as one). 
4 The relations of production of a society coincide with its 
division of labour. That is, what force or forces of production a 
member of society effectively owns in a society coincides with his 
position in that society's division of labour (division of labour 
or. division of vocation being, of course, distinguished from division 
of task - the former implies individuals confined to "an exclusive 
sphere of activity", whereas the latter does not). If, for example, 
one owns nothing but one's own labour-power in a capitalist society, 
then correspondingly: (a) one's job is as a wage-labourer (employed 
or unemployed) and (b) one's job is of this or that sort according 
to the sort of labour-powerwhich is owned (e. g. unskilled manual or 
engineering physics). And if, in the same context, one owns signif- 
icant forces of production in addition to personal labour-power, 
then one's position in society's division of labour - whether in 
the job-place of a small store manager or the job-place of factory 
master - will similarly coincide with the extent and nature of the 
additional forces of production so owned. This correspondence 
between the relations of production and the division labour of a 
society, between its members' ownership places and vocation places 
is repeatedly if cryptically affirmed by Marx. Thus he says such 
things as: 
"In the real world... the division of labour and all M. Proudhon's 
other categories are social relations forming in their entirety 
what is known today as property" (. EofP, 160). 
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It might profitably be added here that division of labour is some- 
thing like a bridging category between forces of production and re- 
lations of production: it mediates between technological relations 
(whose content is implicit in, but not enjoining of, vocational 
divisions) and economic relations (with which the division of labour 
coincides). It is their joint "expression": as so to say the op- 
erations of a language are the joint expression of its semantics and 
syntax. 
8 
5 Relations of production are more "real" "basic" or "essential" 
than legal or political relations-insofar as (among other reasons) 
they involve powers and the latter involve merely rights. As has 
already been suggested powers and rights may regularly coincide, but 
often they do not: as, for example, in any state (e. g. capitalist or 
soviet) where the, citizen body hold the right(s) of ownership of some 
or all forces of production but a small ruling group hold some or all 
of the Power(s) of ownership (i. e. some or all of the powers to use 
or exploit the forces in question and exclude others from doing so). 
Because powers always entail material enablement whereas rights do 
not, the powers of relations of production are in this sense for Marx 
8While 
we have this comparison before us, I might say that Marx's 
notion of a hidden social "essence" (the economic base) - which has 
earned critical notice as the sin of "essentialism" -- is no more meta- 
physical than the grammarian's "essentialist" belief in an underlying 
structure governing language. The comparison here also illustrates how 
it is possible for behaviour to be governed by laws that the behavioural 
agent does not himself discern -a claim that has upset many readers 
of Marx (though not readers of grammar books). 
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more "real". "basic" or "essential" than the rights of legal and 
political relations. 
6 Relations of production - like human nature, forces of pro- 
duction and the other general categories of Marx's sociohistorical 
ontology - are historically conceived. Thus although all relations 
of production through successive eras are characterized by the various 
general properties already outlined, they vary from epoch to epoch 
inasmuch as: 
i the forces of production to which men are so related vary from 
age to age in content (e. g. artisan workshops historically give way 
to modern factories) and - relatedly - 
ii the "laws of motion" (i. e. laws of exchange and surplus value 
extraction) of relations of production vary from age to age (e. g. 
feudal obligations and rent-in-kind historically give way to cash- 
payment and money profits): 
9 
Now that Marx's concept of relations of production has been 
clarified and elaborated we may consider these relations in their 
91n Capital (LI, 10), Marx refers to the "economic law of 
motion" rather than, as I have it, "laws of motion". Though (as it 
shall be the task of the next pages to point out) there is in a sense 
onO "law of motion" for all societies in Marx's schema -- 
namely, every exchange between ruling-class (e. g. capitalists) and 
produclng class (e. g. proletarians) in any Economic Structure yields 
surplus-va, lue-to the rulinR-class - there are also for Marx, many 
complementary specific economic laws (e. g. regarding rate of surplus- 
value) which has led me to talk of "laws of motion", to render this 
term in the plural. (Should the Newtonian nomenclature here dismay 
the reader by its implicit conflation of natural and social science 
models, the less provocative "economic laws" may be properly sub- 
stituted. ) 
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totality: consider, that is, the "Economic Structure". 
For Marx, the essential and defining principle of the Economic 
Structure is its enduring ruling-class pattern: that is, the 'effective 
ownership" of most of society's forces of production by a small part 
of that society (the ruling-class) and the effective ownership of 
few or none of society's forces of production by the large majority 
of that society (the workers). 
10 Exactly what forces of production 
are here involved (e. g. whether the arable land as in rural feudalism 
or the factories and machinery as in urban capitalism), who has 
effective ownership of them (e. g. whether hereditary lords or capi- 
talists) and how such relations of production actually operate (e. g. 
whether by the economic laws of feudalism or capitalism) are questions 
to which the answers will provide a more determinate view of the 
Economic Structure under consideration. 
The ruling-class pattern of the Economic Structure however, 
whatever its specific form, readers the non-owning majority, the 
workers, dependent for their survival on the "small part of society 
who possesses the monopoly of the forces of production" (CI, 235): 
for the latter are the material means whereby men stay alive. Thus 
the ruling-class are in the position through their "monopoly" of the 
forces of production to extract payment from the non-owning labourers 
and others in exchange for allowing these latter those benefits from 
"There are, of course, people - "petty" owners - who are 
members neither of the ruling class nor of the labouring (or working) 
class and my wording permits this. 
93 
the productive forces which they require to continue living. This 
payment in the case of the productive workers is surplus labour on 
the ruling-class-owned forces of production above and beyond what is 
allocated to keep them alive (which surplus-labour expresses itself 
in such historical forms as rent-in-kind or money profit). Thus, 
in one of the most definitive passages, Marx says: 
The specific economic form [Economic Structure], in which unpaid 
surplus is pumped out of direct producers ... the direct relationship 
of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct pro- 
ducers ... reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure. (CIII, 791) 
In the case of non-productive workers (e. g. state functionaries, 
personal servants, ideologists and other "parasites"), the payment is 
labour at mere service functions which directly or indirectly protect 
the ruling-class economic order, but produce no material use-value. 
(There are cases, of course, where the non-owners seek to 
avoid this exploitative arrangement and attempt to stay alive in some 
other manner: for example, by beggary, vagabondry or robbery. How- 
ever, Marx reports in detail in Capital the fate of those who have 
resorted to such a strategy: whipping, mutilation, slavery, depri- 
vation of children, imprisonment and execution. ) 
The Economic Structure is in general then, for Marx, the 
enduring ruling-class pattern of the totality of the relations of 
production (i. e. a small minority of society effectively owns most 
of the forces of production and a large majority owns few or none 
of the forces of production): which ruling-class pattern always 
involves the ruling-class extracting surplus labour or service from 
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the non-owning labourers (i. e. its "law of motion"). 
It is worth adding here that an "enduring ruling-class pat- 
tern" embraces for Marx not only those cases in which a ruling-class 
retains its monopolist holdings but those cases in which it increases 
such holdings (e. g. in capitalism). So even though there-may be con- 
tinuing changes in relations of production in many respects (e. g. 
in capitalism, the petty-bourgeoisie being reduced to wage-labourers 
and wage-labourers being reduced to lumpen proletarians,, notto men- 
tion individuals merely supplanting, and being supplanted by, one 
another in economic positions, which themselves remain constant)i 
the Economic Structure itself and its. "laws of motion" do not change. 
Its ruling-class pattern, persists-behind the manifold changes of non- 
ruling-class relations of production, individuals variously switching 
economic places and even the membership of the ruling-class itself 
dwindling; and the extraction of surplus-value according to definite 
laws of motion -- the principles of-operation of such an Economic 
Structure, of such a ruling-classýpattern -- remain-constant too 
(e. g. the feudal lord's exchange of precisely defined protection 
for the serf's similarly defined labour service, the capitalist's 
exchange of a certain money, salary for the proletarian's weekly labour- 
power, etc. ). It is in this constancy of-the Economic Structure 
and its laws of motion or principles of operation that Marx perceives 
underlying "form" or "essence" which continues to obtain through 
whatever changes there are in its production-relations content. 
With particular Economic Structures and, their laws of, motion, 
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of course, Marx presents a much more specific picture. For example, 
in his descriptions of the class make-up of the capitalist Economic 
Structure, the "pattern' Marx presents is a complex mosaic comprised 
of various groups within the ruling class (e. g. "big landed property", 
"high finance" and "large-scale industry") and the labouring class 
(e. g. agricultural, industrial and service workers); as well as in 
between these two great classes (e. g., the "petty-bourgeoisie" and 
the professions) and beneath them (e. g. the "lumpenproletariat"). 
But however determinate and elaborate Marx's representationof the 
Economic Structure's class make-up may be, classes, are such by vir- 
tue of, basically, common relations of production. 
Hence, in any Economic Structure: 
1) Members of the ruling-class own enough productive forces other 
than their personal labour-power that they can exploit them to yield -- 
through the operation the surplus-value extracting "laws of motion" 
of the Economic Structure in question -- all therevenue (and more 
that is required for subsistence above-the social standard: -divisions 
within this ruling-class -- divisions into subclasses -- being a 
matter of what sort of surplus-value-yielding external productive 
forces are so owned (e. g. landed-property, machinery, or, fluid capital 
i. e. ownership of not yet specified forces of production). Such 
division into subclasses, as with class divisions of any sort in- 
Marx's schema, is only historically meaningful insofar as, there is a 
contradiction of ownership interests between the econonomic groups 
involved: that is, only when one ruling group's ownershipInterests 
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or relations of production must be secured through the derogation 
of such interests of another ruling group (e. g. the interests, of big 
landed property in nineteenth century England demanded tariffs on 
corn to protect the value of and revenues from their agricultural 
holdings, whereas the interests of large-scale industry demanded 
the removal of such tariffs -- which must raise food prices - to 
keep their wage-costs down). When, and only when, such antagonisms 
of economic interests obtain between ruling-class groups doesýMarx 
take them into account in his class analysis of the Economic Struc- 
ture in question (herein lies the second criterion for Marx of an 
economic class, of which more later). 
2) Members of the productive labouring class own insufficient 
productive forces other than personal labour-power to subsist at any 
level without exchanging the latter for the means to-stay alive-(which 
economic impoverishment of, and exchange by, the productive labouring 
class is at the same time enrichment of, and exploitation by, the 
ruling-class): the divisions within this labouring class being a 
matter of what sort of personal labour-power is so owned (e. g. in 
capitalism, skilled or unskilled labour-power, or any gradient of 
these). However, such divisions in productive labourer ownership 
are rarely historically significant for Marx inasmuch as there is 
for him seldom -- nationally, at least -- a "contradiction" in owner- 
ship interest, seldom an occasion when the securing of one such 
group's interests must derogate from another's. when there are 
economic antagonisms between working-class owners of different 
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productive labour-powers (e. g. between Irish immigrant workers and 
native English workers in nineteenth century capitalist Britain), 
then class division within the direct producer class obtains and 
subclass analysis becomes of import. (Marx may have drastically 
under-rated the intensity and range of subclass antagonisms of this 
sort in his class analysis of the Economic Structure, unlike his em- 
phasis on subclass division in the ruling--class). 
3) Other owners of forces of production -- e. g. in capitalism 
"independent producers", "small masters", "shop-keepers" and so on 
constitute "petty" classes for Marx insofar as the extent of their 
productive force ownership is relatively small and the mode of 
exchange of such productive forces relatively independent of the 
surplus-value-extracting laws of motion of the obtaining Economic 
Structure. Hence he more or less ignores such classes in his eco- 
nomic (as opposed to his political) analysis. 
4) Most of the remaining revenue-receiving groups in capitalist 
society (lawyers, soldiers, priests, personal servants, salesmen, 
bureaucrats, police, judges, entertainers, academics, lumpenproletarians, 
etc. ) do not own any significant productive force -- not instruments 
of production, utilizable natural resources nor (in practice) productive 
labour-power - and are to this extent not economic classes at all. 
Their economic significance for Marx is that: 
i They live off the surplus-value extracted by the ruling-Lclass 
from the productive labouring class and are thereby "parasites" with- 
in the Economic Structure and upon its laws of motion. 
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ii They typically play some superstructural or ideological role 
and are thereby protectors of the capitalist Economic Structure 
(see Chapter VII) -- performing this protective function is, indeed, 
the earlier mentioned "payment" they must make to secure those benefits 
from the ruling-class-owned productive forces they require to stay 
alive. Marx devotes considerable time to this motley collection of 
non-productive revenue-receiving, structure-protecting groups in 
capitalist society -- especially in the volumes of his Theories of 
Surplus Value -- and he does not seem to have missed the point of 
their significance in numbers. (Why it is that he does not give such 
groups more social weieht in his anticipation of successful proletarian 
political revolution against the capitalist order is never made very 
clear and may constitute a crucial underemphasis on his part: see 
, my 6apter VII, Economic Determinism). But in any case, these groups 
of "parasites" are not economic classes for Marx to the extent that 
they own no significant forces of production other than the material 
commodities and labour power they regularly negate as productive 
forces by unproductive use. Thus Marx often refers to them as merely 
"ideological classes" (e. g. CI, 446). 
This very brief outline of how Marx gives determinate class 
shape to an Economic Structure -- focussing essentially on ruling- 
class and productive-labouring class relations of production and the 
110f course, one could be ingenious here and consider the unused 
productive force of personal labour-power of these "parasites" as one 
of the contributing factors of revIolution. 
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antagonistic subclasses within these, but also noting the insignificant 
class and non-class groups which are, respectively, in the intercicies 
of and parasitical upon this ruling-class pattern -- this brief out- 
line shows us only the bare frame whereby specificity is achieved in 
Marx's characterization of the class-construction of an Economic 
Structure. But I think it discloses the underlying general principles 
he employs in this connection. 
Now so far as Marx's particularization of the laws of motion 
of an Economic Structure is concerned, herein lies perhaps the sci- 
entific core of his entire post-1845 enterprise. That is, specification 
of the laws of the capitalist Economic Structure is the single most 
extensively treated domain of systematic inquiry of Marx's mature 
analysis -- dominating most of the second two volumes of Capital, 
as well as the three books of Theories of Surplus Value. I am not 
therefore going to venture into the details of this massive literature, 
but am simply going to identify the set of principles which seem to 
me of general importance in understanding what Marx means by the 
"laws of motion" of the Economic Structure -- whether it be Asiatic, 
ancient, feudal or capitalist: 
1) The motion of an Economic Structure is the circulation or 
exchange-of productive forces which takes place within it: be tween, 
essentially, the ruling-clasp and the direct producers -- the pro- 
ducers exchanging with the ruling-class some or all of their pro- 
ductive labour-power in return for from the latter the means of 
subsistence required to keep them alive (the practical necessity of 
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this exchange being, of course, what ensures the continuous flow of 
the "motion" in question). For example, in a capitalist Economic 
. 
Structure, there is an unceasing exchange of labour-power and wages 
between capitalist and proletarian, a perpetual circulation or "motion" 
of productive forces changing hands: which exchange is and, must be 
continuous in the system -- hence Marx's persistent-imagery of 
organism in this connection -- for the capitalist to remain a capitalist 
and for the proletarian to remain productive. 
2) The laws of this "motion" have not only to do with the more, 
or less content quantities, standard modes, regularities of circuit, 
etc., of such and such productive forces in repetitive and structure- 
conforming exchange between the ruling-class and the direct producers, 
but -- most important for Marx - with. the regular extraction of 
surplus value (or surplus labour) by the former from the'latter 
which thereby takes place. The laws of motion associated with this 
regular extraction of surplus value are, in the case of capitalism, 
identified in detail by Marx: so that riot only does he talk in 
general terms - as with other Economic Structures -- of such laws 
necessitating and regulating exchange of certain productive forces 
between ruling-class and direct producers in such a manner that 
standard forms and amounts of surplus value are continuously "pumped 
out" to the ruling-class; but -- unlike his analysis of the "motion" 
of other Economic Structures -- he formalizes and schematizes this 
whole process in its main phases of production and circulation, in 
its major forms of exploitative extraction (rent, interest, profit), 
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in its changing content, turnover, rate and accumulation of surplus 
value expropriation, and so forth and so on. With the particular 
Economic Structure of capitalism, in short, the laws of motion govern- 
ing the ruling-class pattern of production relations take on with 
Marx the character of a massive theoretical system. But the essential 
content of these economic laws remains as always for him, the regular 
extraction of surplus-value by the ruling-class from the direct pro- 
ducers via the two's exchange of productive forces, (by, that is, 
the exchange of means of existence for personal labour power): which 
extraction is reinforcing of,, and made possible byt the monopoly 
pattern of the relationscf production constituting the Economic 
Structure in question. 
Now of the laws of motion of capitalism specificallyt it is 
important to emphasize that Marx sees such laws as different from the 
laws of motion of any other Economic Structure in this respect: only 
with capitalism do the laws of motion render the growth of exchange 
value as the end-in-itself of the cycle of production and circulation 
(CI, 154). With capitalism, that is, the role of exchange value 
is no longer as in other economýc formations that of a simple medium 
between use-values (i. e. Commodity--> Money-->Commodity) but the final 
goal for the attainment of which-use-values are reduced to mere 
instrumentality (i. e. Money---3o. Commodity--)Eore_MoneD . Otherwise 
put, the end and aim of production and circulation in capitalism 
is reversed: where it was once use-values or the service of human 
needs/wants (with money as just a go-between in the circulation of 
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use-values), it is now money as such (with use-values, or the service 
of human needs/wants, as the mere go-between in the circulation of 
capital). In other words, the economic laws of capitalism represent 
the real and systematic de-humanization of the production circulation 
process: replacing the service and amplification of men by use-value 
as the end of the economic process with the service and amplification 
of capital by profit as this end (as demonstrated by the recurrent 
phenomena of use-values being sacrificed -- unemployment, unused 
factory capacities and destruction of goods are some of the examples 
given by Marx -- for the benefit of capital gain). Now all this is 
very perfunctorily put, but it gives the gist of the reason Marx 
believed the economic laws of capitalism were inherently anti-human, 
unlike the principles of operation of any other historical Economic 
Structure which were at least directed towards human ends, if only 
essentially the use-value benefit of the ruling class. 
When we consider-topether the particular class content and 
laws of motion of the Economic Structure of., capitalism, it is not 
difficult to discern how a Marxian account might explain and indeed 
predict the well-known social ills that afflict capitalist society. 
Thus, for example, pollution of the life-elements can be seen to be 
an instantiation of the imperative of capital growth exerting its 
primacy over all considerations of human utility. Economic imperial- 
ism similarly can be seen as further instantiation of the same 
imperative, invading wherever and however capital amplification is 
assured. Inflation, in turn, can be read as simply the necessary 
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regular devaluation of money: necessary, that is, to maintain the 
ruling-class's structural monopoly of wealth intact in the face of 
forced increases in wages. Then, to conclude this reportoire of 
examples, replacement of repetitive labour-power by machinery (in- 
trinsically liberative) can be understood to pose the problem -- as 
opposed to the social triumph -- of "unemployment" only because of 
capitalist ownership of such machinery and its benefits. So the 
comprehension of various problems within capitalist society -- more 
or less intractable to "bourgeois" economic theory -- might proceed 
employing the Marxian explanatory frame of Economic Structure and laws 
of motion. 
In summary, just as with a particular Economic Structure 
Marx presents a much more specific and complex picture of the class 
set-up than merely ruling-class and labourers and so -- inseparably -- 
he presents a much more specific picture of the "laws of motion" 
of such an Economic Structure than merely that of the former "pumping 
unpaid surplus-labour out of" the latter. But whether his concern is 
general or specific characterization, it is always the case with the 
mature Marx that he sees in the ruling-class Economic Structure and 
its laws the "innermost secret" of this or any other historical ý 
society: the "secret" that is systematically "hidden" by the legal 
and political superstructure, the ideology-and the forms of social 
consciousness of the society in question (in ways much of the rest 
of this paper will attempt to point out), and the "secret" that 
his work is most of all dedicated to telling. 
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Before concluding this section, it is worth making a few final 
remarks on Marx's central and traditionally problematic concept of 
"economic class". 
1) All classes constitutive of the Economic Structure -- generally 
speaking the ruling-class, the productive labourer class and any re- 
maining classes, as well as the subclasses within all these -- are only 
economic classes: that is, each is (to use Marx's frequent term) merely 
a class, or subclass, "in itself". Whether any is organized or conscious 
of itself as a class (or subclass), whether any is "for itself" is a 
matter of superstructural and ideological "reflex" to the economic 
situation: it is not an economic matter. Hence Marx, says'such things 
as: 
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people 
of the country into workers. The combination of capital has 
created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This 
mass is already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. 
In the struggle-this mass becomes united and constitutes itself 
as a class for itself .... But the struggle of class against class 
is a Political struggle. (LofP, 150) 
2) Economic classes, as I have already indicated, not only require 
common relations of production to count as classes, but also require -- 
to be historically meaningful -- "contradiction" between the common 
ownership interests so involved. The. b_as_i_c contradiction of this sort 
is always of course for Marx that between the ownership interests of 
the ruling-class and the ownership interests of the direct producers: 
a contradiction that is implicit in the very notion of an Economic 
Structure, in the very notion of a "ruling-class pattern" in the 
relations of production. But whatever is treated as a real class 
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phenomenon by Marx, whether basic or peripheral, whether referring 
to general classes or particular (sub) classes, involves some "con- 
tradiction" between the common relations of production or interests 
of the classes involved. This dimension of contradiction is essential 
to all groups that Marx counts as real economic classes: as opposed 
to sets of people united only by common relations of production - 
"classes" only in name. (I think this further criterion of what counts 
as an economic class for Marx - that is, that the latter is such 
not only by virtue of common relations of production but by virtue 
of "contradiction" with other co- n relations of production -- deserves 
special emphasis insofar as it shows the way one might properly com- 
plete the famous unfinished manuscript on classes in Capital, Volume 
111; 12 as well as more generally, pointing up the inherent antagonism 
of material interests involved for Marx in economic class division, 
which antagonism is for him the spring of the entire legal-political 
12Here is the passage in question (CIII, 886): 
The first question to be answered is this: what constitutes a class? 
.... At first glance, the identity of revenues and sources of revenues. 
For example, in a capitalist society there are three great social 
groups whose members, the individuals forming them live on wages 
profit and ground rent respectively i. e. revenues, on the realisation 
of their labour power, their capital, and their landed property i. e. 
sources of revenues. However, from this standpoint i. e. conceiving 
classes in terms of common revenues and sources of revenues, phy- 
sicians and officials, e. g. would also constitute two classes, for 
they belong to two distinct social groups, the members of each of 
these groups receiving their revenue from one and the same source 
the same would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest 
and rank into which the division of social labour splits labourers 
as well as capitalists and landowners - the latter, e. g. into owners 
of vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners and owners 
of fisheries. .... [Here the manuscript breaks off. ] 
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superstructure or State (see Chapter IV). 
3) The ruling-class pattern of the Economic Structure implies, as 
I have emphasized, the basic contradiction between the interests of 
the ruling owners and the interests of the direct producers from whom 
surplus labour (value) is extracted. This bears repeating inasmuch 
as there should be no doubt of Marx's view of all further class an- 
tagonisms as quite secondary (e. g. between particular classes or 
"subclasses" within the ruling class). Classes of any sort'are real 
economic classes for Marx by virtue of the contradiction of their 
common interests with some other economic group's common interests, 
but the "basic" or "essential" classes and class contradiction involves 
for him the ruling owners and the direct producers insofar as: 
i These two classes between them own all or almost all the material 
means (i. e. productive forces) whereby the society reproduces its 
life (hence their "basic" or "essential" status qua, relations of 
production). 
ii From the exchanges of these two classes all or almost all the 
surplus value extraction (i. e. exploitation) of the society is gen- 
erated (hence their "basic" or "essential" status qua "contradictory" 
relations of production). 
On these accounts then any other conflicts of class interest count 
for Marx as less central, if not ultimately derivative. 
13 
DIn Book 2,1 shall suggest that there are many "structures 
of domination" that may not involve exploitation" in the Marxian sense, 
but are no less worthy of attention on this account qua modes of domination 
and class antagonism. 
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From all this description of the Economic Structure and its 
"ruling-class pattern"_, we can understand at least by negation what 
sort of society Marx had in mind when he talked about communism -- 
obviously no ruling-class ownership nor laws of motion of exchange 
whereby a surplus value is extracted from the direct producers for 
rulers and parasites' revenues, nor, any other form of class antagonism. 
Indeed one of the most interesting features of the post-historical 
society Marx sketches is -- in addition to and corresponding with its 
communal ownership of the forces of production -- the general "law 
of motion" of exchange he envisages it as being ultimately governed 
by: namely, in Marx's own famous words, "From each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs" (GP, 37). Here as one can 
see, not only is the. exploitativpýaspect of all historical modes of 
exchange transcended (i. e. there is no surplus value extraction by 
one class from another by virtue of ownership monopoly); but exchange 
itself takes on a new character (i. e. it surpasses the principle of 
quid pro quo1 altogether). The radical quality of Marx's vision here 
cannot be overestimated: exchange is no longer a matter of giving in 
order to take as in all hitherto existing societies but giving according 
to one's abilities (independently of pay-off) and receiving according 
to one's needs (independently of contribution). Exchange in the com- 
munist utopia is thus organic (i. e. there is no division of interest) 
and free (i. e. it is determined by individual "abilities" and "needs"). 
Strictly speaking, it is not really "exchange" as we know it at all, 
inasmuch as grant and reception are not yoked. Rather, it is the 
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arrangement of love socially construed. 
But of course in allhistorical societies, the antagonistic 
ruling-class Economic Structure and its exploitative laws of motion 
rule and divide as for Marx the "essence" of the human condition. 
We have just investigated the mechanics of this "essence". For the 
precise ways in which its determination of other "superstructural" 
factors coercively obtains, I reserve a special section, Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE 
The legal and political superstructure or, asiMarx'often 
more elliptically puts it, the "superstructure". 
' is similar to 
the other categories of his general theoretical framework in that 
it is never accorded explicit definition. The interpretator here, 
as elsewhere, can only derive such characterization from Marx's- 
work, not directly cite it. - 
But the problems in this regard are 
considerably more tractable than with such categories as "relations 
of production/Economic Structure" or "ideology". 
Briefly put, the legal and political superstructure is the 
investitured institutional complex of the State: the ". official 
side" of society which "stands above" the mode of production as its 
sanctioned and coercive regulator (e. g. "the courts, the army and 
the bureaucracy" (RZ, 193)). In general, what distinguishes this 
legal and political superstructure or official state mechanism from 
lSometimes Marx uses the term "superstructure" to refer to 
just legal and political institutions, and sometimes he uses it to 
apply more broadly to these and ideology and forms of social conscious- 
ness as a unitary whole. I shall use the term in the same permissive 




the "underlying" Economic Structure to whichAt "corresponds" is 
that all its content is or has been consciously constructed by some 
form or other of recognized social authority: where as the latter's 
more fundamental content -- more fundamental in the sense,, among 
others, that that which is "recognized" is logically prior to that 
which "recognizes" -- obtains "independently of the will of indivi- 
duals" (GID, 37)2 and is only "scientifically discoverable" (CI, 542). 
Marx follows the gist of this general distinction in almost all his 
discussions of the legal-political superstructure and the economic 
base. 
Implicit in this general distinction between Economic Struc- 
ture (C) and legal-political superstructure (D) are a complex of 
closely related specific distinctions which Marx alludes to repeatedly 
in his corpus. These are: 
a) The relations D involves are in terms of formal. rights and 
obligations whereas the relations C involves are in terms of ef- 
fective powers and constraints (e. g. CID, 80 and 352-9). 
b) D is the de lure representative of "the general interest"s 
whereas C is the de facto organization of particular material in- 
terests (gID, 45-6,78). 
2This favorite claim of Marx that relations of production 
obtain "independently of the will of individuals "has often been 
wrongly interpreted as denial of free will simpliciter. Marx is, 
of course, making no such metaphysical claim, but is, merely stating C- 
the empirically incontrovertible -- that the economI4 or er carries 
on independently of the will (as opposed to actions) of individuals 
(as opposed to groups) See GID, 357 ff. 
ill. 
c) D's form is visible and institutional whereas C's form is 
concealed and unacknowledged (CIII, 791). 
The really contentious point about Marx's notion of a legal- 
political superstructure is not, however, the variously articulated 
distinction he draws between it and the economic substructure, but 
the fact that he regards it as a super structure. What, one is here 
moved to ask, are the reasons for Marx ascribing primacy to the struc- 
-I ture of the economy vis a vis that of law and politics? Why is the 
latter construed as the "base", the infrastructure, and the former 
as the "reflex", the superstructure? No single question-has been 
more persistently put to Marx's theoretical framework than this. 
Marx suggests a number of mutually re-enforcing answers to 
this query, which are briefly as follows: 
1 The legal and political superstructure arises in whole and in 
part onlv upon alreadv existina antaRonisms of material interest 
inherent in the production relations/Economic Structure (which it 
"expresses" and "regulates") and does not obtain independently of 
these economic antagonisms (PofP, 151). 
3 Thus, says Marx, the legal 
and political superstructure is the "official, active and conscious 
expression of the Economic Structure of society" (Lott. p. 222) 
3Note here the similarity in principle to Locke's notion of 
the State as an "umpire' arising to resolve disputes over individual 
property. Like Marx, Locke (not to mention Hobbes and others) takes 
it as obvious that the erection of the State depends upon already exist- 
ing antagonisms of interest. However, unlike Marx, these philosophers 
do not discern a ruling-class pattern to such antagonisms of interest 
which for Marx renders the "umpire" or "Leviathan" of the State ulti- li-*% W% 
mately subordinate rather;, sovereign in its function. 
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wherein (among other, secondary antagonisms) the material interest 
of the ruling-class -- to sustain-its expropriation of the surplus 
labour of others -- is systematically antagonistic to the material 
interest of the ruled class(es) from whom this surplus labour is 
expropriated. If, Marx holds, there were no such systematic antagon- 
isms of material interest inhereht in the relations of production/ 
Economic Structure -- as in the projected communist utopiawhere 
there would be no private power to use or exploit society's forces 
of production and-exclude others from doing so -- then there would 
be no legal and political superstructure required to preside over 
such divisions (just as, Marx contended, there was no State before- 
such private ownership of the productive, forces came, into being). 
Because the necessary material. 'ground. of the superstructure -- an- 
tagonistic relations of production which it is-historically constructed 
to meet -- would no longer exist, it would "wither away" (21,74). 
Insofar as the legal an&political superstructure is thus dependent 
for its existence on the ownership divisions of the economic system, 
it is derivative and-the latter is primary. The two are related, 
to put it loosely, as problem-raiser and problem-responder (thus 
Marx's term "reflex" for the superstructure). 
- 
Marx's claim here of exhaustive dependency of the State or 
superstructure on antagonistic relations ý of production/Economic 
Structure does not, of course, rule out. a central planning and 
distributing agency for production in the communist utopia: such 
an agency is not a State orau2erstructure but wholly integral to 
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the needs-production dynamic (Distribution here, for instance, is 
not dictated by ownership or Juridical right but by the principle 
of "to each according to his needs"). On the other hand, Marx may 
have overlooked certain antagonisms of interest other than those 
involved in relations of production which themselves could ground -- 
and historically have grounded -- an officiating State "standing above" 
needs and production: for which other forms of antagonism, see Book 
2 of this essay). 
2 Except in revolution (where the economic base is proximately 
altered by the operations of the legal and political superstructure), 
any conflict between the requirements or laws of the class-patterned 
relations of production/Economic Structure and the requirements or 
laws of the legal and political superstructure is resolved in favour 
of the former. For example, the established civil rights of the 
superstructure will be suspended or ignored if their operation 
represents a threat to the ruling-class monopoly of productive forces 
or "laws of motion" of the economic baseý The requirements of the 
latter take precedence over the requirements of the former in this, 
or any other, case of non-revolutionary disjunction. In this sense 
too, then, the Economic Structure owns primacy over the legal and 
political superstructure (for a detailed discussion of this and 
other forms of "Economic Determinism", see Chapter VII). 
3 Since men cannot live on the content of the legal and political 
superstructure, whereas they can and do live on the productive-force 
content of the relations of production/Economic Structure, they act 
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in accordance with the latter rather than the former: 
Material interests preponderate ... the Middle Ages could not 
live on Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics. On the 
contrary, it is the mode in which they gained a livelihood that 
explains why here politics and there Catholicism played the 
chief part. (CI, 82) 
Insofar as men act in accordance with their relations to the material 
means of human life (i. e. what is/can be used to make material use- 
value) rather than their relations to the stuff of law and politics 
as such (i. e. what is not/cannot be so used) the relations of pro- 
duction/Economic Structure is more "basic" than legal and political 
superstructure. In this sense (which underlies, of course, sense 
(2)), the former-again-owns primacy. 
(That something is a productive force (i. e. is/can be used 
to make a material use-value) does not mean that it must- be so 
used as the "can be" wording indicates. Hence the ruling class's 
effective ownership relations to housing facilities, foodstuffs, 
tools, natural resources et al which may not in fact be productively 
used but merely parasitically consumed by them in one way or another, 
still qualify as relations of production. And it is in accordance 
with such and other relations of production, Marx claims, that men 
(the ruling-class most importantly) generally act -- as opposed to 
in accordance with rights, obligations and other claims of the 
legal and political superstructure. Nevertheless there may still 
be here a too narrow concept on Marx's part of what counts as the 
"means of life" which men act in accordance with: for which issue, 
again, see Book 2). 
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To this point we have seen that Marx distinguishes the legal 
and political superstructure from the production relations/Economic 
Structure in a number of ways and that on empirical grounds he regards 
it as a Luperstructure in its relationship to the latter. However 
we have not yet identified the precise nature of the relationship in 
question itself: we have dealt rather with the nature of the two 
factors related and which factor, for Marx, -owns primacy. 
As I have suggested in (1) above, the superstructure in Marx's 
view arises because, and only because, of antagonisms of material 
interest inherent in the economic base. It is a social mechanism 
for dealing with the problems of these antagonisms and would, Marx 
holds, disappear or "wither away" with the removal of the latter 
in a communist society (so far, his claim is more or less in line 
with philosophical tradition, except in his belief in the real pos 
sibility of a future communism). The question we must now ask is, 
precisely how does the superstructure relate to the economic antagon- 
isms it is "raised" to deal with? For Marx the answer -- which is 
radically counter-traditional -- is simply this: it relates always 
to the relations of production/Economic Structure (except in epochal 
revolutionary periods) so as to maintain the ruling-class pattern of 
the latter intact. That is, far from being the resolving mechanism 
of common interest it is conventionally held to be, the State for 
Marx relates to the economic antagonisms it is raised to deal with 
by securing them -- or rather, the production relations/Economic 
Structure in which they are inherent -- from alteration (and hence, 
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from resolution). Thus Marx says such things as: 
The bourgeois state is nothing but a mutual insurance pact 
[cf. Social Contract] of the bourgeois class both against its 
members taken individually and against the exploited class. 
(21,48) 
There is a wide variety of ways in which the superstructure can be 
seen as thus protecting the ruling-class pattern of the economic 
base and its inherent antagonisms of material interest. Marx re- 
peatedly draws attention to five: 
1 It validates some or all existing relations of production 
(powers) as legal property relations (rights) and thereby as well 
validates the ruling-class's ownership monopoly and extraction of 
surplus-value. 
2 It enforces some or all existing relations of production by 
virtue of enforcing legal property relations which "express" the 
former, and thereby as well-again-enforces the ruling-class's mono- 
poly ownership and extraction of surplus-value. 
3 It adjusts whatever requires adjusting to perpetuate the ruling- 
class pattern of the production relations/Economic Structure (e. g. 
in a capitalist social formation, by periodically regulating wages, 
imposing protective duties, forcing sale of labour power, funding 
capitalist ventures, waging imperialist wars, persecuting dissidents, 
etc. ) 
4 It adjudicates individual and group disputes over proprietary 
claims (which disputes arise from the inherent antagonisms of the 
ruling-class relations of production/Economic Structure) in a manner 
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always consistent with the perpetuation of the latter. 
5 It misleads some or all of the people of a society into ac- 
ceptance of the production relations/Economic Structure by certain 
"mystifying" and "concealing" characteristics of its formally 
articulated content: 
i by its voluntaristic language which masks economic compulsion 
by a vocabulary of personal "will" and "agreement" (i. e. men do not 
personally "will" or "agree" to enter their various economic re- 
lations, as the voluntaristic language of legal and political con- 
tract pretend: on the contrary, they are generally "compelled" to 
enter such relations as a matter of practical necessity (e. g. GID, 
79)). 
ii by the "abstract" nature of its legal and political rights 
which imply universal equality (capitalism) or mutuality (feudalism) 
while in fact permitting the opposite of these (i. e. the abstract 
and equal right of all to private property in capitalist society 
permits in fact the virtual propertylessness of the vast majority 
(e'. g. CI, 583 ff); the universal mutuality of obligation in feudal 
society permits in fact the lord's extraction from the serf of sur- 
plus labour "without any compensation" (e. g. CIII, 790 ff)). 
iii by the community of interest or "illusory community" (GID, 
91) it purports itself to represent when a minority or ruling-class 
interest is in fact what it protects (i. e. the modern legal and 
political superstructure purports to be-securing the "public interest" 
when in fact its law is merely "the will of the bourgeois class plade 
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into a law for all" (CM, 67) and its political power is "merely the 
organized power of one class for oppressing another" (e. g. 21,74). 
As (i), (ii) and (iii) suggest, the legal and political 
superstructure has an important ideological dimension: that is why 
Marx describes it as "practico-idealist" in nature (GID, 85). How- 
ever because the ideological factor as a whole encloses-considerably 
more area than that covered by (5), Marx generally extends separate 
treatment to it (which I shall deal with in Chapter, V). 
Before proceeding any further with this exposition of Marx's 
concept of the legal and political superstructure, it is worth at- 
tending to what has often been highlighted as a problem. That is, 
how can the superstructure be conceived of as an "expression" or 
"reflex" of the economic base-when it itself may have been a necessary 
condition of the latter's formation? For example, how can the cap- 
italist legal and political superstructure be said to be an expression 
or reflex of capitalist Economic Structure when (as Marx himself 
indignantly affirms throughout his section on the "Primitive Ac- 
cumulation" in Capital "legal enactments" played a central role in 
forming this very economic base? 
The answer is, simply, that the political and legalýsuper- 
structure is related to the Economic Structure and its "laws of 
motion" in a different way between historical epochs (e. g. the 
transition period from feudalism to capitalism) than it is within 
these epochs. In such transition periods, Marx holds, the productive 
forces have "outgrown" the Economic Structure and its laws and thereby 
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transformed the latter's historical status from a "form of social 
development" to a "fetter" on such development. In this situation, 
and only in this situation, the official agency for regulating social 
intercourse -- the legal and political superstructure 7- cannot both 
maintain the Economic Structure and'its laws intact and allow for 
the preservation and development of the productive forces. It is 
on such occasions confronted with what Marx called a "fundamental 
contradiction"'in the mode of production. In this situation, and, 
again it must be stressed, only in this situation, it becomes possible 
-- and indeed technically necessary -- for the superstructure to 
operate in some way as an agency for the qualitative alteration 
(as opposed to maintenance) of the Economic Structure and'its laws: 
in accordance with the requirements of-productive-force development. 
But once this period of epochal transition is achieved, once 
the Economic Structure and its laws have been altered in form so that 
it is no longer a "fetter" on the productive forces but a new "form 
of their development", then the superstructure is ipSO facto deprived 
of the material grounds of its revolutionary potential and'reverts 
to its normal function of maintaining the economic base intact. 
In short, the legal and political superstructure operates always 
as an "expression" or "reflex" of the Economic Structure and its 
laws except in periods of epochal transition (such as that between 
feudalism and capitalism or between capitalism and socialism). What 
may appear to be an inconsistent stance by Marx on the functional 
status of the superstructure is in reality a matter of whether the 
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latter is located in a transitional or non-transitional historical 
context. However, I hasten to add, even in a transitional context 
the legal and political superstructure still remains in an important 
sense derivative or a "reflex" of material conditions: that is, 
with respect to the forces of production. As I have already suggested 
in my account above, Marx sees all. occasions of the legal and po- 
litical superstructure having primacy over the Economic Structure 
and its laws as occasions of the forces of production having "out- 
grown" the economic formation and causing the state superstructure 
to, in turn, exert atypical causal force over the former. So even 
in those exceptional cases of revolutionary social change, "material 
conditions" for Marx continue to be the ultimate determinant of 
superstructural operation. If it isn't the economic base determin- 
ing the legal and political superstructure it is (in a somewhat dif- 
ferent sense of "determine") the forces of production: in all 
cases, for Marx the superstructure remains just that, uTerstructural. 
Indeed Marx is so adamant on this point that when he does treat 
revolutionary situations where the superstructure can be said to 
alter rather than "correspond to" the economic infrastructure, he 
typically leaves out in his simmative statements the"middle-link 
of superstructural influence altogether and talks merely of the 
productive forces ut sic bursting the economic order (e. g. CI, 763). 
I think this habit may have led to many misunderstandings about the 
nature and extent of the superstructure's derivativeness with 
respect to the latter. 
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Another prima facie paradox that may seem to arise out of 
Marx's concept of the legal and political superstructure and its 
relationship to the economic base is worth considering here as well. 
The "paradox" in question is this: how can the superstructure be 
held to be the mechanism for the ruling-class to maintain its economic 
hegemony intact when this same superstructure is often noted by Marx 
to pass laws that seem explicitly against the present interests of 
ruling-class members? For-example, English factory legislation 
limiting the working day of labourers to ten hours (a piece of 
legislation that earns considerable notice from Marx in Capital 
comprised, on the face of it, the interests of factory owners;, be- 
cause such legislation limited the time per day that the factory 
labourer could work for the owner's profit (so that economists like 
Oxford's Nassau Senior claimed the "last hour" -- the profit-hour -- 
was being thereby eliminated and, with it, the safety of industrial 
capital), it seemed very much against at least some ruling-class 
members' economic interests. So how, when the bill was passed, could 
the superstructure still be held by Marx as the executor of ruling- 
class interests? 
The first thing to be made clear here is that Marx claims 
that the state superstructure maintains ruling-class interests with 
respect to the latter as a collective entity; or,. otherwise put, 
with respect to the overall ruling-class pattern of the production 
relations/Economic Structure. So it is quite consistent with this 
principle of the superstructure - base relationship -- namely, that 
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the former "correspond" to the collective economic interest of the 
ruling-class -- that this or that member or group, of members have 
their particular interest, or interestsýderogated: for the good of 
the class as a whole (in'this case, the, collective interest of the 
ruling-class being served by the better preservation of the endangered 
"golden goose" -- the labour-force -- which the bill in question 
secured). Understanding of this collective sense of ruling-class 
interest is crucial to understanding the nature of the superstructure 
and its relationship to the economic base. To recite the famous 
Communist Manifesto-remark: 
The bourgeois state is nothing but a mutual. insurance pact 
of the bourgeois class both taken against its members indi- 
vidually and against members of the exploited class. 
However Marx emphasizes in this case that not even--the 
particular., interests of ruling-class -sector (albeit'a pre-eminent 
sector) were in-fact compromised by this or any other form, of 
factory legislation. Despite the ideological rhetoric of a number 
of industrial capitalists (e. g. earthenware manufacturers), press 
organs (e. g. The Economist), -academic apologists (e. g. Nassau Senior) 
and others who opposed such legislation, as "impossible", what the 
latter's passage in, fact meant (insofar as it was effectively worded 
and got applied)4 was merely the "intensification of labour" by, 
4Marx frequently draws attention to , 
the inadequate formulation 
and application of Parliamentary legislation (e. g.. qI, 479-480,494-5) 
which ensures that little or nothing is, in fact, changed by such 
except official documents. This is one of the common duping features 
of the legal-political superstructure which occasions Marx's general 
description of the latter as "illusory". 
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mainly, the improvement of machinery; and thus the maintenance 
of the economic position and surplus value appropriation rate of 
even the particular interests of the industrial bourgeoisie intact. 
Indeed Marx suggests such and similar legislation actually benefits 
the interests of this particular section of the ruling-class, as 
well as the ruling-class generally (a) by requiring greater capital 
outlays for the improved machinery: and thereby "hastening on 
the decline of small masters, and the concentration of capital"' 
(LIý, 477) and (b) by "relatively depreciating the value of labour 
power" (CI, 406): and thereby "setting free" labourers replaced 
by machinery to swell the "industrial reserve army" available 
to the ruling-class, both for new ventures and for disciplining 
the already employed. So what appears to be the derogation by the 
superstructure (i. e. factory legislation) of the interests of a 
particular, central ruling-class sector is in fact here the main- 
tenance and, indeed, promotion of such interests. In this case, 
ruling-class interests are distributively as well as collectively 
secured by superstructural phenomenon. Such a course of affairs 
is typical in Marx's view. Hence even though an important distinc- 
tion must be made between the collective and particular interests 
of the ruling-class, with the former as always primary in the base- 
superstructure relationship, both sorts of interest are in the end 
typically held intact by the latter, despite "appearances" to the 
contrary. (This is not to say, certainly,, that Marx is suggesting 
that legislation like the ten-hour bill should have been opposed by 
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the working class, or was even possible without their militant pres- 
sure for it, just because it ultimately benefited the ruling-class. 
Marx's dialectical position here is that it is in precisely this 
sort of way that the seed of revolution is nourished within the 
bosom of the, established order: what is good for the latter is 
also at the same time the nurturing of the agencies of its future 
destruction). 
Of course, with all phenomena in the official, superstructural 
sphere the correspondence of this sphere and its phenomena to ruling- 
class economic interests (collective and particular) is systematically 
obscured by the language-and rationale of law and politics. There 
are few more persistent general points made by Marx about the super- 
structure than this. As we have already noted, a society's legal 
and political superstructure has an official language and rationale 
of self-description that obfuscates the economic bases's antagonistic 
ruling-class pattern, like an all-covering "shroud". But for a 
general description of this and the rest of ideology, we reserve 
the next section. 
So far, I have emphasized the derivative status of the legal 
and political superstructure with respect to the production relations/ 
Economic Structure. But it should also be'emphasized here that Marx 
still regarded the former as necessary, in practice to the latter's 
maintenance. That is, though he regarded the superstructure as 
always reflecting, and indeed depending for its very existence upon 
a class-divided economic base, he considered the persistence (not 
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existence) of the latter in its ruling-class pattern as requiring, 
in turn, a legal-political overlay. Without the latter, he repeatedly 
suggests, the relations of production/Economic Structure would not 
be protected by the several practical exigencies of all durable7, -, --' 
structures of domination, such as: 
a) social appearance -- Schein -- of "sanctity", and 
b) collective agency of enforcement for ruling-class, interests 
"as a whole". 
Now of course I have already-treated such superstructural functions 
as a) and b) in finer detail above. What I am concerned to do here 
is to consider them briefly from the point of view of their practical 
necessity or indispensabij_i, ýy as defense-mechanisms for the economic 
base: from which discerned indispensability of function we will be 
in a better position to make sense of the central role Marx ascribes 
to the superstructural phenomenon of political cla_ss strugglq. First 
of all, a) provides the protection of "mask" to the economic base 
(what ideology compounds), and constitutes for Marx the general 
"illusory" quality of the legal-political superstructure which in 
all societies of man's history conceals the true nature of its 
ruling-class economic system. Though he never directly says so, 
Marx generally implies this hoodwinking sanctification by the legal- 
political superstructure of the economic order to be a. required 
cover-up mechanism for the latter: without which it would be exposed 
(in the long run, ruinously) for the systematic exploitation system 
it is. Though in considering this indispensable "veil" function of 
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the superstructure we unavoidably introduce ideology into our ambit 
of inquiry, the mere officialized institutionalization (ideology 
aside) of economic power by State organization must be appreciated 
as itself a hallowing of the former: its very nature as a ceremonialized 
bureaucratic system officering the whole of society accords. it the 
mystique of elevated awful status, independently of formulated, descrip- 
tion. Marx, however, only hints at this kafkaesque phenomenon and, 
in general, tends to conflate the institutional and. ideological as- 
pects of State sanctification of the relations of production/Economic 
Structure. 
b), on the other hand, is a straightforward organizational 
requirement. Ruling-class relations of production require more than 
the particular powers-to-exclude constituting them to survive intact 
as a secure system. Some additional collectivý co-ordinator, adju- 
dicator, adjuster of enforcement in the interests of the ruling-class 
"as a whole" must exist -- that is, a legal and political u er- . L-2 
structure -- or the economic order in question will be ill-equipped 
to maintain its hold for long. In the first place, individual in- 
terests of the ruling-class are not necessarily consistent with the 
interests of this. class as a whole: ipso facto, some resolver of 
possible conflicts between these particular interests must be es- 
tablished "on top of" the production relations/Economic Structure 
(The legal, and political superstructure, the State, that thus arises 
is, as it were, the expression of a "Social Contract" among ruling- 
class members to yield to a common representative of their interests 
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as a whole in order to protect themselves from class-destructive 
internecine strife. ) In the second place, individual economic powers 
of members of the ruling-class are easier to resist or usurp than 
these powers enlarged in a collective form: ipso facto, some com- 
bination of these powers in the unified body of a superstructure is 
necessary to ensure the maximum security required to sustain the 
systematically exploitative and'antagonistic economic order beneath. 
(The State might that is thereby raised is, as it were, the "Leviathan" 
created by the ruling-class's combination of power into a single 
body, which then guards the relations of production/Economic Structure 
as the unbrookable "organized power of one class for oppressing another" 
(CM, 74)). Again here, Marx implies the superstructure as indispensable 
to the maintenance of a ruling-class economic order without stating 
such directly. But his implication here as earlier is no less firm 
for that: it is evident in almost his every discussion of super- 
structural function. 
"Social appearance of sanctity" and "collective agency for 
ruling-class interests as a whole" would seem thus for Marx coincident 
_quir em nts 
for the persistence of the ruling-class economic order; Xe EýI 
or, otherwise put, the indispensable shields of any durable system 
of exploitation -- holist "fraud" and "force" respectively. Such 
protective functions-afforded by the legal and political superstructure 
seem indeed so thoroughly indispensable in Marx's view to the security 
of ruling-class economic power arrangements that even the working 
class majority of a nascent socialist society-are held by him to 
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require State machinery to maintain their-economic ascendancy intact 
against the defeated capitalist minority i. e. "the dictatorship of the 
proletariat" (though here, uniquely, the "social appearance of sanctity" 
would not be "illusory" or "fraudulent" for Marx insofar as the State, 
for the first time in its history, putatively protects a non-ex- 
ploitative economic order. ) The superstructure is in a way thus, 
for Marx, as much a sine qua non condition of the former's persistence 
as this former is for the superstructure's existence. The two are 
dialectically integrated, so to say. Of course, Marx famously 
believed that a noný. class economic order would require no such 
superstructure or State insofar as there would be no intrinsic 
antagonisms of material interest to-institutionally mystify or en- 
force. But so long as the economic order is class-ruptured, an 
loactive, conscious and official expression" of this base contradiction, 
the State, must for 1ýaýx preside over the former to ensure the pre- 
servation of its ruling-class pattern. 
It is perhaps only when this status of indispensability of 
the legal-political superstructure to the ruling-class economic 
order's preservation is appreciated that we can understand why Marx 
counts superstructual "class struggle' -- and all class struggle 
for Marx is "political" or superstructural5 -- as so important in 
5Thus Marx says'such things as "the struggle of class against 
class is a political [i. e. superstructuralj-struggle" (PofP, 150) and, 
more elaborately: 
On the other hand, however, every movement in which the working cont'd 
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history: 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggle (21,45). 
Marx's line of thought seems to go something like this: 
1 The legal and political superstructure is the indispensable 
general protector of the ruling-class relations of production/Economic 
Structure. 
2 Therefore to maintain the ruling-class relations of production/ 
Economic Structure, the legal and political superstructure must be 
under the ruling-class's control: otherwise the former will be 
insecure to the extent that its essential mechanism of defense is 
insecure. Conversely, to alter the ruling-class relations of pro- 
duction/Economic Structure, the legal and political superstructure 
must be seized from the ruling-class's control: otherwise the former 
will remain secure to the extent that its essential mechanism of 
defense is secure. 
3 The only effective way either to keep or to seize control over 
the legal and political superstructure is through class-for-itself 
(i. e. political class) action (which class action necessarily involves 
class comes out as a class against the ruling-classes and tries 
to coerce them by pressure from without is a political movement. 
For instance, the attempts in a particular factory or even in a 
particular trade to force a shorter working day out of 
individual 
capitalists by strikes etc., is a purely economic movement. On 
the other hand, the movement to force through an eight-hour, 
etc., law is a political movement. And in this way out of the 
separate economic movements of the. workers there grows up every- 
where a political movement, that is to say a movement of the class, 
with object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a 
form possessing general, socially coercive force (SC, 328). 
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some form or other of class struggle insofar as the existence, of a 
class presupposes the existence of another class or classes with 
antagonistic material interests: see p. 12, Chapter III. Thýt such 
class-for-itself action - "class struggle" -- is in practice alone 
effective in keeping or seizing control of the protective superstruc- 
ture is the case because it alone possesses-the realized "general form" 
(great social group aware of itself, and committed to acting, as a 
great social group) and the material-interest content (common economic 
stake) together required to achieve disposition over State machinery. 
Without this 'realized general. form , attempts to keep or seize con- 
trol of the superstructure will be too particularistic to be socially 
effective. And without the content of common material interests, 
this . 
'general form, in turn, will be too "idealist" to endure through 
the pressures of unshared relations to the means of life. Political 
class action or "class struggle" is, thus, the key to control of the 
State or superstructure -- demonstrably in the past: probably, there- 
fore, in the-future. 
4 From 1,2, and 3, class struggle must more or less certainly be 
considered as the sole effective agency for keeping or seizing control 
of the legal and political superstructure and thereby, since the latter 
is the necessary general protector of the economic order, the only 
mode of action whereby maintenance or change of the real "anatomy" 
or "form" of the sociohistorical process is secured. 
Now this line of thought of Marx's is guided by several im- 
portant supportive beliefs which it is crucial to identify. Assuming 
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1 to be true, for example, 2 as a whole is true only if one believes, 
further, that there is no other practicable way of altering the 
ruling-class relations of production/Economic Structure than by 
seizing its indispensable mechanism of defense, the State. Yet the 
ruling-class itself or its superstructural agents or some combination 
of these and others might evolve the State away from its historical 
function of ruling-class protection and into conformity with its 
long pretended general interest function with no such seizure "from 
beneath" required (a possibility in which Social Democrats seem to 
believe). or, again, the economic order might be altered by by- 
passing superstructural mediation altogether -- with State repression 
at the same effectively resisted and negated -through workers and 
others taking over, slowly or rapidly, the means of production directly 
(a possibility to which anarchists seem committed). Or whatever -- 
there is more ways than one to skin a cat, more ways than one to 
subvert the production relations/Economic Structure than by seizing 
-its superstructural armour away from ruling-class control. 
But these 
alternative possibilities Marx must -- and does -- believe to be 
impracticable in inferring the latter part of (2) from (1). (Such 
"supportive" judgements indeed are so prominent in his work that the 
orthodox followers of Marx have since regarded them as something 
akin to articles of creed). Then, even assuming all of (2) to be 
true -- notwithstanding alternative possibilities like the above -- 
(3) is only-true if and only one believes, still further, that great 
groups of men in society cannot be enduringly united on other grounds 
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(e. g. humanist) than class ýrelations of production or material in- 
terests. This sort of alternative Marx in one way or another cer- 
tainly entertained, but -- again -- firmly rejected: as light- 
headed, if not downright reactionary. However despite his general 
rigeur de ligne here there are a few largely ignored hints in Marx's 
mature work that the sch-A I have set out above -- reasoning from 
the indispensability of the superstructure as a general protector 
of the ruling-class economic order to the view that class struggle 
is the only mode of action whereby maintenance or change of the 
underlying "essence" of society is secured -- is not quite so restric- 
tive as is generally thought. To begin with, the possibility of 
specific superstructural agents not in fact protecting the ruling- 
class economic pattern but being quite "free from partisanship" is 
not only allowed by Marx but described by him as having actually 
obtained, at the height of industrial capitalism (g. I, 9). Then again 
he was well aware of the possibility that ruling-class members (such 
as the young capitalist Robert Owen) could disengage from their 
present economic interests; and indeed he openly called for in his 
Preface to Capital to promote through the superstructure the in- 
terests of the working class: 
Apart from higher motives, therefore, their own most important 
interests dictate to the classes that are for the nonce the 
ruling ones, the removal of all legally removable hindrances 
to the free development of the working class (ýI, 9). 
And then, he occasionally remarked on the possibility that the 
"class struggle" need not be violent and that power might change 
hands from the capitalists to the proletarians-peacefully: 
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We know of the allowances that we must make for the institutions, 
customs and traditions of the various countries: and we do not 
deny that there are countries such as A4nerica, England, and I 
would add Holland if I knew your institutions better, where the 
working people may achieve their goal by peaceful means (OB, 494). 
With one possible, exception, these qualifications are quite compatible 
with his line of thought as I have described it. The possible ex- 
ception is his claim that "their most important interests dictate 
to the classes that are for the nonce the ruling onces the removal of 
all legally. removable hindrances to the free development of the working 
class". This seems to suggest the possibility that the ruling-claSS 
themselves might revolutionize the economic base by superstructural 
means (i. e. "removal of all legally removable hindrance to the free 
development of the working class") -- a possibility which, of course, 
apparently violates the "line of thought" in question in the most 
fundamental way. Coming as it does from the most unimpeachable 
source in all Marx's writing, Capital, it seems. an extraordinary and 
6 
suggestive remark. However, in the main, the view that the 
6Jerry Cohen makes the following point here, worth citing 
verbatim: 
The Capital, p. 9 quote is less puzzling when we read the context 
which shows wh)r it is in the interests of the ruling-class to 
allow the working class to develop itself: it is because then, 
when the revolution comes, there'll be less chance they'll have 
their heads chopped off by them. If you're going to be dis- 
placed, better "humane" than "brutal" displacers. Here, interest- 
ingly, something is in the interest of the people who are capital- 
ists which is in no way in the interests of the survival of capi- 
talism. Marx is saying that there is something in the interests 
of capitalists as individuals which they should consult against 
even their class interests, given the imminence of revolution. 
I don't want a deluge if it isn't going to be apres moi. 
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superstructurd is the indispensable and incorrigible "mask" and 
"weapon" protecting the ruling-class's economic hegemony; that its 
existence as such requires its control by the ruling-class to sustain 
this rule and by some other class(es) to alter it; and that political 
class struggle (likely violent at some point) is, in turn, the only 
effective way-of keeping or getting this control -- in the main, 
this is Marx's firm line on the legal and political superstructure 
and its disposition in all periods of history. 
As we can readily discern, the importance thus granted to the 
superstructural realm in Marx's theory, is very considerable. Indeed 
Marx here and elsewhere lays such great emphasis on the superstruc- 
tural realm in his social philosophy (a sort of materialist twist on 
Hegel's notion of the State as the bearer of the Universal), that one 
of the most moving criticisms of his position -- exemplified by the 
anarchist Bakunin's opposition -- is that he actually betrays the 
working class struggle in his German love for the State. But what- 
ever the merits or demerits of his position on the significance of 
the superstructural domain, we can see that -- for all its dependency 
on and derivativeness from the production relations/Economic Struc- 
ture -- this superstructure owns central import to Marx as a socio- 
historical factor. That it is always in some sort of "reflex" 
relationship with the mode of production underneath does not -- as 
many have thought -- render it somehow impotent or superfluous for 
him as a mechanism or phenomenon. On the contrary, it is as vitally 
important for Marx in the life process of a society as defense 
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mechanisms are for Freud in the life-process of an individual. It 
is the historically constructed and visible hold whereby internal 
conflict is maintained in the grip of unseen (economic) structure: 
the so to say conscious "ego-formation" of society overlaying, 
regulating and repressing the hidden contradictions beneath in the 
defense of established but unacknowledged interests and their en- 
slaving pattern. 
So much for Marx's concept of the State. Let us now consider 
what is a further dimension of the "superstructure" for Marx, when he 




As with several other of his central categories, Marx's concept 
of "ideology" has given rise over the years to a veritable mob of ob- 
jections and distortions. A common interpretation, for example, has 
mistakenly equated the term to mental activity as such and then con- 
cluded from this an apparent major paradox in Marx's theory: namely, 
that while ideology is said -- as a part of the "superstructure" in 
its largestsense -- to be a mere "reflex" of the material mode of 
production, it must also be in its practical-scientific form a prime 
condition and constituent of the latter (inasmuch as productive forces 
necessarily involve the ideas of practical science in their construc- 
tion and operation). But surely, this objection reasons, ideology 
cannot be both mere reflex and prime condition/constituent of the 
same thing. 
Then, again, a not unrelated interpretation has construed 
Marx's notion of ideology as equivalent to "belief(s)" and, from 
this, criticized the notion in question on the issue of the separ- 
ation of and relationship between belief and action in principle 
(e. g. Alistair MacIntyre) and in the historical past (e. g. Max Weber): 
the former holding that the two cannot, as a matter of principle, be 
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considered as separate phenomena (i. e. belief "consists in" acting 
a certain way); and the latter that certain forms of belief, as 
a matter of historical fact, have given rise to the economic form 
of capitalism and not merely "reflected" it. ' 
What I shall attempt to show here, however, is that Marx had 
a much more limited notion of ideology than mental activity or be- 
liefs as such. Once this is shown, such criticisms as those referred 
to above will be seen as inapplicable and/or irrelevant to his con- 
cept. 
Marx's concept of "ideology" first leaps to prominence in 
his work-in The German Ideology, written with Engels in 1845-46 as 
an attack on then ascendant German Idealist tradition. From the out- 
set, ideology is conceived not as mental activity or belief per se 
but as Marx and Engels make evident in the opening sentence of their 
work, "men's conceptions of themselves": that is, men's various 
articulated forms of social self-consciousness -- from religious to 
I-See MacIntyre's "A Mistake About Causality in Social Science", 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed., Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman 
(oxford: 1967), pp 48-70; and Max Weber's classic The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: 1968) p. 75. Weber seems to 
include in his concept of belief not only -- as is well known -- cer- 
tain religious ideas, but also ideas involving the "rational organi- 
zation of labour" (p. 160): which ideas are with Marx subsumed 
under forces of production. Then too Weber seems to want to subsume 
"ability and initiative" (p. 179) and "purely mundane passions" (p. 
182) under his concept of ideology when these are not, of course, ideas 
at all. In short, Weber's concept of ideology seems from the start 
importantly different from Marx's, and hence what he shows about ideology 
is not likely to disprove what Marx held about ideology: they are 
simply talking about different referents, as the following exposition 
of Marx's concept will make clear. 
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economic, from moral and aesthetic to legal-political. This same, 
strictly delineated concept of ideology -- not at all ideas or be- 
liefs as such, but only special ýýerstructural conceptions of human 
matters or affairs from one or other perspective -- obtains through- 
out Marx's work without exception. Thus in his famous Preface to 
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he says: 
In considering such [revolutionary] transformations, the distinction 
should always be made between the material transformation of the 
economic conditions of production which can be established with 
the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, re- 
. 
ligious, aesthetic or philosophical -- in short, ideological -- 
, 
forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight 
it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on 
what he thinks of himself so we cannot judge of such a period 
by its own consci; u--sness [i. e. what it thinks of itself]. 
And thus, in his The EiRhteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (p. 38), 
he says in a focal discussion of ideology: 
And as in private life one differentiates between what a man 
thinks and says of himself and what he really is and does, so 
in historical struggles one must distinguish still more the 
phrases and fancies of parties from their real organism and their 
real interests, their conceptions of themselves from their reality. 
As Marx makes clear above, his concept of ideology is closely akin 
to our every day concept of "rationalization", only in his case the 
articulation and referrent of such rationalization is social rather 
than "private" or individual (as I shall presently emphasize). 
Now such public conceptions that men have about themselves 
are obviously distinct from the technological ideas used to make 
material use-values (which ideas explicitly belong, as I've already 
pointed out in Chapter II, to the domain of the forces of production 
in Marx's theoretical framework); from, relatedly, the ideas men have 
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of things other than themselves (thus "natural science"'is explicitly 
excluded from consideration in a note in the first section of The 
German Ideology, p. 28); 2 and even from men's beliefs about them-'* 
selves (one of the prominent qualities of much of the ideology which 
Marx discusses-is its deliberate deceitfulness: thus in these cases 
not expressive of "beliefs" at all, but of intentions to deceive). 
3 
The referent we are dealing with in Marx's notion of ideology is 
certainly not, in short, the all-inclusive range of cognitive phenomena 
that so many of Marx's interpretators have held. 
(This important limitation in the referential range of ideology 
should not be construed as necessarily a downgrading of its status as 
a sociohistorical factor. On the contrary, ideology's existence as 
2Marx seems to have presumed -- partly because of a typical 
nineteenth century faith in the authority of "Natural Science" and 
partly because of its apparent methodological insulation from human 
affairs -- that the physical and biological sciences are free from 
the distortions informing ideology, even though the ruling-class 
control of this sphere of published ideation would seem no less 
strict than other areas of published thought to which he attended. 
I suspect it would be plausible however for Marxian theory to hold 
that these sciences by virtue of their ruling-class control have 
also been typically shot through with slantings corresponding to 
the requirements of the established social order -- not only in 
category, but in assumptions, methods, inferences and functions. 
V '_0 LI-4-s- r- c- - 
3The public conceptions of ideology cannot, of course, ever 
be properly said to be beliefs: they might, on those occasions when 
they are not deceitfu-1, be said to express beliefs (or, indeed, cause 
them to arise), but they can never themselves be properly counted as 
beliefs. Otherwise put, belief is an "interior" word, ideology an 
"exterior" word. For MacIntyre and others to talk about beliefs as 
all or even part- of, ideology is, accordingly, akin to a category 
mistake. 
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the body of public self-conceptions renders it a kind of official 
currency of self-consciousness to which most or all-other forms of 
cognition -- private included (e. g. see 18thB, 37) -- are likely 
to conform in one way or another, because man is a "social animal". 
Indeed Marx sometimes loosely talks of "consciousness", with no 
qualifier, as being "determined" in the strict manner that the narrower 
realm of ideology is determined, and this occasional conflation has 
given rise to the mistake that he. equates man's consciousness as such 
with ideology (and thereby holds a tendentious philosophical position 
about the determination of. ideas in general). But Marx makes it clear 
by all the instances of ideology which he considers that it is not 
man's consciousness as such to which he is referring with this concept 
but to its public modes: 
4 though, I repeat, he still regards these 
public modes -- whether the arcane philosophical publications of the 
German Idealists or the contents of the popular press -- as standard 
forms of human self apprehension in any society and, as such, per- 
vasively influential). 
Now we have seen that Marx's concept of ideology is importantly 
limited in its referential range -- not only with human (as opposed 
to non-human) subject matter but with respect to, in addition, its 
public mode of existence -- we can schematize (with some proper but 
significant inference) these and other discernments into a hitherto 
4For-Marx's view of the determining influences on "consciousness 
as such", see my exposition, "Human Nature as Historically Modified", 
in Chapter I. 
141 
undisclosed set of criteria of ideology: 
It is constituted of formulated ideas (as opposed to remaining 
merely on a subconscious, racial memory, feeling, spiritual, 
etc. level). 5 
2) It refers to human matters or affairs (as opposed to non-human 
or natural phenomena). 
3) All of its content is materially unproductive (as opposed to 
being usable, in whole or part, to make material use-value: 
as some ideas which satisfy criteria (1) and (2) -- for example, 
medical science -- would seem normally to be). 
4) It obtains in a public mode, such as any form of publication 
or public speech (as opposed to a private mode, such as personal 
reflection, conversation or letter which occurs outside legal/ 
political jurisdiction). 
6 
5Formulated ideas could include more than linguistically 
formulated ideas, but Marx does not ever consider any further domain 
(e. g. visual or musical arts) in his discussions of ideological forms. 
61) Otherwise put, ideology is constituted only of ideas that 
have 
, reached 
the public stage. I suggest this alternative construction 
because -- as my exposition will presently emphasize -- Marx employs 
an implicit dramaturgical model throughout his work in his description 
of ideological phenomena. Just as the legal and political superstructure 
is implicitly construed by him in terms of stage performance, so ideology 
is similarly construed by him as stage speech. The composite is the 
"world-historical drama" -- sometimes "tragedy" and sometimes "farce". 
Hence Marx's recurrent words for the superstructual realm -- "illusion" 
and "pretence". Possibly the best way of catching the picture Marx 
is trying to present of the relationship between economic base and 
superstructure (in-the largest sense) is thus, to conceive of the former 
as man's material interests and the latter as these interests being, 
as it were, played out on the public platform to the audience and 
spectators of society's members as a whole. (One almost wonders whether 
Marx himself, with his great emphasis on superstructural mediation cont'd 
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5) (From (4)) It has received direct or indirect state sanction, 
by virtue of the formal approval of some sort (e. g. license, 
or permit) required from the state for any public mode to ideate 
(whether publishing firm, official document agency, church, 
school, assembly or whatever). 7 For anything to court as 
ideology, it must meet all five of these criteria. 
The last criterion here -- (5) -- is of particular significance inas- 
much as it explains Marx's famous insistence that the ideology of a 
of efforts to alter the economic base, isn't drawn into this very realm 
of "acting" he seems otherwise so aware of). 
ii) It might be argued against criterion (4) here that such words of 
Marx's as "fancies" and "thinks" used in connection with the realm of 
ideology militate against my interpretation of Marx's concept of 
ideology as only those ideas which have been some way or other published. 
In an earlier writing of this section I deferred to this consideration 
by stipulating in criterion (4) only that ideological phenomena are 
at some time or other published, hence permitting ideas to count as 
ideology which are not in a public mode but have been so in the past. 
The reasons I now restrict-in my interpretation the referential domain 
of ideology to be published ideas ut sic') are first and most important, 
all instances of ideology which Marx repo'rts or treats are (so far as 
I can see) of this sort and only this sort; second, the words which 
seem to suggest otherwise - e. g. "fancies" and "thinks" -- do not 
necessarily so suggest (i. e. one can properly use such words in referring 
to published material: their use does not at all entail their referrent 
obtaining 'in the head" alone); third, ideology's "correspondence" with 
the economic base makes best sense under this strict interpretation (as 
will emerge more clearly in subsequent discussion); and fourth, Marx's 
subject matter is social phenomena, and ideology construed exclusively 
as socially expressed (i. e. published) ideas most clearly complies with 
the limits of such a subject matter. 
7This final criterion of ideology, yielded by criterion (4), 
indicates the unnecessary muddle. traditional interpretation of Marx's 
work has gotten into with respect to construing the relationship Marx 
postulates between the economic base and ideology as an epistemological 
stance. It is no such thing. The economic base for Marx determines 
ideology bu virtue of (inter alia) state control of the latter's modes 
of expression -- a political fact for Marx, not a general principle of 
knowledge as such. 
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society is the ideology of its ruling-class. The latter after all 
are held to control the State as their agency of collective self- 
piotection: hence inasmuch as ideology qua obtaining in a public 
mode must receive (if only often indirectly) this state sanction, 
it must thereby be approved by a ruling-class agency. Its necessary 
mechanism of presentation is not only economically tied to the ruling- 
class, but superstructurally tied as well: as Marx himself knew well 
from his personal experience at the hands of state censors (i. e. 
direct state control of ideology) and at the hands of publishers 
afraid to publish his work for fear of official repression (i. e. 
indirect state control of ideology). Hence that the ideology of a 
society is said by Marx to be the ideology of its ruling-class is 
not at all the philosophicall problematic claim it is often made 
out to be -- for example, a claim about the nature and causation of 
ideas in general which is subject to weaknesses of a general epis- 
temological sort -- but a plausible empirical claim about how ideas 
that reach the public stage are in fact subject to effective control 
by established social power, state as well as economic (see Chapter 
VIII, Economic Determinism). 
Now these five criteria of ideology in the Marxian sense 
are not, as I have already suggested,. all explicitly stated by Marx. 
But they are all one way or another implied by him, and there is so 
far as I know no instance of ideology which he treats - of the 
countless examples spread through his work -- which do not in fact 
satisfy each and all of these criteria. So Marx's concept is a far 
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more tightly drawn one than is generally realized. Indeed recognition 
of the strict limits to the sense of his concept has not to my know- 
ledge received any attention before, as the whole tradition of treat- 
ment of his notion of ideology makes clear in its strictly speaking 
irrelevant objections (by critics) and crude advocacy (by Marxists). 
Yet though Marx's concept of ideology denotes a much more- 
restricted domain than is conventionally held, it must not be thought 
that the concept in question thereby loses its referential power. 
It still clearly includes within its ambit of reference the entire 
realm of mass media, school, church, adademic, legal, political, 
aesthetic and all other forms of public communication: and, as, such, 
informs the private sphere of ideas with its content more or less 
exhaustively, depending on the extent to which particular individuals 
are influenced by. the public realm (i. e. pretty much). What remains 
over, outside of this domain, Marx may have properly regarded -- its 
being merely personal ideation -- as not warranting separate consider- 
ation as a sociohistorical influence. 
Though we now seem possessed of a firmly delimiting set of 
criteria of Marx's notion of ideology, a very important issue remains 
unexplored. That is, throughout his work, essentially with regard 
to the theories of political economists, Marx draws the distinction 
between scientific and unscientific conceptions of human affairs 
(e. g. between "classical" and "vulgar" Political Economy). Even 
though in these cases, the works in question seem alike to satisfy 
the criteria of ideology as I have so far characterized them, their 
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difference to Marx is so substantive that a case has sometimes been 
made for cardinalizing their difference by classifying only. Hn- 
scientific thought as ideological. If this line of interpretation 
is followed, then still another mark of ideology must be that it is 
"unscientific" (in another sense than already implied by the criteria 
outlined so far). By this additional criterion, then "classical" 
Political Economy and other "truly scientific" theory -- especially 
Marx's theory itself -- would count as non-ideological. 
Though there is evidence of a sort to recommend such an 
interpretation -- Marx's generally pejorative use of the term 
"ideology", for example -- I am not going to accept it as decisive. 
Rather I am going to interpret Marx as regarding scientific and 
unscientific conceptions of human affairs as distinct subclasses of 
ideology. My main reason for doing this is, first, that only in this 
way can scientific conceptions, of human affairs be clearly subsumed 
by his general model of sociohistorical explanation; and, second, 
that one may only suppose from his persistent talk of ideological 
struggle in his own day that he counted "scientific socialism" as 
part of the struggle. Granting then that Marx's notion of ideology 
does as a matter of theoretical adequacy and consistency extend to 
scientific as well as unscientific formulations, we might now ask 
what criterion or criteria he employs to distinguish these subclasses 
of ideology. If we are to understand the full complexity and import 
of his concept, this substantive distinction -- which is basic to 
his harshly critical attitude towards almost all ideology (i. e. 
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ideology which is unscientific) -- must be elucidated. 
Unfortunately, Marx never makes a general distinction between 
scientific and unscientific conceptions which men have about themselves, 
but only makes a specific distinction with respect to his most abiding 
concern, the conceptions of Political Economy. But I think we may 
extend without distortion the principle he proffers here to historical, 
legal and all other ideological conceptions. What he says in this 
regard -- that is, with regard to Political Economy -- is this: that 
scientific Political Economy "investigates the real relations of pro- 
duction" (i. e. the effective ownership relations) in a society; 
whereas unscientific Political Economy does not investigate such re- 
lations, but ignores or conceals them. In his own words: - 
once for all, I may here state, that by classical Political 
Economy, I understand that economy which, since the time of 
W. Petty, has investigated the real relations of production in 
bourgeois society, in contra-destruction to vulgar economy, which 
deals with appearances only -- (ql, 82). 
Thus for Marx the work of David Ricardo, who "consciously makes the 
antagonism of class interests -- the starting point of his-investi- 
gations" (CT, 14), belongs to the sphere of science; whereas the work 
of most political economists after 1830 which conceals or distorts or 
ignores these "real relations of production" (e. g. by representing the 
bourgeois economy as a harmony of freely choosing subjects) is not 
scientific, but merely "superficial". "trite" or -- at worst -- embodies 
"bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetic" (LI, 14). To 
render Marx's distinction here-more general and systematic, we might 
say that any conceptions of human affairs which attend to the economic 
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"essence"-of the latter in the following respects are scientific; 
whereas any conceptions which to do not so attend are unscientific: 
1) the real relations of production (i. e. effective relations of 
ownership to society's forces of production) 
2) the division into oblectivelv antagonistic classes of these 
relations of production (i. e. generally, monopoly ownership of 
the means of production by a minority of society (the "ruling- 
class") and little or no such ownership by the rest of society 
(the "working class")). 
3) the laws of exchange between these classes (i. e. generally, 
laws such that the class that has an ownership monopoly is able 
to extract from the other class or classes unpaid labour). 
(Presumably, conceptions of human affairs which attend to these 
related facts of effective ownership, class division. and laws of ex- 
change would count as scientific for Marx even if the precise classes 
and laws of exchange discerned were -- assuming accurate data -- not 
the same as those perceived by himself. Otherwise, of course, Marx's 
distinction between scientific and unscientific ideology would be 
subverted by his own unscientific assumption of infallibility: not' 
altogether an impossible assumption on his part, I must acknowledge ). 
Now certainly Marx's conceptions of human affairs is not wholly 
confined to these considerations alone. He also insists in various 
places on the classical scientific canon of empirical method (as in 
his assaults on continental Idealism of all sorts); on the indispen- 
sability of a dialectical approach to human affairs (as in his repeated 
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repudiation of those who -- like the otherwise scientific Ricardo 
-- ignore the universal principle of "negation" or change in their 
conceptions of the social formation in which they live as an "eternal" 
and "god-given necessity" (CI, 14)); on the necessity of "freedom 
from bias" (LofP, 19) -- which, by the way, he saw the working class, 
as opposed to the. ruling-class and its "hired prize fighter" ideol- 
ogists, as specially capable of by virtue of its membership's owner- 
ship of a few or no material interests to distort their vision; and 
on the theoretical imperative of explanatory adequacy (as in his 
almost life-long obsession with full explanation of the source of 
profits which previous economists -- scientific or not -- had, in his 
view, failed to provide). Nevertheless, when it comes to the question 
of distinguishing in ideology the scientific from the unscientific, 
Marx's most basic concern seems to be with whether or not the con- 
ceptions in question attend to the. economic "essence" of all historical 
society -- its relations of production, class structure and laws of 
exchange. Indeed he often attributes, failures in other areas to a 
more funamental failure to investigate critically this underlying 
flessencell. Thus, for example, political economists prior to him 
fail to achieve "explanatory adequacy" in their work in consequence 
of a more basic failure to apprehend the real relations of exchange 
between. classes -- they find it "very dangerous to stir too deeply 
the burning-question of the origin of surplus-value" (LI, 516). And 
thus, too, failures to pursue empirical method, to be "dialectical" 
and to be "free from bias" also seem for Marx to be outgrowths of a 
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more fundamental negligence with regard to apprehending the economic 
foundations of the society in which the ideologists in question live: 
they fail in these various respects, he insinuates repeatedly, because 
they are, on a deeper level, consciously or unconsiously afraid of 
examining critically the economic system which yields them the privilege 
of being ideologists in official favour rather than toiling producers 
anonymously oppressed. From this so to speak basic "sell-out", Marx 
implies, their other failures in scientific method derive. It is on 
this account, I think, that Marx is so deprecatory about ideology 
generally. For him, its characteristically (but not necessarily) 
unscientific nature seems ultimately grounded on cowardly self-interest. 
With the exception then of certain modern formulations of social 
science -- "classical" Political Economy and his own theory, for example 
-- virtually all ideology for Marx is unscientific. (Needless to say, 
this view refers only to historical, class societies. In the future 
communist society which Marx-projects, -ideology -- so far as it exists 
-- will be neither scientific nor unscientific, but rather a- 
scientific inasmuch as there will be no economic classes to discern 
and relations of production and exchange will be, qua socially planned, 
plainly evident to all: the need for social science to penetrate 
beyond appearances "withering away" along with the state). 
8 But Marx 
does not stop in his characterization of the mainstream of ideology 
with the attribute of "unscientific". Throughout his work, he alludes 
8See G. A. Cohen's "The Withering Away of Social Science" 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1. No. 2 (Winter 1972) pp. 182-203. 
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to further (non-necessary) properties of the ideological mainstream 
which render it systematically misleading or, to call upon a number 
of his own particular terms, "illusory", "upside-down", and, more directly 
put, "false". What is generally misleading about the various forms 
of ideology (and here the misleading formal content of the legal and 
political superstructure is recalled: See Chapter IV, are these 
related features: 
1) The categories they involve are "empty generalities" rather than 
"determinate" and, as such, permit discourse to be "torn away from 
the facts" (GID, 53). For example, the contentless category of "Man 
as such" (familiar in the continental philosophy of Marx's day) detaches 
thought from "real, living, concrete individuals" in the here-and-now 
of the ongoing historical process or, more specifically, the indeter- 
minate categories of "Freedom", "Equality" and "Rights" in capitalist 
society mask by their generality the distinctions in the real world 
between the "Freedom", "Equality" and "Rights" of individuals who own 
nothing but their labour-power and individuals who own the wealth to 
buy, among other things, this labour-power for their own profit (such 
"empty generality" of categories permitting for Marx as well, by the 
way, almost any signification whatever that might be convenient to 
ruling-class interests: see fi3). 
2) These same categories or ideas are not only "emancipated from 
the world" by virtue of their indeterminateness, but just as importantly 
are "transformed from predicates into subjects" (GID, 255), from 
general properties ascribed descriptively to the world to the self-subsistent 
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movers of the world (a Feuerbachian point, of course). For example, 
German Idealists believe "the real world is the product of the "ideal 
world" (GID., 24), Proudhon believes that economic categories precede 
and give rise to economic realities, adherents to religion imagine 
that the properties of a God they project rule human affairs as an 
omnipotent force, and bourgeois apologists ascribe to their conceptions 
of liberty, rights and law the magical role of independently operating 
authors of world-historical events. 
3) The conceptions of ideology insofar as they are employed to refer 
to determinate social phenomena at all, are selectively employed so 
that they validate what promotes the vested order of human affairs and 
invalidate what challenges this order. For example, the conceptions 
which articulate an abhorrence of violence are generally applied in 
cases of people acting by force against established material interests 
(e. g. rebels or communists) and generally suspended in the far more 
frequent cases of people acting by force for established material 
interests (e. g. political officials, police forces and armies). Or, 
similarly, the conceptions which articulate a fondness for "Law'% 
"Order", and "Property" figure very prominently in the ideology of a 
society when what's involved is the protention of the ruling-class's 
interests in these respects, but very weakly if at all, when what's 
involved is the ruled class's interests of the same sort (e. g. illegally 
oppressive working conditions, "anarchial" insecurity of employment, 
and expropriation of centuries-old "commons" land rights). 
4) The conceptions of ideology, whatever their specific type, are 
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to some extent historically distorted in that the language they employ, 
the phenomena to which they refer. and the viewpoints they embody are 
more or less tied to the past and, ipso facto, more or less inadequate 
to the present. For example, the ideology of the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury French political struggle is permeated with "borrowed language", 
references to past circumstances and views of dead heroes from the 
French Revolution of 1789 (18thB, 10). Or, again, the ideology of 
maturely capitalistic England employs the phraseology of personal 
property, the circumstances of the yeoman past and the arguments of 
Locke to justify the monopoly holdings of the modern big bourgeoisie. 
"The tradition of all the dead generations",, Marx says in one of his 
more allusive and poetic utterances, "weighs like a nightmare on the 
brains of the living" (18thB, 10). 
5) The conceptions of ideology generally tend to idealize human 
states of affairs by ascribing predicates to such affairs which 
"clothe" them in an inappropriately attractive guise. For example, 
the social positions which men hold by their superior command of 
material power are described as held from "divine sanction", "Social 
Contract" or "eternal necessity"; the material conditions into which 
men are born or forced are characterized as manufactured or chosen 
by acts of individual "will"; the untrammeled course of capitalist 
exploitation and accumulation is lyricized as "progress", "civilization" 
and "freedom"; and the successful securing of the economic interests 
of the ruling-class are celebrated as the victories of "mankind", 
"universal rights" or "the Absolute Spirit". The "aura", "intoxication" 
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and "glamour" of such phraseology gives rise, in Marx's view, to an 
opiated ideological dwelling place where the perpetual conquest of 
force and fraud ever yields the inverted and romantic picture of the 
best of all possible worlds. 
Now these several characteristics of the ideological mainstream 
are not, as I have already suggested, necessary attributes of Ideology. 
Unlike the five criteria of ideology earlier outlined, they are simply 
common features of the phenomenon in question which Marx draws attention 
to in his many provocative ad hoc comments on various ideological 
forms. But they are nevertheless informed by one essential and 
unifying function: that is, all these attributes in one way or another 
obfuscate the real relations of production, class divisions'and laws 
of exchange of the society in question, and thereby exemplify non- 
scientific ideology's principle of not attending to the economic 
"essence" of human affairs. 
By virtue of this unifying function of obfuscation of the re- 
lations of production/Economic Structure, the role of mainstream ideology 
is in the end precisely the same in general import as that of the legal 
and political superstructure: that is, it forms part*of the total 
"defense mechanism" whereby in Marx's account, the class divided economic 
base is maintained intact. What legal and political institutions do 
by organized coercion and appearance of sanctity, mainstream ideology 
does by various forms of "masking" in the realm of public ideas. 
Both sorts of phenomena contribute (in all but revolutionary or pre- 
revolutionary periods) to a single, embracing end -- protection of 
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the underlying economic order. They are both parts of the super- 
structure, in its largest sense; both defenders, in various ways, 
of the economic substructure, and indispensable as such to the latter's 
historical persistence; both dependent, in Marx's view, on the inherent 
antagonisms of this economic base for their existence; and, both fated 
to "wither away" with the end of class divided relations of production 
in the communist utopia (ideology here becoming ideas as such: ceasing 
to be ideology by virtue of release from state control and the role 
of class "weapon"). 
Like legal and political phenomena then, ideological phenomena -- 
which are in a sense derived from the former inasmuch their public mode 
requires some sort of state sanction -- are in the main for Marx a 
defensive "reflex" to the exigencies of the'underlying economic base 
rather than any sort of initiating influence. Indeed with Marx's 
concept of ideology, unlike belief, to which it has been conventionally 
but mistakenly assimilated, ideology's relationship is not so much to 
action but to inaction. None of the content of ideology can, by 
definition, -be used to make a material use-value, is not therefore 
a productive force; and it is not normally a motivator of economic 
behaviour insofar as it is typically constructed by non-economic 
agents, formulated in other than mate'rial-interest terms, and expressed 
outside the sphere of commodity-exchange altogether. So ideology in 
Marx's sense -- to a large extent in principle -- is not positively 
related to productive nor even economic action. ' On the other hand, 
as public formulations sponsored by non-productive agencies living off 
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the society's surplus-value, Marx saw ideology as very much'responsible 
for the inaction of society's members, namely with regard to altering 
their economic arrangements. For insofar as it is normally a "cloak", 
"disguise", "veil", . "shroud" etc., of these arrangements, it blocks 
apprehension of their reality and, in this way, ensures their per- 
petuation (i. e. it is difficult to socially change what is not socially 
seen). So the explanatory force of ideology with Marx, is for the 
most part with respect to men's refraining from a certain sortýof 
action -- changing the economic substructure -- rather than to their 
undertaking this orýany other sort of materially influential initiative, 
It is for Marx, as I indicated earlier, public rationalization of human 
matters and affairs and -- like private rationalization of private 
matters and affairs- typically a shield by obfuscation of established 
patterns of behaviour. In this way, ideology accords neatly in general 
function with the legal and political, aspects of the superstructure 
as a whole: that is, both it (public ideas) and the latter (public 
institutions) constitute an overall "defense mechanism", whereby the 
underlying class divided economic system of society is held in its 
established form. This is why, in general, Marx talks about, the 
three realms in question -- economic, legal and political, and ideological 
-- as in "correspondence" with one-another. . 
However just as the legal and political superstructure operates 
as an agency of action with respect to changing the production relations/ 
Economic Structure before or during periods of revolutionary upheaval 
(i. e. periods when the productive forces have "outgrown" their economic 
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"integument", and require a change in the latter to ensure their own 
preservation and development), so ideology too becomes such an agency 
in these exceptional times of epochal transition. Ideology, like law 
and politics, is always part of the "class struggle" -- its public 
consciousness side -- and in these abnormal periods of revolutionary 
unrest a rising, hitherto repressed class's attempt to "seize" its 
influence is simply the cognate in the realm of ideas of the struggle 
to capture State power. In these periods, the class-ruptured economic 
order ceases to be maintained intact and more or less "explodes" into 
open conflict by virtue of the superstructure as a. whole being effectively 
claimed on all levels by a challenging class which in the past has been 
successfully kept from such superstructural levers of social power by 
the ruling-class's control of them. Hence, just as the State ceases 
to "hold" the economic base-in its established pattern to the extent 
that a formerly repressed class seizes its reigns, so pari passu the 
ideology of the society in question ceases to exercise such a. hold-to 
the extent that its reigns are seized (e. g. by new and able critical 
conceptions of the social order in question -- for example, Marx's 
scientific theory itself -- which achieve the public mode status of 
ideology to the extent that new permission of State sanction is secured 
by the under class's struggle on the legal and political level). In 
short, the ideological aspect of the superstructure as a whole, like 
the institutional aspect, reverses its'normal role of defense mechanism 
for the economic infrastructure in pre-revolutionary or revolutionary. 
periods, and becomes a mobilizer with respect to altering the latter 
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rather than -- as. in its typical function -- an immobilizer (and, 
as such, qualified for the status of knowledge in Marx's praxis 
epistemology -- unlike mainstream ideology which does not seem able, 
in principle, to so qualify). Here ideology can and does truly, if 
exceptionally, spring men into economic action -- its public formulations 
no longer merely the excuse, concealer, opiate of social rationalization, 
but penetrating to the secrets of the old economic system: as a sort of 
public self-recognition taking place in the final act of the historical 
drama of the ancien regime and resolving its conflicts into new, unwrit 
plot. 
Of course for Marx it is only with scientific socialism that 
such "public self-recognition" which prefaces the death of the old 
order and the birth of the new may be properly regarded as being true 
self-recognition. For only here is the so to speak tragic flaw of all 
historical human society -- antagonistic class relations -- fully 
apprehended. As Marx poetically puts it in one of his early works: 
"Communism is the riddle of history solved, and knows-itself" to be 
this solution" (EPM, 102). In contrast to the revolutionary ideology 
of the seventeenth century bourgeoisie which masqueraded as such 
redemptive realization but in fact merely sanctified the tragic flaw 
of class-division in another form to which it remained blind in 
accordance with bourgeois class interests, scientific socialism is 
scientific and, as such, adequately comprehends this flaw in all its 
depths and-grip. The final resolver on the plane of public consciousness 
of the tragic flaw of historical society is thus the scientific 
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ideology of Marxism which in the adequacV of its recognition spells 
the end of antagonistic class relations altogether. As in all classical 
tragic drama, its insight may indeed disclose to the stage's action 
the harbinger of bloody climax, but the new order whose dawn it 
signals is one purged by it of the hidden hamartia from which the 
travails of classical tragedy have always sprung. 
(I extend my exposition of Marx into explicit dramaturgical 
model, here and elsewhere, not merely for explication flair -- though 
this is surely worthwhile -- but to suggest the intensely dramatic 
nature of his work. Marx was a great devotee of classical drama -- . 
especially that of Aeschylus and Shakespeare -- and the sociohistorical 
conflicts and flaws and rhetoric he describes are imbued with its 
archetypal power. Indeed I sometimes wonder whether this as much as 
his scientific penetration and sweep is not responsible for the 
immense influence of his theory). 
Well, given that Marx's concept of ideology like his concept 
of the State allows for a quite different function in pre-revolutionary 
or revolutionary periods than the merely "defense-mechanism" function 
of normal times, we might ask what is the nature of man's public self- 
conceptions in that communist utopia that succeeds the last, the 
proletarian revolution. 
First of all, we know that such self-conceptions are no longer 
ideological inasmuch as there is no State by which their public mode 
must be sanctioned nor, relatedly, any class-divisions whereby an 
ascendant class controls the ideas in question as part of its mechanism 
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of rule. Man's social self;. -conceptions, thus, become literally dis- 
interested (i. e. neither funded nor informed by class interest); 
and, as such, they neither obfuscate an antagonistic economic order -- 
as mainstream ideology -- nor penetrate behind such Schein -- as 
scientific ideology. All ideology'disappears with the disappearance 
of class division: the former sort to the extent that there are 
no longer any social ruptures to conceal, and the latter sort to 
the extent that there-is no longer "appearances" to penetrate behind. 
Man's economic relations, being communistic, cease to furnish the 
antagonistic material conditions required for either scientific or 
unscientific ideology to arise. At this point, man's intrinsic 
potentia of projective consciousness is liberated in the realm of 
social self-conception (as well as elsewhere) and the "chains of 
illusion"-binding the Prometheus of humankind are, with his other 
chains, "sprung into the air". Ideology gives way, in brief, to the 
emancipated ideas of public self-knowledge. 
However, the "chains of illusion" are not for Marx merely a 
matter of ideology, but run into the very frame of social consciousness: 
which hidden superstructural phenomenon -- hitherto missed in com- 
mentary on Marx -- we shall now consider. 
CHAPTER VI 
FORMS OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Unlike the other categories constituting what I have called 
. "the structure of Marx's world-view", this final category, "forms 
of social consciousness'! has little to go on in the way of textual 
grounding. That is, though Marx very often talks of "forms of 
consciousness" or, in his later texts, "forms of social conscious- 
ness", he usually does so in such a way as to justify its inter- 
pretative conflation with "ideology" or "ideological forms". Pub- 
lished commentary on Marx has usually if not always assumed an identity 
of sense here: counting the distinction in formulation as a mere 
difference of expression, and not sense. I myself assumed this until 
a typically provocative comment by Jerry Cohen that these were "not 
obviously the same" provoked a new consideration on my part that 
emerges here in the claim that "forms of social consciousness"Is 
a distinct and general category, of signal importance: a germinal 
concept which suggests the outline of a sort of Marxian philosophy 
of social mind. 
Now in claiming for this category of "forms of social con- 
sciousness" a distinct and general status in Marx's overall schema, 
I am relying on Marx's continual reference to it, as well as his 
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occasional distinction between it and-"ideology": for example, his 
distinction in The German Ideology (38) between "morality, religion, 
metaphysics and all the rest of ideology and their corresponding 
forms of social consciousness. "l Secondly, I am relying on the fact 
that the literal German here -- Bewusstseinsformen -- just cannot 
without distortion of the word, and the Kant-and-after philosophical 
tradition associated with the notion of "forms of consciousness", 
be-held as synonomous with ideology. - Such conflation just involves 
imperspicacious translation and grasp of. philosophical history. 
Finally, I am influenced by the theoretical sense the distinction 
in question makes, when introduced into Marx's general categorical 
framework: it raises no problems that I can see in the coherence in 
quality of Marx's overall model, yet it increases its explanatory 
range and adequacy interestingly and substantially. 
Given then, that ideology and forms of social consciousness 
are discrete categories, precisely how do they differ? To-, strikeý 
straightýto the point, the former are explicit formulations whereas 
the latter-are presupposed principles. The relation between these 
two, in turn, is such that the latter governs the former, as the 
underlying, general principles of a bigot govern-his specific state- 
ments. Consider for example, the particular statement "Columbus 
discovered-America" and (I suggest) the presupposed general principle -- 
All human discernment is European -- underlying and governing this 
lSee also pages 483 and 485 of Theories of Surplus Value, Part III. 
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statement. The former would qualify as a form of ideology in Marx's 
schema, whereas the latter would qualify as a form of social con- 
sciousness. With this concept of "forms of social consciousness" we 
have, in short, a sort of historical materialist variation on Kant's 
a priori forms of understanding. 
The relationship of "forms of social consciousness" to the 
forces of production or economic base is, however, not different in 
substance from the relationship of ideology to these. The latter 
remain, for Marx, primary and determining (SeeChapýfer'sVII and VIII). 
What is being suggested by the category in question is just another 
level or sphere of "correspondence" between a society's mode of 
production and the rest of its life: here, the presupposed principles 
or "forms" -- as opposed to ideological "expressions" or "products" -- 
of its social consciousness. 
"Forms of social consciousness" and "Ideology" then are two 
aspects -- the governed manifest and the(secondarily) governing latent 
-- of published conceptions of human affairs. And though a society's 
ideology and forms of consciousness may be as a matter of fact at 
the same time the ideology and, forms of consciousness of individuals 
belonging to this society, they are not necessarily or always so 
inculcated, and Marx makes no claim of this sort: as he himself 
suggests in his talk of the "private" realm, the latter is outside 
his domain of analysis, and figures as a sphere of comparison rather 
than of subsumption. -All he is directly concerned with is conscious- 
ness that has achieved public exhibition of some sort or other: 
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whether one is considering this consciousness with respect to its 
"products" (ideology) or with respect to its presupposed principles 
of regulation ("forms"). 
Having outlined the general sense of Marx's category of 
"forms of social consciousness", I will seek to identify now what 
Marx -- by implication -- suggests these "forms" in fact are. Together 
these forms will constitute what one might call the "public frame of 
mind" of all historical societies or -- in Marx's language -- "forms 
of social consciousness in general": 
2 
- 
Let us consider, as I have suggested the "forms" in question 
as presupposed or assumed or given general principles to which publicly 
exhibited ideas -- of whatever sort-or variety (excluding revolutionary) 
-- typically conform: whether or not these governing principles are 
discerned or, much more likely not discerned, by the ideological 
agents in question (Forms of social consciousness are like rules of 
grammar insofar as they may regulate what is expressed without those 
who are expressing knowing what they are, or even that they exist). 
To strike straight to the point, the "forms" or presupposed principles 
of this sort1hat Marx repeatedly implies as "in general". governing 
2, will not discuss "forms of social consciousness as his- 
torically modified" in Marx's schema inasmuch as my construction from 
Marx's work of this whole category is already tentative enough. Even 
what follows is almost entirely inferential. Though there are good 
grounds (as I have tried to show) for giving this category the 
status I have in Marx's general theoretical framework, he simply 
does not directly develop it beyond implicit postulation. 
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the manifold of ideological formulations are (my examples of ideo- 
logical instantiation are drawn, more or less, from Marx): 
1) The existing social order cannot be qualitatively altered 
(Thus it is ideologically represented as an "eternal necessity" 
which may possibly be made more internally consistent or "har- 
monious" but not itself changed). 
2). The existing social order is morally good (Thus, in ideological 
formulation, it is described as bearing the attributes of some 
ethical entity -- "Divine Will", "Reason", "Justice", "Civili- 
zation", etc. ) 
3) What does not comply with the existing social order is blame- 
worthy (Thus in ideology, social protest is depicted as "ex- 
tremist", reformers as "agitators", foreign antagonists as 
"barbarous", non-compliance with authority as "violence", 
spokesman for the impoverished as "demagogues", etc. ) 
4) What promotes the social order, is praiseworthy (Thus in ideology, 
undeviating submission to this order counts as "moral" and "high- 
minded", foreign conquest as "heroic" and "glorious", violent 
repression of opposition as "firmness" and "resolve", exercise 
of vested power over others as "duty" and "public service", 
passive acceptance of exploitation as "loyal" and "reliable", etc. ) 
5) Whatever rank is held by individuals in the social order repre- 
sents their intrinsic worth (Thus in ideology, in successive 
epochs, slaves are held to be slaves "by nature", the privileged 
as privileged by "noble blood", the unemployed as unemployed by 
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"innate laziness", etc. ) 
6) The social order represents the interests of all in the society 
(Thus in ideological account, all citizens "will" it, "consent" 
to it, "benefit" from-it or whatever -- the multi-form "Social 
Contract" postulate -- even if some of them "treacherously" 
or "irresponsibly" oppose it). ' 
7) A part of a society (or a social organization) must always 
represent the whole of the society (or social organization 
(Thus in ideology, a society without rulers or a workplace 
without a master is simply unintelligible or dangerous "chaos" 
and/or "anarchy"). 
8) The social Propertv of the ruling-classis an independent, self- 
moving power (Thus in ideological formulation, the militarily 
held territory of the feudal lords is represented as "Landed 
Property" autonomously enjoining obligations and duties of all, 
the collective weapon of the ruling-class is represented as 
"the Law" or "the State" independently and impartially sub- 
jecting all citizens alike to its rule, the private capital 
of the big bourgeoisie is represented as self-governing subject- 
hood which of itself "produces profits", "creates Jobs", "brings 
prosperity", etc. ) 
9) Ultimate social agency resides in a non-human entity (Thus in 
the ideology of various epochs ultimate responsibility for social 
phenomena is attributed to "Fate", "God", "Divine Plan"S' "Nature", 
"Fortune", "Gold", etc. ) 
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Now a number of clarifying points should be made about these 
"forms of social consciousness in general": 
a) They are obviously very intimately related (though not mutually 
entailable) that is why I have called them, together, a "frame". 
To use a crude metaphor, they are like the layers of a unitary (if 
inverting) lens: through which the objective phenomena of human 
society pass and are organized prior to this or that ideological for- 
mulation. (Consider Marx's notion of, a camera obscura: GID, 37) 
b) This "unitary lens" or "public frame of mind" which governs or 
organizes as an historically and socially developed a priori or 
"given" that which emerges ultimately in ideological formulations is 
not of course necessarily the "frame of mind" of individuals as such 
in the soceity, even if the individuals in question-happen to be 
themselves ideological articulators. As I have emphasized several 
times, the ideas Marx is concerned with in "ideology" are only those 
ideas which achieve the social reality of public exhibition. As 
Marx's imagery repeatedly suggests, these are the ideas of the 
sociohistorical stage; and one may adopt the "public frame of mind" 
required of a speaker-on this social "stage" without'being committed 
anymore than any, other hired performer to either it or the ideological 
expressions it emerges in as a private individual. It may be merely 
an in-role performance: and the histrionic aspect of ideology and 
corresponding forms of social consciousness is persistently stated 
or implied in Marx's descriptions. (Consider his recurrent imagery of 
"masks". "costumes", "chorus", "platform", etc., when talking of these 
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phenomena). However, it would be wrong to suppose that Marx con- 
sidered or suggested that the various forms and'expressions'of thought 
of this public "drama" did not carry over into and impinge upon men's 
private mental lives. On'the-contrary, his massive emphasis on man 
as a "social animal", on man as'a'being whose consciousness derives 
from his "social being" and "social relations" urges the conclusion 
that ideology-and forms of social consciousness are extremely in- 
fluential in the formation of individuals' own1cognitive lives (see, 
for example, 18thB, 37). Such ideas and forms of public judgement 
would-seem to comprise for Marx the sociallyaccepted standards of 
ideation in any historical society into which personal consciousness 
more or less resolves itself as the price of social existence. It 
is in this way, among others earlier described, that the individual's 
consciousness becomes a "social product". Thus individuals, as a 
matter of fact, take, on the various'roles, postures and lines of'this 
public stage as their own -- so that what exists in'principle only 
in the realm-of official superstructure comes-more or less simultan- 
eously, to'obtain contingently in individuals' own minds (what we today 
might call "brain washing"). At this point, social "self-deception" 
(Marx's own phrase, 18thB, -11), becomes individual "self-deception" 
and the important distinction in principle is conflated in fact 
("all the world's a stage" to cite the insight of one great ideologist). 
This is why Marx is so-often anxious*to "drum into people's heads"-, 
his revolutionary. mode of thought. He is trying literally to break 
the hold that-ruling-class ideology and its-governing forms of social 
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consciousness have on the minds of their individual working class 
victims and the latter's various representatives. His recurrent 
phraseology of "shattering illusions", it seems clear, most aptly 
applies to the ensconced forms of public consciousness and it is 
these forms, with their "carry-over" effect on individual consciousness, 
that perhaps more than ideological formulations themselves Marx is 
concerned to challenge and usurp. More basically (i. e. structurally) 
than anything else in the realm of consciousness, they allow for the 
identification of the individual with the ruling-class social order 
within which he lives, an identification that can and does approach 
the level of "organic", to invoke Nino Gramscits term. Through such 
"forms of social consciousness" becoming part of the cognitive equip- 
ment of the in dividual himself (on the public "stage" or not), the 
remarkable possibility of one who is objectively being exploited by 
the social order comprehending the persistence of the latter as really 
in his interests achieves actuality. A servility of very mind struc- 
ture is accomplished (e. g. "The advance of capitalist production 
develops a working class, which by education, tradition, habit looks 
upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident 
laws 
of nature" CI, 737) which accounts, I think, most of all for the 
sheer invasive brutality of Marx's polemic: be is struggling as it 
were, against the ruling-class framework as it has gotten into 
people's heads , against the mechanics of public 
illusion as they have 
been adopted as the individual's own. 
c) The "foms of social consciousness" are a social unconscious 
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insofar as they are not recognized but govern ideology as an undiscerned 
set of regulative principles. Since little or no ideology, certainly 
little or no ideology that Marx talks about (excepting his own theory), 
does in fact formulate these principles but is merely governed by them, 
it can be safely inferred that these forms of social consciousness 
obtain for Marx more or less unconsciously. The reach thereby of 
Marx's overall model into the domain of the unconscious -- a reach 
that is permitted by construing as we have "forms of'social conscious- 
nessit as a category distinct from, and in addition to, ideology -- 
deserves pause. For not only does it extend the referential range of 
Marx's world-view into an extremely significant (and generally un- 
suspected) realm, but it indicates a certain common ground with that 
other central theory of human affairs which is associated with the 
name of Freud. 
d) The term a priori as applied to "forms of social consciousness" 
is, as I've already suggested, only similar to the term of the Kantian 
tradition with respect to these forms governing consciousness as a 
given existing prior to this or that concrete judgement. It is not 
at all meant to imply the socially independent and logically necessary 
regulation of understanding that Kant's "Liori does. The forms of 
social consciousness are (relatedly): 
i socially acquired 
ii historically grounded (how great a role history plays in the 
, 
determining of these forms is indicated by Marx's poetic 
declar- 
ation that the "weight of all the dead generations weighs like 
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a nightmare on the brain of the living" 18thB, 10) 
iii applicable in principle (though not in fact) only to the public 
realm of ideas 
iv general but not absolute in their government (Marx's scientific 
ideology, for example, is not governed by them and the rest of 
ideological formulations vary in the stringency of their obedience 
according to the permissiveness of the specific historical con- 
ditions in question) 
v defeasible both in their particular historical form (e. g. feudal 
"forms of social consciousness" giving way to capitalist "forms 
of social consciousness") and (presumably) as a general mechanism 
governing public conceptions of human, affairs (e. g. the emancipated 
consciousness of the classless communist utopia): defeasible, that 
is, both in part and in whole 
e) The same forms of social consciousness, -- even assuming thorough- 
going stringency of government -- may tolerate very different ideo- 
logical formations: depending on the "historical circumstances" of 
the ideological phenomenon in question. Indeed even with respect to 
the same class at the same time over the same issue, no uniformity 
of ideological formulation or anything like it is being suggested -- 
just that such formulations are generally governed by these several 
principles. The same grammar after all -- and forms of social con- 
sciousness are not nearly so exhaustive in their governance as a 
grammar -- permits an-infinite variety of language expressions. 
f) It is worth noting, finally, that the forms of social consciousness 
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as I have characterized them are neatly consistent with, and even 
explanatory of, the various common characteristics of ideology I 
outlined in the previous'section. That, for example, ideological 
formulations-(e. g. those-articulating an abhorrence of violence) 
are "selectively applied" corresponds nicely with the forms of social 
consciousness which presuppose what violates, or promotes, the social 
order. as morally bad, or good, respectively (i. e. which Rovern the 
selective application which takes place). Or, again, more generally, 
that mainstream ideology is systematically misleadinR is at least 
partly explained by the fact that it-is regulated by forms of'social 
consciousness which are each and all petitio principii., Forms of 
social consciousness and, mainstream. ideology-in the Marxian schema 
seem, in short, as his language suggests, related as deluding (gov- 
erning) form-and deluding (governed) content in the domain of public 
conceptions of human affairs. 
As far as the relationship between forms of social conscious- 
ness and the other categories of phenomena constituting Marx's general 
theoretical framework it would seem that the former cohere neatly 
not only with ideology (as indicated above) and thus the superstructure 
as a whole and the economic base (like the rest of the former, they 
"correspond" with the latter, i. e. obtain in such a way as to-maintain 
it intact); but also with Marx's notion of the capacity for projective 
consciousness of human nature as well. That is, the forms of social 
consciousness would appear to be part of the social mechanism -- 
described in Chapter I -- "restraining the compass" of the former's 
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"functionable range": limiting such "functionable range" of con- 
sciousness by virtue of the established "public frame of mind" they 
comprise. For example, the limit earlier described in Section I 
(p. 20) as restraining Aristotle's thought from conceiving of the labour 
theory of value --, the limit imposed by, Marx says, the economic con- 
ditions of slavery of Greek society -- would seem erected in part by' 
the existence of-certain forms of social consciousness obtaining as 
a sort of medi ting, influence between the production relations/Economic 
Structure and the human natural capacity of creative intelligence: 
hence, Marx's talk in this place of the necessity of the notion of 
human equality achieving the "fixity of a popular prejudice" (i. e. 
form of social consciousness) before Aristotle or anyone else can 
"decipher the secret. of the expression of value. 
0 Here, it seems, 
Marx is indicating a middle link role for the forma of social conscious- 
ness between the economic infrastructure and man's essential cognitive 
3 Lest it be thought that. the notion of human equality (even 
it owns the "" fixity of popular pre--judice' cannot, by reason of con- 
sistency, be properly considered as a "form of social consciousness" 
as I have identified these forms, I suggest that it be considered as 
an historical modulation of the very form of social consciousness ((5) 
in my catalogue) that it seems to violate. Under this view, the form 
in question -- "whatever rank is held by individuals within the social 
order represents their intrinsic worth" -- easily accomodates the notion 
of human equalitV insofar as the equality involved here is merely 
equality of right before the law (which equality is, of course, per- 
fectly consistent with radical inequality of rank in other respects). 
Indeed, such a notion of equality before the law may in certain 
contexts be a necessary condition of intelligible ranking, in the 
way that equality before the track rules is a necessary condition 
of intelligibly ranking runners in a race. 
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potentia: a role in which the compass beyond which the latter does 
not go is proximately determined by the frame which the first to- 
gether constitute -- between, that is, limits upon the most rudi- 
mentary factor of Marx's general theoretical framework (human nature) 
and. limiting by the final component of superstructure (forms of social 
consciousness). The so to say "bottom" and "top" categories of Marx's 
model thereby connect into implicit relationship, showing the way to 
a richer interrelationship in Marx's framework than perhaps even he 
himself was explicitly aware of. 
In summary then, "forms of social consciousness" in Marx's 
schema constitute a still further superstructural "hold" maintaining 
-- as the rest of the superstructure in its largest sense -- the 
economic base intact. As the underlying principles governing public 
conceptions of human affairs or ideology, they bind the Prometheus 
of humankind on yet another, unseen level: the "public frame of 
mind" to which individual consciousness as a matter of fact generally 
conforms and within which in any historical society, man's essential 
power of projective consciousness seems likewise confined. The forms 
of social consciousness are, in brief, as Marx's discussion of 
Aristotle and the labour theory of value suggest, the machinery of 
fixed public prejudice regulating ideas as an unseen grammar of 
ideological propriety, as a set of undiscerned rules of acceptable 
formulation on the public stage. Or, otherwise put, they are the 
underlying cognitive mechanism-of historical illusion: the 
implied 





Perhaps no doctrine in our intellectual history has received 
more attention -- critical, puzzled and celebrative -- than that of 
"economic determinism! '. To adequately catalogue the literature on 
Karl Marx's epoch-making theory would require, no doubt, a consider- 
able tome. 2 
I am not, therefore, going to attempt such a task here, 
illuminating though it might be as a study in the history and 
sociology of ideas. Rather I am going to outline an interpretation 
which will -- if I am successful -- be both faithful to Marx's texts 
and immune to the standard philosophical criticisms which have been 
lThis chapter is a direct reprint of my article "Making Sense 
of Economic Determinism", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. III, 
No. 2 (December 1973) 249-61.1 regret any intrusive repetition or 
in-elegance which such direct reprint may involve. 
2Marx never himself employed the specific formulation "eco- 
nomic determinism! '; but he talks so persistently through his mature 
work of the "economic structure" "economic base" and "economic form!, 
in relationship to other factors of the sociohistorical process such 
that it "determines" ("bestimmt" or "bedingt") them that this label 
seems clearly apposite. 
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hitherto advanced against the theory (e. g. that it is intolerably 
3 imprecise, that it is indefensibly monocausal, 4 that it is refuted 
by historical fact, 5 that it is committed to logically improper 
6 
prediction, that it is incompatible with ethical and personal 
responsibility, 7 etc. ). My hope also is that the account that I 
give of Marx's position on economic determinism will clarify several 
of his fundal categories (e. g. "relations of production" and "super- 
structure") which have hitherto remained murky and, hence, specially 
provocative to the philosopher. 
As well, my interpretation will be quite unlike what has been 
offered in defence of Marx in the century which has passed since his 
publication of Capital: for example, Friedrich Engels' interpretation, 
3H. B. Acton (Illusion of the Epoch (London: 1955), p. 271) 
condemns Marx's entire theory as "a philosophical farrago; " Sidney 
Hook (Marx and the Marxists (N. Y.: 1955), p. 35) advises "Rigorous 
examination is one thing Marx's ideas will not stand; " and so forth. 
. 
4This is a claim advanced by Western social scientists gen- 
erally: for example, R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page in Society, 
An Introductory Analysis (Toronto: 1965) p. 563. 
5This 
sort of criticism has achieved the universality of a 
conventional wisdom. 
6This is Karl Popper's central point in The PovertV of 
Historicism (London: 1961), especially pp. v-vii. 
71saiah Berlin articulates the most famous version of 
this argument in Historical Inevitability (London: 1957) Vassi 
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which holds sway among Orthodox Marxists to this day. 8 
2. 
The essential framework of Marx's theory of history and 
society is constituted by the following categories: 9 
(A) Human Nature (i "in general", ii. "as modified in each historical 
epoch")lo 
(B) Forces of Production 
(C) Relations of Production (whose "totality ..... constitutes the 
Economic Structure") 
(D) Legal and Political Superstructures 
(E) Ideology- 
(F) Forms of Social Consciousness 
(A) is an arguable inclusion.. Many commentators on Marx 
would say that he completely excluded such a category from his 
theoretical framework after 1845. Though I am confident this view 
can be shown to be mistaken, the issue deserves a more thorough 
8Engells argument, given in his well-known letter to J. Bloch 
in 1890 (Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: 1953) 
pp. 498-500), is essentially that the "economic conditions" are 
"ultimately decisive", that they determine action "in the last resort. " 
This, obviously, tells us Very little. 
9This theoretical framework is derived (with the exception of 
W) from Marx's celebrated Preface to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy. 
1OMarx, qapital, Volume I (Moscow: 1965) p. 609. 
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investigation than can be afforded here. In any case, it has no 
importance to the argument of this paper. 
Also, there might be some resistance from Marxian scholars 
on the distinction between (E) and (F). Though none of the argument 
of this paper depends on such a differentiation, I make it for two 
reasons. The first is that Marx makes it explicitly on at least 
one occasion himself. 
" The second is that I discern in the dis- 
tinction fecund possibilities-for eliciting from'Marx a philosophy 
of mind, a theory of socially engendered forms of apprehension -- 
constituting what I would call an "interest frame"- which stand to 
Ideology something like Kant's a priori subjectivity stands to 
concrete judgements. But I do not wish here to claim so much as to 
suggest, to seduce, further inquiry. 
What concerns us in this paper though is (C) the Production 
Relations: or, speaking holistically, the Economic'Structure. It 
is these which provide the focus of our inquiry. Before-proceeding 
further, it is important to note that Productive Forces (e. g. tools, 
natural resources and human skills) are not strictly part of the 
Economic Structure, though they are often thought to be'such. 
12 
For the Economic Structure is with Marx a "totality of relations", 
"The German Ideglogy (Moscow: 1964) p. 38. It is, interesting 
to consider the relationship between Forms of Social Consciousness (F) 
and Human Nature as historically modified (A, ii). 
12See, for example, C. Wright Mills'. The Marxists (N. Y.: 
1962) p. 103. 
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a "form", while the Productive Forces are simply one of the two 
factors connected by these relations, this form. Hence in any full 
description of the Economic Structure, all expressions and/or definite 
descriptions referring to the Productive Forces would be replaced 
by variables. 
13 Marx himself seems to make clear this extrusion 
of the Productive Forces from the Economic Structure when he says 
such things as: 
Machinery is no more an economic category than the bullock, 
that drags the plough. Machinery is merelV a Productive 
Force (my emphasis)14 
All this is not, of course, to suggest that the Forces of Production 
are any the less important. As anyone who is familiar with Marx 
knows, they constitute, for him the motor force of the sociohistorical 
process. They even "determine", but in a quite different way than 
the Productive Relations and/or Economic Structure. 
Now having narrowed the conceptual field somewhat, we must 
characterize more exactly the Production Relations and, that which 
they as a totality constitute, the Economic Structure. When we have 
accomplished that task -- which is in itself a notoriously problematic 
undertaking -- we can proceed to the question of "economic determinism" 
as such. 
131 am indebted on this point to Gerald A. Cohen's article, 
"On Some Criticisms of Historical Materialism" (Aristotelian Society 
Supplementarv. Volume XLIV, 1970). 
- 14The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 116. 
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The Relations of Production, as H. B. Acton has pointed out, 
are apt to leave us in "the devil of confusion". 15 On the one hand 
they seem difficult to pry apart from the relations which are in- 
volved in technology per se: for example, the precisely ordered 
relations between men on an assembly-line which are constitutive 
of the assembly-line as an operable Force of Production. On the 
other hand, they are at least as difficult to pry apart from the 
legal superstructure or, speaking more specifically, the property 
relations of the legal superstructure: for Marx says in one of his 
most celebrated passages that "property relations" are but a "legal 
expression" of Relationsýof Production. 16 
The importance of these conceptual problems in Marx's theoretical 
framework should not be underestimated. They are prominent throughout 
his corpus and any attempt to solve them must, I think, venture beyond 
the texts somewhat. I shall feel free to take'such license here, but 
not so as to violate in any way Marx's own claims., Any extensions 
will complement, not disturb. 
First of all, let us clearly distinguish Forces of Production 
from Relations, of Production. A Force of Production is. anything which 
can be used to make a material use-value: 17 natural resources, tools, 
15jllusion of the Epoch, p. 162 
16 . N&A fi*ý" Z S'eft dPwck U)4u; 43 -4 I..,. 
Q S-ar., j 
Pp 00"T v WIU 
17This definition is implicit in Marx's most thorough discussion 
of the Forces of Production in Capital, Volume I, p. 177ff. 
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labour-power (skilled and unskilled) and the materials which all 
these require to operate (e. g. food and dwelling as well as oil and 
fertilizer). 18 Now this characterization could certainly profit 
from further development, but such is not required for our present 
purposes. What does warrant our attention here is the place of 
technological relations in Forces of Production. They-are, briefly, 
those relations which must obtain between the various, resources,, 
instruments and labour-powers of a productive system in order to 
set these forces into some sort of productive coherence. Such 
relations are as integral to the productive mechanism as, in the 
microcosm, linking and organizing mechanical parts are to a machine. 
Technological relations are, in short, wholly within the sphere 
of the Productive Forces and are necessitated by them. 
19 
Relations of Production, on the other hand, are extra- 
technical relations akin to property relations: "property relations" 
being for Marx, as we have seen, just "a legal expression" for 
. 18 That means of subsistence are Forces of Production is made 
clear in Capital, Volume I, p. 183, as well as Theories of Surplus 
Value Part I (Moscow: 1954) p. 378. As well, that which "trains, 
develops, maintains or reproduces labour-power itself" (ibid, p. 
167) is considered a Force of Production: hence schools and'hospitals, 
among other things, would seem to count as Forces of Production. 
190ne co-ordinated system of Productive Forces permits, of 
course, quite different inter-personal contents. For example, such 
a system may require la ur-power x functioning with machine y for 
time ti .... tn: but whether such labour-power is provided by one 
man or men acting in turns, and whether it is self-directed or 
commanded are extra-technical matters determined by the Relations 
of Production. 
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Relations of Production. 
The difficulty with so distinguishing Relations of Production 
from Forces of Production is that we seem thereby to be pushed, as 
it were, from the frying pan into the fire. That is, we are now 
confronted with the problem of distinguishing Relations of Production 
from property relations which are part of the Legal Superstructure. 
To advance straight to the point, the distinction lies here 
in the difference between power and right. 
20 A Relation of Pro- 
duction is a relation of a person to a Force of Production such that 
he has the power to use or exploit it and exclude others from doing so. 
(what we will call "effective ownership"). 
21 A cognate property 
relation, in contrast, is a relation of a person to a Force of 
Production such that he has the right to use or exploit it and ex- 
clude others from doing so, (what we will call "legal title"). Now 
though the power and the right to so employ a Force of Production 
often and even usually coincide, frequently they do not. The army 
commander, the criminal chieftain, the upper bureaucrat, the religious 
leader, the political stringman, the monopolist, and so on may all 
own the power to use or exploit Forces of Production and exclude 
others from doing so, with no corresponding right. On the other hand, 
20For the most extendedgeneral discussion by Marx of the 
power-right distinction, see The German Ideology, p. 357ff, and p. 394ff. 
2'By the "power to exploit", I mean the power to derive non- 
self-produced benefit: such as rent, profit, director shares, upper- 
rank renumeration, sale mark-up etc. 
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the penniless, the conquered and intimidated, the legislatively 
deceived, and so on may all have the right to use or exploit Forces 
of Production and exclude others from doing soi- with no corresponding 
power. 22 The two are quite distinct. Furthermore, it should be noted, 
even where legal property relations and Relations of Production do 
11coincide", this may well be a matter of right sanctioning power 
which has been or could be held independently of such sanction (e. g. 
as enforced custom). 
23 This is an important point because it suggests 
a still more thoroughgoing distinction between property relations 
and Relations of Production. 
3. 
Having secured a definition of Relationsýof Production that 
pries these relations apart from technological relations (which 
belong to the Forces of Production) and cognate property relations 
(which belong to the Legal Superstructure), we can now identify the 
subject term of "economic determinism. " 
The totality of Relations of Production constitutes, we have 
seen, the Economic Structure. This Economic Structure, in turn, 
is what Marx sees as determining not only men's individual behaviour 
but society's Legal and Political Superstructures, Ideologyýand Forms 
22 See, for example, The German Ideology, pp. 79-80. 
23"Right", claims Marx (The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 75) 
"is only the recognition of fact". - 
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of Social Consciousness as well. 
For Marx, the essential and defining principle of the 
Economi c Structure is its enduring ruling-class pattern: that is, 
the "effective ownership" of most of society's Forces of Production 
by a small part of that society (the ruling-class) and the effective 
ownership of few or none of society's Forces of Production by. the 
large majority of that society (the labourers). 
24 Exactly what 
Forces of Productiodare here involved (e. g. whether the arable land 
as in rural feudalism or the factories and machinery as in urban 
capitalism), who has effective onwership of them (e. g. whether 
hereditary lords or capitalists) and how such Relations of Production 
actually operate (e. g. whether by the economic laws of feudalism or 
capitalism) are questions to which the answers will provide a more 
determinate view of the Economic Structure under consideration. 
The ruling-class pattern of the Economic Structure, however, 
whatever its specific form, renders the non-owning majority, the 
labourers dependent for their survival on the "small part of society 
who possess the monopoly of the means of production": 
25 for the 
latter are the material resources whereby men stay alive. Thus the 
ruling-class are in the position through their "monopoly" of the 
Forces of Production to extract payment from the non-owning labourers 
24There are, of course people -- "petty" owners -- who are 
members neither of the ruling-class nor of the labouring class, and 
my wording permits this. 
25Capital Volume I, p. 235. 
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in exchange for allowing these latter those benefits from the 
Productive Forces which they require to continue living. This payment 
is in the case of productive workers surplus-labour on-the ruling- 
class-owned Forces of Production above and beyond what is allocated 
to keep the labourers alive (which surplus-labour expresses. itself 
in such historical forms as rent-in-kind or money profit). Thus, 
in one of his most definitive passages, Marx says: 
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is 
pumped out of direct producers ... the direct relationship of 
the owners of the conditions of'production to the direct pro- 
ducers ... reveals the inner-most secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure. 1126 
In the case of non-productive workers (e. g. state functionaries, 
personal servants, ideologists and other "parasites"), the payment 
is labour at service functions which directly or indirectly protect 
the ruling-class Economic Structure, but produce no material use- 
value. 
(There are cases, of course, where the non-owners seek to 
avoid this exploitative arrangement and attempt to stay alive in 
some other manner: for example, by beggary, vagabondry or robbery. 
However Marx reports in. detail in. Capital the fate of those who have 
resorted to such a strategy: whippingi mutilation,. slavery, de- 
privation of children, imprisonment and execution). 
27 
The Economic Structure is. in general thin, for Marx, the 
26Capital, Volume III, p. 791. 
27Capital, Volume I, p. 734ff. 
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enduring ruling-class pattern of the totality of the Relation of 
Production (i. e. a small minority of society effectively owns most 
of the Forces of Production and a large majority owns few or none 
of the Forces of Production): which ruling-class pattern always 
involves the ruling-class extracting surplus-labour (or service) 
from the non-owning labourers. 
4. 
Now, the general conceptual groundwork laid, we can suggest 
what Marx means by "economic determinism. " 
Before doing so, however, it is well to point out, against 
some well-known interpretations what Marx does not mean: 
1) He is not saying that any of the non-economic phenomena is 
uniquelv determined by the Economic Structure: the widespread 
tendency to read "uniquely determine" when Marx writes "determine" 
or, to be more exact, the German "bedingen" and "bestimmen" 
is one of the great banes of Marxology . 
28 
28The question might arise here, "Well, if Marx doesn't mean 
'uniquely determine' by his notion of 'determine', then what does he 
mean? " In the next pages, I exhibit three specific uses of the con- 
cept by Marx, but I make no attempt to reduce theses uses to any 
single sense. I might appeal to the later Wittgenstein in defence 
of this strategy and leave it at that. However, I think it is worth 
mentioning here that Marx's concept of "determine" is most often used 
in the interesting sense of "limit: " a sense which is familiar in 
the pre-twentieth century philosophical tradition and which is, as 
well, the original meaning of the Latin "determinare. " (See p. 255ff 
for detailed discussion of this use). I mig t also point out here 
that such a use of "determine" is neatly consistent with Marx's 
concept of an economic form. 
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2) He does not mean by "ideology" those scientific principles and 
theories that are technically utilizable in maintaining or 
improving productive output: these are primary constituents of 
the Forces of Production and are everywhere recognized by Marx 
as such. 
3) He is not saying that those phenomena which are determined by 
the Economic Structure are inefficacious in their relationship 
to the latter: throughout his work he draws attention to the 
great practical influence and indeed necessity of laws, politics, 
ideology etc., in maintaining the Economic Structure. 
Still speaking generally, we may now say that the Economic 
Structure "determines" by virtue of these principles which define it. 29 
1) Effective ownership by a small minority of most of society's 
Forces of Production and effective ownership by a large majority 
of few or none of the Forces of Production is maintained intact: 
the proportion of the society who so control the means, of life 
and the share they hold remaining constant, or becoming more 
monopolist still. 
2) Surplus labour over and above the amount allocated to the 
290f course, in any pre-revolutionary or revolutionary 
stage, the Economic Structure is in the process of dissolution and 
correspondingly ceases, thus, to exert determining force. What 
happens in such stages, according to Marx, is that men reorganize 
their constraining Economic Structure through political action, a 
reorganization that is made both possible and technically desirable 
by the growth of the Productive Forces beyond the limits of the 
Structure to accommodate them. 
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producers for their survival is extracted (by and to the advantage 
of (1)) from the latter by the ruling-class: the amount of such 
tribute labour remaining constant, or increasing. 
30 
Strictly speaking, (1) constitutes the Economic Structure per 
se and (2) is its "law of motion. " 
31 Remaining on the general level, we may now state how, for 
Marx, the operation of these principles of the Economic Structure 
determine individual behaviour, the Legal and Political Superstructure, 
Ideology and the Foms of Social Consciousness. 
First of all they determine individual behaviour by: 
(a) compelling those who are without the Forces of Production they 
require to stay alive (the majority of society) to work and 
provide surplus-labour or service for others (those others being 
correspondingly compelled to follow their role of domination 
or sink to the same level). 
32 
(b) compelling those who work and provide surplus-labour or service 
for others in order to survive to pursue precisely and externally 
, 30Though the rate of profit in capitalist society declines, 
according to Marx, the mass of surplus labour grows (Capital, Volume 
III, p. 219). 
3'None 
of the specific laws of the capitalist Economic Struc- 
ture will be treated here, though it is in their operation that many 
contemporary Marxists see the brunt of Marx's economic determinism 
(for example, French continental Marxists like Louis Althusser and 
Maurice Godelier). 
32Compare Hegel's celebýrated treatment of the Master-Slave 
relation in the Phenomenology. 
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stipulated forms of activitv in their work: which external 
prescriptive control of the individual's working life, extending 
as it often does to most of the activities of his waking hours, 
is perhaps the strictest sort of determinism which the Economic 
Structure exerts (those who hold the power to so stipulate other 
men's activities being correspondingly compelled, again, to 
sustain their hegemony or sink to the same level). 
(c) restricting those who are not members of the ruling-class within 
narrow limits in their non-work lives by virtue of: 
(i) placing severe non-technical consumer limits (e. g. by 
meagre wages) on what they may enjoy in the way of 
dwelling-place, food supply, culture goods, luxuries and 
so forth. 
(ii) excluding them from access to most of the natural and 
technological environment which is owned by the-ruling- 
class. 
(iii) so confining them in their work lives by extended repetitive 
labour that the possibilities of their non-work lives are 
gravely curtailed (e. g. by virtue of exhaustion and mech- 
anical habit). 33 
Secondly, the Economic Structure determines the Legal and 
Political Superstructures, the Ideology and the Forms of Social 
Consciousness by blocking or selecting out all such phenomena which 
33These constraining influences of the Economic Structure are 
reported by Marx throughout his corpus, especially in the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts, The German Ideology and Capital, Volume I. 
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do not comply with it. 
34 For example, a proposed law which guarantees 
an above poverty income to all citizens, a parliamentary party policy 
to expropriate without compensation economic monopolist holdings, a 
mass-media advocation of the prohibition of unearned income, an edu- 
cational technique (or drug) which alters public consciousness to- 
wards non-competitive outlook -- none of these will be permitted to 
survive in a capitalist society. Such and similar non-occurrences 
35 
are firmly predictable. They do not comply or "correspond" with 
the Economic Structure. They are "blocked" therefore from obtaining, 
34Marx consistently uses the German word "entsprechen" 
(meaning "correspond to" or "comply with") to describe the relation- 
ship between the Economic Structure and the Legal and Political 
Superstructures, the Ideology and the Forms of Social Consciousness. 
(e. g. in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy The Poverty of Philosophv (p. 95 and p. 160), Capital, 
Volume I (p. 82 and p. 372) Capital, Volume III (p. 791), etc. The 
implication is, as I argue, that what does not "correspond to" or 
"comply with". the Economic Structure. is excluded. 
35If one of these phenomena did occur, then the'economic 
determinist principle, as I have applied it here, would be prima facie 
falsified. Such a falsification upon further investigation might lead 
to any of the following conclusions: 
(1) The Economic Structure of the society is in a state of dissolution: 
a revolutionary stage has been entered. 
(2) The phenomenon in question is, to use Marx's frequent term, 
"accidental": an exception to an otherwise firmly obtaining 
regularity. 
(3) The phenomenon in question does in fact "correspond" with the 
Economic Structure in a manner not yet evident. 
(4) The phenomenon in question, in company with other phenomena 
similarly recalcitrant, obtains and continues to obtain with 
no revolution ensuing: thus falsifying the principle of 
"economic determinism" as here applied. 
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or "selected out" before they can achieve effective hold. 
36 
Marx's writings are full, from 1843 on, with descriptions 
of precisely this negative determinism. 37 
(Such "blocking" or "selecting out" of phenomena which do 
not comply with the Economic Structure is made possible by, essentially, 
the following conditions: 
(1) the supervisory prominence of ruling-class members in legal, 
political and ideological agencies. 
(2) the power of ruling-class members to provide and withdraw 
economic support from parliamentary, educational and. mass- 
media personnel who are not members of the ruling-class. 
(3) the tendency of societies to sustain, simply as a, matter of 
entrenched historical "habit", the Economic Structure which is 
already firmly established. 38 
360ne of Marx's favorite illustrations of this "blocking" 
phenomenon is nineteenth century Political Economy-which always re- 
mains "within the bounds of the bourgeois horizon, " "within a limited 
field of expression" (my emphases). Once the class antagonism of 
the Economic Structure becomes manifest, then these "bounds" are more 
restrictive than ever. "It was thenceforth no longer a question 
whether this theorem or that was true, but whether it was useful to 
capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient, politically dangerous 
or not" (Capital, Volume I, p. 14-15). 
37"Determinatio est Negatio", says Marx, echoing Spinoza 
(Lbid, p. 597). 
38"The tradition of all the dead generations", says Marx in 
one of his more lyrical passages, "weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living" (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 
(Moscow: 1967) p. 10. 
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the logic of collective action which, insofar as legal, political 
and ideological activities are only collectively generatable, 
renders individual commission impossible). 
It might well be thought here that the notion of "complying" 
or "corresponding" with the Economic Structure is too loose that, 
consequently, the precise extent of such economic determinism is not 
clear. This is true enough. But such a caveat tells as forcefully 
against Darwin's similar (but generally accepted) theory, of Natural 
Selection: that "favourable species tend to be preserved and un- 
favourable ones to be destroyed". 39 Darwin never offers explicit 
criteria of what it is for a species to be "favourable" or "un- 
favourable" or, otherwise put, -"fit" and "unfit" for natural sur- 
vival. Similarly, Marx does not sponsor such criteria for what it 
is for a superstructural or ideological phenomena to be fit or unfit 
(i. e. compliant or uncompliant with the Economic Structure) for social 
survival. In each case, empirical inquiry into all the relevant 
concrete circumstances is required to mount a sound judgment of 
what in fact will be selected, or selected out, in the '. 'struggle 
for life". Thus whereas Darwin might specifically claim that, 
say, the rhinoceros in the tundra will suffer extinction,, (because 
the material succour it rejuires is lacking in such a natural environ- 
ment), so Marx might specifically claim that a bill for worker 
39MArx, it is interesting to remember, wanted to dedicate Capital 
to Darwin, and Engels -- in his graveside speech on Marx -- compared the 
theories of the two men. 
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management of factories on the floor of British Parliament will suffer 
extinction (because the material "succour" it requires is lacking 
in such a social environment). Marx, as Darwin, would insist here 
and elsewhere on investigation of particular material conditions 
before he ever hazarded judgment on the precise extent to which his 
general principle held. 
It might still be objected here that there are many possible 
refutations of Marx's principle that only that which "complies" or 
"corresponds" with the Economic Structure is permitted social survival. 
For instance -- I am casting about for the most persuasive local ex- 
ample which this sort of rejoinder might muster -- the Canadian volume 
White Niggers of America by Pierre Vallieres was recently permitted 
publication and wide distribution in two languages in Canada, though 
it outrightly called for armed overthrow of the government and the 
uncompensated expropriation of all large-scale capitalist enterprises. 
Here, surely, a critic might claim, is a clear case of successful 
empirical rebuttal of Marx's economic-deterministic principle. 
A convincing reply to such a counter might be this. First 
of all, the book itself was published by a large capitalist firm and 
earned substantial profits for-the firm: reinforcing, thus, in this 
respect at least, the Economic Structure. Secondly, repression of 
its publication might ultimately have generated more challenges to 
the Economic Structure than it prevented and, therefore, been inimical 
in the end to the preservation of this structure. And finally, when 
circumstances arose such that this and similar literature did represent 
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a clearer threat to the Economic Structure than hitherto, a special 
and decisive superstructural step was taken invocation by the 
national government of the War Measures Act whereby all support 
of the cause it embraced was subject to indefinite detention (an 
executive move which permitted, among other things, the extended 
imprisonment of. the book's author). In short, an examination of 
specific historical circumstances leads plausibly to the conclusion 
that the apparent refutation here of Marx's economic-determinist 
principle, represents, '--in fact, a confirmation of it. Other such 
rebuttals might be similarly subverted. 
We come to the third -- and perhaps most interesting -- sense 
in which the Economic Structure determines the Legal and'Political 
Superstructure, Ideology and Forms of Social Consciousness-'This 
sense of economic determinism complements the second sense discussed 
above. It refers to the mapping, so to speak, that takes place 
between a specific Economic Structure and the particular legal, 
political and ideological phenomena of a society. Marx gives no- 
rules whereby such a "mapping" proceeds, but he frequently discusses, 
describes and alludes to cases of its occurrence. In this "mapping", 
definite conomic-structural content is "projected" onto the super- 
structure, the ideology and public consciousness (which, in our account, 
have already been shown to be constrained within a "limited field" 
i. e. within bounds that comply with the Economic Structure). Thus 
whereas in the second sense of economic determinism, we spoke of the 
determining limits beyond which superstructural and ideological 
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phenomena could not go, now we speak of the actual content within 
these limits which the Economic Structure gives rise to. Together, 
these determinations make for the "correspondence" between economic 
and non-economic configurations to which Marx so often refers. But, 
it is important to remember, this (third) sense of economic determin- 
ism -- though highly suggestive and even intriguing -- is characterized 
by Marx usually in the form of ad hoc, highly specific accounts or 
asides. Indeed it is probably not properly subsumed under the concept 
of "determinism" at all: unless we think of this term (as Marx, 
following Hegel, often does) as equivalent to "make determinate". 
Perhaps the most graphic way of explicating this generally 
permissive mode of economic determinism is by illustration. 
Consider a capitalist Economic Structure. It is constituted 
of "bloodless" exchange-value terms: abstract, equal and homogeneous 
money-units to which all use-values and economic roles in the society 
are increasingly reduced. This capitalist Economic Structure, says 
Marx, is qualitatively "reflected" in the political and legal doctrines 
of Equal Rights, 
40 the abstract religion of Potestantism, 
41 and the 
42 
empty reified categories of German Idealism. Its translation of 
social labour into cash value terms, into the "social hieroglyphic" 
of money, is mirrored as a "reflex in men's brains" of commodities 
40Capital, Volume I, p. 176. 
41Tbid, p. 79. 
42The German Ideology, passim. 
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and forms of capital ruling the world as independent entities (a 
"fetishism" in which what I have called "mapping"takes its strictest 
form). 43 Its atomicizing of economic intercourse is expressed in 
moral doctrines of exploitative self-interest. 
44 Its principle of 
unlimited competition is projected not only onto specific Malthusian- 
Darwinist theories but the very structure of consciousness of society's 
members. 
45 Its indifference to human content is reflected in a 
scientific and religious rhetoric of "abstinence"; 
46 its inequalities 
of income in the popular notion of "God's Elect"; 
47 its unrestricted 
extension into distant lands in the credo of "Civilization"; 
48 its 
reduction of the labourer to machine-appendage status in an ethic of 
"Work" and "Order"; 49 and its removal of all hindrances to exploitation 
by Capital in the laws and slogans of "Liberty" and "Freedom". 
50 
(The primacy of the Economic Structure in all this being demonstrable 
for Marx by -- among other things -- the fact that economic interest 
43See especially Marx's section "The Fetishism of Commodities 
and the Secret Thereof" (Capital, Volume I, pp. 71-83). 
441bid, 
p. 449ff. 
45Selected Correspondence, p. 157 and p. 367. 
46Capital, Volume I, pp. 596-7. 
47Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Moscow: 1961) p. 138ff. 
48Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, ed. Schlomo 
Avineri (N. Y.: 1969) p. 347. 
49Capital, Volume I, p. 229 and p. 368. 
501bid, p. 279ff. 
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generally takes precedence over superstructural or ideological content. 
As he says in one of his wittiest epigrammatic thrusts: "The English 
Church will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles 
than 1/39 of its income"). 51 
Now, though the above panorama of illustration could be 
unfolded indefinitely, it gives us no precise account of the form of 
determinism under consideration., But such conceptual flexibility 
is, I think, unavoidable. As with economic determinism in the second 
sense, methodological placement in a definite historical context is 
required here before the general principle -- in this case what I 
have, called "mapping" affords satisfactory specificity. 
At this pointV I have come to the end of my outline of the 
general signification of Marx's economic determinism theory. That 
is, the Economic Structure "determines" via what I name: (1)' Work- 
Leisure Constraints (2) Social Selection and (3) Mapping. If we 
consider again the traditional objections that have been fielded 
against this theory, we can see that none of them succeeds against 
the version that has been presented here. First of all, Relations of 
, 511bidg p. 10. One of the most detailed accounts by Marx of the 
way Economic-Structural interests regularly assert themselves over super- 
structural and ideological considerations is in the pamphlet The Eight 
eenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: 1967). Here too his wit 
flashes: "Thus the Tories in England" he says, "long imagined they 
were enthusiastic about monarchy, the church and the beauties of the 
old English Constitution, until the day of danger snatched from them 
the confession that they are enthusiastic only about ground rent"(p. 38). 
It is instructive to compare Marx's contrast between the "hidden" 
Economic Structure and the "visible" Superstructure -- Ideology to 
Freud's contrast between the "latent" and "manifest" content of dreams 
(or to our own conventional "real motives" and "rationalizations"). 
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Productions can be adequately distinguished from Forces of Production 
and Legal Superstructure. Secondly, the claims that Marx's economic 
determinism is indefensibly monocausal, that it is easily refuted 
by historical fact, that it is committed to logically improper pre- 
dication, that it is incompatible with ethical and personal responsi- 
bility and so forth, all seem clearly to fail against the theory of 
52 economic determinism as articulated above. Only in the realm of 
application of the theory does Marx's economic determinism appear to 
run into difficulty: for example, his most famous prediction that the 
industrial working class of the West-will "inevitablyvo53 rise up 
against and overthrow the capitalist Economic Structure. Ironically 
here, Marx's confident anticipation of such a revolution (was it just 
52Economic 
monocausality is simply not claimed or implied by 
Marx's texts (rather the opposite: see, for example, his claim that 
revolutionary class struggle is "political", not "economic" in a letter 
to Bolte, 1871 (Selected Correspondence, p. 327) and in The Poverty of 
Philosophy, p. 150). Refutive historical events since Marx's work 
do not tell against any of the principles of Marx's theory of economic 
determinism (as I have defined them) but only, if at all, against their 
specific administration. The sort of prediction which Popper accuses 
Marx of making is by no means, as Popper claims, a commitment of his 
economic determinist theory. And the denial of ethical and personal 
responsibility which is said to be implied by Marx's economic determin- 
ism is certainly not so implied: as the latter's continual use of 
the vocabulary of praise and (more so) blame indicates. 
53, t is well'not to put too much weight on Marx's use of the 
term "inevitable". Among other reasons, it is sometimes improperly 
intruded into English translations. For example, the well known 
statement from the first Preface to Capital -- "It is a question 
of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron 
necessity towards inevitable results" -- makes no mention of "in- 
evitable results" in the original German. 
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hortatory? ) misses the mark from. underestimation of the Economic 
Structure's determining force rather than overestimation of it. 
His error is, in the end, on the side of voluntarism. 54 
54MArx thought, for example, that the working class would 
resolve by revolutionary action the conflict between ever expanding 
Forces of Production and the Economic Structure which increasingly 
confined these Forces of Production within a narrow "shell". It did 
not, apparently, occur to him that: (a) the working class might be 
too "determined" to ever mount such a collective assertion and, cor- 
relatively, (b) the growing Forces of Production might be progressively 
re-deployed-as instruments to protect the Economic Structue (e. g. as 




Just as Marx employs the German bestimmen and. bedingen -- 
conventionally translated as "determine" - to characterize the in- 
fluence of the production relations/Economic Structure on the legal 
and political superstructure (in the largest sense), so he uses the 
same terms to characterize the influence of the forces of production 
on the relations of production/Economic Structure. So also, he calls 
the former the "base" (Basis) of the latter and repeatedly says the 
two "correspond" (entsprechen) with one another. In other words, 
the language Marx employs to describe the relationship between the 
productive forces and the productive relations/Economic Structure 
is similar to the language he employs to characterize the next-step- 
up relationship between the latter and the overall superstructure. 
In both cases, the terms "determine", "base" and "correspond" figure 
very prominently in his description. In both cases, the notion of 
a determinism has arisen from the use of the terms in question. 
'This use of the terms "determine" (bedingen or bestimmen), 
"base" (Kasis) and "correspond" (entsprechen) to characterize the 
relationship between the forces and relations of production is most 
persistent in. The German Ideology, pp. 1-95. 
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The "determining" relationship which Marx thus suggests be- 
tween the productive forces and the economic order is the essence of 
what I have called his "technological determinism". Through this 
relationship, the forces of production obviously also influence the 
"whole immense superstructure" but they do so thereby only indirect- 
ly -- determining the economic determiner so to say. The forces of 
production also determine (in the sense of "make determinate") the 
needs and capacities of human nature: as I pointed out in some detail 
in Chapter I. Furthermore, in the exceptional breakdown stages of 
a mature social order such forces, mediated by class struggle, impel 
superstructural change on their way to "bursting" the relations of 
production/Economic Structure: as I described in Chapter IV. Finally, 
Marx even suggests on a few occasions that productive-forces content 
is in some sense directly "mapped" onto and reflected in ideology as 
economic content is: this determining influence I will briefly dis- 
cuss near the end of this section. But the relationship of a tech- 
nologýically determining sort with which he is most fundamentally con- 
cerned is that between the productive forces and the relations of 
production/Economic Structure ut-siC. Any discussion of his "tech- 
nological determinism" has to focus, with Marx, on this foundational 
relationship of his world-view structure (He himself seems to have 
regarded the identification of the relationship in question as one 
of his truly new contributions to human thought (SC, 85). ) So though 
it is acknowledged here (and largely described elsewhere) that the 
forces of production are in various relationships with other factors 
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of Marx's model (i. e. human nature and the elements of the super- 
structure), which in one sense or another could be said to be re- 
lationships of a technologically determining sort, I am mainly con- 
cerned in this section with the relationship of "correspondence" 
between the determining productive force "base" and the determined 
production relations/Economic Structure. Herein lies, I think, the 
complex conceptual linchpin of Marx's entire system. 
Unfortunately, this pivotal relationship of "correspondence" 
between the productive forces "base'"and the economic order has been 
the subject of -- as with so much'of Marx's categorical framework -- 
considerable disagreement about what it means and/or whether-it in 
fact obtains. As I pointed out in my introductory chapter, the re- 
lationship in question is for many critics intractably problematic. 
Once again, too, since Marx's'relevant texts fail, typically, to 
articulate the precise principles involved, one must press analysis 
beyond the raw letter of his corpus to ascertain the logic of the 
connection he is here claiming. His own repeated characterization' 
of therelationship in question is simply that "relations'of production 
correspond to a definite stage of development of the material forces 
of production. " Now, we have already argued in the last section that 
the implicit converse of "correspond to" is for Marx "selected out": 
that is, what does not "correspond to" or "comply with" or "answer 
to" the "base" (here, forces of production at a definite stage of 
development) is not permitted to arise or persist or is, in any' 
parlance, "selected out" (here, economic phenomena). For example, 
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feudal economic arrangements cannot survive or arise in a society 
with modern factories and machinery, according to Marx: the former 
do not "correspond" with the latter -- the underlying principles of 
the required correspondence being the main issue to which I will soon 
address myself - and hence they are not so to say a "live" option 
in such a technological environment. The "selecting out" which thus 
occurs may be -- adaptation aside - of a ruling-out-in-advance sort, 
a failed-attempt sort, an epochal-revolutionary sort-or whatever: 
but the general principle of economic phenomena which do not corres- 
pond to the stage of development of the productive forces being 
economic phenomena which do not therefore arise, or persist -- this 
general principle or "law" remains the same. The determining re- 
lationship between the technological and the economic thus continues 
to resemble in outline the next-set-up determining relationship be- 
tween the economic and the superstructural, In both cases, the 
latter either "corresponds" with the former (the Basis) or, as a 
matter of fact, it fails to come into -- or-to persist -- in historical 
existence. There is, in sum, a suggestive and integrating symmetry 
of principle informing the two central relationships of Marx's overall 
framework of sociohistorical explanation: a neat congruence of sense 
between his notions of what I have called "technological determinism" 
and "economic determinism". 
However identifying such similarities between the principal 
determining relationships in Marx's system still does not disclose 
to us the answer to the more pertinent question before us -- which 
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is the nature of the technological-economic correspondence in terms 
of which the so-called technological determinism in question takes 
place and by which alone the latter may be precisely understood. It 
is all very well to say that the economic order must "correspond" 
to the stage of development of the productive forces or be "selected 
out" of historical existence - and, in this sense, be subject to the 
latter's determination -- but until we know the salient principles 
of such technical-economic correspondence, the determining relationship 
in question remains vague. There is, of course, the still further 
question of the grounds Marx gives for the primacy of the technological 
in such correspondence (to which I shall later attend), but the more 
elementary, if difficult, question which must be answered here first 
is what are the underlying principles of this claimed correspondence 
itself. In such claimed correspondence lies, as I have indicated, 
the most important linkage of Marx's whole mature philosophy of society 
and history: it must, therefore, be granted the systematic expli- 
cation hitherto denied it (by both Marx and his defenders, as far as 
I know: an omission which has been amply noticed by his critics). 
Without further ado, then, I suggest that the following (four) prin- 
ciples can be gleaned, if not cited, from Marx's work to clarify 
the crucial link of technological-economic correspondence he supposes: 
1) The relations of production/Economic Structure correspond to 
a definite stage of development of the forces of production in so far 
as: the units of effective ownership involved in the former correspond 
in scale to the units of technological integration involved in the 
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latter. 
Thus, for example, if a society's stage of development of 
productive forces involves technological units of large-scale fac- 
tories with machines and extensive work-forces integrated into single 
great productive complexes, then the relations of production/Economic 
Structure must mutatis mutandis involve effective ownership units 
of correspondingly large-scale dimensions, (or, specifically, "great 
capital concentrations"). 
2 If the scale of effective ownership units 
does not so comply with or correspond to such scale of technological 
units, the ownership units in question cannot -- because the relations 
they entail are by nature exclusive -- accommodate the technological 
units in question. There is a mismatch between production and owner- 
ship domains of integration: the technological units of productive- 
forces are in "contradiction" with the economic powers over such pro- 
ductive forces by virtue of different scales of unification. Thus, 
in Marx's account, the small ownership units of feudalism "dissolve" 
in the face of large-scale industry, and "petty" capitalist ownership 
2A technological unit may be defined as a set of productive 
forces co-ordinated by one productive plan. Similarly, an effective 
ownership unit may be defined as a set of productive forces related 
to 
' one owner 
(individual or corporate). Thus, otherwise put, the 
required technological-economic correspondence which is being suggested 
here is a correspondence of unitary domains of ownership to unitary 
domains of productive plan. (This does not mean that one domain of 
ownership may not include more than one productive unit (as in present 
capitalist conglomerates). It is just means that domains of ownership 
must correspond to technological domains in the sense of being as 
large in scale as the latter: which is of course consistent with 
their being larger scaled). 
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is "ruined" or "taken over" by the same, process. Since the scale of 
their effective ownership units is unable to comply with the scale of 
the technological units prescribed by the stage of development of 
productive forces of the society in question, their ownership domains 
have to be somehow rendered into larger capital holdings which do so 
correspond in scale. By virtue of this same principle of scale- 
correspondence between production and proprietary-units, Marx also 
predicts the end of large-holding capitalism itself. That is, as 
technological units achieve an increasingly international scale, 
capital ownership units must correspondingly grow to comply with them: 
more and more beyond past national boundaries of ownership (thus 
increasing imperialism, national conflicts, wars among leading cap- 
italist nations, etc. ) until such technological-economic correspond- 
ence of scale can only be stably secured through the conscious regu- 
lation of a Social Plan of international communism (i. e. beyond pri- 
vate ownership altogether). 
(Though Marx himself seems solely concerned with cases: in 
which the scale of technological units has. outgrown the scale of 
ownership units (as in late feudal and late capitalist modes of 
production), the principle of correspondence in question would seem 
also to cover somewhat converse cases in which the scale of ownership 
units has over-reached the scale of technological units, thereby 
involving a non-correspondence or "contradiction" between forces and 
relations of production the other-way-round from what Marx seemed to 
have considered the historically universal pattern (i. e. the productive 
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forces "outgrowing the economic order but not vice-versa: "No social order 
ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room 
in it have been developed" (Bott., 67))., Yet it would seem plausible that 
it is just such a converse non-correspondence between forces and relations 
of production (not precisely converse because ownership units may to some 
extent be larger-scaled than technological units without dysfunction of the 
latter, whereas the reverse is not possible) that might well yield an ex- 
planation of the transition from the ancient Roman social order to the 
barbarian/feudal order which does not seem otherwise explicable in terms 
of this principle of scale-correspondence. That is, briefly, here there 
does not appear to have been a case of productive units "outgrowing" in 
scale economic units at all (as Marx says, in the above citation, must be 
the case in all such epochal transitions), but rather a case of economic 
units in a more permissive sense "outgrowing" technological unitsf Roman 
big farms (internally) and imperialism (externally) more and more extend- 
ing the scale of ownership domains beyond the scale-of productive force 
integration of the day, and ultimately suffering --by virtue of such 
over-reaching of economic control - decline and'ruin (with the smaller- 
scale ownership units of a new order taking over to resolve the "contra- 
diction" in question). Though the principle of scale-correspondence 
indicated by Marx might thus be aptly inverted as an explanatory device 
of real fecundity here, his insistence that such correspondence is only 
rent into revolutionary contradiction by productive force, outgrowth seems 
to rule out such a promising direction of inquiry. 
2) The relations of production/Economic Structure correspond to a 
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definite stage of development of the forces of production in so far 
as: the social co-ordination of exchange and appropriation of products 
involved in the former corresponds to the social co-ordination of the 
production of these products involved in the latter. 
Thus, for example, if the stage of development of the productive 
forces is such that masses of individuals co-operate in their work- 
activities, then the relations of production/Economic Structure must 
be such that the exchange and appropriation of the products so made -- 
more simply put, their distribution -- is correspondingly mass co- 
ordinated: by some standard medium of purchase (e. g. money), available 
in sufficient quantity and adequately divided for the co-operating 
producers to continue producing (e. g. salary system), and so on. If 
the social co-ordination of economic distribution does not so cor- 
respond with the social co-ordination of productive co-operation then 
the relations of production/Economic Structure must either be adjusted 
so that it does (e. g. by collective bargaining, charity and welfare 
programmes, rationing, price controls, monetary schemes, etc. ) or 
the economic order in question will be revolutionized (e. g. by worker's 
revolt). Without such correspondence, the human parts of the productive 
mechanism have no assured form of material sustenance and the products 
of the productive mechanism in question cannot be marketed in the 
manner required to regenerate the productive cycle: which alternatives, 
though of course possible are, as a matter of technological imperative 
historically avoided in favour of maintaining or securing the cor- 
respondence of co-ordination between men's producing and men's receiving, 
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even should this involve revolution of the established economic order 
itself. Hence Marx predicts in accordance with this principle that 
in capitalist society as men's co-operation in production is main- 
tained or increased while at the same time the distribution of their 
products is progressively concentrated in ruling-class hands through 
the "laissez-faire" expansion of private capital, a non-correspondence 
of social co-ordination between the forces and relations of production 
(successfully coping superstructural interventions aside) will in- 
creasingly obtain that must ultimately culminate in a socialist 
revolution: which revolution will re-establish the required cor- 
respondence between the social co-ordination of production and of 
distribution-by collective ownership. Here, as in all such "contra- 
dictions" between forces and relations of production, the-forces of 
production are held by Marx to be ultimately over-riding:, their social 
co-ordination of labour-power will maintain its stage of development 
whether the established system of distribution is able to comply with 
such productive co-operation in its present form or must be revolu- 
tionized into a new economic order to do so. 
(Note that the general principle here of correspondence in 
social co-ordination between forces and relations of production could 
be met -- has been met since Marx's day -- by other than revolutionary 
alterations of the economic base. Indeed the centralization of con- 
trol of the mode of appropriation-which Marx considered a practical 
prerequisite of such social co-ordination of distribution seems to 
have been successfully secured by what we have come to call "fascism", 
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as well as by "welfare statism". So here again Marx's underlying 
general principle seems to cover possibilities which he himself did 
not take into consideration: the former thus retaining a status of 
genuine and important plausibility, while Marx's inferences from 
it seem mistaken i. e. confounded by subsequent historical development 
in which social co-ordination of distribution has been achieved by 
other forms of centralization than revolutionary transition to social- 
ism). 
3) The relations of production/Economic Structure correspond to 
a definite stage of development of the forces of production in so far 
as: what is effectively owned in the former (the "content" of the 
economic "form") corresponds to the socially standard level of pro 
ductivity involved in the latter. 3 Thus, for example, Marx holds 
that in the transition from feudalism to capitalism as machines, 
factories and co-operative labour raised the socially standard level 
of productivity in European society, the ownership content of all 
less efficient forces of production unavoidably dissolved through 
transformation (e. g. craft-skill to pliant factory labour power), 
3Very briefly put, a productive force is at or above the 
"socially standard level of productivity" for Marx when it demands no 
more than the "socially necessary labour" to produce (or help produce) 
a certain quantity of material use-values. For example, a handloom is 
well below the socially standard level of productivity in 1850 England 
because it requires far more than the "socially necessary labour" -- 
a prominently recurrent, if problematic, concept in Marx's work -- to 
produce (or help produce) x yards of cloth. Thus ownership of a hand- 
loom in 1850 England is no longer a relation of production (consider 
the adjective "uneconomic" which might be used to describe such owner- 
ship) because its ownership content does not correspond to the "definite 
stage of development of productive forces" of the society in question. 
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takeover (e. g. sale of feudal lands to capitalists) and simple ex- 
tinction (e. g. junking of old tools) of the productive forces in 
question. Ownership obtains only so long as its socially competitive 
productive efficiency: which effective ownership may endure over 
long periods of time with the same productive force content (for ex- 
ample, in the case of monopolist feudal guilds which managed to keep 
the social stage of development of productive forces more or less 
fixed by strictly enforced regulations), or may endure for only short 
periods of time with the same productive force content (for example, 
in the case of laissez-faire capitalism where the social stage of 
development of productive forces spiralled continually upwards in the 
competition among capitalists to make cheaper goods). But in all 
cases, Marx indicates, what productive force is effectively owned 
complies with the socially standard level of productivity. Otherwise 
the labour-power, instrument or natural resource so possessed is rendered 
obsolete or "uneconomic". It is thus in accordance with this principle 
of required correspondence between the ownership content of the re- 
lations of production/Economic Structure and the socially standard 
level of productivity of the forces or production that Marx predicts 
a (still further) sort of increasing "immiserization" of the majority 
in capitalist society. That is, in so far as the socially standard 
of productivity is continually rising and in so far as only owners 
of great amounts of capital possess thereby the resources to update 
their forces of production in compliance with such development, the 
productive force content of small capitalist ownership is constantly 
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being rendered socially uncompetitive with insufficient economic holdings 
to adapt to society's ever higher stages of technological development. 
The "petty bourgeoisie" of society are thus increasingly plunged into 
the ranks of those who have nothing left to sell but their own labour- 
power. And like all other proletarians, they are able to sell this 
(their own labour-power), in turn, only if it is, or is made, fit for 
the rapidly changing technological environment. The immiserization 
which thereby takes place is a matter of insecurity and loss of past 
productive-force ownership (e. g. small capitalists "going under" and 
skilled or unskilled workers being bereft of the value of their former 
labour-power): as distinguished from - if complementary to -- the 
relative immiserization which occurs with respect to the ruling-class 
capitalists simply owning more and more capital. (See Chapter. III) 
It is indeed because the ascending stages of development of productive 
forces in capitalist society so regularly require the increasing ranks 
of those who own only their labour-power to continually reform the con- 
tent of such ownership to maintain its exchange-value, that Marx holds 
that a "many-sided" labour-power is thereby increasingly enjoined by 
capitalism: a requirement which, he further holds, must ultimately 
subvert the very fixed division-of-labour framework of capitalism and 
class society generally (yet another example of how he views the cap- 
italist economic order as sowing the seeds of its own destruction): 
Modern Industry on the other hand, through its catastrophes imposes 
the necessity of recognizing as a fundamental law of production, 
variation of work, consequently fitness of the labourer for varied 
work, consequently the greatest possible development of his various 
aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society to 
adapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law. 
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Modern Industry indeed compels society, under penalty of death to 
replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition 
of the one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to a mere 
fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a 
variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and 
to whom the different social functions he performs are but so many 
modes of-giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers 
There is also no doubt that such revolutionary ferments, the final 
result which is the abolition of the old division of labour, are 
diametrically opposed to the capitalist form of production, and 
to the economic status of the labourer corresponding to that form. 
(CI, 487-8) 
Note the connection here between ever-developing forces of production 
or technology and the fulfillment of man's natural capacities. It is 
in ways like this that the mature Marx presupposes the human nature 
factor and assimilates its development to that of the productive forces. 
In such manner one could say, technological determinism is on another 
implicit level the affirmation for Marx of man's essential nature. 
However other possibilities consistent with the course'of modern in- 
dustry he describes such as merely less and less requirement for pro- 
ductive labour-power and an increasing "industrial reserve army" to 
choose fit labour-power from with no "fully developed individuals" 
required - are elsewhere acknowledged by Marx: which make the san- 
guine connection he draws here between technological and human-natural 
development somewhat hard to accept. The difficulty of this connection 
will, indeed, provoke concern a few more times yet before this essay 
is concluded. 
4) The relations of production/Economic Structure correspond to a 
definite stage of development of the productive forces in so far as: 
the mode of extraction of surplus-labour bv the ruling-class involved 
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in the former complies with the technol6ýical requirements of the 
latter. 
Thus, for example, if the stage of development of the pro- 
ductive forces (i. e. factories, machines and assembly-lines) requires 
that labour-power be present in unskilled form and elastic quantities 
continuously during the working week, then the relations of production/ 
Economic Structure must correspond with this requirement by a surplus- 
value extracting mechanism which is sufficiently indifferent to labour- 
power (no "gradations of skill", "personal ties" etc. ), sustained in 
operation (not the intermittent expropriation of a part of the working 
week as in "corvee labour", but expropriation spread throughout the 
week), embracing in application (not restricted to this or that ret- 
inue or craft but with all the "free" labour-power of society at its 
disposal), and so forth, to answer to the requirements of the tech- 
nological stage in question. Hence in Marx's account as the stage 
of development of productive forces of European society developed 
from individual plot tillage and small craft shops to mechanized and 
mass-labour farming and factories, the mode of expropriation of surplus- 
labour changed and had to change in accordance with such development: 
changed and had to change, that is, from the "fixed hierarchy" and 
"personal ties" of feudalism which could not accommodate such develop- 
ment to the "cash nexus" of capitalism which could and did. It is 
also in accordance with this principle of required compliance between 
the mode of expropriation of surplus-value and the technical require- 
ments of a definite stage of development of the productive forces that 
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Marx projects the inexorable dissolution of the capitalist economic 
order itself by virtue of an increasingly automated or "self-acting" 
technology which, in so far as it reduces the need for human labour, 
contracts the very source of the capitalists' surplus-value while at 
the same time swelling the ranks of the unemployed. Hence the rate 
of surplus-value accruing to capitalists must progressively fall, - 
predicts Marx, until the capitalist economic form'is no, longer ,- 
compatible with its labour-diminishing productive force base, and 
is revolutionized into a new economic order where surplus-value 
extraction by a ruling-class disappears altogether as historically 
obsolete in the technological conditions of an automated society 
(i. e. a society where labour can no longer be exploited to the ex- 
tent that it is no longer technically required). 
4 Hence too,, simul- 
taneously, Marx predicts, sheer unemployment mustAncrease as an 
ever-expanding sphere of "idle" human productive forces-which either 
die or live parasitically, and ---ipso facto -- which cannot be 
used to lower the working day for those who toil: until, again, the 
capitalist economic order inevitably disappears and is sublated 
in a new economic form which can'accommodate all the forces of 
production as then developed (i. e. a society which, by transcending 
the former mode of extraction of surplus-value, is able to employ 
all its productive labour without any ruin or parasiticism of idle 
4For the most extended and interesting discussion of this 
process, see G,, 692-706ý. -. 
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workers, and is simultaneously able thereby to permit a shorter 
working day for all: a society, that is, which is only possible when 
the extraction of money profits ceases to be the "law of motion" of 
labour utilization). 
(Once again, it is important to distinguish this underlying 
general principle of required correspondence between technological 
stage and economic order -- here, more specifically, the necessary 
compliance of the latter's stipulations of labour-power utilization 
with the former's -from the particular inferences Marx seems to 
draw from the principle in question (e. g. his claim that a proletarian 
revolution must occur against advanced capitalism in order for such 
technological-economic correspondence to be secured). Here, as 
elsewhere, the principle of correspondence in question may hold true, 
and yet Marx's application of it, which is not a straight logical 
consequence of it, prove false: with, for example in the case of 
the prediction of an inevitable proletarian revolution, the claimed 
correspondence being secured in other ways than such revolution. 
I press this point again here because it seems to be a common 
mistake of commentators on Marx to miss it: and to suppose, for 
instance, that some or all of his basic theoretical principles 
(inter alia, those pertaining to technological-economic correspondence) 
are falsified by virtue merely of this failed prediction of revolution). 
These four general principles together clarify in a systematic 
way, I think, the long obscure nature of the required correspondence 
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Marx claims between a soceity's definite stage of development of 
productive forces and its relations of production/Economic Structure. 
Though they are all implied by Marx's texts in one way or another, 
their above formulation is virtually entirely new (so far as I know), 
and may benefit therefore from the following further remarks: which 
shall also bring us in the end to discussion of the question of the 
primacy of the productive forces in this complex and foundational 
relationship of Marx's general theoretical framework: 
a) These underlying general principles of the correspondence Marx 
claims between a society's technology and its economic order seem to 
refute decisively the common criticism that such claim of corres- 
pondence has no grounds at all. Raymond Aron's objection, for ex- 
ample (see my introduction, p. 11) that there "may be exactly the 
same technical organization of agricultural production whether the 
land is the individual property of a great landowner, the collective 
property of producer's co-operative or the property of the state" 
would appear to suffer, as so much of the criticism of Marx, from 
missing the substance of his position almost altogether. That is, 
Marx's notion of production relations/Economic Structure is as we 
have seen an uncomparably more developed one than merely, say, 
ownership "by a great landowner": it makes all the 
difference, for 
example, whether such "ownership by a great landowner" 
is feudal 
or capitalist or some other specific form (and Marx could 
hardly 
have emphasized this more strongly than he does). Yet 
Aron's wording 
is utterly indifferent to all such critical and laboured 
distinctions. 
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It seems difficult therefore to take such criticisms as his seriously 
as objections: though of course one might well take them seriously 
as instantiations of Marx's general claim that mainstream ideology 
is systematically misleading. But whatever the merit of this latter 
suggestion, Marx's claim of correspondence between productive forces 
and relations is hardly the insubstantial strawman that Aron and 
others have suggested. 
Supposing though that Aron's objection were less conveniently 
simplistic in its understanding of Marx's position on this issue of 
technological-economic correspondence, and ran something like this: 
"There may be exactly the same technical organization of agricultural 
production whether the land is owned by a great landowner according 
to feudal economic arrangements, by a producers' collective according 
to socialist economic arranAements or by a state according to capitalist 
economic arrangement. " As soon as the objection is so rendered in 
a form which is not wholly devoid of the fundamental and substantive 
distinctions Marx makes with respect to economic formations (though 
even this wording is hardly adequate), it already loses its tenability. 
For example, ownership by a great landowner according to feudal economic 
arrangements is such that mass production methods of working the soil -- 
a "technical organization of agricultural production" which is, of 
course, possible with the latter two forms of economic arrangement -- 
is clearly ruled out on a number of counts (as the exposition above 
of the several underlying principles of Marx's notion of technological- 
economic correspondence makes clear). Then, as for communist and 
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capitalist economic arrangement being able to accommodate the "same 
technical organization of agricultural production" this part of the 
ýeformulated claim, so far as it is true, represents no objection 
to Marx at all in so far as it was his very well-known view that 
capitalism's technical organization of production (e. g. mass-production 
methods) had to be adopted by socialism as the latter's requisite 
productive base. If instead the objection in question were torefer 
to another sort of state ownership of land than capitalist -- say, 
ancient Asiatic state ownership -- the objection would still remain 
without force: for then, the state ownership in question would not 
be able to accommodate the "same technical organization of agricultural 
production" as socialist ownership because, among other reasons, it 
wants the mechanism of social distribution necessary to sustain methods 
of mass production (see principle (2) above). In short; Aron's 
objection seems to fare no better when it is bolstered with some of 
the substance it requires to be informed than when it is left tilting 
at a strawman.. 
b) The four principles in question are, obviously, very intimately- 
related. Indeed they are so closely related that one might properly 
wonder about their ultimate amenability to four-fold distinction. 
But I think one can sustain their discreteness as principles. (1) 
and (2), for example, can be kept distinct, dealing as they do with 
separate aspects of the economic form (i. e. its scale of ownership 
units and its system of distribution respectively), not to say separate 
aspects of the productive forces. As well (2) and (3) are easily 
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distinguishable in so far as (3) is concerned with the content of 
individual's effective ownership whereas (2) involves no such con- 
sideration. Then too (3) and (4) may just as clearly be held apart: 
and so on, I believe, for all possible such pairings. However, it 
is fair to say that in most historical situations which Marx treats the 
correspondence of these sorts between the stage of development of the 
productive forces and the production relations/Economic Structure is 
more or less across-the-board: that is, in most cases such corres- 
pondence, or non-correspondence, obtains with respect to all four 
principles at once. Thus, for example, if there is, or is not, 
correspondence between the scale of technological unit and scale of 
effective ownership unit then in most cases there is, or is not, 
correspondence in terms of the other three principles at the same time. 
It is the historical prevalence of just this kind of integral inter- 
connection which, I suppose, made Marx think of human society as an 
organism and of any "contradiction" between its economic "anatomy" 
and its productive force "organs" as the signal of the impending birth 
of a whole new body, the "birth pangs" of a new form of life altogether. 
5 
5It perhaps warrants an aside here that Marx's imagery of organic 
birth in connection with revolution seems out of line with the latter 
conceived as armed civilwar: which, if we wish to pursue such imagery 
of organism further, would seem more akin to disease of the body-politic 
- involving amputation rather than midwifery. Lest it be thought that 
this is mere play upon metaphor, it's worth adding the further ob- 
servation here thatievolution by armed civil war would seem apt to 
destroy in large part the verV productive forces upon which such rev- 
olution is. according to Marx's theory, materially dependent. So such 
a form of revolution seems on several counts, difficult to square with 
the Marxian schema: though, on the other side, the technologically 
progressive French and English "bourgeois" revolutions required cont'd 
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c) Correspondence between a society's developed forces of production 
and its relations of production/Economic Structure is, for Marx, what 
one might call a general law of collective human survival. During much 
or most of a society's existence, the problem of non-correspondence 
or "contradiction" in this regard simply does not arise: correspondence 
obtains without complication as the necessary material foundation of 
its (the society's) stability. Even when non-correspondence or 
"contiadiction" between the technological and the economic does threat- 
en or obtain, typically in the late stages of a social order, it still 
must, according to Marx, be somehow rapidly resolved, somehow rapidly 
engineered back into correspondence again: either tennously and 
haphazardly through superstructural interventions, conquests of new 
markets, destruction/waste of productive forces, etc., or a social 
revolution which alters the production relations/Economic Structure 
into a new form where the required technological-economic correspondence 
is more decisively secured. Marx seems also to have believed that 
the former sort of piecorneal resolution "inevitably" leads to the 
latter, thoroughgoing sort of resolution: but be that as it may, 
just such armed civil war to give "birth" to a fully blown capitalist 
society and Marx, least of all, was unaware of this or the further 
good possibility that a proletarian revolution would-Ttake the form 
of an armed civil war too. In short, the whole issue here requires 
a much more extended treatment than I am able to offer now, have 
offered, or will offer in this section (or indeed any other of my 
essay). I merely take the opportunity of this footnote to acknow- 
ledge my general omission in this regard: the issue in question 
being, in my view, one which has already distracted readers of 
Marx overmuch from the theoretical underpinnings of his social 
philosophy. 
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he was committed to the view in soEe way correspondence between 
forces and relations of production had to be secured if men were to 
collectively survive. Indeed in this "law" of technological-economic 
correspondence lies the nub, I think, of historical materialist 
doctrine: social stability, instability, and revolution seem all 
primarily accounted for by Marx in its terms. 
d) So far as the primacy of the stage of development of productive 
in its relationship of correspondence with the relations of production/ 
Economic Structure, such primacy is held by Marx on the following 
grounds (though i and ii are more implied than stated): 
i The former in some form is a necessary material condition 
of the latter, but not vice-versa. In other words, men cannot have 
a private-property economic order without a stage of development of 
productive forces (which they require to reproduce themselves), but 
they can have a stage of development of productive forces without a 
private-property economic order (e. g. with communism). The former is 
an flethical, Nature-imposed necessity", but the latter is a defeasible 
historical construction. 
A stage of development of productive forces that yields a 
surplus product is a necessary material condition of production 
relations/Economic Structure with a ruling-class (i. e. to support 
the latter's non-productive existence: CI, 211-12), but not vice- 
versa. With communist economic arrangements, for example, there 
exists and must exist a stage of development of productive forces 
yielding a surplus product, but there does not and cannot exist a 
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ruling-class order. The former is the indispensable material basis 
of the latter, but the latter is merely one economic form (albeit 
historically prevalent) within which the former can obtain. 
iii In all cases where correspondence between a societyts stage 
of development of the productive forces and its relations of production 
Economic Structure cannot be secured without the forfeit, of one or the 
other, the former is preserved and the latter is annihilated/replaced 
by an economic form that can so correspond. 
Hence Marx says: 
As the main thing is not to, be deprived of the fruits of civi- 
lization of the acquired productive forces, the traditional 
forms-in which they were produced must be smashed (LofP, 107). 
Men never relinquish what they have won, but this does not mean 
that they never relinquish the social form in which they have 
acquired certain productive forces. On the contrary, in order 
that they not be deprived of the result attained, and forfeit the 
fruits of civilization,. they are obliged from the moment when the 
form of their commerce no longer corresponds to the productive 
forces acquired, to change all their traditional social forms 
(-PofP, 157). 
Now a few paragraphs back, I suggested that the nub of the 
historical materialist doctrine was the general "law" that a society's 
stage of development of productive forces and its relations of pro- 
duction must correspond. Here we have the further and complementary 
"law" that when such correspondence cannot be secured without the 
forfeit of the former or the latter, it is the former (the existing 
stage of development of the productive forces) that is preserved 
and the latter that is forfeited (i. e. revolutionized into a new 
form to accommodate such preservation). Thus while the first "law" 
223 
stipulates a multi-faceted -correspondence between the technological 
economic factors in a society, the second "law" claims the primacy 
of the technological factor in this relationship of correspondence 
on thos occasions when such correspondence may only be obtained by the 
relinquishing of one or the other factor in its present stage (in 
the case of forces of production) or form (in the case of relations 
of production). 
Now it is crucial to note and explicate the sense of the 
primacy of the productive forces that is being suggested here. As 
I have formulated it, such primacy refers only to those occasions 
when either the stage of development of the productive forces or the 
economic order must be "forfeited". It is quite consistent with this 
claim that the productive forces are "fettered" by the production 
relations/Economic Structure -- and in this sense subject to the 
latter's primacy, so long as such "fettering" does not involve a 
relinquishing of established productive stage, a giving up of the 
achieved level of material productivity of the society in question. 
Hence, for example, the production relations/Economic Structure of 
advanced capitalism may since Marx's day have hindered technological 
development and indeed involved the outright wastage and destruction 
of productive forces on an increasing scale (e. g. through growing 
unemployment, non-productive utilization of labour-power, destruction 
of commodities, unused factory capacities, decimating economic wars, 
etc. ); but nevertheless -- since during the same period the level of 
productivity of the societies in question has been preserved and indeed 
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has enormously increased -- there has been during this time no 
relinquishing of the achieved stage of development of the productive 
forces, no giving up of the "fruits of civilization" of historically 
developed technology. 
In other words, the general principle or "law" under dis- 
cussion (as formulated above) is sufficiently restrictive in its 
reference that the course of development of advanced capitalism since 
Marx's writings -- however draconian its "fettering" of productive 
forces may have been -- has not falsified its claim: cases where 
correspondence between the stage of development of the productive 
forces and the relations of production/Economic Structure cannot be 
secured without the forfeit of one or the other, cases to which alone 
the "law" under discussion applies, have in advanced capitalism simply 
not arisen (as opposed to late feudalism where, it seems, at least 
in Marx's account, the situation was such that either the stage of 
technological development or the feudal economic order did have to 
be sacrificed: hence the "thunderclaps" of the bourgeois revolution). 
But it would be disingenuous to leave the impression that 
Marx made or implied the distinction between "fettering" and "for- 
feit" upon which the above argument in favour of his principle of 
productive force primacy is based. I think it is fair to say that 
he quite conflated the concepts of "fettering" and "forfeit", and 
that, in consequence, he often (as it turns out, mistakenly) antici- 
pated a revolution of the advanced capitalist economic order as 
"inevitable" by virtue of its "fettering" of productive forces alone: 
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At a certain stage: of [productive force] 'development it [the 
economic order] brings forth the agencies of its own dissolution 
... but the old'social organization fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated (. qI, 762). 
It is this latter, less discriminating view of productive force 
primacy that I have challenged several times, most directly at the 
end of the previous section. But since Marx's wording in such places 
as The Poverty of Philosophy passages cited above suggests the pos- 
sibility of the salvaging distinction I have made, and since besides 
he does (as he must) allow for a "fettering" -- as opposed to "for- 
feit" -- of the stage of development of the productive forces to 
obtain extensively under the capitalist economic order without the 
latter's "annihilation" (i. e. during the many decades of his own life 
when, as his own descriptions make clear, this capitalist economic 
order persistently and without dissolution inhibited full productive 
force utilization. in the historical maintenance of technical-economic 
correspondence) -- since there are these enabling features of his 
analysis to ground my unconventionally strict interpretation of the 
principle in question, I think such objections as I have indicated 
to his notion of productive force primacy can be plausibly met. That 
is, the latter notion seems to be sustainable if the inchoate distinction 
in Marx's work between "fettering" and "forfeit" is made. 
6 
61t is perhaps worth formulating this distinction between 
"fettering" and "forfeit" of the stage of development of the pro- 
ductive forces a little more explicitly here. As I have already 
suggested, to "fetter" such is to , 
impede full utilization of the 
productive forces it involves but not thereby to diminish the 
quantity of use-values ("the fruits") these forces already cont'd 
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However it is well to emphasize one very crucial implication 
of accepting such an interpretative strategy. If the productive 
force stage of developinent in advanced capitalism owns primacy here 
only with respect to its not being "forfeited" by virtue of a 
capitalist inegument, then the latter under such an account seems to 
remain historically viable to this day and the necessary revolution 
of it claimed by Marx isn't in fact even yet necessary because various 
produce. Any case of decline in the achieved level of productivity 
is a case of "forfeit" of the stage of development of the productive 
forces, and it is here that the distinction between "fettering" and 
"forfeit" lies: the former does not imply this decline, whereas the 
latter does. 
Is then a "depression" insofar as it involves a decline in 
level of material productivity a forfeit of the stage of development 
of the productive forces? As I have so far generally characterized 
"forfeit" and "stage", yes., To avoid this difficulty, and at the 
same time to capture better the ordinary force of the concepts "for- 
feit" and "stage", we must add the further provisos that the giving 
up of the achieved level of material productivity must be both more 
or less permanent (to count properly as "forfeit") and of qualitative 
significance (to count properly as relinquishing of a "stage of de- 
velopment"). As to the latter, where the giving up of productivity 
goes from quantitative to qualitative significance, where -- otherwise 
put -- the forfeit is of a full "stage" of development, Marx seems to 
mean by the latter (at the risk of category crossing): that which 
involves distinct types of productive force which are, at the same 
time, capable of distinct levels of material productivity (e. g. a 
hand-mill vis a% vis a steam engine). In other words, the notion of 
forfeiting a stage of development of productive forces is sufficiently 
strict that -- when the concepts of "forfeit" and "stage" are unpacked 
-- the instance of simple "depression" in material productivity falls 
outside its range of reference. 
However the definition I accord here to "forfeit of a stage 
of development of productive forces", though it may salvage Marx's 
general historical "law" so far as modern depressions and so forth 
go, raises an obvious problem so far as the epochal transition from 
the ancient Roman order to the so-called "Dark Ages". For here there 
does seem to have been an authentic forfeit of the stage of development 
of productive forces. Is then Marx's general historical "law" falsified 
by this particular but crucial case? contd 
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ascending stages of productive development have been -- even if 
"fettered" -- continuously preservable within its confines. The 
capitalist economic order is thus -- despite Marx's thundering pro- 
clamations to the contrary, a century and more ago --, still a tech- 
nologically permissible system in terms of the principle or "law" 
in question. If all this is so, then the revolution of the capitalist 
economic order which Marx urged and predicted may be ultimately, if 
unwittingly, predicated -- as I have suggested in various ways already 
-- on his underlying concept of human nature. For here, maintenance 
of the mature capitalist economic order could be said to require 
genuine "forfeit" -- of the fulfillment of man's essential capacities 
As I observed earlier, the transition in question is one 
with which Marx himself never seriously engages. It is a definite 
weak-link in his technological determinist account of history. One 
could through, I think, meet this problem on behalf of Marx in one 
of the following ways: 
a) The transition from the ancient Roman order to the 
"Dark Ages" is indeed refractory to Marx's general historical "law" 
that a civilized society never forfeits its stage of development of 
productive forces, but does not thereby falsify this "law": the latter 
is simply true in most cases but not all, a statistical "law" or 
firmly obtaining regularity. 
b) Marx's general historical "law" here is really meant to 
apply only to post-ancient Western society: it is not an unqualifiedly 
general historical "law", but qualifiedly such (i. e. applicable to the 
last 1000 years of Western civilization alone). 
c) The transition from the ancient Roman order to the "Dark 
Ages" does not in fact involve a "forfeit of the stage or productive 
forces" at all so far as the basic productive complex of food and 
shelter goes, but on the contrary salvages these most basic forces 
of production from increasing ruin within the economic form of Roman 
imperialism (see my earlier discussion on pp. 6-7). Only for the 
most part the production of luxuries and military installations of 
the ruling-class is forfeited in this transition, and hence the fal- 
sification of Marx's general historical "law" by the transition in 
question is only apparent. The basic forces of production of the society 
as a whole 
, 
are in this case actually secured from dissolution, and Marx's 
law is thus confirmed here rather than refuted. 
I favour (c). 
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and needs as Marx construed the latter, if not the stage of develop- 
ment of productive forces. And here too, economic revolution could 
be said therefore to be "necessary" -- to ensure the realization 
of man's intrinsic being itself, if not the preservation of his tech- 
nological base. The "inevitable" revolution that Marx anticipates 
against advanced capitalism could, thus, be ultimately grounded on 
human-natural rather than technological requirements. But I indulge 
here in speculative probes between more or less conflated roots of 
Marx's concern: probes which raise issues of vital importance, I 
suspect, but which work from distinctions that Marx himself never 
considers (i. e. distinctions between "fettering" and "forfeit" and 
between human-natural and technological requirements). At this point, 
our direct concern is with the primacy Marx ascribed to*the stage of 
development of the productive forces in its relationship of corres- 
pondence with the production relations/Economic Structure: a primacy 
which, according to my formulation of the principle concerned, ob- 
tains only with respect to cases where either the former or the latter 
must be "forfeited"; and which, consequently, allows the primacy of 
the economic order to obtain, in dialectical turn, with respect to 
cases where utilization of the productive forces are merely "fettered". 
Now this principle or "law" of the stage of development of 
the productive forces being preserved and the existing economic form 
being destroyed in cases of one or the other having to go, is, I 
suggest, a limited version of a still more general principle or "law" 
of Marx's that the stage of development of its productive forces is 
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never forfeited by a society7 -- whether in conflict with the ob- 
taining economic order or not. (i. e. "Men never relinquish what 
they have-won"). 
Indeed in this more general principle or "law" of a society's 
stage of development of productive forces never being "forfeited" 
by it -- whether such stage is in correspondence or non-correspondence 
with the economic order or superstructure or anything else in Marx's 
sociohistorical ontology -- lies perhaps the ultimate ground of Marx's 
entire system, certainly of "technological determinism". It is I 
think essentially this embracing principle or "law" that earns the 
stage of development of productive forces the predicate "base" in 
Marx's discussion of technical-economic correspondence, and similar 
attribution elsewhere; and it is I think as well essentially in terms 
of this principle that for Marx the determination by "selection"' 
of economic arrangements (and indeed -- implicitly at least -- all 
other sorts of sociohistorical phenomena) takes place. 
Accordingly, the more limited principle initiating this 
subsection might be formally broadened into the more inclusive form: 
No civilized society ever forfeits its stage of development of 
productives forces: including cases where the production relations/. 
Economic Structure must be annihilated/replaced by a new economic 
7Marx's phrase "fruits of civilization" in the passage I have 
been drawing upon indicates that the wording here might more properly 
be: "the stage of development of its productive forces is never - 
forfeited by a civilized society". When I use the open term "Society" 
here (and elsewhere), it is with this qualification in mind. 
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form to secure correspondence with such preservation of the stage of 
development of productive forces. 
(Note that-this expanded principle or "law", like its initial 
limited version, does not of itself permit the inference of an "in- 
evitable" revolution against advanced capitalism either during or since 
Marx's day. Mý distinction between "fettering" and "forfeit", which 
Marx himself never follows through, rules out the propriety of such 
an inference as I emphasized earlier (Possibly forcing Marx back, as 
I've already mentioned, to human nature as the ultimate ground of such 
"necessary" revolution. ) 
Note also, relatedly, that any such "forcing back" to human- 
natural as opposed to technological requirements as the necessitator 
for Marx of revolution against advanced capitalism might invite the 
speculation that the former not the latter constitutes the really 
ultimate "base" of history for him (though not, of course, explicitly). 
However, I think Marx himself believed that the technological was 
simply the material realization of the human-natural and that, as such, 
distinguishing between the requirements of the two was just abstract: 
and likely as well to raise normative/moral questions about "human 
nature" which could be aptly avoided by sticking to consideration of 
the more straightforwardly empirical issue of productive force require- 
ments alone. In this way, the problem of a conflict between the so 
to say "humanist" and "technocrat" strains of his work is kept more 
or less mute. In such fuzzing over of the distinction between human- 
natural and technological requirements may lie, I think, one of the 
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arch ambiguities of his entire work. ) 
iv Any case of dissolution and/or revolution of established 
relations of production/Economic Structure is causallZ dependent 
on an "outgrowing" stage of development of the productive forces. 
Thus Marx's famous interlocking general claims of the Preface to 
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 
No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces 
for which there is room in it have developed. 
and 
New higher relations of production never appear before the material 
[i. e. productive] conditions of their existence leave matured in 
the womb of the old society. 
Now, granting these are not mere tautologies (as they might be unsym- 
pathetically read), and granting, in addition, they are claims for 
the economic form's causal dependency for change on an "outgrowing" 
stage of productive force development (so far, I think, I am following 
the conventional rendering), these statements might furthermore be 
interpreted -- without, I trust, excessive ingenuity on my part -- as 
together constituting a neatly complementary "law" to that adduced in 
subsection iii above. That is, Marx holds (according to iii) that 
the stage of development of productive forces is never forfeited by 
a society and furthermore - here is the theoretically integrating 
complement to this "law" I suggest he provides by the interlocking 
claims in question -- a society's production relations/Economic 
Structure never "disappear" and/or are revolutionized into "new, 
higher relations" unless they must be so negated/transcended to avoid 
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such forfeit (i. e. the forfeit of an "outgrowing" technological 
stage). Note that I am retaining here iii's distinction between 
"fettering" and "forfeit". Thus, according to my interpretation, 
to say that "no social order ever disappears before all the pro- 
ductive forces for which there is room in it have developed" means, 
more explicitly, that no society's production relations/Economic 
Structure ever disappears before the stage of development of produc- 
tive forces can no longer obtain within these production relations/ 
Economic Structure without forfeit (i. e. the "room" for growth ends 
where the "forfeit" starts). And thus as well, under my reading, 
to say that "new, higher relations of production never appear before 
the material conditions of their existence have matured in the realm 
of the old society" means, along the same lines, that "new, higher 
relations of production/Economic Structure never appear before the 
stage of development of productive forces to which they correspond 
must be forfeited under the old relations of production/Economic 
Structure within which they have developed (i. e. "higher"relations 
because they require no forfeit of technological stage whereas the 
old relations, within which this stage has arisen, do). In both 
cases, with my integrative rendering, change -- dissolution and/or 
revolution -- of an established economic form is held to be causally 
dependent on an "outgrowing" stage of development of productive 
forces which (by the "law" adduced in iii) requires such change 
for its non-forfeit or preservation to be secured. It seems then 
that, if my interpretation is accepted, Marx here is proposing a 
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"law" of the economic form's causal dependency for change on tech- 
nological development which might be simply stated as follows: 
No production relations/Economic Structure is ever dissolved 
and/or revolutionized before it must be so dissolved and/or revo- 
lutionized to avoid forfeit of an "outgrowing" stage of development 
of the productive forces. 
As I have it then, this "law" links felicitously with the 
"law" of technological primacy reported in iii: namely, that a' 
society never forfeits its stage of development of productive forces. 
Here, I repeat, we have the complementary "law" that it is only when 
the persistence of an economic order enjoins such a forfeit that it 
will disappear and/or appear in a new higher form. 
Well, this complementary "law" of technological primacy 
(still remembering its qualification, as the first, by my "fetter" 
-- "forfeit" distinction) owns less immediate plausibility than the 
first inasmuch as it seems more subject to prima facie historical 
falsification: that is, cases of dissolving and/or revolutionizing 
of an economic order seem as a matter of fact not always causally- 
dependent on cases of "outgrowing" technological stage whose pre- 
I servation requires such dissolution and/or revolution. Let me 
therefore suggest two pairs of very simplified examples which might 
indicate a firmer and broader hold of this "law" than first appears: 
a) Britain conquers India and then introduces to the latter a 
radically new stage of development of productive forces. India's 
relations of production/Economic Structure are dissolved and/or 
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revolutionized. 
Turkey conquers Transylvania an&then introduces to the 
latter no new stage of development of productive forces, but merely 
exacts tribute in produce. Transylvania's, relations'of production/ 
Economic Structure are not dissolved and/or revolutionized. 
In the first case, India's economic order changes because an 
"outgrowing" technological stage has been introduced by Britain 
(positive confirmation of the "law"'in question). In the second 
case, Transylvania's economic order does not so change because such 
an Tioutgrowing" technological stage has not been introduced by the 
conqueror (negative confirmation of the "law" in question); 
b) "Reds" and "Whites" vie for power in Russia. The Reds win 
and introduce a new stage of development of productive forces. 
Russia's relations of production/Economic Structure are dissolved 
and/or revolutionized. 
"Labour" and "Conservatives" vie for power in Britain. 
Labour wins and introduco-s*no new stage of development of productive 
forces. Britain's relations of production/Economic Structure is not 
dissolved and/or revolutionized. 
In the first case, Russia's economic order changes because 
an "outgrowing" technological stage has been introduced by the Reds 
(again, positive confirmation of the "law" in question). In the second 
case, Britain's economic order does not so change because an "out- 
growing" technological stage has not been introduced by the victorious 
party (again too, negative confirmation of the "law" in question). 
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Of course, these examples more illustrate than demonstrate 
the force of the "law" under present scrutiny. But they do lend I 
think an increased plausibility to Marx's principle here of the eco- 
nomic form's dependency for change on technological causation: or 
under my interpretation, to the "law" that no economic order is ever 
dissolved/revolutionized before it must be so dissolved/revolutionized 
to avoid forfeit of an "outgrowing" stage of development of the 
productive forces. Cases like the Russian Revolution of 1917 or 
the British conquest of India which might seem at first to be cases 
of old economic orders disappearing and new economic orders appearing 
by virtue of other-than-technological cause are, albeit via bare 
outline, shown on the contrary, to obtain because of technological 
cause. Now assuming that the point has been made for such prima 
facie difficult cases -- as well as for the apparently more tractable 
historical case which Marx himself usually invokes (i. e. the transi- 
tion of feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe) one might still 
object, even granting all this, that the "law" in question does not 
furnish proper grounds for claiming the primacy of the technological 
vis'a vis the economic factor in the Marxian schema. For even if 
there is this law-like dependency for change of an economic order 
on technological causation, one might want to argue that the same 
holds for Marx the other way round: that is, changes in technological 
stage also always depend on economic causation. Marx held, in other 
words, this rebuttal might go, a typically dialectical position 
here, viewing changes in technological stage as just as dependent 
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on economic cause as -- conversely -- changes in economic form 
on technological cause. Hence to suggest that there is for him 
primacy of one or the other-factor in this regard is, this counter 
might conclude, a frontal mistake. 
To which I briefly reply -- while I agree that Marx often 
indicates economic causation of technological change (e. g. capitalist 
competition causing the invention and introduction of labour-saving 
machinery), he nowhere claims this etiological pattern to be'uni- 
versally or even generally the case: whereas he does say that no 
economic order, changes without technological cause. - Indeed Marx 
frequently and explicitly cites such non-economic phenomena as geo- 
graphical challenge and population growth as causes of productive 
force development or change. So, it would seem, dialectic here 
stops-decisively short of lawfulness for him. The technological 
factor does in the end own authentic primacy in the specific respect 
claimed. 
As I have already indicated of i to iv above it is iii 
(albeit involving discrimination between cases of "fettering" and 
"forfeit" which Marx does not pursue and which, besides, does not', 
support his prediction of the overthrow of capitalism) which provides 
the really fundamental principle of technological primacy-in the 
Marxian schema. It is in accordance with this "law" -- that is,, in 
its most general form, in accordance with the "law" that the stage 
of development of productive forces is never forfeited by a society -- 
that economic and indeed all other sociohistorical phenomena may - 
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be said to be "determined" by the technological "base". The latter, 
the stage of development of productive forces, is that to which all 
else must comply or be "selected out", whether economic order or 
anything else. (It is worth pointing out, before concluding this 
part (e), to how great an extent I have tampered with Marx's position 
in my formulation of this fundamental "law" of technological primacy 
and determinism. I have already acknowledged that Marx makes no 
explicit distinction between "fettering" and "forfeit" and that such 
a distinction, as I use it, bears in its wake the crucial consequence 
of significantly disabling his most famous prediction. - Nevertheless 
I think it can be properly claimed that all my tampering amounts to 
with respect to theiprinciple in question is selection of one-of 
its two-versions,.. which Marx wrongly conflates: a selection which 
plumps for the stricter version implied in The Poverty of Philosophy 
passages cited above and which, by so doing, allows (as Marx himself 
does on occasions other than his predictions of the imminent over- 
throw of advanced capitalism) for cases where the economic order 
"fetters" the stage of development of productive forces but does 
not on that account alone suffer dissolution and/or revolution. In 
short, my tampering does not alter Marx's position here, I think, so 
much as refine it to the extent of rejecting one looser version to 
which he only seems committed in his celebrated prophecies of the 
impending doom of mature capitalism). 
8 
8This "refinement" still permits, of course, the prediction 
that the advanced capitalist order will be dissolved/revolutionized 
once the situation is reached where either it or the stage of cont'd 
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To this point, to sum up, I have attended to the principal 
relationship of what I have called Marx's "technological determinism": 
the relationship of correspondence between a society's stage of 
development of productive forces and its relations of production/ 
Economic Structure. I have suggested that this relationship of 
correspondence obtains in terms of a (hitherto unformulated) set of 
four principles, and that the stage of development of productive 
forces owns the status of primacy, of "base" in the relationship 
by virtue of essentially the "law" that it is never forfeited by a 
society (whereas the economic order is, when either it or the former 
must go). I have also suggested, finally, that it is in*ter of 
this "law" of technological stage preservation that the productive 
forces may be said to determine all else: that is, whatever in a 
development of productive forces must be forfeited to maintain tech- 
nological-economic correspondence. All it rules out is this predic- 
tion by virtue of the former's merely "fettering" the latter. If, 
for example, the situation arose -- by virtue of a successful general 
strike or the introduction of radically new methods of productive 
co-operation or corporate ruin of natural resources or whatever -- 
such that either its technological stage or its capitalist order 
had to be sacrificed by a society, then the prediction of an "in- 
evitable" revolution against the economic order in question would 
be justified, according to my account. But such a situation does 
not seem as a matter of fact to have obtained during or since Marx's 
time in Western Europe or North America. 
The implication of all this for a Marxian revolutionary 
strategy is crucial. If my 'refinemenf is granted, then the way a 
revolution against advanced capitalism must proceed is through engi- 
neering -- or waiting for -- this situation where either technological 
stage or economic order has to be forfeited: revolution by, say, 
seizure and consolidation of state power alone must prove abortive 
-- lacking as it does, if my account here is accepted, the required 
material conditions for success. 
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society is not compatible or does not correspond with the preservation 
of the stage of development of its productive forces is "selected out" 
(including, most importantly, the economic order itself). Just as, 
to follow Marx's own course of metaphor, the human individual might 
be said to be governed before all else by the natural law to preserve 
his own "organs" of person, so the human collective-society might, 
be said to be governed before all else by the historical law to pre- 
serve its own "organs" of technology. That everything in a society 
thus conforms to the preservation of its technological stage, of its 
"productive organs" (CI, 372) is not only the "law" whereby Marx, ex- 
plains the dissolution and/or revolution of the economic order itself, 
but also the "law" by virtue of which he judges utopian communes, 
return to'craft-labour, romantic anarchism and so on as historical 
impossibilities -- to identify just a few of the cases in which he 
seems most plainly to invoke it. All in all, it seems for Marx -- 
to release still further into the liberties of metaphor -- that tech- 
nology has replaced Divine Will as the ultimate arbitrer of history, 
fating whatever does not conform to its dictates to death or ruin -- 
with Marx as the secular prophet of its design. Only here Marx 
truly "descends from heaven to earth". Man, not God, is the Maker. 
And historical praxis, not supernatural grace, is the agency of 
salvation. 
Having schematized in general terms the essential principles of 
what I have called "technological determinise' in Marx's theory, I will 
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move now to other less central sorts of determining influence which 
the productive forces are occasionally suggested by Marx to exert. 
I have already discussed in my section on "Human Nature", and else- 
where, the relationship Marx posits between men's needs and capacities 
and the forces of production. So there is no need to recount here haw 
he sees the latter as expressing capacities and answering needs and, 
in so doing, "determining" (or, "making determinate") such needs and 
capacities in dialectical turn. This is not to deny that the pros- 
pects for working through this line of thought, for exploring the 
full richness and complexity of the mutually determining relationship 
suggested by Marx between the productive forces and human nature, are 
extremely inviting. In the human-nature/productive force dialectic, 
after all, lies for Marx the essential process of man's. self-making: 
and in its explication may also lie one of the most promising fron- 
tiers of investigation opened by his thought (partially pursued by, 
for example, contemporary McLuhanism): 
For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses 
-- the practical senses (will, love, etc. ) -- in a word human 
sense -- the humanness of the senses comes to be by virtue of 
its object, by virtue of humanized nature [i. e. production]: 
The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history 
of the world down to the present (Marx's emphases: EPM, 108). 
Nevertheless I shall not cultivate my discussion of this area -- 
however fecund -- beyond the outline I have already provided of the 
general principles of Marx's treatment. I shall confine myself at 
this point to considering briefly -- and with this my exposition of 
Marx's "technological determinism" ends -- several as yet undiscussed 
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sorts of determining influence Marx suggests or implies the forces 
of production to have with respect to the elements of the super- 
structure. Marx does not say very much in this connection, and 
what he does say is elliptical and desultory, but the following two 
general principles would seem to adequately cover the substance of 
his various ad hoc comments: 
a) The methods of the forces of production of a society "map onto" 
the methods of the legal and political superstructure and ideology. 
For example, he says in Capital: 
The principle, carried out in the factory system of analysing 
the process of production into its constituent phases ... becomes 
the determining principle everywhere. ' (CIP 461) 
And he says in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 
There is in every social formation a particular branch of pro- 
duction which determines ... all other branches as well. It is 
as though light of a particular hue were cast upon everything 
tingeing all other colours and modifying their specific features. 
(CPE, 212) 
Though in neither case above does he explicitly develop the force of 
"everything" beyond merely other materially productive sectors, it 
seems reasonable to infer that part of what he meant by his celebrated 
Preface remark -- "The mode of production of material life determiAes 
the general character of the social, political and spiritual procestes 
of life" -- was this "mapping" of the methods of production onto the 
superstructure. (e. g. The method of the capitalist forces of production 
of "analyzing into constituent phases" is mapped onto its state 
bureaucracy and modes of publication which reflect just this method 
in their progressive resolution of legal, political and ideological 
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processes into assembly-line-like series of detail functions). 
b) Practical control achieved bV the forces of production dis- 
places supernatural control by mythical forces in the societv's 
ideology. For example, Marx says in A Contribution to the Critique 
Of Political Economy: 
All mythology subdues, controls and fashions the forces of nature 
in the imagination and through imagination; it disappears there- 
'fore when real. control over these forces is established. What 
becomes of Fama side by side with Printing House Square? ... is Achilles possible when powder and shot have been invented? 
(CPE, 216) 
It is by virtue of this principle of technological control displacing 
supernatural control in a society's ideology that Marx counts such 
things as the British conquest of India and the victory of the 
bourgeoisie over feudalism as historically progressive: that is, the 
technological advances which were introduced by the victors in these 
cases rid the societies concerned of ancient superstitions "enslaving" 
public consciousness and, for this, as well as simple increased pro- 
duction of the material means of life, the brutal takeovers in question 
were in his view steps forward in the onerous labour of human history. 
(Though the paradoxical possibility of technology itself in some way 
taking on the status of a mythical force -- "There is no problem 
technology cannot solve" -- in a society's ideology, and thereby in 
a sense dissolving one sort of superstition in favour of another, 
is never considered by Marx: a further example perhaps, of his un- 
critical temper with respect to the development of productive forces). 
I have come now to the end of my account of Marx's so-called 
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"technological determinism". The real substance of this determinism, 
I repeat, obtains for Marx with respect to the relationship of 
"correspondence" between the productive forces "basis" and the pro- 
duction relations/Economic Structure, a correspondence which obtains 
in terms of four essential principles and, in cases of non-resolvable 
non-correspondence or "contradiction" (one or the other having to be 
"forfeited") Is ultimately, re-established again in favour of tech- 
nological preservation on a "higher" level, through the mediation 
of superstructural class struggle. However I have also identified 
other less central sorts of "determining" influence by the forces of 
production -- on "human nature", and on the elements of the super- 
structure. As far as any unifying sense to this whole conceptual 
complex of "technological determinism", it would seem to be simply 
that the stage of development of productive forces exerts systematic 
(i. e. in terms of definite general principles) and over-riding (i. e. 
the stage of development of productive forces ismever forfeited by 
a society, but whatever does not comply with it is forfeited) in- 
fluence on the rest. of the factors of Marx's socichistorical ontology. 
The only real ambiguity here, as I've already pointed out, is the 
question of whether the technological or the human-natural factor is 
for Marx reallyprimary. 
Before closing, this latter point warrants perhaps some'further 
comment from a perspective embracing Marx's great corpus as a whole. 
There is a radical change of emphasis ýy Marx in the development of 
his social philosophy after 1845. Up. until The German Ideology -- 
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most strikingly in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts -- 
his concern is with man's nature and its material fulfillment, and he 
deplores the capitalist economic order most for its systematic vio- 
lations and repressions in this regard. Here the technological factor 
is viewed as the "open book of man's essential powers, the-exposure 
to the senses of human psychology" (EPM, 109) and is valued. as such, 
in terms of the realization of human nature. In his mature work, 
however, though as I argue he maintains his concept of man's nature 
and continues to view the forces of production as its-materialized, 
realization, his concern with man's nature and its violations and 
repressions by the capitalist economic order is generally worked out 
in terms of the realization of technology,, condemned because it 
derogates in various ways from the productive forces of labour-power 
and thereby from technological development. (e. g. The riveting of 
men to detail-functions must be replaced, for Marx, not so much be- 
cause it is an offence to human nature, but because in such offence 
it fails to utilize labour-power properly for technological develop- 
ment). Wrongs to man's nature are now, it seems, subordinate to 
wrongs to man's technology. Now this is an appropriate shift in 
Marx's thought, inasmuch as (among other reasons) his post-1845 
Praxis epistemology commits him to a concern with what men materially 
do rather than what they constitutionally are; while at the same time 
the basic "law" of history for him in his mature writings is that the 
. stage of development of a society's productive 
forces is preserved 
before all else. Furthermore, since Marx regards man's technology as 
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in a sense simply his historically acquired "organs", the shift in 
emphasis onto them rather than man's nature is in a way merely the 
extension of his former central concern. The primacy of one or the 
other's requirements is thus kept ambiguous. It certainly seems that 
the stage of development of productive forces is (and ought to be) 
for the mature Marx the legislator for mankind; but the interests 
of such technological stage are for him so intimately bound up with 
the interests of human nature that the distinction between them that 
is required to decisively answer the question of which of these two 
in his view ultimately prevails (or ought to prevail) simply cannot 
be elicited from his texts. It is kept as it were in a kind of phil- 
osophical limbo which, to animaie into issue, requires movement beyond 
his stated position. Such a movement, among others, I shall briefly 
initiate in the following pages. 
BOOK 2 
DOMINATION AND LIBERATION: 
BEYOND THE MARXIAN PARADIGM 
In the foregoing pages, my enterprise has been to provide 
an embracing if highly compressed exposition of what I have called 
"the structure of Marx's world-view": an exposition which, in 
attempt at least, penetrates beneath the ubiquitous profusion of 
Marx's written vision of the human condition to a precise frame- 
work of underlying concepts and principles. In so doing, I have 
met I think the complex of well-known objections (cited in my in- 
troduction) to the putatively irredeemable vagueness and confusion 
of his system's general categories and relationships. But this 
latter has been subservient satisfaction to my much more general 
and systematic goal: to clarify and organize into integrated ex-- 
plicit structure that labyrinthine -- to use Marx's own phrase -- 
"guiding thread", which may so easily lose us in confoundment with 
its fleeting twists and turns through almost every corridor of 
historical social experience. 
Now my concern is both more specific and more critical. 
I want to argue that Marx's general theoretical framework is in- 
adequate at the very core of its greatest concern (and, indeed, 
world-historical influence) -- inadequate, that is, in its grasp 
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of domination and liberation. While I certainly believe Marx's 
highly developed notion of a work-and-marketplace ruling-class eco- 
nomic structure makes one of the greatest contributions in Western 
intellectual history to our understanding of the former (domination), 
and his complementary notion of praxis struggle against this ruling- 
class order a similarly important contribution to our understanding 
of the latter (liberation), I also believe that the confinement of 
his analysis to the work-and-marketplace sphere of domination and 
liberation alone renders his system in the end crucially incomplete 
in its comprehension. And my concern here is not merely academic. 
Insofar as there is with Marx this narrowness of purview with respect 
to domination and liberation, insofar as such narrowness is trans- 
lated -- as it progressively is - into the materialized form of 
social practice across the earth, and insofar as this translation 
itself plausibly represents itself as the most advanced and systematic 
movement against domination and for liberation in human history -- 
the issues in question are of paramount practical import. Indeed 
it is my own pragmatist criterion of, if not truth, problematic 
which above all commands the present line of inquiry -- I am not able 
to think here of another domain of investigation where there is more 
at stake. 
At'the same time, on the purely ad hominem level, there 
seems a deeply authoritarian streak to Marx himself-which must pro- 
voke interest when juxtaposed with his profound written concern with 
the passage of mankind from a situation of domination to one, of 
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liberation. Marx's disposition to take control of every situation 
of which he was part, his intolerance of any who opposed him, his 
love of discipline and plan, his peculiar contempt for anarchists, 
his celebration of "weakness" in women, his great esteem for the 
genocidal advances of West European "civilization" and so on -- 
these and other propensities bespeak, I think, an ambivalence at 
the very core of the man about dominion and liberty. There is, 
one almost wants to say,. a Marxist personality-type of which Marx 
sets the archetypal pattern -- authoritarian in the name of freedom: 
with the domination from which liberation is sought sufficiently 
distanced and fixated to avoid the travails of self-examination. 
But enough of preface. To come straight to the point, it 
seems to me that Marx posits essentially the following principles 
of domination and liberation respectively. 
1) One group of people (the ruling-class) have monopoly ownership 
of the material means of life of a society while another group (the 
ruled-class) have little or no ownership of the material means of 
life of that society. 
2) The ruling-class (individually and/or collectively) exchanges 
some portion of the material means of life they own in return for some 
substantial portion of the ruled class's life-activity (individually 
and/or collectively) in conformity with the former's dictation. 
3) Liberation obtains insofar as this ruling-class monopoly owner- 
ship (1) and this dictatorial mode of exchange (2) are respectively 
replaced by communal ownership and socially planned work (during an 
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ever shortening working-day made possible by ever higher stages of 
development of the productive forces). 
Now (1) and (2) -- the essential principles of domination 
for Marx--- do not only apply to owners and labourers in the work- 
and-marketplace,. as Marx's virtually exclusive concern with this 
sphere would seem to indicate. They apply as well, and perhaps more 
decisively, to other spheres of social intercourse than work-and- 
marketplace: for example, to adults and youth, or (with increasing 
exception) to men and women. Adults have monopoly ownership of the 
material means of life of a society and they (implicitly or explicitly) 
exchange some portion of these means of life in return for youths' 
life-activity executed in conformity with their (the adults') dic- 
tation. Much the same could be said of men and women (certainly up 
until and during Marx's time). - 
So why does Marx only seriously attend 
to one sphere of'domination when his principles of the same (as I 
conceptualize them in (1) and (2))* apply at least as powerfully 
elsewhere? And, furthermore, would not this apparently inadequate 
application of his own principles of domination correspondingly 
limit the reach of his ideas of liberation, insofar as the latter 
are worked out in terms of the former? -In short, has not Marx 
gravely failed to pursue the logic of his own position here? 
One immediate response to this line of criticism might be 
that Marx does not in-fact fail to take into account these other 
spheres of domination in his analysis, but does in fact refer to them 
occasionally and only downplays their consideration because he sees 
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them as wholly dependent on the work-and-marketplace sphere of 
domination for their existence. As so dependent, he properly 
refuses them distinct concern or treatment. 
,- This counter though does not bear much scrutiny. First of 
all, it is not true that Marx ever mentions an adult ruling-class 
pattern--- talk of such would probably have struck him as merely 
odd (for reasons that will emerge soon) and though he does allude 
here and there to the male ruling-class pattern -- maybe half a 
dozen-lines in his entire corpus -- his remarks indicate an ex- 
tremely meagre grasp of the problem (as contemporary women-libbers 
have-increasingly drawn to our attention). Secondly, though it seems 
fair to say that he supposed any other forms of domination (recognized 
or not)'as, wholly dependent for their existence on the work-and- 
marketplace'form of domination, he nowhere demonstrates this to be 
the case. Rather, at most, he draws merely ad hoc connections. 
But since the dependency in question is by no means self-evident 
(it seems perfectly plausible for an adult or male or indeed some 
other ruling-class pattern -- racial perhaps? -- to obtain without 
a ruling-class pattern of the sort Marx is concerned with: say, 
adult male communism with women and youth as ruled classes), we'are 
left with only a monolithic assumption in this regardý The dependency 
of other ruling-class patterns on the work-and-marketplace ruling- 
class pattern is more or less just taken for granted with virtually 
no support at all given by Marx to sustain the supposition. 
' And 
1-Engels seems to try to give some sort of support tn thn le-n 
that the man/woman structure of domination is dependent mii '(7 
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even if there were such support and the dependency in question was 
shown -- which it is not it could still be the case that such 
dependency was reciprocal or interdependency - with the work- 
and-marketplace structure of domination as dependent for its ex- 
istence on other structures of domination (e. g. adult and male) 
as vice-versa. Furthermore, even if this problem were resolved by 
Marx -- which, again, it is not - and the latter ruling-class pat- 
terns were truly shown to be dependent for their existence on the 
former and not vice-versa, even then his extrusion of these presumably 
derivative orders of domination from serious consideration still does 
not seem justified: for, despite any such proven derivative status, 
they still remain crucial and persistent forms of the sociohistorical 
process which Marx's overview, to be adequate, would have to include 
within its framework of sociohistorical explanation (as, say, ad- 
ditional important elements of a more complex Economic Structure). 
But I have granted Marx successful steps in argument which he never 
takes and which, I believe, are not securable in any case. He simply 
does not anywhere demonstrate - nor do I think he could -- the 
work-and-marketplace structure of domination in his The Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State, (Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, Moscow). But Engels is not Marx, though commen- 
tators seem often to suppose the contrary. And Engels' argument 
seems to miss the nature of the man/woman order of domination almost 
altogether anyway. For example, he construes women's liberation 
under socialism as essentially a matter of her being able "to 
give herself freely to the man she loves" (my emphasis: p. 124). 
This is rather like arguing that a slave's subjugation must end 
when he can "give himself" to the master of his choice. So intro- 
ducing Engels' position to this issue hardly lets Marx off the hook 
here: it gaflfes. him. 
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dependency for existence of such other ruling-class patterns as I 
have indicated meet his ova principles (e. g. adult and male) on 
the work-and-marketplace ruling-r-lass pattern which commands all 
his attention. He either misses such other structures of domination 
altogether (e. g. adult vis. 'a' vis youth) or assumes them in passing 
mention as dependent (e. g. Tnan vis a vis woman), with no substantive 
argument to support his supposition. Of course, this failure to 
bring such other crucial structures of domination into his frame- 
work except at most by blanket and unjustified assumption of their 
dependency for existence on the work-and-marketplace structure of 
domination not only seriously curtails his grasp of forms of dom- 
ination, but ipso facto his grasp of liberation from these latter 
too. His "realm of freedore' - as quite consistent with, say, an 
adult and/or male ruling-class - is hardly then the vision of ulti- 
mate liberation it promises to be. Some groups of society may still 
hold monopoly ownership of the material means of life and the power 
to dictate to members of other groups which such monopoly ownership 
permits. Only one such structure of domination has been surpassed, 
even in Marx's most utopian projection of human liberty. 
Another rebuttal of this line of argument though might mount 
a much more frontal attack than the first and insist that the es- 
sential principles of domination I here impute to Marx and then turn 
against him miss the very core of his own position. That is, he was 
concerned with the extraction of surplus labour from productive 
workers by a minority of society through the power to starve etc. 
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the former for any refusal to go along with such arrangements. On 
the other hand, the structures of domination or rulirig-class patterns 
I identify by putative use of his own principles involve none of 
surplus-labour extraction, productive workers, minority of rulers 
nor power to starve etc. into submission. My whole line of argument 
thus fails by substantive omission from the outset. 
Well, I could attempt to show that the adult or male ruling- 
class patterns I single out do in fact involve these things, apart 
from the minority idea. Thus, for example, I think it might be 
successfully argued that the male ruling-class has historically 
extracted surplus labour from the female ruled class who are at the 
same time productive workers. They are productive because they 
typically perform a host of tasks (e. g. transportation and prep- 
aration of food, clothing, dwelling etc. need-objects for present 
labour-power, similar servicing, reproduction and upbringing of future 
labour-power, and so on) which are necessary factors in any society's 
material production and reproduction process. And surplus-labour 
seems extracted from them at least as much as the work-and-marketplace 
labourer insofar as they labour at these productive tasks as long 
or longer per week or year for as little or less payment in return. 
(i. e. Compare the value of what would have to be paid today to 
proletarians to perform all the productive tasks of a household 
to the value in mere subsistence goods which a wife/mother in fact 
receives for the performance of such tasks). Then as. far as the 
ruling-class's power to starve etc. the ruled class into submission, 
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the male ruling-class has historically had pretty well as much power 
via a vis the female class as slave-owners, feudal lords or capitalists 
have had via "a' vis the working class. - When for instance slave- 
holders held the power of life and death over their slaves (pristine 
patria poteatas) so too did males have similar power over their wives 
by the same inclusive potestas. And ever since, any modification of 
this power of the male ruling-class has been more or less matched, 
if not exceeded, by similar modification (before or after) of such 
power of the work-and-marketplace ruling-class. So, with the ex- 
ception of the ruling-class being a minority in the latter case, 
and not in the former, the structures of domination in question are 
more or less as symmetrical in the further respects raised by this 
second rebuttal as they are in respect to the essential principles 
of domination with which I began. 
This sort of counter though might prima facie appear much 
less easily sustained in the case of the adult ruling-class vis a% vis 
the youth ruled class. The latter does not seem, unlike the female 
ruled class, to be productive nor to have surplus-labour extracted 
from its members: although one could argue against this that the 
Youth class is as productive as other technologically indispensable 
raw materials are (i. e. "raw" youth is, to mature labour-power as 
raw minerals are to completed machines); and one might even argue, 
furthermore, that this youth class yields at least-as much surplus- 
labour - in its own formation into such mature labour-power -- as 
any other ruled class (i. e. all the hours of youth are under adult 
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command in this working-up into mature labour-power, in return for 
the barest means of life the latter chooses to grant). Then, so far 
as the adult class's historical power to starve etc. - members of the 
youth class into submission, here there seems no question of having 
to invoke any such ingenious arguments. When the slave-owner had the 
power of life and death over his slave and the male similar power 
over his wife, so too did the father have this power over his children: 
and, again, the modification of this inclusive power of paterfamilias 
in subsequent historical societies does not seem to have been any 
greater with respect to the youth ruled class than with respect to 
Marx's working class-or indeed the female class. Perhaps less. So 
again, the structure of domination or ruling-class pattern in question 
- adult vis a vis youth - continues to resemble to some significant 
extent at least the ruling-class order to which Marx more or less 
limits his attention. Certainly, there is much more across-the-board 
similarity with respect to the productivity, surplus-labour yielu 
and relative powerlessness of the various ruled clIsses than the 
rebuttal in question can allow to secure its point. 
However, a stronger and simpler counter to this rebuttal 
at least that part of it which refers to the issues of productivity 
and surplus-labour - is that it is irrelevant to the question of 
domination. That is, it makes no whit of difference so far as 
domination is concerned whether or not the party who is being 
dominated is materially productive or yields surplus-labour. These 
are questions which pertain to exploitation, not to domination. If 
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someone were to claim, for example, that a domestic pet was any 
the less an object of domination because it was not productive 
and/or did not yield surplus-labour, the claim would be patently 
i9noratio elenchi. So too, to bring these issues to bear on the 
Present area of inquiry is similarly irrelevant. I think it is 
clear that Marx, and Marxists, have themselves failed to make this 
crucial distinction between domination and exploitation and, that 
indeed, Marx attended to the so-called work-and-marketplace structure 
of domination so one-sidedly because it exhibited the additional 
quality of exploitation more obviously than the other such struc- 
tures which I have been insisting upon: this concern with domination 
and with distributive injustice seem for him inextricably bound up 
with one another. But whether or not Marx is thus confused, the, 
point remains that domination is distinct from exploitation and that 
these issues of productivity and/or surplus-labour yield are relevant 
to the latter but not to the former. 
The same cannot be said of the power to starve etc. into 
submission - the third respect in which the rebuttal in question 
claims the male and adult structures of domination do not measure 
up to Marx's work-and-marketplace structure of domination. Such power 
is quite obviously relevant to the question of domination: 
it relates 
directly to the principles of monopoly ownership of the means of life 
and the dictatorial exchange such monopoly permits. But I have al- 
ready argued that there Is in historical fact a striking similarity 
in this respect aza ng the various structures of domination in question: 
257 
the male and the adult ruling-class having had since ancient times 
just about as much power to starve etc. into submission the female 
and the youth ruled class respectively as the ruling-class with which 
Marx is essentially concerned has had vis 14 vis the workers. So 
the rebuttal in question does not seem to work here either. Of 
course, this counter could provoke interminable empirical controversy 
which we have not time nor resources for here: but I still think 
it can be sustained every step of the way. (Let me sketch out how 
just a little more than I have. ) Say we consider the various ruling- 
class patterns at issue so far as they obtain today in North America. 
So far as the monopoly ownership of the material means of life, the 
male and, much more so, the adult ruling-class have without question 
a far more thoroughgoing such monopoly vis a vis the female and youth 
ruled class than the capitalists do vis a vis the proletariat. With 
respect then to this first (Marxian) principle of domination, Marx's 
ruling-class has patently less power than the ruling classes I have 
identified. If anything here, the opposite to what the rebuttal 
claims is the case. Then so far as this p'ower being actualized in 
dictatorial exchange - the second Marxian principle of domination 
- the male, and again much more so, the adult ruling-classes seem 
to command more of the life-activity of the female and youth ruled 
classes respectively by virtue of their positions of monopoly owner- 
ship than do the capitalists command of the proletariat 
(e. g. a youth 
is typically almost never outside the coercive dictate of adults 
whereas a worker is after 40 or so hours a week, and a youth receives 
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in return for his services typically far less material means of 
life). So here too, Marx's ruling-class of owners seems to have 
less (actualized) power over the proletariat than at least one of 
the two other ruling-classes he more or less ignores. And, I might 
add, in the sociohistorical context in question capitalists have no 
more so to say "exceptional" powers over proletarians (e. g. of 
starvation, of physical assault, of forced detention, etc. ) than do 
North American adults over youth or even men over women: proletarians 
are effectively protected in these regards as much as, (e. g. from 
starvation) or more than (e. g. from assault or forced detention) 
women or youth. 
2 In sum, any specific differences that exist in the 
overall powers of the various ruling-classes at issue over their 
respective underclasses seem to fall more on the side of the adult 
and male ruling-classes than the capitalist. That youth or women 
almost universally regard the move from adult or male domination in 
the home etc. to capitalist domination in the work-and-marketplace 
as a liberating move is plain proof of this point: next to the 
servitude of the young and the female, the wage-slavery of manhood 
2Consider this summary from a legal point of view of youth's 
Position here: 
It is an anomalous and incredible fact that there is almost no 
case or statutory law setting forth the rights of children. 
- Almost half of all Americans are under twenty-one. - Yet 
even now the laws governing the treatment of animals are more 
specific than those with respect to children (Lois G. Forer, 
"Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum"j American Bar Association 
Journal, Vol. 55 (December 1969), 1151-2). 
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stands as the achievement of positive freedom. The same kind of case 
could be mounted I suspect with respect to the Europe of Marx's own 
day, or of mediaeval times, or indeed of any other sociohistorical 
context. Here too the work-and-marketplace structure of domination 
could be shown as, if anything, less thoroughgoing than adult/youth 
or men/women orders of rule. 
Well, the structures of domination I have been insisting upon 
as meeting Marx's own principles of such as well as or better than 
the only one he pays serious attention to (i. e. the so-called work- 
and-marketplýce structure of domination) seem so far to have stood 
the test of rebuttal. But I have still not coped with certain 
special properties of the latter which might yet appear to justify 
Marx's more or less exclusive concern with it. First of all, there 
is the fact that it alone involves a clear minority, of society in 
the position of ruling-class and, correspondingly, a clear majority 
in the position of ruled-class (though other possible structures of 
domination which I have not gone into -- for example, racial -- may 
also involve this sort of minority rule). Secondly, and more sig- 
nificantly I think, there is the fact that it involves the uppermost 
ruling-class of society ---- Members of its ruling-class alone are 
not subject to the domination (in the Marxian sense) of any other 
ruling-class-(e. g. members of the adult and male ruling-classes 
in a capitalist order are subject to domination by capitalists, but 
the latter are not so subject to domination by any other ownership 
class). 
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What in the end, however, can be inferred from these ad- 
mittedly special and even important features of the work-and-market- 
place structure of domination? Certainly not, I think, the propriety 
of attending to it more or less exclusively as a structure of domi- 
nation or of assuming its overthrow as the sufficient condition of 
a "realm of freedom! '. To reason in this way, as Marx seems at least 
implicitly to do, seems rather like the blinkered ratiocination of 
the 18th century bourgeois republicans - whom he himself so ro- 
bustly despised -- who imagined that the royal court's domination 
was the only form of domination worth attending to and whose overthrow 
would guarantee a utopian realm of "liberty and equality". For in 
this latter case, the ruling-class in question was even more clearly 
both a minority and the uppermost ruling-class of the society in 
question. And since its removal was according to Marx's own assess- 
ment quite consistent with various forms of domination continuing in 
force anyway, what makes him think or presume that the removal of the 
capitalist class will ensure a "realm of freedom" by virtue of its 
being simply the minority and uppermost ruling-class of his period? 
These special features give no warrant it seems for such a sanguine 
inference, either in the eighteenth century or in the nineteenth or 
after. Just as a new ruling-class replaced the royal court in the 
"Age of Reason" and other structures of domination persisted quite 
intact despite this revolutionary overthrow, so we might expect 
a new ruling-class (e. g. state administrators) to replace the cap- 
italists in the "Age of Automation" with, again, other structures of 
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domination persisting through such revolutionary overthrow unabated 
(e. g. the adult-youth structure of domination continuing as before and 
even intensifying in the form of authoritarian schools, regimented 
youth corps and so on). The fact that a ruling-class is specially a 
minority and the uppermost ruling-class of its day would not appear 
at all to justify Marx's more or less exclusive concern with it as 
an order of domination whose overthrow must somehow constitute the 
be-all and end-all of social liberation. 
This sort of counter though is not fully fair to Marx's 
position. He did insist upon more than merely the overthrow of the 
capitalist ruling-class: he insisted upon the overthrow of the so- 
called work-and-marketplace structure of domination. altogether, 
though I must add there is a more than a little conflation of specific 
and general here in his work. But let us overlook this and related 
problems for the purpose of argument -- despite what I think is'the 
great mistake of such a grant -- and presume with Marx that the work- 
and-marketplace structure of domination does disappear altogether 
with the overthrow of the capitallst ruling-class and that no new 
ruling-class order in this sphere arises with the social ownership 
of the material means of production involved. Let us, in short, 
give Marx his case so far as this one sphere of domination is con- 
cerned, even though we might think it just a little less blinkered 
in its way than bourgeois republicanism. This given, we now re-ask 
whether the fact that the ruling-class in question is specially a 
minority and the uppermost ruling-class can justify Marx's more or 
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less singular attention to it as a structure of domination. The 
only faintly plausible argument*that I can think of off-hand for 
supposing that even here Marx's'preoccupation is thus warranted is 
along the lines of a "domino theory" plea. Crudely put, knock over 
the "uppermost" domino and the rest will follow suit: the work- 
and-marketplace ruling-class is alone distinguished by virtue of the 
position of domination its members have with respect to the members 
of any and all other ruling-classes, so its overthrow must uniquely 
carry down onto these other ruling-classes and all of them, as it were, 
must fall down in a collapsing line of command. Unhappily though this 
kind of argument is simply not sustainable. To begin with - problems 
of metaphorical appeal aside - the uppermost ruling-class here is not 
in a position of domination with respect to other ruling-class members 
so far as these latter are themselves rulers. For example, the 
father exerts monopoly ownership over the material means of life 
of his wife and (more so) his children and is able thereby to exact 
life-activity in conformity with his dictates independently of the 
capitalist's position of domination over him. Members of the work- 
and-marketplace ruling-class are in a position to dominate (in the 
sense employed here) only in the sphere of work-and-marketplace and 
what their subordinates do in their own spheres of domination as 
members of adult and/or male ruling-classes is quite outside the 
former's realm of command. (e. g. a capitalist cannot dictate to 
his worker how the latter is to relate to his children, whatever 
he may dictate to the latter on the job). Distinct ownership .. 
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structures are involved -- with members of the male and/or adult 
ruling-classes having monopoly'ownership and (thereby) power of 
dictatorial exchange vis a vis female and/or youth ruled classes 
whatever members of the work-and-marketplace ruling-class may command 
there. Indeed the effective ownership relations involved in the male 
and adult structures of domination - and thus their independence 
qua proprietary jurisdictions from work-and-marketplace or any other 
sort of intervention -- are as definitively protected in a modern 
order by the whole coercive superstructural mechanism of police, army, 
courts, etc. as the effective ownership relations of the capitalists 
themselves. Thus, for example, were a capitalist to attempt (and the 
sheer unlikelihood of such an event reinforces the claim) to'subvert 
the domination structure of a worker-father vis a vis his non-adult 
son by breaking the former's monopoly ownership over the latter's - 
material means of life (say, by receiving or harbouring the son with 
food and lodging elsewhere), his action would be as liable to criminal 
prosecution as the worker-father attempting to steal the, capitalists' 
machinery. In fact, there is an asymmetry to the protection of in- 
dependent effective ownership relations here which tells in favour of 
the adult-youth structure of domination as -- at least-in this case 
-- considerably more extreme than the work-and-marketplace structure 
of domination. That is, the youth here is himself, in the Marxian 
sense, owned by his worker-father whereas the latter is not so owned 
by the capitalist. It is not merely the case that a member of the 
uppermost ruling-class and a member of the adult ruling-class have 
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mutually independent monopoly-ownership relations to the material 
means of life of those they respectively dominate (though even here 
the latter's such monopoly is considerably more thorough-going than 
the former's), but the case that the adult's effective ownership 
extends in addition to the very person of the dominated party whereas 
the work-and-marketplace structure of domination involves no such 
totalization of ruling-class ownership power. 
However, leaving aside such further points of asymmetry, it 
seems we may conclude, here that there is no "line of command" from 
the work-and-marketplace structure of domination through other struc- 
tures of domination (i. e. adult-youth, man-woman) such that the latter 
can be said to be dependent on the former for their being upheld or 
for their being overthrown. The various structures in question in- 
volve, as we have seen, independent ownership relations, independent 
material interests: and, for Marx-himself, that's independence at 
the "base". The "domino theory" of structures of domination seems 
rebutted by his own most fundamental principle of sociohistorical 
analysis. 
If though, to approach this issue of Marx's peculiarly- 
exclusive concern with the work-and-marketplace structure of domi- 
nation from a somewhat'-different angle, the latter really was more 
or less the only set of material relations warranting Marx's concern 
(despite all that has been said above), then we would expect that 
from more or less its relations alone we could develop superstructural 
content. For Marx says that the "only materialistic and therefore 
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the only scientific method" is "to develop from the actual relations 
of-life the corresponding celestialized forms of these relations" 
(CI, 372). (Here Marx is referring particularly to "religious con- 
ceptions". ) 
It is worth recalling the principles cited in my-chapter 
"Economic Determinism! ' to explain how such a "development from the 
actual relations of life" to "corresponding celestialized forms" , 
might proceed. A definite range or "limited field" of ideological 
possibilities can be developed from the economic order by what I 
called then the principle of "Social Selection", and the specific 
ideological content within this range or "limited field" can in turn 
be developed from the economic order by what I, called then-the 
principle of "mapping" (though this latter procedure is rather in- 
adequately characterized by Marx). But since it seemsýquite im- 
possible to develop from work-and-marketplace relations alone, say, 
the fundamental religious conceptions of almighty God as the Father, 
passive Virgin Mary as the Mother, crucified Jesus as the Son, and 
so on, there must be some material relations other than work-and- 
marketplace ones constituting the real "base" from which the-con- 
ceptions in question might be properly derived. Obviously, the adult- 
youth and man-woman structures of domination provide-just such sets 
of material relations. And just as obviously, these sets of material 
relations must have for Marx as central a role in the "base" as they 
do in the superstructure, if the "correspondence" between these'social 
factors which Marx-persistently claims is to be upheld. 'So it would 
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seem, yet again, that by Marx's very own principles the adult-youth 
and man-woman structures of domination warrant a concern on a par 
with the work-and-marketplace structure of domination: which he, 
nevertheless, does not accord them. However we look at the matter, 
it seems, - his extrusion from consideration of the former ruling- 
class orders does not seem justifiable. Indeed on several counts 
so far, it would appear that Marx is verging on central self-contra- 
diction. His whole work focuses on the work-and-marketplace order 
as somehow the order of domination to be seriously reckoned with in 
a materialist and revolutionary analysis of the historical human 
condition, and yet the very most crucial principles of his own such 
analysis point to other orders of domination as of similar significance 
and even determining import. The inadequacy of his purview of domi- 
nation and liberation comes close now it seems -- implicitly at least 
-- to the more serious philosophical sin of incoherence. 
Two final points, however, require some airing before closing 
this discussion of other structures of domination which Marx -- im- 
properly and even inconsistently, if I am right -- more or less ignores 
in his work in his preoccupation with the ruling-class-order of work- 
and-marketplace. The first arises from a suggestion I made earlier 
about female and youth activity which is dictated by male and adult 
ruling-classes respectively qualifying possibly as productive activity. 
If this suggestion is accepted as true, then one might argue for a 
dependency of the structures of domination concerned on the work-and- 
marketplace structure of domination by virtue of the former as it were 
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merely servicing the latter with unpaid and concealed productive 
labour. In this case, it could be held, the male and adult ruling- 
classes come out as merely ruling for the work-and-marketplace 
ruling-class: dictating to woman and youth respectively as so to 
say covert domestic-labour managers of the "uppermost" social bosses 
(i. e. in modern times, the capitalists). A counter to this sort of 
line of argument, however, is that it is in the Marxian sense an 
utterly baseless (though common) assertion to relate the ruling- 
classes in this way: the "uppermost" ruling-class have, as I have 
shown, no ownership relations within or over the so-called domestic- 
factory that enable them to exact obedience from the male or adult 
ruling-class members with respect to the latter's domination of 
women and youth. Such structures of domination involve, as I have 
already pointed out, independent ownership relations not subject 
to the "uppermost" ruling-class's sway; and insofar as their male and/ 
or adult ruling-class members exact obedient life-activity -- productive 
or otherwise -- from women and/or youth class members, they do so by 
virtue of their own ownership relations without command or power of 
command in this respect from the work-and-marketplace ruling-class. 
That is why the present strategy of some avant garde women liberation- 
ists -- to demand a wage from capital for their domestic services -- 
is fundamentally reactionary: it brings the "uppermost" structure of 
domination into the home where effective relations of ownership among 
family members have hitherto been independent and where, as thus 
independent, broad revolutionary liberation might otherwise most 
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suitably start. 
The second point I wish to raise briefly here arises from 
Marx's concept of human nature and its relationship to his concept 
of domination. I think it might be properly held that it is because 
man for Marx is in essence a being who has the capacity/need to raise 
a project in the imagination and then execute it in reality that he 
(Marx) regards domination as evil. That is, insofar as domination 
entails the dictation of some's life-activity by others, it militates 
against the very essential creative nature of those who are dominated: 
and it is ultimately on this human-natural ground that Marx opposes 
himself to domination. If, on the other hand, this line of thought 
might go, there were cases of domination consistent with, or even 
enabling of, the fulfillment of man's essential need/capacity to 
raise and implement projects, then the domination in question would 
not be opposed by Marx but accepted (by virtue of its harmony with 
the realization of human nature). And given all this, the argument 
might continue, might not the good reason for Marx's extrusion from 
consideration of the adult-youth structure of domination be simply 
that here domination is "consistent with, and even enabling of" the 
fulfillment of the human essence? Youth are dominated, that is, as 
a sort of indispensable training period to the status of humanity 
which they do not qua youth possess. Domination does not here thus 
inhibit the fulfillment of man's nature but promotes it and, as such, 
is properly excluded by Marx from critical concern. 
Well, to this sort of defence of Marx I can only reply that 
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precisely the same argument could be employed against his own pre- 
occupation with the work-and-marketplace structure of domination. 
Everything that has been said of the youth. class above could be said 
with as good reason (i. e. not much) about the working class, and 
critical concern with their domination could thereby just as plausibly 
or implausibly be rationalized away. Indeed mainstream political 
philosophy since Plato has for the most part taken this position -- 
Marx perhaps the only notable exception -- with respect to members 
of the working class: they require domination for their own good. 
So it is by no means obvious that there is any better case for saying 
that members of the youth class have not the capacity/need for pro- 
jective self-actualization -- though most adults might, as other 
ruling-class memberships, conveniently assume otherwise about the 
nature of those they dominate -- than there is for generalizing the 
same claim and conclusions therefrom about the working class. To 
defend Marx's neglect in prosecuting the adult/youth structure of 
domination on such grounds is thus to invite precisely the same argu- 
ment against his preoccupation with prosecuting the work-and-market- 
place structure of domination. And this in the end is no defence at 
all. 
To this point, I have been considering domination pretty well 
solely in terms of Marx own principles of sociohistorical analysis 
and have argued that these principles pick out other structures of 
domination than the so-called work-and-marketplace ruling-class order 
to which he more or less exclusively attends: which other structures 
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of domination, I have also argued, cannot be properly ignored -- 
as, say, somehow wholly dependent for their existence or liberation 
on the former's existence or liberation. The implication throughout 
has been that insofar as Marx does almost entirely and without good 
warrant overlook these other structures of domination, he fails 
crucially and by his own principles to comprehend the full range of 
domination informing man's sociohistorical condition; and ipso facto 
fails as well, to the same extent, to comprehend the full extension 
of human liberation requisite to a "realm of freedom". Now before 
pressing my argument to still further structures of domination which 
I also hold Marx importantly fails to take account of in his world- 
view, I would like first to suggest how the acknowledgment of these 
other structures of domination I have already identified must radically 
broaden and enrich any enterprise of revolutionary liberation of the 
human condition that pretends to adequacy. As Marx's theory stands, 
revolutionary liberation is more or less a matter of altering the 
ruling-class pattern of work-and-marketplace relations alone. But 
given that there are other non-dependent structures of domination, 
then it would seem to follow that they too must be revolutionized 
to achieve a fully-blown "realm of freedom". Hence, a so to say 
all-fronts approach of some sort would seem required of any adequate 
liberative enterprise here, not one of merely singular focus -- and 
perhaps dwarfish issue -- as is proposed by Marx. Moreover, I would 
suggest -- to even further qualify Marx's position -- there are the 
following good reasons for holding that the more promising "front" 
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of engagement here from a praxis point of view is not at all the work- 
and-marketplace structure of domination to, which Marx so exclusively 
attends (now referred to as A), but rather the adult-youth structure 
of domination to which he pays virtually no heed at all. (Now re- 
ferred to as B). 
1) Liberative alteration of A is a matter of fact always or 
nearly always accompanied for sometime by the threat or reality of 
retrogression in the stage of development of productive forces (from 
producer strike to civil war). On the other hand, liberative al- 
teration of B is as a matter of fact not so accompanied (because, 
among other reasons, B does not involve direct producers). Indeed 
there is even a case for holding that such liberative alteration is 
likely to be succeeded by progression in the stage of development of 
productive forces as the members of the youth class in question 
succeed to the roles of direct producers (on the plausible and not 
uriMarxian principle that the less adult monopoly of the young's 
means of life in upbringing, the more praxis access to, and thus 
proficiency with, the tools of existence the young will develop). 
In other words, liberative alteration of A is problematic and, of B 
is not so far as immediate sustaining of the stage of development 
0. f productive forces is concerned; while so far as long-range effec- 
tiveness in promoting such stage. of development, liberative alter- 
ation of B may be no less positively effective than of A. And, it 
might be added, it is the former, the immediate sustaining of the 
stage of development of productive forces that a society must always 
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ensure: by, it would seem, Marx's own most basic "law" of tech- 
nological determinism (i. e. "a society never forfeits the fruits of 
civilization"). Thus the advantage of revolutionizing B because it 
threatens and/or involves no immediate technological retrogression, 
whereas revolutionizing of A does, seems a radically important 
advantage, in terms of Marx's own most basic principle of socio- 
historical analysis. 
2) Liberative alteration of A and B_ so far as long-range ef- 
fectiveness with respect to material relations is concerned (as 
opposed to merely their technological stage content), is secured 
better through B thah A insofar as B's dominated members (i. e., youth) 
as a rule simply live longer as social agencies than A's dominated 
members (i. e. workers). This greater longevity of youth class 
members as social agencies, and hence the longer-range impact of 
their liberation of B more historically adequate than of A. (Surely, 
again, a fundamental advantage in terms of Marx's own historical 
materialist principles). 
3) There are praxis-blocking intractibilities to A inhibiting its 
liberative alteration which do not obtain to the same extent with 
respect to B and its liberative alteration. The following such praxis 
blocks, which render thus Aa less promising structure than B with 
which to engage in liberative enterprise, are discernible by Marx's 
own principles: 
(a) The ruling-class of A is historically governed solely by 
the protection and promotion of its collective material interests 
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(i. e. of its structure of domination), whereas the ruling-class of 
B is not so rigidly governed (e. g. parental love of their offspring). 
Hence A is more resistant to the praxis of liberative alteration 
than B. (I suspect that Marx and Marxists might count all this as 
a reason for pursuing the liberative alteration of A rather than B 
because A's ruling-class is, as characterized by the, more hateful 
and hence more important to attack than B's ruling-class. But then 
this position would seem to put considerations of vengeance above 
considerations of revolutionary success as a guide to action, which 
would seem in turn to introduce problems of incoherence to the 
Marxian program. ) 
(b) The dominated class of A (i. e. workers) by virtue of its 
members' longer domination than the dominated class of B (i. e. youth) 
is more subject to what Marx called "ingrained habit" with respect 
to such domination: "ingrained habit" which Marx himself, in a 
number of ways and on even a greater number of occasions, regretted 
or abused as a subjective impediment to the liberative alteration 
of the ruling-class pattern of material relations. Hence, again, A 
is thereby more resistant to the praxis of liberative alteration than 
B. 
(c) Liberative alteration of A does as a matter of historical 
fact and Marxian precept always require the pressure of masses acting 
more or less in concert or otherwise put, is more or less closed off 
to the praxis undertakings of individuals (for a number of reasons; 
including (1) and (3) above as well as the great remoteness and 
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systematically interlocked power of the ruling-class involved). 
On the other hand, liberative alteration of B has no such limiting 
requirement of co-ordinated mass action but is on the contrary 
radically open to the praxis undertakings of virtually any adult 
individual of a society (e. g. parents), and much more open to any 
youth member of that society than the liberative alteration of A 
is to any worker. I might add here that this much greater accessi- 
bility of B (or indeed the male-female structure of domination) to 
liberative alteration by individual praxis is of utmost import insofar 
as -- to use the words (in another context) of Marx himself -- it 
"sets loose the whole energy of free individuality' (761,1) for 
the pursuit of liberation: an energy entirely lost as such to the 
service of liberative alteration of A by virtue of the latter's 
imperative of collective action. 
(I might still further add here that it is in my view the 
ruling-out of this "energy of free individuality", of the personal 
dimension, in Marx's masses-only revolutionary program that is the 
single greatest weakness in its potential. Not only by his program 
is liberative alteration thus rendered fundamentally narrower in 
enablement, but -- perhaps more important -- rendered somewhat 
contradictory in effect to what I take to be the sheer-individualism 
goal of Marx's entire enterprise (i. e. "the absolute elaboration of 
what lies within without any preconditions"). This issue is one to 
which I shall return. 
Well, the above are some reasons why from a praxis point of 
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view the "more promising front" of liberative alteration of social 
structures of domination would seem to be B (adult-youth) rather than 
A (owner-worker). Several of the same arguments and others would 
seem to apply to the male-female structure of domination (C) vis'a vis 
A as a similarly more promising front of liberative alteration. And, 
given all this, one might even want to say that were these two "more 
promising" fronts pursued to the full with nothing done with respect 
to A, the latter (as increasingly peopled with graduates of the former) 
would itself inevitably dissolve as a so to say ungrounded pyramid 
top: the dependency for existence here held as A on B and C rather 
than vice-versa as Marx seem to have assumed. However, I do not now 
wish to commit myself to this line of thought: though I do think that 
it is a fruitful line of inquiry, and that perhaps the most apt 
covering model for the various structures of domination in question 
is a social pyramid with A as the "uppermost" constituent of its 
framework. 
The reason I do not wish to commit myself to this line of 
thought -- despite its possibly greater promise than the Marxist -- 
is simply that it is falsely disjunctive from the outset to suppose 
that one or other front of liberative alteration must be pursued -- 
whichever of the above is in question -- rather than all together. 
So far I have been merely insisting that if one or other "front" 
must be exclusively attended to, then the work-and-marketplace - 
structure of domination is not obviously the most effective candidate 
for such an exclusive approach. But there does not seem any grounds 
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at all for raising the dilemma of choice between fronts of engagement 
to begin with. Rather I should think only an all-fronts approach 
provides adequate extension to the project of liberative alteration 
so far as the latter is itself adequately conceived. Hence my position 
here is not in the end to oppose Marx's ideas of revolutionary 
transformation of the work-and-marketplace structure of domination 
as authentically liberative, but rather to claim the need to radically 
broaden his great project of revolutionary emancipation to include 
other central spheres of domination to which he was more or less 
insensitive: and in such fundamental amplification of scope, to 
render this project a far grander and simultaneously more immediate 
enterprise than simply proletarian class politics. I am, in a 
phrase, trying to universalize the issues of domination and-liberation 
and, in so doing, individualize them too (in the sense of bringing 
them to bear upon material relations in which virtually everyýindi- 
vidual of a society has continually the enablement for liberative 
undertaking). 
Thus far I have been operating with the essential principles 
of domination supplied, or better, implied, by Marx himself and have 
argued that these principles not only pick outýthe so-called work- 
and-marketplace structure of domination alone attended to by Marx, 
but other similarly significant and non-dependent structures of domi- 
nation as well: an argument which so far as it has been successful 
demonstrates Marx's grasp of both domination and liberation in 
historical society as one-sided and narrow and, at the same time, 
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yields a much amplified concept of communist revolution and the 
"realm of freedom" at which it aims. However there is still further, 
radical broadening in these respects which in my view Marx's, theory 
invites: a broadening that is impelled by critical consideration 
of his general principles of domination themselves rather than of 
merely -- as so far -- their consistent application to domains other 
than the work-and-marketplace. 
But before shifting into this new locus of inquiry, I would 
like to bring to light just one more central structure of domination 
that ultimately meets Marx's underlying essential principles of 
domination -- certainly he himself acknowledges it as a structure 
of domination -- but is uniquely regarded by him as a good thing. 
Here it is not a question, as earlier, of Marx's improperly 
missing some central structure of domination picked out by his own 
most basic principles, but of his explicitly recognizing it and 
approving of it as a form of domination to be rendered ever more 
totalitarian in the course of human advancement. In this case, 
Marx takes the side of the oppressor, and he takes it consciously, 
persistently and outspokenly. 
I speak of the relationship between human and non-human being, 
with the dominator as man and the dominated as the rest of nature's 
existents. That Marx does in fact recognize and approve of such a 
structure of domination does not even approach a question of debate. 
From his earliest to his latest writings one of the most prominent 
and insistent refrains of his thought is that man's great and'-, ý 
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progressively realized destiny on earth is to reduce the rest of 
nature's being to mere instrumentality of human will:. to "conquer", 
ttsubjugate", "humanize", "make organs" of, "command", 11master", 
"force", "yoke", etc., all-non-human existence ever more exhaustively 
to man's design till nothing remains that is not perfectly the 
subject of utter human dominion. This ever more absolute enslave- 
ment of the rest of being under the sway of man - normally considered 
a key component of Marx's "humanism" -- might be more aptly titled 
his 
-total 
human chauvinism (what I earlier called in Chapter I Marx's 
"absolute anthropocentrism"). Of course, a thoroughgoing "human 
chauvinism" or "anthropocentrism" is hardly atypical of the Western 
philosophical tradition -- it is difficult to think of even a single 
figure who deviates from it (though, it is worth adding, the Eastern 
religious philosophies of Hinduism and, even more prominently, 
Buddhism exhibit continual concern in their texts with the freedom 
from oppression of other "sentient being" than man). But Marx goes 
perhaps further than most in this Western tradition in his notion 
of nature as wholly man's object of instrumentalization: I cannot 
call to mind anyone who puts such explicit and exclusive emphasis on 
man as the so to say absolute ruling-class of the cosmos. There is 
no higher being or law by which he is governed or to-which he is 
responsible in his dominion, nor does there seem any sphere of non- 
human being which is exempt or even partially exempt from the program 
of his evermore absolute rule. Marx is, in short, the ideologue 
par excellence of human domination of all other classes of being. 
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(Now though, for me anyway, this sort of unqualified commit- 
ment to total human domination perhaps most of all demonstrates Marx's 
seriously inadequate grasp of the full import and range of the issues 
of domination and liberation, it must be acknowledged that Marx cannot 
from this be properly held as inconsistent in his principles: that 
is, the apparent contradiction between his basic concern. to liberatively 
revolutionize structures of coercion and his basic concern to promote 
the opposite with respect to the human nonhuman structure of coercion 
does not in fact hold as a contradiction. Marx's concern from the 
outset is explicitly with, and only with, human affairs: so any 
consideration of nonhuman interests is ruled out. ex hypothesi. 
Furthermore, it seems that Marx's ultimate ground for positioning 
himself against domination and for liberation is essentially his con- 
cern for the unhindered material realization of projective conscious- 
ness: a concern that cannot apply to those classes of being in- 
capable, by definition, for him, of projective consciousness: such 
classes of being for Marx lack by their very nature the very property 
which would in his schema entitle them to the enablements of liberty. 
So on several counts, it would seem improper to charge Marx with any 
kind of inconsistency in this regard. But even if his stance thus 
involves no internal contradiction of principles, anyone who holds 
such things as wilderness, free animal life or nonhuman sentience as 
end-in-self values must, I think, find Marx's "humanism" repugnant. 
Its ambit of liberative concern precludes most of the world's being, 
indeed condemns it to perpetual and progressive servitude under the 
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most murderous and destructive species ever, as a positive good. By 
such exclusive "humanism" Marx perhaps promotes a far more tyrannical 
ruling-class form than the one he is concerned to usurp). 
Let us though return to that critical consideration of Marx's 
general principles of domination promised earlier. As I remarked 
then, here I wish to address myself to these principles as such rather 
than simply -- as so far -- to the illicit inadequacy of their recognized 
extension. These principles of domination were, to resuscitate my 
earlier characterization: 
1) One group of people (the ruling-class) have monopoly ownership 
of the material means of life of a society while another group (the 
ruled-class) have little or no ownership of the material means of 
life of that society. 
2) The ruling-class (individually and/or collectively) exchanges 
some portion of the material means of life they own in return for some 
substantive portion of the ruled-class's'. ýIife-activity executed 
(individually and/or collectively) in conformity with the former's 
dictation. 
Now what I want to say in criticism of these principles of 
domination, and say very briefly, is that they fail in their present 
form qua principles to cover many sorts of social relationships of 
domination. The inadequacy I am suggesting here is of Marx's prin- 
ciples themselves, not merely of his application of them. And how they 
fail as principles is this. Even if one agrees with the brilliant 
insight that domination is essentially a matter of an exchange of some 
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means of life (owned by the dominator) for some mode of obedient life- 
activity (yielded by the dominated), one need not agree -- indeed should 
not agree -- that within human societies this exchange of domination 
always involves: 
a) straightforwardly material means of life; 
b) the dominator's extended ownership of the dominated's means of 
life; 
C) means of life as the content of the dominator's ownership; and 
d) social classes of dominators and dominated. 
Let us consider (a), (b), (c) and (d) in sequence. First of 
all, so far as (a) is concerned, it is indisputably the case that a 
relationship of domination may obtain by-virtue of one party's (say, 
a charismatic leader's or an established cliquels) monopoly ownership 
of some means of life (say, group approval or esteem) that is not 
" straightforwardly material means of life. Yet Marx, operating with 
" perhaps-simplistic materialist ontology, seems to have more or-less 
confined his notion of human means of life to merelyýfood, clothing, 
shelter, productive tools and so on -- confined his notion, that is, 
to the realm of things. Now there are tricky ontological issues , 
involved here that are compounded by Marx's treatment of variousýskills 
and forms of activity -- which are not things -- as subsumed by his 
materialist concept of means of life. So it is difficult to make the 
criticism here hard-and-fast. But be this as it may, Marx certainly 
does not include within his concept of means of life anything like 
group approval or esteem or love or what our language only permits 
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us to call psychological means of life; and he certainly does generally 
insist on the clear materiality of those means of life about which he 
talks. (Even the need "to raise a project in the imagination and execute 
it in reality" has as its ultimate object a straightfowardly material 
thing., And skills and forms of activity -- though not themselves material 
things -- must for him respectively issue in, or be defined in terms of, 
such to count for him as authentic means of life). So despite the com- 
plexities of issue here, it seems fair to say that Marx held means of 
life as means of life if and only if they were in some (usually straight- 
forward) sense material means of life, and that he thereby precluded in 
fact, and likely in principle, all so-called psychological means of life 
(e. g. group approval, esteem, love, etc. ) from basic consideration. ' 
Now how all this ties in with domination may be briefly stated 
as follows. A structure of domination might involve one party's monopoly 
ownership of merely psychological means of life, with no clearly material 
means of life involved at all: as, say, in the case of a gang elite's 
monopoly ownership of group approval, measures of which approval are 
granted to ordinary members only insofar as the latter yield in return 
their life-activity in confomity with the elite's dictations. The domain 
of monopoly ownership here, though by no means necessarily extending to 
food, shelter, clothing and other straightforwardly material means of 
life (e. g. with an adolescent gang or a tribe or a religious or political 
movement) still provides a base for domination, still permits an exchange 
whereby one party may coerce another's obedience by virtue of its un- 
reciprocated power to exclude the latter from the, so to say, 
"food of 
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the spirit". In ignoring this sort of structure of domination -- in- 
volving ownership of psychological as distinct from material means of 
life or, less controversially put, involving ownership of means of life 
of another type than any he ever mentions Marx's schema is unable to 
account adequately even for such crucial and frequent sociohistorical 
phenomena as men's volunteering for war, paying tithes or otherwise 
performing according to command with insufficient or no straightforwardly 
material inducements involved. Such prominent occurrences -- not to 
say much of man's everyday life -- must simply remain cipheric modes 
of domination, or be forced to fit a procrustean explanatory frame, 
so long as we remain within Marx's too-narrow notion of means of life. 
Indeed, inasmuch as inducements such as social approval or deprivation 
of it are known often to sway men more than food or shelter etc. (con- 
sider men's material sacrifices for glory or mere social acceptance), 
Marx's conceptual restriction here becomes not merely inadequate in 
extension but may miss the ultimate interest itself determining men's 
sociohistorical behaviour. 
It is of interest to note here that it seems to be one of the 
few contributions of contemporary behaviorist psychology to have 
demonstrated that human conduct may be successfully controlled by the 
granting or withholding of approval pay-offs alone. That is, a mon- 
opolizer of approval (a "controller") meting out approval benefits 
("positive re-enforcements") according to a strict system of exchange 
("a schedule of re-enforcement") may exact precisely obedient life- 
activity ("behavioral objectives") from other individuals or groups 
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of individuals ("subjects") with no material inducements involved. 
One might indeed wonder here whether so-called "brainwashing" techniques 
in contemporary "people's republics" do not involve this very mechanism 
of domination on a grandiose scale: with such domination crucially 
if conveniently immune to detection by a Marxian standpoint and its 
restricted concept of "means of life". 
If, on the other hand, so-called psychological as well as 
material means of life are, unlike Marx, allowed by us as means of 
life, then the kinds of phenomena alluded to above seem explicable in 
terms of ruling-class monopoly ownership: as in the case of the gang 
elite or the behaviourist controllers, the structure of domination 
involving in these cases the monopolizers of approval or some such 
psychological means of life meting out measures of this "food of 
the spirit" in exchange for life-activity in conformity with their 
dictation. 
Now none of this should be misconstrued as denying that main- 
tenance of ownership over the so-called psychological means of life 
might itself often require material devices (e. g. hidden or overt 
strong-arm tactics) to advance or protect it. But these material 
devices are not means of life, and so are not relevant to the point 
at issue (though they shall be later). Here it is the content of 
ownership, not its mode of security, with which we are concerned. 
And it seems clear that one party may dominate another by virtue of 
control over psychological means of life and that therefore Marx's 
restriction of means of life to more or less merely material content 
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renders his principles of domination Importantly inadequate. 
What however obscures this inadequacy in Marx's theory is the 
latter's confinement of purview to the work-and-marketplace structure 
of domination, where the ruling-class's monopoly ownership of the direct 
producers' material means of life is more or less conflated withits 
monopoly ownership of the society's material organs of ideological 
production (e. g. the mass media) so that the so-called psychological 
means of life (e. g. group approval) seem merely a matter of material- 
content ownership too. But even here, thepoint is missed that ruling- 
class domination is not just a matter of the monopoly owners exchanging 
such and such material means of life with the direct producers for 
such and such forms of the latter's obedient life-activity in return, 
but also a matter (usually correlate) of their exchanging certain 
psychological means of life with the direct producers for the latter's 
obedient life-activity in return. That is, the compound nature of 
the domination involved here, the psychological as well as the material 
content of coercive exchange between ruler and ruled, is missed. Thus, 
for example, that the white-collar worker yields his life-activity 
in conformity to ruling-class dictation not only to receive required 
material sustenance in return (e. g. food and shelter) but also to 
receive psychological sustenance (e. g. social status) is simplified by 
Marx to merely the former level of exchange, with all matters of this 
psychological sort having significance in his schema only derivatively 
on the super structural plane. In consequence, such phenomena as 
various workers' persistent collaboration with the ruling-class beyond 
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as it were the call of material interest becomes an issue of only 
ideological dimension: rather than -- as it should be -- a matter 
as well of men's very (psychological) means of life and at, therefore, 
the very "base" of sociohistorical consideration. 
It would seem evident then that Marx's concept of "means of 
life" must be fundamentally broadened to subsume adequately the basic 
interests by which men are governed. 
Such a revision would of course have far-reaching implications 
for his theory. To begin with, the work-and-marketplace structure of 
domination would stand under such a revision as a far more thorough- 
going system of coercive exchange - involving material and psycho- 
logical means of life -- than even Marx held. The ruling-class's 
hegemony over the working class comes out with any such broadening 
of the concept of means of life, as more totalitarian still than the 
most indignant Marxian apprehension presently has it. It is compounded 
And, of course, insofar as comprehension of the mechanism of domination 
here is thus enriched, so correspondingly is comprehension of the 
requirements of liberation. Any theory of revolution, for example, 
must take into account disposition over these psychological means of 
life as well as over the straightforwardly material means of life 
if it is to be adequate in its liberative considerations. For if it 
does not so take account, it thereby gives unlimited allowance to 
"psychological" tyranny by approval/disapproval mechanisms: precisely, 
it seems, that permission of Marxian theory of which certain Marxian 
leaderships appear most fond in their "liberating" social rule. 
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The revision in question is also at least as significant with 
respect to those structures of domination that Marx omits from con- 
sideration - namely, the adult/youth and man/woman ruling-class 
orders. For here, the power of domination of the respective rulers 
seems more thoroughly bound up with control over so-called Pacho- 
logical means of life than is the case with work-and-marketplace 
rulers. Indeed one might even say that it is on the so to say 
psychological level that the really substantive grip of, say, parents 
over their children lies - both because the needs of the subject 
class in question are so great in this respect (a child may notor- 
iously sicken or die from deprivation of parental love and approval) 
and because the monopoly ownership by the rulers of such means of 
life is so thoroughgoing (a child has virtually Lo alternative 
source of such love and approval than parents or in loco parentis 
figures). A similar, if not so strong, case might be made for the 
importance of control over psychological means of life in the man/ 
woman structure of domination (e. g. the exchange of male admiration 
for "feminine" behaviour determining women's life-activity down to 
the latter's very posture and mode of movement). In any case, the 
broadening of the concept of means of life that I have been recommend- 
ing -- to include the so-called psychological as well as the straight- 
forwardly material - seems imperative if domination is to 
be under- 
stood in anything like its full substance. Without such conceptual 
revision,. we miss as it were half the story. 
Finally, it is well to reiterate our earlier claim that some 
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sorts of domination must be missed altogether by confining as Marx 
does the notion of means of life to material stuffs alone. Not only 
is much of the order of domination he does attend to missed, and even 
more of the orders of domination he overlooks, by such conceptual 
narrowing, but certain sorts of domination (i. e. those involving the 
granting and withholding of social approval alone) are in principle 
ruled out holus-bolus. Consider, for example, the entire realm of 
"leisure" social intercourse with its abundance of domination frame- 
works operating solely in terms of minority-controlled group ap- 
probation and censure. Such socially permeative orders of rule just 
cannot be discerned at all by Marx's principles of domination so far 
as these hold merely to food, clothing, housing et al as the only 
means of life. In short, new as well as complementary forms of 
domination emerge into view via the conceptual revision in question: 
with of course precisely corresponding enrichment in the general 
project of human liberation. 
Let us now move to consideration of (b) -- which holds that 
the exchange of domination must always involve extended ownership 
of the dominator over the dominated's means of life. This "extended 
ownership" is to be understood in both of two senses: 
i_ that the dominator's ownership of the dominated's means of life 
extends beyond merely one means of life to many or all of the means 
of life (e. g. the capitalist typically has the power to exclude the 
worker from many if not all the means of life of the latter: similarly, 
the feudal lord the serf, and more so, the slave holder the slave). 
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ii that the dominator's ownership of the dominated's means of life 
extends through time beyond definite term to temporally unlimited 
ownership (e. g. the capitalist's power to exclude the worker from 
various means of life is not restricted in temporal duration, but may 
persist indefinitely with no time-limit to its hold). 
Now Marx never explicitly states that domination to be domi- 
nation must involve these two sorts of "extended" ownership. But 
since in his mature work he virtually never identifies as a relation- 
ship of domination anything that is not so characterizable, 
3 
we may 
take this condition of extended ownership (in both senses) as at 
least his implicit stipulation. Certainly his treatment of domination 
is limited to what in his account does meet such a two-sensed stip- 
ulation, and certainly we are presented thereby with an analysis of 
domination that altogether misses a great range of cases of domination 
which do not meet it. 
What then is this "great range of cases" his implied principle 
of extended ownership fails to subsume? Well, first of all, there 
are many and various instances of domination which involve the 
dominator's underivative ownership of merely one means of life of 
the dominated: by which patently non-extended (in sensej) owner- 
ship obedient life-activity may still be effectively extracted by 
3So far as state and religious officers are involved in 
domination, they are for Marx just acting on behalf of "extended" 
owners collective interests, on the Lu2erstructural, sphere: not 
thus themselves constitutive with those below them of a relationship 
of domination. (See Chapter IV) 
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the latter from the former. For example, ownership of just the 
village water-well and nothing else has quite enabled both bandits 
(e. g. Sicilian) and legal authorities (e. g. Iranian) to dictate to 
non-owning users a number of substantial forms of life-activity, 
though these non-owners may in other respects be entirely self- 
sufficient so far as their means of life are concerned. One party's 
unreciprocated power to exclude another party from simply a single 
means of life can provide here and elsewhere sufficient base for 
an exchange of domination: ownership of many or most means of life 
- the economic base of domination to which Marx alone attends -- 
is just at the extreme end of a spectrum of forms of monopoly owner- 
ship whereby domination is enabled to obtain. Marx thus, again, 
misses much by his too narrow conceptualization of domination req- 
uisite. Lest it be thought that the sort of example I proffer above 
is of merely flukish social significance, I urge consideration of 
such mainstream phenomena as sexual domination or bureaucratic 
domination or professional domination where the dominator may here 
too have the unreciprocated power to exclude the dominated from 
just one means of life say, love-object or automobile license 
or medicinal treatment and be enabled thereby to extract an extra- 
ordinary yield of obedient life-activity from the non-owner in 
return (which performance we sometimes call in neat comparison with 
trained beasts, "jumping throug-ý, hoops"). ` Indeed it seems not al- 
together implausible that domination by this merely singular owner- 
ship of means of life - which would seem to proliferate with 
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increasing social interdependency into an ever more elaborate 
series or gauntlet of separate servile exchanges - is as ultimately 
oppressive for the modern everyman as his wage-slavery. Certainly 
it deserves some attention in any adequate analysis of domination 
and, correspondingly, in any adequate vision of human liberation. 
Marx's implicit requirement though of domination -- that it involve 
the dominator's ownership of many or all the dominated's means 
of life -- insulates all such less extended but perhaps progressively 
ubiquitous modes of domination from recognition. In a word, it 
liquidates the subtle where the subtle seems to hold ever more 
historical claim to acknowledgement. 
The second sort of "extended ownership" implied by Marx to 
be necessary to a structure of domination is more radically inadequate 
in its subsumption still. Marx in fact never counts as effective 
ownership what is held merely for a limited term (e. g. by state 
officers). The owners of material resources to whom he refers are 
without exception those who have no such definite restriction of 
duration to their proprietorship. -- Indeed it is because their owner- 
ship is not so limited in term that they are consistently able -- 
unlike, say, the state officer - to sell off and/or to transfer 
by 
inheritance the goods they own. Their ownership is subject to no 
set temporal bound (so long as the obtaining epochal economic 
form 
remains intact) and remains so even if the goods 
they own are by 
technological change or market ruin rendered valueless 
(the relation 
of ownership has not here altered, only its content). This difference 
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in ownership duration is for Marx recognized and protected by the 
legal and political superstructure and qualifies the ownership in 
question as truly private property. And it is the economic cognate 
of this private property -- what we have called private ownership -- 
with which he is exclusively concerned in his ruling-class analysis. 
Thus a state official's power to exclude his underling's from material 
means of life (e. g. by firing, demotion, etc. ) -- because this owner- 
ship power is restricted by his term of office i. e. is non-private -- 
does not in itself constitute for Marx the economic base of a ruling- 
class arrangement. His position on these matters, is of course that 
the state is just an instrument of collective protection for the 
private owners of society and its officials thus mere executors of 
the latter's rule and not themselves rulers. 
The problem with'Marx's position here though is that it seems 
refuted ironically, by modern "Marxist" societies themselves where 
there is little or no private ownership of the means of production, 
yet state officials exert just as great if not greater dominion over 
their underlings as in any other social order. Since their dominion 
is not merely executive of private owners' collective rule -- it 
cannot be: there are few or no private owners of productive forces 
-- what is then its economic base? 
The only satisfactory answer to this question must lie 
I think in broadening Marx's concept of ownership to include non- 
extended (in sense ii) as well as extended forms: that is, more 
specifically, not construing the ownership which the dominator has 
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over the dominated's means of life in terms merely of extended or 
unlimited-by-term or private ownership, but also in terms of owner- 
ship for a period of office alone (i. e. non-private ownership). 
By so broadening Marx's concept of ownership here, the peculiar 
ruling-class order of so-called "Marxist" societies themselves is 
rendered theoretically tractable and not, as hitherto, more or less 
cipheric to economic-base explanation. State officials are dis- 
cernible as simply a different sort of monopoly owner of the means 
of life of those they dominate (i. e. owners for the term of their 
office), but monopoly owners nevertheless. Their ownership is just 
limited to their period of tenure and not unlimited by any such time- 
limit as Marx's owners are. Similarly, their exchange with their 
underlings of means of life for the latter's obedient life-activity 
in conformity with their dictation is also limited to such term in 
office, but again it is an exchange of domination nevertheless. 
Once Marx's notion of ruling-class ownership is revised to include 
what I have called "non-extended" ownership as well as "extended" 
ownership -- or, otherwise put, once his notion of ruling-class 
ownership is released from its implicit stipulation of unlimited 
duration - the ruling-class mechanism of those "Marxist" societies 
he never saw are neatly comprehended by his own principles of dom- 
ination. But without such revision, such mechanisms remain more or 
less immune to discernment, and continue masked in the misleading 
guise of socialist status. 
None of the above is meant to impugn the importance of the 
294 
sociohistorical change from extended ownership (with all the economic 
powers of sale, inheritance etc. it permits) to non-extended or term 
ownership (with its abrogation of such powers). But that ruling-class 
ownership and the exchange of domination it enables may still obtain 
within the confines of period of office. is still of signal signifi- 
cance. Almost half the peoples of the globe presently labour under 
such a ruling-class order with an ideological litany -- dedicated 
to the maxim that no ruling-class private ownership of social means 
of life = no (non-proletarian) ruling-class ownership of social means 
of life at all -- seeking to conjure away the domination beneath 
more casuistically perhaps than ever before. And this is important 
to expose: in some other manner than the mere counter-deceptions of 
anti-communism with which we are ordinarily regaled. I think the 
reason why Marx's theory itself fails to provide the needed breadth 
of concept of ownership to enable discernment of such ruling-class 
arrangements is because he never develops a clear concept of ownership 
to begin with; but merely employs historically ostensive definition. 
However, with the notion of ownership formulated in this essay (briefly, 
x owns y=x has power to exclude others from y), the requirement of 
temporal extension assumed by Marx -- and indeed by all former 
characterizations of property that I am aware of -- loses its con- 
ventional force and the ruling-class order so-called of Marxist 
societies emerges clearly into view. 
I do not think though that the importance of acknowledging 
what I will henceforth call term ownership (as opposed to private 
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ownership) ends with its applicability to post-Marx "socialist" 
societies. I suspect that it is as appropriately employable as 
a concept to the administrative structure of almost any public 
sector formation -- whether in a "socialist", capitalist or any 
other society. Marx's analysis of the state, as we have seen, 
construes it and/or its officials as wholly the executors of the 
collective interest of the ruling-class of private owners -- permit- 
ting thereby no distinct ruling-class ownership interests to the former 
as such. Now though one might agree with his sustained claim that 
the state and/or its officials do indeed conform in behaviour with 
the collective interest of the ruling-class of private owners. in 
protecting the latter's dominion over the working class, I do not 
think that from this granted fact one may at all properly deduce 
that the former have no distinct ruling-class (term) ownership 
interests of their own. It is perfectly consistent with this granted 
fact that state officials do have such distinct (i. e. term) ownership 
interests; that these interests are not compromised but promoted 
by siding with the ruling-class of private owners against workers 
(e. g. not only for what is returned in the way of election expenses, 
propoganda support and so on, but for what is gained in maintaining 
their own ruling-class relations intact by preventing change in such 
relations in the complementary private sector); and that ruling-class 
term owners and ruling-class private owners together form one larger 
ruling-class who together defend their great collective ruling-class 
interest in the private and public work-and-marketplace as a monolithic 
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social partnership. Not only do I think that all this is perfectly 
"consistent" with Marx's claim that the state and/or its officials 
conform in behaviour with the collective interest of the ruling- 
class of private owners vis A vis the workers, but I think that only 
in this way can what is anomalous to Marx's one-sided theory of the 
state be plausibly explained. For example, if the state is merely 
"the executive committee" of the ruling-class of private owners, how 
is it that we can meaningfully talk about "splits" or "dealing" 
between government and business sectors as we persistently and properly 
do? How can there be "splits" or"dealing" between public and private 
sector rulers if the former have no comparable ownership interests 
with which to "split" or "deal", but are merely superstructural agents? 
One may perhaps explain with Marx -- if with difficulty -- the phen- 
omena of "splits" here (by claiming them as essentially rifts of 
private owners' interests with private owners' collective interests 
being "reflected" on the superstructural plane), but the "dealing" 
the infamously permeative mutual pay-offs -- between public sector 
and private sector ruling-class members cannot be so explained without 
absurdity. For so soon as such exchanges are even admitted, the 
ownership holdings (albeit term holdings) of the former are admitted 
too and the claimed role of state rulers as only executors of the 
latter's interests is rendered self-contradictory. 
If on the other hand, one allows that the state has district 
ownership interests of its own (and its officials corresponding 
"term! l 
ownership interests) -- ownership interests whose content 
by the way 
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is not merely material means of life but "psychological" means of 
life (e. g. formalized social approval of titles and so on) and, as 
yet undiscussed, means of anti-life (e. g. weapons) as well -- then 
these and other anomalies are easily explained without derogating a 
whit from Marx's claim that the state is a protective mechanism of 
ruling-class private owners against workers. Again here, the alteration 
here is one of extension or, dialectically put, Aufhebung -- preser- 
vation of his insight in the process of surpassing it. Yet it is a 
crucial such alteration because it avoids Marx's crude fallacy of 
inferring in effect from the premise: 
The State is the protector of the collective interests of the ruling- 
class of private owners against workers. 
to the conclusion that: 
The State is nothing but the protector of collective interests 
of the ruling-class of private owners against workers 
while at the same time (leaving the above premise intact) it yields 
the explanation of what remains anomalous to Marx's improperly deduced 
position. Though from all this the implications are considerable with 
respect to the nature and extent of the work-and-marketplace ruling- 
class (i. e. it enlarges to include formerly mere superstructural 
roles and agents, not to say through such enlargement admitting the 
possibility of new ruling-class divisions), I will forego their 
exploration here. What alone I am concerned to point out now is that 
the concept of "term" ownership not only enables discernment of a 
ruling-class order in post-Marxian "socialist" societies, but just 
as importantly allows us to see the ruling-class set-up within the 
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state or '-public sector- of-non-"socialist" societies. Here again 
the ruling-class in question - what we might broadly label the 
public administrators -- has monopoly ("term") ownership of the 
material means of life (leaving aside now psychological means of life 
and means of anti-life) while the ruled class -- what we might 
broadly label underlings - has little or no such ("term") ownership. 
And here again the former exchange those material means of life for 
the latter's obedient life-activity in return. The same principles 
of domination apply as with Marx's work-and-marketplace structure of 
domination proper, only here it is "term! ' rather than "private" 
ownership which provides the economic base of dominion. Yet another 
distinct ruling-class order (public administrator/underling) thus looms 
into sight which Marx seems to, have missed or, at least, to have 
assumed as merely derivative from the one structure of domination 
to which he attends. In this case, however -- as with all cases 
addressed in this section -- the failure is with his principles of 
domination as such (here their too narrow notion of ownership) rather 
than with their adequacy of application. 
It is worth emphasizing just how crucial this sophistication 
of the concept of ownership to include "term" ownership is so far as 
radically broadening the extensional hold of our two principles of 
domination. As I have-said, it not only permits their proper appli- 
cation to the hitherto, cipherIc and contemporaneously important 
ruling-class orders of "socialist" societies, but to the state or 
public sector of non-socialist societies as well. Now so far as the 
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former range of application goes, one might with confidence assert 
that the view of a non-proletarian ruling-class order. obtaining here 
is already pretty widely held by social and political thinkers, albeit 
without the theoretical foundations I have outlined above. However 
so far as the latter goes - the public administrator/underling 
structure of domination in non-socialist societies -- the recognition 
of such seems absent from the critical literature 
of social and political theorists. No Marxist or neo-Marxist so far 
as I know has even bothered to consider the issue, sanguine with Marx 
in the simplistic and often convenient belief that the capitalists 
have the monopoly of domination as well as everything else. And non- 
Marxists seldom consider, the, state in anything but its abstract 
relationship with citizens in general. Yet it seems fair to say that 
this structure of domination is, considering the human condition as 
a whole, much the most prevalent workplace structure of domination 
there is: growing apace with the growth of the public sector in 
non-socialist societies, and already totalitarianly pre-eminent in 
"socialist" societies. Indeed I think it may properly be suspected 
that this, public administrator/underling structure of domination is 
the coming universal ruling-class order of the world's work-and- 
marketplace, inexorably replacing capitalist hegemony as the latter 
replaced that of the lord and the guild-master. That even our,: radical 
social and political thought has remained more or less blind to it -- 
or, more specifically, to the "term! ' ownership which provides its base 
is more than faintly reminiscent of 18th century bourgeois theory's 
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blindness to the structure of domination being raised by the "free" 
ownership system it promoted to replace the fixed holdings of feudal- 
ism. In both cases, liberation from the old form of-monopoly owner- 
ship (feudal then, capitalist now) seems viewed as liberation from 
such monopoly ownership altogether. In both cases, the new monopoly 
owners bourgeois (private owners then state "term" owners now) 
represent themselves as the liberators of humanity at the same 
time as they consolidate their own dominion. And in both cases, 
dogmatic insouciance of the new form of monopoly ownership is coer- 
cively elevated to the status of social creed, with all claim to the 
contrary regarded as the tool of reaction and the old ruling-class. 
That despite all this the new structures of domination in question 
may both be liberative compared to the old, I do not wish to deny. 
4 
But that they usher in some preultimate "realm of freedom! ' for all 
in the work-and-marketplace seems as gross a deception with the 
new ruling-class 'term' owners of a communist party as it formerly 
was with the new ruling-class "private" owners of a, republican party. 
The claim in both cases seems merely to protect a new order of social 
rulers under an old ideological halo. The difference that matters 
here is that the form of ownership of the more recent of these 
4By "liberative" here, I do not refer to the technological 
advancement which these revolutionizing orders each yielded in their 
turn, but to the greater limitation each placed on ownership tenure 
by the ruling-class: the "bourgeois" revolution reduced such owner- 
ship tenure from its permanent ties to ruling-class lineage to the 
fluid ties of capital holding, and the "bolshevik" revolution reduced 
this in turn even further to ties of term-in-office alone. 
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ruling-classes is not yet clearly discerned -- a problem I have tried 
to remedy with the concept of a non-extended ownership. Once this 
concept is admitted, it seems to me that the hitherto undisclosed 
theoretical underpinnings for comprehending the progressively uni- 
versalizing dominion of a public administrator ruling-class is made 
present to us. And such a notion Marx's presumption of only an 
. 
extended ownership does not of course, permit. Indeed in this 
inadequacy of his ownership concept -- which fails as it does to 
subsume a pivotal order of domination at the very center of his 
theoretical focus, the work-and-marketplace itself -- in this in- 
adequacy has perhaps Marx's most frontal theoretical failure. For 
so far as what he himself regards as the "essence" and "base" of 
sociohistorical affairs is thus largely unapprehended, he is rendered 
purblind in his own terms. As the anarchist Bakunin only instinctively 
recognized, it is on this matter of State rule that Marx is most 
fundamentally blind. 
I would like to add in closing that it seems clearly to be 
within the effective jurisdiction of the "termý' owners of the public 
sector or state that the most extreme of all forms of domination ob- 
tain -- more extreme certainly than the oppression of workers by 
capitalists which Marx so indignantly exposes. I do not refer here 
to the mainstream exchanges of domination between public administrators 
and worker underlings - though even these may well be more thoroughly 
dictatorial than the exchanges of domination in the private work-and- 
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marketplace with which Marx deals5 -- but to the more or less hidden 
exchanges of domination between such adminstrative rulers and innate 
underlings (e. g. inmates of prisons, asylums and compulsory armies). 
Now it would be silly to overlook, the private-owner (or indeed adult) 
ruling-class's contributory role in fostering such forms of more or 
less totalized domination. But on the other hand, the effective 
ownership monopoly of means of life in these contexts (albeit "term!, 
ownership) is held -- as opposed to engendered -- by public admini- 
strators more or less independently of other ruling-class owners. 
The former seem thus, by Marx's economic principle of identifying 
ruling-class relations itself, an authentic ruling-class group in 
the situations in question. And I do not think it requires empirical 
demonstration here to claim properly that these forms of domination 
especially within those literal human-cages called prisons which 
involve utterly totalized ownership of the dominated's means of life 
without even the latter's ownership of a single article of clothing, 
dwelling-place and so on -- are forms of domination beside which the 
private-owner's rulership, pales in comparison. of course, Marx so 
far as he pays heed to these most thoroughgoing of all orders of 
domination (and he does more than almost anyone else I can think of 
5This is possible inasmuch as State work-jurisdictions are 
generally monopolist, whereas capitalist work-jurisdictions are gen- 
erally not. This difference might belie the claim that even com- 
parative liberation is secured for the worker under state-socialist 
as opposed to capitalist rule. But we enter now into an area of 
debate which it is not my purpose here to resolve. 
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in the philosophical tradition -- he is at least atypically sensitive 
enough not to ignore their import in the human condition altogether), 
Marx regards them as wholly derivative from the ruling-class interests 
of private work-and-marketplace owners. But as the foregoing pages 
have pointed out, it is precisely his failure to discern the "term" 
ownership interests of public sector or state rulers which permits 
him to draw such a reductionist conclusion. By so doing, he seems 
ultimately to insulate such orders of domination from any distinct 
critical consideration, and to sponsor thereby unwitting theoretical 
provisions for their continuance and re-enforcement (as "Marxist" 
societies have amply demonstrated with their abundance of state pris= 
and asylums for those who challenge not private but "term! ' ruling- 
class ownership). So not only does Marx's too narrow concept of 
ownership miss the increasingly universal public administrator-worker 
structure of domination and thus fail at the focus of his own con- 
sideration (work-and-marketplace), but it misses as well adequate 
comprehension of the correspondingly expanding public adminstrator 
-- inmate structure of domination which seems the most ruthlessly 
totalitarian ruling-class order of all. Those conservatives who see 
in his system "the road to serfdom! ', or "the new tyranny" or whatever 
have I think, like Bakunin, intuitively apprehended just this "double" 
failure in referential power of his principles of domination. The 
latter simply cannot apprehend -- without the conceptual broadening 
I have suggested -- the terrible power with which public-sector rule 
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is enabled in its own right. 
6 
We come now to consideration of (c) - Marx's important 
supposition that the content of ruling-class ownership involves only 
means of life, or forces of production, means of anti-life or forces 
of destruction are thus conceptually ruled out by him from ever 
counting as economic content. 
7 This certainly does not mean that such 
6Throughout this section, I have not made the following two 
necessary qualifications to my claim of a public administrator/under- 
ling structure: 
i) Such a structure of domination ceases to obtain to the 
extent that "public administrators" are democratically responsible 
to and recallable by "underlings" (principles of government which Marx 
accorded enthusiastic report in Civil War in France (p. 41), but 
shied away from ever sponsoring himself. To the extent that this 
occurs, obedient life-activity is resolved into co-operative activity 
and domination into freedom (in the sense first sponsored by Rousseau). 
2) Such a structure of domination operates -- as all struc- 
tures of domination identified thus far, but more clearly -- within 
the socially embracing framework of what I call formal domination: 
which latter shall be elucidated in my consideration of (d). 
7Marx 
uses the phrase "forces of destruction" in The German 
Ideology (e. g. p. 76), but in a quite different sense than I intend 
here: 
These productive forces received under the system of private 
property a onesided development only, and became for the 
majority destructive forces. 
Of course, I do not think Marx really intended by his con- 
cepts of "means of life" "forces of production" to rule out, say, 
owners of munitions industries as capitalists, and my point here does 
not require any such imputation. Ownership of "means of anti-life" 
or "forces of destruction" here, as I mean it, supposes their employ- 
ability as such by the owner in question. Thus the ownership con- 
tent of the munitions capitalist is not the sort of ownership con- 
tent I am claiming Marx misses here. 
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"means of anti-life" or "forces of destruction" are ignored by him, 
or are not of crucial sociohistorical significance in his view. On 
the contrary, he treats these things as of signal importance in 
securing or protecting relations of production and the economic 
order as a whole: for example, as an integral part of the state 
mechanism of coercion which helps to maintain ruling-class private 
ownership intact. But such "means of anti-life" or "force of de- 
struction" are clearly not themselves economic content for him: 
they are merely a central instrument whereby such ownership content 
is gained and/or held. Otherwise put, -they are part of the power 
to exclude people from economic content but are not themselves 
constitutive of it. 
However, to advance straightway to rejoinder, it seems quite 
clear that means of anti-life or forces of destruction can themselves 
be ownership content and not merely instruments of the latter's 
protection; and that, as well, their monopoly ownership can of itself 
provide an economic base for exchanges of domination, and not merely 
help to secure or maintain this base as extrinsic guard. Means of 
anti-life or forces of destruction do not as Marx seems to have 
it merely play the fole in human affairs of indispensable fence 
to the quintessential ownership content of means of life or forces 
of production, but are themselves ownership content of no less import 
which, when monopolized, can ground exchanges of domination every bit 
as effectively as ownership of the staffs of life-support. To 
demonstrate this claim more formally, let me immediately proffer two 
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principles of domination that "match" those implicit in Marx's theory: 
only with the economic or ownership content here as "means of anti- 
life" or "forces of destruction", and the exchange of domination as 
a matter of withholding rather than of granting such economic content 
in return for obedient life-activity: 
1) One group of people (the ruling-class) have monopoly ownership 
of the means of anti-life (or of the forces of destruction)-of a so- 
ciety while another group (the ruled-class) have little or no owner- 
ship of these means of anti-life (or forces of destruction). 
2) The ruling-class (individually and/or collectively) withholds 
to some extent the exercise of these means of anti-life or forces of 
destruction upon the ruled-class, (individually and/or collectively) 
in return for the latter's life-activity in conformity with their 
dictations. 
Let me now give a simple illustration of the operation of 
these two principles of domination. A group of men (let us call them 
"the Whites") have a monopoly ownership of "means of anti-life" or 
"forces of destruction" (i. e. guns and ammunition) while another group 
of men (let us call them "the Non-Whites") have little or no such 
ownership. Neither group on the other hand owns any monopoly of 
the means of life or forces of production which the other requires to 
stay alive. The first group (the Whites) then by virtue solely of 
its monopoly ownership of the forces of destruction implicitly or 
explicitly exchanges the withholding of the exercise of these forces 
upon the non-owners (the Non-Whites) for the latter's obedient life- 
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activity -- and there are no limits to what this may include -- in 
accordance with the former's dictations. In any case where the Non- 
Whites refuse or neglect to so conform to the white's various dic- 
tations, the white's cease to suspend the exercise of their forces 
of destruction upon the Non-Whites and the latter are wounded, mut- 
ilated or killed. In this manner, the Non-Whites enter into the ex- 
change of domination with the Whites to. stay alive. Just as the ruled- 
class in Marx's structure of domination must exchange their obedient 
life-activity in return for the means of life in order to stay alive, 
so the ruled-class here must exchange their obedient life-activity 
in return for the withholding of means of anti-life to stay alive. 
The exchange of domination operates just as effectively with the 
economic base of monopoly ownership of means of anti-life as with 
the economic base of monopoly ownership of means of life. In both 
cases, the non-owners in this respect either yield up obedient life- 
activity in conformity to the owners' dictations, or they suffer 
material suffering or demise. 
Now this negative exchange of domination which is enabled 
by the monopoly ownership content of means of anti-life or forces 
of destruction seems contrary to Marx's assumption to operate in 
many social contexts without any monopoly ownership of means of life 
or forces of production necessarily involved. Of itself, it is suf- 
ficient economic base for Tuling-class hegemony. Much of the realm 
of organized crime and much of historical international relations, 
for example, seem to involve simply this negative exchange of domination 
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-- one party extracting obedience from another party by virtue 
of unreciprocated ownership of destructive forces alone. Indeed one 
might even plausibly claim that this sort of ownership is a necessary 
condition for monopoly ownership of the means of life or forces or 
production to obtain, whereas the reverse is not the case. According 
to this argument, the former would not merely deserve the distinct 
status here accorded to it against Marx, but would deserve in addition, 
and even more frontally against his position, the status of primacy as 
well. Indeed reasoning this way, Marx's supposition that the content 
of the dominator's ownership is means of life or forces of production 
alone (with means of anti-life or forces of destruction simply part 
of the mechanism whereby this ownership is protected) might be shown 
not just to have missed a crucial type of economic content, but -- 
worse -- to have missed the very primary type of such economic content. 
However, I do not-wish here to pursue this line of argument, 
plausible and telling though it might prove to be. Rather I choose 
to insist merely upon means of anti-life or forces of destruction 
as one fundamental sort of ownership content that can of itself ground 
exchanges of domination, and that must accordingly be taken into 
distinct account in any adequate analysis of ruling-class structures. 
As a matter of fact, it seems to me that pretty well all the structures 
of domination to which I have so far attended in this essay ultimately 
involve monopoly ownership by the fuling-class of both means of life 
or forces ofproduction and means of anti-life or forces of destruction. 
Indeed I suspect that it is precisely this conflation in fact which 
309 
disposes Marx towards that conflation in principle whereby he supposes 
monopoly ownership of the former alone to exhaust the realm of economic 
content altogether. However it is crucial here to emphasize that 
where monopoly ownership of both forces of production and destruction 
lies in the hands of a single ruling-class, this ruling-class must 
be accordingly conceived more broadly than Marx allows - to include 
explicitly that sector whose ownership co ntent is forces of destruc- 
tion: otherwise we remain confined yet again to that one-sided view 
of the ruling-class that Marx persistently sponsors: which, in this 
context, is one-sided by virtue of its conceptual restriction of 
ownership content to forces of production alone. Once we do properly 
broadened here the referential range of ruling-class to include the 
monopoly owners of forces of destruction as well as forces of pro- 
duction, then we have -- most significantly -- people like military 
and police commanders qualifying for membership in the "uppermost" 
social ruling-class. Now the latter's ownership in this respect is 
generally (certain in modern times) term ownership as explained in 
(b) above -- and -- as also indicated in (b) above the latter are 
also generally in partnership with the ruling-clasS owners-of forces 
of production. But neither of these qualifications negates their 
status as ruling-class members who have by virtue of their monopoly 
ownership sufficient economic base for exchanges of domination with 
non-owners. 
Should it still be insisted here that these "term! ' owners 
of forces of destruction are merely -- as Marx would seem to want to 
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have it -- executors of the interests of ruling-class private owners 
of forces of production, then neither "dealing" or indeed outright 
struggles between these classes can be adequately explained. Much 
less can those various important modern cases where military and/or 
police commanders secure rule of a society against the interests of 
the private monopoly owners of forces of production (e. g. in "socialist" 
military/police takeovers). Indeed even those very numerous his- 
torical instances of military invasion or occupation of this or that 
country are difficult to explain in terms of private monopoly pwner- 
ship interests alone: some significant status must be granted to'the 
interests of owners of forces of destruction too to avoid procrustean 
theoretical subsumption. In short, monopoly ownership of the means 
of anti-life or forces of destruction needs to be taken into account 
in any sociohistorical context as well as monopoly ownership of the 
means of life or forces of production. The former is not, as Marx 
supposed merely an instrument of the latter's protection, but is 
itself economic base content whether its owners are in partnership 
"with productive-force owners" (normally it would seem) or in out- 
right conflict with the latter, or -- as my opening example suggested 
-- ruling so to speak "on their own stick", their ownership content 
qualifies them for full ruling-class status. And it is in terms of 
the principles of domination proffered at the beginning of the 
present section that their rule or dominion functions: principles 
which Marx by his supposition of only means of life as the content 
of dominator ownership failed, with the fut. i. her ruling-class membership 
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they pick out, to recognize altogether. 
Well, it is obvious how Marx's failure in concept of owner- 
ship (missing "term! -ownership: see (b)) and his failure here in 
concept of ownership content together constitute a dual failure in 
his principles of domination which render the latter specially unable 
to pick out the non-derivative role of State rulers in social domi- 
nation. Again then, my criticisms and broadening of Marx's concepts 
in these respects provide the philosophical and theoretical under- 
pinnings to the intuitive recognition of both anarchists and con- 
servatives that Marx's theory is consistent with and even promotive 
of a "new tyranny" by public-sector potentates alone. However the 
enablement in understanding domination which these conceptual revisions 
provide is not restricted in its application to merely state domi- 
nation., The adult/youth and male/female structures of domination 
with which we earlier engaged are also more adequately understood in 
light of these crucial revisions: more particularly, in light of 
the principles of the "negative" exchange of domination which my 
broadened concept of ownership content permits us to discern. That 
is, this more inclusive concept, in subsuming means of anti-life 
or forces of'destruction as well as means of life or forces of 
production, enables our theoretical recognition of the enormously 
important role that simple brute force plays or can play in adult/ 
youth and male/female ruling-class orders. 
Suppose, for example, that man and wife effectively own all 
their means of life in common: and that the former therefore is no 
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longer able to dominate the latter by virtue of monopoly ownership 
of means of life. Though for Marx this arrangement would seem enough 
to dissolve the material base of domination here altogether, it is 
clear that by virtue still of the man's monopoly ownership of means 
of anti-life -- held for the most part in lieu of the injury-imposable 
might which he owns in his person and which his wife owns in her 
person little or none of -- he may exact obedient life-activity from 
her- as effectively as if he had monopoly ownership of their means 
of sustenance. An exchange of domination may take place by virtue 
of his personal capacity for violence and his wife's want thereof, 
with no monopoly ownership of means of life involved. Either she 
implicitly or explicitly yields obedient life-activity in accordance 
with his dictations or, simply, he attacks her physically (i. e. in 
my earlier formulation, no longer withholds the exercise of means 
of anti-life upon her). Indeed it seems plausible to regard, as 
elsewhere, this monopoly ownership of means of anti-life or forces 
of destruction as primary ownership: that without which "positive" 
monopoly ownership cannot obtain, but (as here) can itself be held 
independently of the latter. Again, monopoly ownership of the 
former sort must be taken account of in understanding domination, 
being perhaps more basic still than the ownership of means of 
life. 
(I suspect it is: not only in the sense above, but in the sense 
of being the evolutionary/historical ground of all human ownership 
of means of life). But whether primary in these ways or not, my point 
is simply to show that ownership of means of anti-life cannot be 
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ignored as a ground of rule in the male/female structure of domination 
any more than elsewhere. Of course, again as elsewhere, the (male) 
ruling-class here generally has in the sociohistorical continuum 
monopoly ownership of both means of life and means of anti-life. 
But the full extent of this domination must be understood in terms 
of both and not only, as with Marx's concept of the content of owner- 
ship, in terms of the former alone. My revision in this respect 
thus turns out to be as important to adequate understanding of the 
material base of male domination as of the State's. 
Needless to say, what has been argued above with respect to 
men's rule over women as informed by the "negative" sort as well as 
-- if not more primarily than - the "positive" sort of exchange of 
domination, applies a fortiori to adults' rule over youth. With the 
father or mother's relationship with pre-adolescent offspring, for 
example, the former's monopoly of physical power in virtue of height, 
weight, motor dexterity et al is so overwhelming as to be not only 
socially unique in the power it affords but probably thereby the 
very elemental facticity of the latter's lives (thus perhaps children's 
near-universal terror of all-enabled giants, and the persistence of 
such fear into adult notions of the almighty). Indeed the monopoly 
of violence-capacity, of the forces of destruction by adults in their 
relationship with youth might more than anywhere else be held here 
as the basic ground of ruling-class dominion: for in no other struc- 
ture of domination is the extraction of obedient life-activity from 
the ruled so consistently translatable into the immediately cashable 
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imperative of "Do x, or suffer physical attack". With this order 
of domination perhaps more than any other then, the exchange of 
withheld "means of anti-life" for compliant behaviour seems a basic 
principle of rule requiring theoretical recognition if human domination 
is to be anything like adequately understood. 
In summary of (c) thus, we may say that Marx's concept of means 
of life as the only ownership content upon which domination is based, 
is fundamentally mistaken not only the rule exercised by men over men 
by virtue of the monopoly ownership content of "means of anti-life" 
(e. g. military rule), but even more so the rule of men over women and 
adults over youth by virtue of the same sort of economic base. Just 
as Engels correctly rebutted the "brute-force theory" of Duhring as 
missing the basic importance in history of the ownership of productive 
forces, so here we correctly rebut Marx for missing the basic impor- 
tance in domination of the ownership of destructive forces. Both 
types of ownership content it is clear must be granted status as 
the stuff of the economic base upon which exchanges of domination are 
enabled to arise. And if one or the other is to be called "primary", 
it seems the latter is the more appropriate candidate: inasmuch as 
it is true as a matter of fact that unreciprocated ownership of 
destructive forces can of itself ground exchanges of domination, whereas 
similar ownership of productive forces by itself cannot in general even 
obtain. Or, more colloquially put, the carrot requires a stick to 
protect it to exact obedience, but the stick is able to command alone. 
(Lest the Marxian response to all this be-that the "stick" requires a 
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"carrot" before its wielder can stay alive, and thus ownership of 
the means of life remains primary, I remind him that -- on the 
infrastructural level of power as opposed to the superstructural 
level of right -a hungry stick-owner ýcan usurp a stickless carrot- 
owner any day. Though, I hasten to add, historically the two sorts 
of ownership here are generally allied - against non-owners 
rather than opposed). 
We come now, finally, to consideration of (d) -- of, that is, 
Marx's central supposition that all cases of domination, in human 
society are cases of opposing classes of dominators and dominated. 
Now though I have spent most of this entire section in furtherance 
of precisely this claim - more or less simply broadening its re- 
ferential hold to include much more than the private work-and-market- 
place to which Marx pretty well exclusively attends -- I still want 
to hold that domination in human society is not always a matter of 
a ruling-class or classes on one hand and a ruled class or classes 
on the other. Rather I want to argue that domination is to a sig- 
nificant extent a matter of: (i) individuals oppressing other 
individuals with no class relations necessarily involved; and, to a 
much more significant and interesting extent, (ii) a matter of this 
or that social form dominating all members of a society alike with 
no internal classes identifiable as the rulers and the ruled with 
respect to the domination in question (this latter being I think 
something Marx himself brilliantly recognized in part, but neglected 
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to follow through to its paradigm-subverting conclusion). 
Well, (i) really requires very little in the way of explanation 
given its abundant evidence to ordinary experience. I suspect there 
is almost no-one who has not been subject on occasion to the purely 
individual domination of this or that person who holds for that 
occasion and with no class affiliation a monopoly of some means of 
life or violence which he grants or withholds only in return for some 
form of obedient life-activity in conformity with his demands: the 
proprietor of some petty commodity (whether it be drink, transpor- 
tation or whatever that is not at that time available from any other 
source), or the owner of some minor weaponry (whether it be arti- 
ficial (e. g. gun) or organic (e. g. muscle), that is again, monopo- 
listically held for that time) who in either case requires compliant 
behaviour -- say, unearned payment or obsequious deference -- for the 
granting or withholding of the particular instrument of which he 
then has possession. Now cases of this sort, cases of merely indi- 
vidual domination with no class involvement at all are just too well 
known to labour further here. But they deserve recognition, which 
of course Marx's purely class analysis of domination does not and 
cannot accord them. And inasmuch as they constitute by virtue of 
their peculiar arbitrariness perhaps the most immediately excruciating 
forms of domination in all social intercourse, this failure in 
principle of his theory of domination to take account of them is 
really rather significant. Again, Marx's theory here seems to suffer 
from that liquidation of particularity about which I have already 
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commented in other connections. 
(Before leaving this point, I think it is worth acknowledging 
on Marx's behalf that the cases of non-class domination to which I 
refer are not obviously of historical import, in the usual sense of 
this term. Yet on the other hand, it seems that it is precisely this 
"usual sense" of the tem to which Marx in other contexts is intransi- 
gently opposed: "history" which pre-empts from its reference the 
oppression of "real, living individuals" in its attendance solely 
to "great" men and events strutting the world's stage. ' If it is 
one of Marx's central concerns, and I think it is, to lift into 
ideological view the nitty-gritty of the everyday lives of the masses, 
then his failure in the respect identified above is not one that may 
be too easily dismissed as non-historical). 
Let us now engage with the second and much more important 
claim I want to make against Marx's supposition that domination 
always involves classes of rulers and ruled. Here as I've already 
suggested, my concern is to argue, very briefly, that domination is 
to a most significant extent a matter of a form of social life 
dominating all members of society with no ruling-class/ruled-class 
division accountable for the domination. Consider the following 
exemplary case of such domination: 
Members of a society live in accordance with a strict rule 
or rule-complex stipulating that no member may touch the erotogenic 
zones of, or disclose his or her own to, any other member except in 
hiding. This rule or rule-complex is classless inasmuch as no class 
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is specially responsible for its construction (it is passed down from 
time immemorial) nor for its enforcement (its violations are in some 
way penalizable by all other members of the society); and inasmuch 
as no class is specially free from its repressive governance (it 
prohibits or frustrates the erotic expression and contact of all 
alike). 
This coercive regulation at the same time constitutes a 
structure of domination par excellence inasmuch as: 
i) Not merely some but all individuals of the society are con- 
fronted as individuals by monopoly ownership of some means of life 
or anti-life (e. g. social approval or disapproval) held by the 
society as a whole. The monopoly ownership is the so far unidentified 
but crucial one of collective monopoly ownership vis a vis owner- 
lessness in this respect of each of the individuals composing the 
collective (a distinction which is logically grounded in the ele- 
mentary difference between collectively and distributively construed 
sets, which difference permits of course properties to obtain with 
respect to the whole of a membership and yet not to its constituting 
members). 
ii) Not-merely some but all individuals of the society are re- 
quired as individuals to exchange obedient life-activity in con- 
formity with the social rule or rule-complex in question in return 
for the granting or withholding of the means of life or anti-life 
respectively by the society as a whole. That is, the non-owners 
(society's members qua individuals) must conform in their behaviour 
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to the dictates of the monopoly owner (society's membership qua 
collective) or suffer as grievously (though differently) as if they 
failed to comply with the demands of the work-and-marketplace ruling- 
class. Here too obtains the exchange of domination: only with the 
dominator and the dominated as collective and individuals composing 
the collective as opposed to ruling and ruled-classes of different 
memberships, and with the dictates to which the dominated are re- 
quired to conform to secure well-being as imposed by all on each 
as opposed to some on others. But despite such distinctions, it is 
a structure of domination nevertheless. 
Because too this sort of non-class domination -- what I shall 
henceforth call purely formal domination -- does not involve indi- 
vidual or co-operative project in the life-activity which is so 
dictated (i. e. the dictation here is a social given, not a conscious 
construction), it is clearly different from government by social 
plan: which Marx took to be the activity of liberation. Indeed 
insofar as here not even a ruling-class is free in the sense of 
materially realizing self-raised project, the form of domination in 
question is more thoroughgoing than any of the orders of domination 
to which this essay has so far attended. It involves all members 
of the society in the yielding up of obedient life-activity 
in 
accordance with non-self-raised dictate, involves all members of the 
society on the ruled side of the exchange of domination. 
Now this sort of non-class or "purely formal/domination" 
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which the above case of a rule or rule-complex of erotic prohibition 
compressedly demonstrates is not altogether unsensed by Marx. 
Throughout his mature work he persistently and strikingly describes 
the capitalist order as having so to speak "a life of its own", 
blindly operating as a network of economic roles and laws by which 
even the capitalist is bound and chained. The idea of a "formal 
domination", (if not . purýqy formal) is thus raised to theoretical 
consciousness by him - domination by a form of social life as 
distinguished from domination by merely this or that ruling-class. 
However, in seeing as he does the latter as the "representative" 
of the former, Marx does not as he properly should catch the obvious 
implication of this relationship he himself suggests: which is that 
the structure of "formal domination" here is primary'and the struc- 
ture of class domination secondary Qqaa "representative"). 
8 In- 
stead, perhaps in his well-known zeal to lay blame on the privileged, 
8Consider this remark from Marx's Preface to Capital where 
the ruling-class capitalist is seen by Marx as a mere "creature" 
of the social order in which he lives: 
To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the 
capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But-- 
my standpoint--can less than any other make the individual 
responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains 
[my emphasis], however much he may subjectively raise himself 
above them (CI, 10). 
But then Marx proceeds to fill his great volume with thundering 
denunciations and ascriptions of blame squarely directed at this 
very "creature" capitalist, who cannot, by his own words, be made 
"responsible" for the social role he plays! 
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he always reverts to preoccupation with ruling-class domination as 
such. Because the capitalist, despite his own enslavement to the 
system of capital which he "represents", is at the same time enabled 
by this system to exploit others awfully, Marx so fixes his attack 
on him, the merely "representative" capitalist, that the formal 
domination by which he is enabldd and into which he too must re- 
ductively fit is somehow lost to view. And so the "class enemy" 
looms so large in his eyes that it becomes somehow in the end the 
enemy of human liberation for him, despite his own apparent recognition 
of its derivative status. In this way, Marx seems to fall victim 
to something akin to self-contradiction - by virtue of that same 
peculiar preoccupation with the domination of the work-and-market- 
place ruling-class upon which this essay has already often commented. 
"Formal domination" has now, it is clear, taken on a sig- 
nificance in our considerations which my opening paradigm does not 
indicate. The latter (which by the way I think may be properly 
applied to almost all social formations in history, including present 
"socialist" societies) simply shows the plausibility of purely 
formal domination, but with our notice of Marx's own (ambivalent) 
postulation of formal domination. underlying class domination we are 
faced with apon7pure but perhaps much more important sort of formal 
domination than we started with. Marx's failure to take account in 
any way of purely formal domination has now become a failure as well 
to take proper account of formal domination as it grounds class 
domination. 
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But before the great flaw in Marx's theory I am suggesting 
here may be fully appreciated, more clarification of the theoretical 
place of formal domination is indispensable: more precisely how, 
for example, it is to be seen as related to class domination. So 
far we have considered the nature of purely formal domination (i. e. 
with no class domination involved), but we have not considered how, 
as such, it relates to class domination; nor, more importantly, when 
class domination is involved in its operation (as, to use Marx's 
term, its "representative"), how exactly this relationship of "re- 
presented" to "representative" is to be construed. Somehow "formal 
domination" has rapidly taken on in our account the dimensions of 
not only a complementary but an underlying framework to class rule 
- and thereby suddenly all embracing theoretical status -- but its 
conceptual shape in this regard is, to say the least, still somewhat 
amorphous. To strike straight and very abridgedly to the core of 
my contention here, I proffer the following description of "formal 
domination" which explicates its possible candidacy as the basic 
unifying framework of all human domination discussed to this point. 
Formal domination is the domination of a form of social 
life, in accordance with which all the individuals of a society are 
constrained to act: in an exchange of domination (as described above) 
between members of the society qua individuals and members of the 
society qua collective. Such a coercive form Of social life may be 
understood merely as a particular form (e. g. the rule or rule-complex 
of erotic prohibition discussed in my opening case), or as all such 
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particular forms, "pure" and "non-pure", taken together as an in- 
tegrated system. The latter is the sense in which I am interested 
here. 
Formal domination as a system - well recognized in the or- 
dinary language phraseology of "the system! ' -- is perhaps best likened 
to an all-covering social game-structure into which every individual 
of a society is plunged from his, or her birth as the historically 
ensconced framework through which each is constrained to act as a 
current member of the society in question. Thus, as again our ordin- 
ary language has it in referring to this embracing system of social 
intercourse, failure "to play the gameýl, whatever one's "Position", 
entails liability to "penalty' according to "the rules". What 
permits this peculiar "game" to be a structure of domination as 
opposed to ordinary games is that entry into the form of its given 
dictates is not a matter of choice, nor of restricted duration. 
Everyone is constrained "to play the game" and to continue doing so 
as long as he or she is a member of the society concerned. 
It is, of course, difficult if not impossible to identify the 
underlying principles in virtue of which ordinary language thus re- 
duces the exquisite complexity of our forms of social intercourse 
to the conceptual unity of "the system" or "a game" binding all alike. 
But let me suggest anyway, in line with the principles of domination 
developed to this point, that the unifying principles of this so- 
called system or game are: 
1) Every participant (i. e. member of the society in question) is 
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required to attempt to protect his/her powers to exclude others from 
society's available means of life and anti-life: or, otherwise put, 
to protect his/her effective ownership domains (the content of such 
exclusive domains ranging almost unlimitedly from food-stuffs to 
weapons, from personal effects or money to spouse's sexuality, 
9 
other 
people's abilities or sectors of the earth). 
2) Every participant (i. e member of the society in question) is 
required to attempt (in historically varying respects) to increase 
these powers to exclude or ownership domains by continuous exchanges 
of some part or use of them with others. 
10 
9 See my "Monogamy: A Critique", The Monist, Vol. 6, No. 54 
(October 1972), pp. 587-600. 
10I 
cannot undertake here to say all I would like to say about 
these two proposed unifying principles of the "social game": such 
requires considerably more than all I have written to this point. 
But a few brief asides here anyway., 
First, I think the rule or rule complex of erotic prohibition 
identified earlier in my example of "purely formal" domination is an 
important exemplification of the operation of principle (1). 
Secondly, I think such various popularized phenomena as 
those referred to in talk of "pecking order", "inflation", "creeping 
bureaucracy", "profit maximization", "imperialism", and so on are 
just so many exemplications of the operation of principle (2). Lest 
it be objected that principle (2) is not really applicable to feudal 
and caste social orders with their fixity of social station and thus 
proprietary holding, I must insist that though people have in such 
societies a more or less fixed social station 
ýsay, guild worker) 
within these fixed stations there is generally an elaborated order 
of rank (apprentice, journeyman, master, etc. ), not to say an outside 
chance to leap up or fall down a whole social station or more through 
some good or bad "fortune". As the literature of these societies 
abundantly indicates, attempting to "get ahead" in social position 
and/or cognate ownership holdings is as much a governing principle 
of playing these "social games" as any other: only the range of 
movement here is different, not the logic of action. (To reject the 
correspondence of social position and proprietary holding here is, 
of course, to reject the original objection). cont'd 
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Individuals of a society are said to be "required" to act 
or attempt to act in accordance with these underling principles of 
the social "system! ' or "game" in which they find themselves because, 
if they do not as individuals so act or attempt to act, they are 
liable to some form or other of substantial "penalty" in that social 
11system" or "gameý'. For example, anyone not attempting to protect 
or increase by exchange his/her own powers to exclude thereby renders 
him/herself liable to penalties ranging from social contempt ("fool", 
"weakling") to indigence or death; whereas anyone not attempting to' 
act in accordance with other's ownership domains or sanctioned em- 
powering exchanges thereby renders him/herself liable to more immediate 
and more formidable penalties still. Such failures to comply with the 
underlying principles of the "way of life" or social form in question 
are -- to pursue the model of "game" in the more vivid concrete -- 
as If a racer were to be overtly indifferent to holding/advancing 
his own position in a race or to his violation of another's holding/ 
advancing position. Such non-adherence to game principles risk not 
only post facto penalties, but utter unintelligibility. The game 
Finally, that people may not be conscious of their conformity 
to these principles in their action is no more mysterious than people's 
unconsciousness of the grammatical principles according to which they 
speak. For direct example, the contemporary academic who acts in such 
a way as to protect and increase by exchange his academic holdings 
(e. g. writing journal articles inreturn for tenure, or rank/salary 
promotion, or other professional payoff to self) is governed by these 
principles whether he is aware of it or not. He would not be so gov- 
erned only of course if he acted in other manner (e. g. was indifferent 
to plagiarism of his work or refused self-advancements: which is, it is 
certain, is as rare behaviour as voluntarily yielding position in a race, 
an analogy which I shall soon pursue. ) 
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seems the very framework of meaning of action which has to be followed 
for action to even achieve social sense. Hence to return to the 
macrocosmic social "game", those who do not attempt to follow its 
given general dictates of ownership behaviour are very apt to be 
considered insane. That remarkable antagonist to this ownership 
logic, Jesus, was, we might recall, not only crucified but considered 
largely inhuman by those not regarding him mad. 
If there is then a general hold of the social form or "game" 
constraining all alike within a given common framework in terms of 
which every individual must continuously act or attempt to act to 
"keep his chances alive", if there is then this "formal domination" 
of social order over all its current membership such that all must 
obey its given dictates to avoid the stricture of various penalty or 
indeed condemnation to one form or other of social meaninglessness, 
it is not difficult to see how ruling-class domination is related 
to it as - to use Marx's notion -- its "embodiment" or "representative. " 
(Marx of course only employed this notion to the capitalist "rep- 
resenting or "embodying" capital: but we shall construe the relation- 
ship here in much more general terms, with all ruling-class members 
-- male, adult, public-administrator et al as well as work-and-market- 
place -- included in our concept of ruling-class membership. ) That 
is, just as with an ordinary game, we regard those who most effectively 
exemplify its logic as "embodiments" or "representatives" of the 
game, so with the social "game" we may regard those who most effectively 
exemplify its logic as its "embodiments" or "representatives": and 
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ruling-class members, who by definition have most successfully protectec 
and increased by exchange their powers to exclude (else their rule or 
exchanges of domination with ruled-class members could not obtain) 
obviously so qualify. They best exemplify the social "game" by virtue 
of their demonstrably ascendant status in its ownership contest, 
" 
and in this sense they are properly regarded as its "embodiments" 
or "representatives". As ordinary language again has it, they are 
society's "winners" and those they dominate its "losers". Needless 
to say, the logic of the social "game" in which they are ascendant 
requires that they keep it intact: thus their vigorous protection of 
the social form, which follows from their exemplification of its 
requirements. 
Ruling-class domination is, in sum, based on formal domination. 
The latter enables the former as a game-structure enables the game's 
winners. Behind the "representative" rule of the monopoly owners 
lies the sovereign rule of the social form itself, in terms of which 
ruling-class members are themselves constrained to act. It commands 
all; they, in virtue of their effective exemplification of its 
historically given dictates, command others: while at the same time 
protecting it in lieu of the same obeisance to its imperatives of 
ownership security and increase. It is, in the arresting phraseology 
llContest here, of course, does not imply fair contest. On 
the contrary, unlike ordinary games, there is no "starting-even" 
stipulation heret an inequity which the contemporary ethical panacea 
of "equal opportunity" would seem to have the function to resolve. 
328 
of Marx himself, "the weight of all the dead generations that hangs 
like a nightmare on the brains of the living": the all-cons training 
heritage of a way of lif e that binds like a given grammar of social 
intercourse, in terms of which all are required to act to achieve 
even social intelligibility. 
Despite the obviously very skeletal nature of this description 
of "formal domination", I think that its postulation promises resolu- 
tion to certain basic anomalies in Marxist sociohistorical explanation. 
One such anomaly concerns, as I have already pointed out, Marx's 
inconsistent positioning on domination by economic form and domi- 
nation by ruling-class: on the one hand he holds the former to be 
primary (with ruling-class membership as merely its "creature" or 
"representative"), while on the other hand, he seems to hold the 
latter as primary (with all domination a matter of this or that 
12 
ruling-class's hegemony as such). , But what 
I'm concerned to engage 
with here is not this internal anomaly of apparently inconsistent 
positioning In Marxian theory, but rather the latter's utter inability 
to explain the historical failures of its own social products to 
achieve liberation in the work-and-marketplace by virtue of capitalist 
usurpation alone. What I suggest th e postulation of formal domination 
121t is worth emphasizing here that even when the economic 
form underlying ruling-class domination is kept in view by Marx, it 
is not at all the same as the "formal dcýmý_ation" I identify and is 
still unable to explain the "anomalies" to which I now address my- 
self. 
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underlying class domination permits is resolution of precisely 
this problem: in a phrase, Marxist revolutions' failure to achieve 
liberation in the work-and-marketplace accountable for here by its 
guiding theory's failure to come to grips with the formal domination 
upon which ruling-class domination is based. 
Thus, if it is granted that there is formal domination in 
a pre-Marxist society -a form of social life constraining all 
its members to act or attempt to act in terms of its principles of 
ownership protection and increase -- by virtue of which formal domi- 
nation ruling-class domination is enabled - then clearly usurpation 
of merely the current ruling-class's position of domination does not 
ensure liberation. Formal domination is not necessarily touched by 
any such change. And a new ruling-class may arise just as easily 
as before, because the underlying form enabling it remains intact. 
Even if the type of ownership itself is importantly altered - with 
so-called Marxist societies, from what I-call "private" ownership 
to "term" ownership - the general form of social life is still not 
thereby nihilated. And, again, the ruling-class domination it 
enables is with this new type of ownership no more ruled out than 
before. The sovereign dominator, the underlying structure or "game" 
of social intercourse is just altered in the tenure of its work-and- 
marketplace states: its general principles of government continue 
in force, and the ruling-class domination they enable is as likely 
as ever. In other words, there is no question here of a dark 
"human 
nature" or a "leadership betrayal" or "capitalist plot" - the standard 
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gestures of explanation in this regard - somehow undermining Marxist 
revolutions in the mysterious manner of deux ex machina, but rather 
a question of an ensconced form of social life remaining generally 
intact throughout specific changes in its ownership holding period 
and ruling-class embodiment. (I suspect that this point is what 
people intuitively apprehend with their talk of the "same old game" 
going on in Marxian societies. ) The great failure of liberation 
here is no sinister anomaly, but quite explicable in terms of a 
formal domination that - until it itself is broken -- persists through 
mere ruling-class overthrows, and even overthrows of "private" owner- 
ship. To undertake only the latter alterations, as Marx and the 
Marxists seem to have done, is to leave the ultimate enemy of work- 
and-marketplace (or indeed any other ruling-class) domination intact: 
as if to eliminate a game's established winners and their tenured 
positions was to eliminate the game itself. Only by postulation 
of, and liberative engagement with, the underlying structure of 
all ruling-class domination -- formal domination -- may the his- 
torical failures of Marxian societies to achieve their intended liber- 
ation be adequately explained, or transcended. 
Another basic'anomaly in Marxian theory (though not so far 
as I know ever recognized as such) which the postulation of formal 
domination helps to resolve is one I hinted at in the closing para- 
graphs of the last chapter. Here the suggestion was that Marx's utter 
conflation of the requirements of human nature and technological 
development left his theoretical framework unable even to discern, let 
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alone account for, possible contradictions between the two. Now I 
think it is undeniable that human-natural and technological require- 
ment, as characterized by Marx, may conflict: inasmuch as the former's 
essential requirement is for him positive freedom (see Chapter 1), 
while the latter's inevitable effect is by implication of his own 
claim, expansion of the realm of physical necessity: 
Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it 
also supplies a need for the material ... creating ... a felt 
need in the consumer (my emphasis: G, 92). 
By thus expanding the realm of physical necessity in virtue of ex- 
panding needs, technological development stands opposed to the 
achievement of positive freedom, according to Marx's own words in 
Capital: 
In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour 
which is determined by physical necessity ... ceases (my emphasis: 
CIII, 820). 
So it seems clear that Marx's own claims place technological develop- 
ment and material realization of human nature at odds with another. 
13 
The former creates needs, thus broadens the hold of "physical neces- 
sity", thus hinders actualization of "the realm of freedom" towards 
which human nature is intrinsically disposed. 
Though it is thus derivable from his own work, Marx appears 
to have missed this fundamental opposition in principle between human 
DBut there is ultimately-no conflict between them, the Marxist 
might reply, "because technological development always satisfies more 
needs than it creates, hence contracts the 'realm of necessity, more- 
than it expands it". Such a reply embodies of course just the sort 
of indiscriminate assumption at which my criticism is aimed here. 
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natural essence and technological development. And he seems to have 
managed this oversight by, in brief, attending only to the positive 
freedom which technological development promotes by virtue of its 
amelioration of natural necessity and by virtue of its material 
realization of the human essence within need-stipulated limits. 
In other words, only those aspects of technological development which 
are consistent with or abet man's positive freedom seem ever to be 
appreciated by him. Technological development's negative role of 
expanding the realm of necessity through expanding needs -- which 
historically raised necessity just as clearly as natural necessity 
derogates from man's positive freedom -- seems simply to have eluded 
his consideration. In this way, the element of contradiction between 
human-natural essence and technological development is theoretically 
repressed by Marx, with the most significant consequences. For 
example, there can never be a question for Marx of putting the human 
natural requirement for positive freedom (e. g. a shorter "necessary" 
work day) ahead of the technological requirement of securing pro- 
duction development (e. g. making large automobiles for everyone): 
14 
14Consider this disturbing passage in Wage Labour and Capital 
where Marx allows for the unlimited growth of need-objects: 
--however high it [the human dwelling] may shoot up in the course 
of civilization, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or 
even greater extent, the occupant of the relatively small house 
will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped 
within its four walls 
--Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, 
therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for 
their satisfaction (WLC, 57). 
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the two sorts of requirement are always consistent with one another 
for him, even though they obviously are not. Had he appreciated that 
technological development's creation of needs (which he recognizes) 
is at the same time the expansion of the realm of necessity (which 
deduction he shirks) then he would not have so crucially missed the 
tension between the former and human-natural essence. But as I've 
already mentioned, he has an uncritical temper with respect to 
technological development which blinds him too much. 
Now how all this ties in with formal domination is as follows. 
I suggest that one of the coercive requirements of the (post-feudal) 
form of civilized life is to attempt to promote the production of 
ever more material goods: a requirement that is neatly consistent 
with and complementary to those two constraining requirements of 
ownership protection and increase I have already identified as 
underlying principles of the established social "game" (more par- 
ticularly the requirement to attempt to increase one's ownership 
domains). That this requirement of production increase is not merely 
a capitalist ruling-class dictate to the ruled-class workers is 
attested to by the former's own blind subsevience to it, not to 
mention the revolutionary Marx's and Marxists'. The requirement in 
question is imposed on all members of modern society as a stipulation 
of its general form, and no- one may flout it without liability to 
severe penalty, from social disapproval ("against Progress") to 
economic ruin. Even the overthrow of the capitalist ruling-class 
and its species of property in "Marxist" societies seems not to have 
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hindered its hold of formal domination much (i. e. production output 
here too a shibboleth immune to question). It stands as an historical 
given whose constraint is so monolithic that even the arch liberationist 
and revolutionist Marx himself counts a version of it as the ultimate 
"law" of civilized society and its violation, apparently, as historically 
impossible. It constitutes in short, formal domination par excellence. 
It may be true of course, as Marx persistently reminds us, 
that various "laws" of capitalism lead to ever more technological 
development (i. e. "laws" of capitalist competition, constant-capital 
growth, etc. ). But this production growth in line with the require- 
ments of the capitalis-t ruling-7cl4s. ý economic formation is hardly 
explicable as such when the same or similar imperative of production 
growth obtains in anti-capitalist-ruling-class societies guided by 
Marxian theory. Only, I think, the postulation of formal domination 
running beneath this or that ruling-class order of domination is able 
to explain the transepochal hold of the imperative in question. The 
latter is, it seems, a given dictate of the very form of life of all 
modem society, hardly less imperious in its hold than former inviolate 
laws universally believed to be sanctified by the Deity (the role of 
the Maker here, we might suppose, not yet assumed by Technology). 
The final anomaly which I will suggest the postulation of 
formal, as opposed to merely ruling-class, domination helps to resolve 
is that of the decisive failure of the working-class in liberal demo- 
cratic societies to vote workers' ownership of the means of production 
into political reality, as Marx considered progressively probable if 
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not inevitable with the secure achievement of universal suffrage. 
Though Marx certainly thought that the capitalist ruling-class was 
almost sure to turn to unconstitutional reactionary violence to 
forcibly prevent any such socialization of their ownership holdings 
from taking place, he did not envisage any other objective obstacle 
to workers' thus voting for the immense advancement of their own 
collective material interests. It was just a matter of organization 
and propaganda and-they would do it, barring ruling-class nihilation 
of the liberal democratic process in the meantime., I 
However things have turned out rather differently from what 
Marx expected; there does seem to be some. other objective obstacle 
to the workers' voting their collective material interests into 
political sway; and the problem is to explain it. Now of course one 
can use Marx's own ad hoc method of blaming inveterate stupidity, 
betraying leaders and so forth for the failure in question. But 
post facto. selective scapegoating is generally a symptom of explanatory 
impotence, and does little to reduce that lingering sense of some 
other great restraint than vicious ruling-class capitalist power 
systematically blocking workers from electing workers' control into 
state office. I suggest that formal domination is this other great 
obstacle, underlying indeed ruling-class dominion as the coercive 
regulator maintaining workers in their historically established place. 
Let me proffer an illustration. Smith is a young worker in 
an American factory who has some way or another been converted to 
a thoroughgoing socialist standpoint, and who attempts to advocate 
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to, and organize, those around him accordingly: in a manner that is 
visible to no capitalist ruling-class force (e. g. straw-boss, police, 
onwer). Nevertheless, he meets, as he puts it, "a brick wall". His 
mother, his father, his fellow-workers, his friends - themselves 
wage-slaves -- all agree he has, as they put it, "flipped out". 
After months of arguing with him - generally in terms of support 
for the "American Way of Life" and denunciation of his "hurting Rý 
-- they shift from such modes of intimate disapproval to outright 
ostracism. In the end, he is compelled to leave his home, his family, 
his job, his friends and his haunts until, as they put, it, he "makes 
sense" and "fits in" again. 
Now it is just not possible to account adequately for this 
sort of case in terms of ruling-class repression alone. In absence 
of dedication to a species of devil theory, another deeper mechanism 
of coercive regulation is required for its satisfactory explanation. 
Needless to say, the notion of formal domination - domination of 
the individual members of a society by a form of social life which 
is coercively imposed on each of them by all of'them (and this 
formulation is only paradoxical if one denies the possibility of a 
11social" self imposing on an "individual" self in the same person) 
-- needless to say, this notion of formal domination provides precisely 
the explanatory framework to account for such phenomena as the above; 
which, in one variation or another, constitute the very stuff of 
sociohistorical repression and control. Indeed this domination by 
form of social life would seem here to underlie work-and-marketplace 
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ruling-class domination in a rather more concrete sense than that 
already subscribed to: as so to say the latter's "grass roots". 
I suspect that a more detailed account of formal domination 
could provide any number of important phenomena of coercive rule 
which are explicable in its terms, but which remain anomalous to the 
Marxian analysis of domination in ruling-class terms alone. With 
almost any social formation, for example, such coercive dictates as 
those associated with speech, eating, dwelling and dress convention 
seem for the most part irreducible to explanation via ruling-class 
domination; yet they together constitute a veritable labyrinth of 
constraining walls against human life-activity in accordance with 
self-raised project. Indeed they form a framework of domination, 
a network of dictations to human action which must be complied with 
to stay alive in the society in question, so massive and basic and 
all-encompassing that obedience to them seems to those they bind almost 
a matter of conformity io physical laws. But despite this immense 
import qua human dominati-on, despite the constraining regulation of 
what Marx himself saw as the very substance of all human society 
and history -- "eating and drinking, habitation and clothing" - 
which this network of dictations involves -- despite all this, the 
Marxian ruling-class explanatory panacea of sociohistorical domination 
seems hardly even to apply here. On the other hand, yet again, the- 
notion of a formal domination seems easily able to account for what 
stands anomalous to Marx's theory of domination. 
(The theoretical plumbing required to comprehend the great 
. 
338 
coercive network I have alluded to in terms of formal domination 
is not something that this essay has the purpose to provide. But 
it does not seem difficult to discern how what I've already said 
with regard to domination by form of social life applies to these 
manners or conventions of speaking, eating, dressing et al governing 
this or that social membership. The very use of the word "form" -- 
as in the expression "good form" and "bad form" -- indicates the 
connections here. 1hus with, for example, the coercive dictate which 
requires members of the Masai tribe to wear dung in their hair, or, 
correspondingly, requires us to cover in specific layers our feet, 
legs and torsos with suits of clothing-armour, we cannot properly 
impute the obedience-extracting and immiserating prescription in 
question to domination by a ruling-class; but we certainly can 
properly impute it to a form of social life: which constrains all 
members of the society concerned as an historical given and which 
no one may violate without liability to severe social sanction. Now 
though it is tempting to sustain a proffering of such examples into 
many more pages, of cathartic report, the amenability of all such 
conventions to explanation in terms of formal domination is too ob- 
vious to draw out any further. I might add in loose speculation, 
however, that I think so far as a civilized social formation goes, 
these specific restrictions of convention or manners relate to the 
general underlying principles of ownership protection and increase 
earlier identified, as the protocol of a game does to its internal 
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"point". 15 
I have come now to the end of my argument against Marx's 
simplistic resolution of all sociohistorical domination into work- 
and-marketplace ruling-class domination. Though I am not going to 
re-traverse in summary the immense territory I have so briefly 
covered, there are three broad concluding points I want to make: 
with still the compressed deliberation featured throughout this 
essay. The first has to do with indicating why what I call "formal 
domination" must be considered the socially'universal and primary 
structure of domination informing sociohistorical intercourse. The 
second has to do with rebutting the claim or subterranean conviction 
that our established structures of domination are indispensable to 
our species' continuance in a civilized state (however desirable 
partial or complete liberation from them may seem). And the third 
and final point has to do with pointing out some of the more crucial 
implications which my extra-Marxian analysis of domination has on 
pursuit of the appropriate course of human liberation. With these 
points - again involving only the swift carve of outline -- my 
15Thus, for example, as the protocol regulations of wearing 
amour and uniforms are to the underlying principles of territory 
protection and seizure in the North American game of football, so 
are the protocol regulations of clothing identified above related 
to the underlying principles of ownership protection and increase in 
the established "game" of social intercourse in general. For my 
theory of sport as social paradigm, see "Philosophy of a Corner 
Linebacker", The Nation, Vol. 212, No. 3 (Jan/71) 83-6 and "Smash 
Thy Neighbour", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 229, No. 1 (Jan/72), 77-80. 
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enterprise ends. 
Formal domination is a socially universal structure of dom- 
ination because, as I have already shown, all members of a society 
are subject to the given dictates it involves. Unlike ruling-class 
domination, by which only a certain class of the social membership 
is systematically constrained, domination by the form of social life 
coercively regulates every member of the society in question (which 
coercive regulation is, of course, quite consistent with the deviation 
of some of society's membership from it: the former only ceases to 
be such when deviation is no longer liable to penalty). In this sense 
then, formal domination is socially universal, as opposed to ruling- 
class domination which is only partial in its social hold. 
The universality of formal domination obtains, furthermore, 
with respect to the dominating side as well as the dominated side 
of society's membership. That is, not only are all members of a 
society subject to the coercive dictates formal domination involves, 
but all are - to some extent enforcers of such dictates: even 
the very deviant from its rule is liable to censure by his own "social 
self" for his deviance (as Freudian psychoanalysis has it, a "superego" 
mechanism of self-castigation which may be the most terrible enforcer 
of all).. On the other hand, of course, ruling-class domination 
involves no such universality: the dominating side of its domination 
is restricted to a narrower segment still of society's membership 
than its dominated side. (Certainly this is the case with Marx's 
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ruling-class, which is confined to a tiny minority of society's 
membership. ) 
In short, formal domination embraces the*whole of society's 
membership, both as coercers, and coerced: whereas ruling-class 
domination is only segmental in both respects. 
Though from this peculiar universality of social hold of 
formal domination, wanting in ruling-class domination, we might want 
to infer the former's primacy, this is not the claim I wish to advance 
here. Rather I am going to undertake a quite new, and I think more 
directly telling, line of argument for the primacy of formal vis a Vis 
ruling-class domination. It is-really a very simple argument and 
is obvious once one squarely faces a fact that Marx the philosopher 
strangely never really pays any heed to, though it is the very most 
primordial and eternal fact of the human condition. The fact in 
question is this: every person without exception dies within a 
time-span of a few decades. Members of the ruling-class are, of 
course, in no way exempt from the government of this iron law of 
human existence, though they may indeed be encouraged by their 
special privilege into special delusions of such exemption. And since 
every ruling-class member without exception has short shrift as an 
historical agent, so necessarily has every ruling-class member's 
material interests short shrift as historical influence. Thus the 
ruling-class of any society, and all their material interests', have 
really quite pathetic sway so far as the great continuum of history 
is concerned. They come and go like Ozymandiases writ small. All 
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this is true of any specific ruling-class membership and/or their 
material interests, whether taken individually or collectively. 
What Marx does, however, is to ignore utterly this gross 
facticity of the human death-sentence and all it implies so far as 
the sway of ruling-class memberships and their material interest 
go: a theoretical extrusion of great moment which he seems to 
manage by usually conflating the personal and role referents of the 
concept "ruling-class". That is, this concept as it is generally 
employed in his work does not make clear the crucial distinction 
between'ýuling-class" as it refers to a group of powerful people 
in a society (who soon die) and "ruling-class" as it refers to a set 
of powerful positions in a society (which do not soon die). And in 
this way, the sheer mortality of the former never emerges to present 
a problem to his view that ruling-class memberships and their material 
interests are the ultimate ground of social domination. 
Yet, as we can easily see once the subjecthood of all owner- 
ship attachments to Nature's short stay of execution is recognized, 
no ruling-class membership nor their material interests ever lasts long 
enough to be so villainously responsible. Something underlying their 
domination has to be the proper candidate for this status. And the 
underlying something here is clearly the form of social life through 
whose roles of ownership ascendancy this or that ruling-class member- 
ship and their material interests function as merely temporary oc- 
cupants, before some other equally short-lived membership succeeds 
them. 
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(None of the above of course should be misconstrued to meati 
that ruling-class memberships have no individual and/or collective 
responsibility for social domination: they certainly do to precisely 
that extent which they can choose to renounce or violate at cost their 
ascendant roles. Furthermore, they bear in the society concerned 
disproportionately large responsibility for failing to so choose 
inasmuch as their)occupancy of ruling-class place confers upon them 
disproportionately large effective jurisdiction over that society's 
means of life and/or anti-life. All that is being claimed here is 
that the form of social life owns primacy as the sociohistorical 
ground of people's domination of one another, which is quite consistent 
with substantial ruling-class membership responsibility on a penul- 
timate level). 
The second point with which I promised to engage before con- 
clusion is "the claim of subterranean conviction" that domination is 
indispensable to man's continuance in a civilized state. Freud of 
course makes a version of this claim quite explicit in his social 
philosophy, but I suspect it has a much deeper and wider hold in 
man's beliefs generally: manifesting a transhistorical "form of 
social consciousness", to draw upon our earlier lexicon. And although 
it is a claim that has already been rejected in one way or another 
in the expositional body of this essay, it deserves because of its 
primordial influence (if. not reasoned support) at least perfunctory 
rebuttal here on my own behalf. 
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To avoid convenient confusion about the extremity of my 
rebuttive position, I straightway acknowledge the following two claims 
as uncontroversially true (hermits aside): 
1) People of any age or place require a common form of social life 
of some sort to survive either as individuals or as a community. 
2) Such a common form of social life itself always involves production 
requirements stipulated by need-imposed necessity which must be met 
for the members of the society in question to survive either as in- 
dividuals or as a community. 
From neither of these acknowledged claims though, it is 
certain, can the principles of domination adduced in this essay be 
properly inferred, or indeed anything like them: despite the easy 
habit of so reasoning to which men have, in various ways, long been 
disposed (e. g. inferring from the requirement of social "order" the 
requirement of coercive "authority" to impose it; inferring from 
the requirement of production to meet needs the requirement of "men 
in charge" to dictate it). It is quite consistent with (1), for 
example, all that people own society's means of life (or anti-life) 
in common as opposed to some people owning them monopolistically, 
and that their use and disposal of these means is in accordance with 
mutual and creative agreement rather than ruler-dictates. Indeed 
the hold in a society of these principles of liberation rather than 
of domination is itself obviously constitutive of a common form 
of social life, and a more durable -- because non-antagonistic -- 
such common form at that. Then as well it is quite consistent with 
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(2) that the same principles of liberation rather than of domination 
obtain in a society: the production requirements stipulated by need- 
imposed necessity -- precisely because they are need-imposed or, 
otherwise put, derive from the natural seat of motivation obtaining 
in all members of the society in question -- are quite as adequately 
satisfiable by common ownership and project-agreement as they-are 
by monopolist ownership and monopoly-owner command. Indeed there is 
good reason to suppose that the former form of social life much more 
adequately than the latter meets the claims of human need-requirements, 
inasmuch as (if Marx is right, and I judge he is) it is an essential 
need of people to act in accordance with (individually or co-operatively) 
self-raised project: an essential need which the former (the liberative) 
form of social life by definition meets, 'and which the latter (the 
dominating) form of social life by definition fails to meet. That 
as well the former necessarily precludes, and the latter contingently 
ensures, the possibility of need-requirements not being properly met 
for many by virtue of the restts monopoly power to exclude them from 
need-objects, tells still again in favour of the former (the liberative) 
form of social life more adequately meeting need-imposed necessity 
than the latter (the dominating) form of social life. So, in sum, 
the requirements of need-imposed necessity do not support the familiar 
but facile conclusion that domination is indispensable to such 
necessity's being properly satisfied, but on the contrary support 
the less familiar but well founded conclusion that domination is a 
positive hindrance to such necessity's being adequately met. 
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The briefest of analyses thus exposes the fraudulence of 
inferring from men's requirements of common form of social life and 
of production to meet need-imposed necessity the conclusion that 
domination is socially indispensable. Not only does this inference 
not follow from the premises in question, but there are good reasons 
to suppose that the very opposite conclusion in favour of the social 
indispensability of liberation is far more plausibly yielded. In 
any case, domination certainly cannot properly be said to be indispen- 
sable to civilized social survival on the grounds identified. Such 
ratiocination, however commonplace, hardly deserves further notice. 
Another favorite if less vague argument for the indispen- 
sability of domination to men's civilized survival is that people are 
by nature so aggressively self-interested that they require a master's 
dictates simply to keep them from perpetually attacking one another 
(Kant, for example, argues this way in his Idea of a Universal History 
from a Cosmopolitan Point of View: not to mention the better known 
arguments of Hobbes). Well, I've already dealt with a form of this 
argument in Chapter I ("Human Nature") where I sponsored the rejoinder 
that postulation of such human-natural disposition constitutes a 
needless multiplication of entities, and that men's behaviour of 
aggressive self-interest can be explained without any such speculative 
postulation of innate program behind it (e. g. by scarcity and estab- 
lished social relations). What I've already said in this present 
section on civilized society's coercive form of social life which 
requires of its members on pain of extreme social penalty, to attempt 
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to protect and increase their ownership stakes, lends further sub- 
stance to this rejoinder: again the gist (by implication) of my 
position here being that men's behaviour of aggressive self-interest 
requires no Occam-violating postulation of inborn dictate to explain 
it, when coercive social structure can account for such behaviour 
with no such theoretical invention. Indeed the very fact that this 
form of social life is sytematically coercive in its requirement of 
aggressive self-interest tells against natural disposition towards 
the same: for if it were truly inherent in men's nature to so behave, 
then the sytematic coercion to so behave would be gratuitious and a 
massive anomaly. 
The above are by no means the only effective rejoinders to 
the postulation of human-natural disposition to aggressive self- 
interest as a ground from which the indispensability of overlords 
follows. Even granting the existence of such a nature-given program 
in humans (an illicit grant in my view), the argument in question 
still seems to fail. For if men are all thus intrinsically disposed 
to aggressive self-interest, then those who dominate are similarly 
afflicted and their position of domination ensures thus no control 
of aggressive self-interest in society at all and, besides, gives 
them more enablement than before in this direction. Then, again, 
it does not seem any more to follow from the natural impulse to 
aggressive self-interest that a dominator is required to keep men 
ýrom behaving in accordance with it, than it follows from the natural 
impulse to defecate on the spot that a dominator is required to keep 
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men from defecating. Natural impuse is incontrovertibly subject to 
self-directed restraint; and why what is obvious in the latter case 
is not so obvious in the former is something the position I am 
rebutting simply never considers, in perhaps convenient enthusiasm 
to justify masters. 
Another standard argument (advanced indeed by some Marxists) 
for the indispensability of domination to man's continuance in a 
civilized state is a more convincing variation on part of the first 
general argument of this sort with which I engaged: that is, that 
domination is technologically necessary. Here the more specific 
claim is that in an advanced industrial society, the great complexity 
of the production process is such that its government by co-operatively 
raised project is simply impracticable. People generally are just not 
equipped, nor can they be equipped, to understand adequately the grand 
intricacy of this production process in which they are involved: and 
lacking thus the primal requisite of appropriate decision-making in 
this regard, they must pay the price for their technologically-enabled 
material abundance, and obey the dictates of those specially qualified 
in these matters, technical experts. To ensure, in short, that the 
productive system achieves or sustains an advanced stage of develop- 
ment and efficiency, domination by technical experts is indispensable. 
The essential problem with this sort of argument, however 
is that it fails to take into account a crucial and proper distinction 
between requirements which take the form of explicated mutually 
advantageous recommendation by experts to non-experts, and requirements 
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which take the form of non-explicated mutually advantageous dictate 
by experts to non-experts: requirements which are satisfiable in 
the former sort of relationship by agreement to follow such recom- 
mendation for appreciated reasons and satisfiable in the latter sort 
of relationship by obedience to the dictator experts to avoid sub- 
stantial harm to self. In both cases, the general incompetence of 
people in adequate technological understanding, the contrary competence 
of experts in these same matters, and the achievement or maintenance 
of technological advancement as social necessity are granted premises 
-- no quarrel is being raised here (though one might well be warranted). 
What -- again -- is being criticized here is the inference from these 
premises that domination is indispensable to the satisfaction of 
expert-discerned technological requirements. Clearly, as our dis- 
tinction above shows, such inference by no means follows. Technological 
requirements, even of an advanced productive complex, are satisfiable 
in other manner: informed not by the principles of domination at all 
but, on the contrary, those of liberation. Indeed insofar as this 
latter form by its very nature involves the non-expert majority in 
a continuing educative process in technological matters, while the 
former form by its very nature precludes such a process; insofar 
as the latter form by its very nature involves the integrated co- 
operation of experts and non-experts in resolution of technological 
problematic, while the latter form by its very nature precludes such 
co-operation; and insofar as the former by its very nature prevents 
production-derogating "meaninglessness" of task, while the latter 
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form by its very nature promotes it -- insofar, that is, as the form 
of liberation necessarily enables producer education, integration 
and sense of purpose which the form of domination just as necessarily 
curtails, the form of liberation would seem a superior social form 
of productive engagement by technological criterion alone. Far from 
being disqualified by the rigour of advanced productive criterion 
as "impracticable", as the argument in question would have it, the 
form of liberation would seem to qualify as preferable to that of 
domination by just this standard. 
I might add here that analogous and just as important rebuttal 
of the "domination is technologically indispensable" line of thought 
can be made with respect to the adult/youth framework of intercourse. 
That is, to claim that the young must obey the dictates of the adults 
(like the non-experts, the experts above) for the society in question 
to achieve or sustain its stage of technological advancement, the 
same sort of counter can be returned: technological -- or, more 
broadly, survival -- requirements are at least as satisfiable here 
within a form of explication and agreement as within a form of command 
and coercion. Indeed in this adult/youth context, a form of liberation 
seems much more decisively preferable to a form of domination in 
meeting material survival requirements than is the case with the 
expert non-expert case above. For here, explication by the more to 
the less informed, and the latter's understanding agreement with such 
explication, is intrinsic. imperative: the very point of the upbringing 
process, and not -- as in the above case -- merely an arguable 
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advantage for ultimate direct producer output. A form of domination, 
on the other hand, is necessarily antithetical to the upbringing 
process's very telos as it involves command in place of explication, 
and coercion in place of understanding. 
Lest the rejoinder to all this be that I have improperly 
assumed agreement to follow from explication, and thus have missed 
the essential problem of the form of liberation in meeting survival 
requirements -- which is that agreement does not so easily follow, 
but is regularly tortuous in achievement and hence prejudicial to the 
satisfaction of the ever-insistent harsh claims of "the reality prin- 
ciple". -- I have only this to say. Agreement that does not follow 
from explicated proposal presents a situation -- coercion ruled out 
-- where explication must be rendered more illuminating, or proposal 
altered to more agreeable form, to effect such concordance. Since 
either of these modifications constitutes a positive development in 
social understanding, the initial failure of agreement is not so 
much abortive in issue, as pregnant with higher possibility; not 
so much to be avoided as deleterious, as to be prized as the ground 
of emergent mutual apprehension. Explicated proposal from which 
agreement does not easily follow is hardly then as-rebuttive to my 
position as it may first appear. It is, on the contrary, prime 
substance of this position's attraction. Should a conviction without 
good reason and in ultimate philistinism still persist that domination 
is somehow indispensable and liberation somehow impracticable in 
civilized human affairs, I suspect that the grounds of such conviction 
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may be causal rather than rational. After all, the form of social 
life within which we relate to one another, and have since time 
immemorial, is one governed by principles of domination, not liberation: 
so, that conventional thought with action might be thoroughly bound 
to such a form is not an altogether unlikely possibility. Men are 
not undisposed to the pattern of ratiocination of whatever is and 
has been must be. The fixed belief of commonsense that human-kind has 
to operate within a framework of domination to resolve the ruinous 
bents and clashes of self-interest into some kind of order -- whether 
technological or moral or legal or whatever -- a fixed belief that 
would seem to provide the common "reason" informing arguments for 
domination, seems simply closed to the possibility that such "ruinous 
bents and clashes of self-interest" are not resolved by a dominion- 
structured form of social life so much as enjoined by it. For if 
the underlying governing principles of this established form of social 
life are indeed ones of protection and increase of one's ownership 
stakes, society's regulation by such principles would seem rather to 
systematically enforce "the bents and clashes of self-interest" of 
people than to regulatively mitigate them. If this is so, then argu- 
ments for the indispensability of such a dominion-structured form of 
social life seem more than a little close to instantiating ultimately 
the general and absurd argument form: "The way to prevent x is to 
coercively prescribe it. " 
In the end, I am tempted to think that arguments for the 
indispensability of domination and the impractibility of liberation 
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in the civilized human condition relate to the underlying form of 
social life with all its mechanisms of class rule as, in narrower 
form, ideology relates to the work-and-marketplace economic order in 
Marx's theory: arguments, that is, which in virtue of their "cor- 
respondence" to this underlying form of social life, and not in 
virtue of their rational power, are "selected" for survival on the 
sociohistorical stage. On the other hand, I am complementarily 
suspicious that contrary arguments against domination and for liber- 
ation are in virtue of their thoroughgoing "contradiction" with the 
underlying form of social life, and not in virtue of their want of 
rational power, fated by the same mechanism of "social selection" 
to extinction on this sociohistorical stage. I suspect, in short, 
that a continuing dogged rejection of arguments for liberation may 
not be philosophically but socially determined, and that therefore 
still further counters to it here may well be rationally futile. 
With this concluding provocation, I rest my case. 
The third and final point I want to raise has to do with 
some of the more significant implications which my extra-Marxian 
analysis of social domination has on the question of social liberation 
from it. The gist of my whole contention against Marx has been that 
his preoccupation with the work-and-marketplace ruling-class order 
as ultimately the only order of domination to be transcended to 
achieve a "realm of freedom" for humankind is a preoccupation which 
drastically fails to appreciate the enormous complexity and range of 
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domination frameworks by which sociohistorical intercourse is and 
has been governed. Other, non-derivative structures of domination 
regulate sociohistorical intercourse, I have demonstrated, that have 
to be recognized and engaged with as well as the work-and-marketplace 
order of rule if any such "realm of freedom" is to be adequately sought: 
structures of domination picked out not only by Marx's own implied 
principles of domination (e. g. adult/youth and male/female orders of 
rule), but -- just as importantly -- by systematically revised prin- 
ciples of domination which subsume in their reference "psychological" 
as well as material means of life, "term" as well as "private" owner- 
ship, "forces of destruction" as well as forces of production and, 
finally "formal" as well as class rule. In the end, what emerges from 
my analysis is a great system of social domination frameworks within 
which Marx's work-and-marketplace ruling-class order is just one 
important part: a system whose operation is ultimately in terms of 
an all-encompassing form of social life -- within which the entire 
social membership is constrained to act including those members who 
for the nonce belong to the work-and-marketplace or any other ruling- 
class. Thus, on the grounds of this analysis of social domination, 
the enterprise of radical liberation, of seeking a "realm of freedom" 
in the human condition, stands as a vastly broader project than Marx's 
narrow notion of revolutionizing merely one locus of rule would have it. 
Indeed, I might add here in critical complement, the hold of 
domination seems considerably deeper in its roots than Marx conceived 
too-. running back to the very origins of human society into which the 
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Marxian eye for servitude never seriously penetrateA. That the way 
of domination has in fact this aboriginal grip on human affairs may 
be deduced (though oddly never has been) from the surviving ideological 
remains of pre-literate tribal societies which almost without exception 
indicate the principles of domination as the governing logic of their 
religious conception. The figure or figures of the divine, that is, 
are in virtually all these societies' religious systems of self-under- 
standing the monopoly owners of some means of life or anti-life: for 
the granting or withholding of which the members of the society in 
question must of fer some form or other of obedient life activity in 
return. Whether one looks to the pre-ancient remnants of Hinduism or 
Judaism, animism or Greek polytheism, this exchange of domination is 
the governing underlying form of men's relations with their heavenly 
patrons. And whether such exchange of domination involves sacrificial 
rite and/or fulsome praise and/or duteous behaviour or whatever as 
the form of obedient life-activity the human subordinate must yield 
this or that divine lord for the latter's proprietary favours, and 
whether such exchange of domination is thought elevating covenant and/ 
or fearful submission or whatever -- it is in principle an exchange of 
domination between ruling monopoly owner and ruled needful subject 
nevertheless. The principles of domination seem to govern here with 
as great theoretical purity as they govern a nineteenth century English 
factory or an ancient slave-farm. And if we accept the historical 
materialist method of inferring social structure from religious ideology, 
then the latter here demonstrates the way of domination really informing 
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the former. But in any case, the way of domination would seem to have 
roots literally older than recorded history, if only between men and 
their celestial masters. 
So, the problematic of the way of domination would seem to 
have a deeper as well as broader hold on human affairs than Marx's 
civilized work-and-marketplace focus discloses. Accordingly, man's 
liberation from this way of domination would seem a profounder as well 
as more socially embracing task than Marx's counsel of proletarian- 
revolution-against-capitalists would simplistically have it. Let me 
now indicate then, if only with the ellipsis of aphorism, some of the 
more important implicati-ons which my extra-Marxian analysis of domi- 
nation seems to have with regard to the liberation of human-kind from 
it. With these concluding curt probes, I am done. 
The proletariat do not specially qualify for the historical 
role of human liberators, For as predominantly male and adult, they 
are themselves dominators of female and youth under-classes. And as 
substantial part of the collective mechanism of formal domination 
which underlies all ruling-class domination including that of work- 
and-marketplace, they are themselves party to their own domination 
in the latter sphere itself as well as elsewhere. Further, by virtue 
of t4eir very material deprivation which Marx so relentlessly exposes, 
they are relatively disabled from adopting the way of liberation in 
any sphere of domination: the economic base of their historical 
adherence to the way of domination in general, and in particular, where 
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they themselves own the role of dominators (e. g. as fathers and hus- 
bands). 16 In short, given our broader analysis of domination, the 
direct producers come out as far from the uniquely unsullied victim- 
class to whom to look as the great emancipator of mankind. They are 
as deeply held in the way of domination as any of society's member- 
ship if not more. 
On the other hand, the work-and-marketplace ruling-class whom 
the direct producers serve are by no means the only or even the main 
force of repression inhibiting human liberation. In part due to the 
role of the direct producers here in the all-embracing mechanism of 
formal domination, the members of this. ruling-class are themselves 
constrained by the given form of social life: even in the work-and- 
marketplace where they penultimately rule. Furthermore, in other 
frameworks of domination than the latter, the very wealth they have 
derived therefrom gives them special material enablement to pursue 
the way of liberation: the economic base of their or the intellectuals' 
they patronize liberative forays in the realms of purely formal domi- 
nation, not to mention adult/youth and male/female spheres of domination 
(e. g. more liberative leisure mores and family relations). In short, 
16The relative economic disablement of workers here is not of 
course the same with respect to the work-and-marketplace order of rule 
(where they are dominated) as with respect to the adult/youth and male/ 
female orders of rule- (where they are dominators). In the former case, 
such disablement is historically speaking "deterministic" in the sense 
outlined in Chapter VIII. In the latter cases, such disablement is never 
"deterministic" in any sense, with perhaps the by-gone exception of work- 
ing-class fathers being constrained to press their children into paid 
employment to keep themselves and their families alive. 
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the work-and-marketplace ruling-class under our universalized concept 
of domination is not the one and only dominating group in society, 
but on the contrary bears in certain crucial respects the potential 
and even actuality of human liberation. (Marx himself, we might re- 
call, lived off the avails of the capitalist Engels' Manchester 
factory: indicating the enablement of work-and-marketplace rulers 
and those they patronize to forge the way of liberation even within 
the work-and-marketplace). 
From the above, we may conclude that mankind's liberation is 
not merely a class-divided affair where one class is simply on the 
side of domination (i. e. the capitalists) and another class merely 
on the side of liberation (i. e. the proletariat). Both classes have 
important and substantial enablements to liberate: the capitalists 
for reasons I defer to above, and the proletarians for reasons Marx 
has already made famous. And both classes have important, if dis- 
proportionate, stakes and rootedness in forms of domination: the 
capitalists for reasons Marx has long ago forcibly demonstrated and 
the proletarians for reasons I have already indicated. Insofar as 
no one class is wholly responsible for domination nor any one class 
uniquely enabled in the way of liberation, both the hold of the former 
and the quest of the latter cut across Marxian class lines. The 
problem and the solution both are held in common, albeit in unequal 
shares. 
17, 
17' None of this is meant to rule out class struggle of the 
Marxian sort as a part of the liberative enterprise. To say cont'd 
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Workers' or workers' representatives seizing control of the 
state and governing society as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" 
-- the Marxian strategy of liberation - is obviously not adequate, 
even as intermediate step, to the pervasive problem of domination as 
it has been identified here. The principles of domination, it has 
been demonstrated, govern human behaviour too broadly and deeply for 
any such restricted overthrow of domination-structure to be even 
transitionally adequate to the requirements of liberation: even 
granting here that such workers' movement is historically possible 
in industrialized countries and that it in fact does represent an 
authentically liberative move rather than mere rhetorical guise for 
rule by a new class of "term" owning public administrators. One 
might argue, as I already have, that neither of these grants is easily 
admissible and that the Marxian program is not likely to be achieved 
in advanced capitalist societies and - where it is achieved in other 
"peasant" societies -- is not clearly liberative even in the work-and- 
marketplace (merely in effect replacing here one "private" owner ruling- 
class with another "term" owner ruling-class, albeit a far less ex- 
ploitatively enabled ruling-class with its temporally restricted 
ownership oowers). But even if we namely by-pass such critical con- 
siderations -- grounding historical possibility on historical achievement 
that the liberative enterprise "cuts across Marxian class lines" is 
not to deny that a crucial part of this enterprise may obtain within 
Marxian class lines at the same time. 
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in quite dissimilar conditions, and assuming so to speak that the 
greater material security of a national boarding school is more 
qualified for the status of freedom than the lesser material security 
of a national honky-tonk -- we are still left with a Marxian mode 
of liberation which is altogether too limited a solution to the 
permeative problematic of domination. Even granting in short the not 
altogether plausible claims of Marxism to solution of domination by 
a ruling-class in the work-and-marketplace, its program of human 
liberation still remain'S'quite inadequate to the hold of the a 
. 
ýL. y 
of domination on the human condition as a whole. This way of domination, 
as we have seen, governs mankind as a form of life almost akin in its 
grip to the prescriptions of physical instinct (which status in fact 
the crudest "realism! ' often affords it). 
On the other hand, the very universality and depth of hold 
of the way of domination would seem to require to be transcended a 
universality and depth of liberative enterprise that only members 
of society qua individuals are able to mount in the first instance. 
It would be comforting to think that groups, classes or collectives 
could begin as a body to reprogram themselves to the liberative way 
of life -- and undoubtedly such a radical transformation of the social 
body would have to take place somehow if the way of liberation were 
to take historical hold -- but the restructuring required here is so 
embracing and so intrinsic At the same time that it is difficult to 
imagine how the liberative way can in fact be initiated by the well- 
known refractory clumsiness and impercipience of collective action as 
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hitherto known: not to mention the anti-liberative disposition of 
collectives to purely formal domination even in the process of in- 
tended emancipation (as the totalitarian and increasingly purely 
formal domination informing the current People's Republic of China 
most trenchantly illustrates). Some several millenia of history have 
already passed with the all-encompassing way of domination hardly 
altered in principle (though assuredly in extremity of penalties) 
as human form of life, so one might properly speculate that the 
radical departure involved in its alteration to a liberated way is 
really of the order of artistic invention: of the order, that'isof 
mutationally original human life-construction, manageable in the 
beginning only by the creative imagination of individual agency in 
integral pursuit of life itself as art-form. Not the traditional 
confinement of aesthetic pursuit to the mere raising of isolated 
artifice for leisure spectacle, but the opening of projective im- 
agination to the dizzying raw matter of one's being itself for 
formulation into new liberative pattern: man here, with Marx, as 
driven artist -- urging towards realization of the human essence and 
the way of liberation simultaneously in the creative praxis master- 
piece of the good life. Otherwise put, the philosophical mission 
pursued in its profoundest sense. 
The ultimate revolutionary task in short, may lie in its 
gestation with the individual as existential artisan. 
The way of liberation involves obviously the transformation 
in practice of the two principles of the ensconced way of domination -- 
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monopoly ownership of the means of life/anti-life and extraction 
therefrom of obedient life-activity -- into other, transcending 
grammar of action: into that is, co-operative access to/dissolution of 
means of life/anti-life and life-activity in accordance with self- 
raised project (whether individually or co-operatively forged). Such 
revolutionary transformation of form of life is, against Marx, to a 
large extent within the immediate domain of praxis possibility (albeit 
strenuous possibility, given the established coercive regimen of social 
intercourse) of any ordinary man of any contemporary, technologically 
advanced society. 
Note the qualifying phraseology here of "to a large extent", 
"man" and "contemporary, technologically-advanced". I so qualify 
because it is clear from the foregoing analysis of domination that 
deviance from the established form of social life is liable to 
survival-endangering penalty: even the occupant of the role of 
dominator is himself subject to formal domination which constrains his 
endeavour to perpetuation of his rule. Hence holus-bolus pursuit of 
the way of liberation is clearly not at all unconditionally possible 
if the pursuer is not to suffer extinction. But such pursuit is 
possible to. a man, "to a large extent", consistent with his survival, 
inasmuch as -- all ignored by Marx- qua adult male he occupies the 
role of'dominator vis a vis women (e. g. his conjugal partner) and youth 
(e. g. his children), and qua thus elevated member of the community 
he occupies the role of important participant in the collective 
mechanism of formal domination: all of which role occupancy he can 
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revolutionarily transform in accordance with the principles of 
liberation in a contemporary technologically-advanced society where, 
for a complex of reasons, the essential penalty he faces for such 
liberative transformation is social disapprobation. Simply as an 
ordinary man, an individual, in technologically enabled circumstances 
it is possible for him across a very broad and crucial range of social 
relationship to pursue the way of liberation without substantial 
threat to his survival. 
A man who thus liberatively transforms his way of life -- 
the work-and-marketplace order of domination which fixates Marx aside 
-- has thereby largely achieved the mutating gestation of "the new 
man", the liberated and liberating man, already. Though a concrete 
description of the radical change in moment-to-moment way of life 
which must be involved in such transformation is not of course possible 
here, suffice it to say that virtually every facet of extra-work 
intercourse with others would require fundamental conversion from its 
conventional pattern by any such adoption in action of the grammar of 
liberation. Since the most historically far-reaching consequences 
of this transmutation in way of life obtain in the upbringing sphere 
(for reasons T have already alluded to earlier), let me proffer brief 
illustration of how just one characteristic moment in the great con- 
tinuum of encounter between a man and his children might undergo 
radical restructuring by the former's pursuit of the proposed way 
of liberation rather than the archetypal way of domination. Let us, 
that is, glimpse the general through the lens of paradigmatic particular. 
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The father confronts the specific situation of his children's 
dangerous incursions into a heavily-trafficked street. Governed by 
the established principles of domination conventionally informing 
the adult/youth sphere of social intercourse, he gives a dictate 
to their action, and exchanges with their subsequent behaviour grant 
or withdrawal of means of life (e. g. tools of play), or restraint or 
application of means of anti-life (e. g. physical beating), in accordance 
with the children's obedient or disobedient life-activity in conformity 
to his command. Governed on the other hand by the principles of 
liberation in such situation, his way of relating to his children is 
fundamentally transformed. Instead of a. dict_ate to their action, he 
constructs an adequate explication to their understanding (e. g. of 
the dangers of the street to their well-being, explication which 
itself requires creative project on his part to adequately communicate 
to their sensibility): from which explication, the children by them- 
selves or with his help are enabled to raise the project of pre- 
cautionary measure with respect to the street, and to self-directedly 
execute in action the project in question. ' Then too, in accordance 
with the principles of liberation as opposed to domination, the 
father does not grant/withhold means of life/anti-life in return for 
his children's life-activity in this regard (otherwise the structure 
of domination persists, with merely implicit in place of explicit 
dictate); but'on the contrary there is co-operative access to/dissolution 
of means of life/anti-life with no effective monopoly ownership in 
these regards being held to ground this -- or any other -- exchange 
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of domination (any continued dangerous street incursion by his 
children here not inviting penalty, but more effective explanation, 
in return). In such manner the father himself pursues the way of 
liberation, and in so doing liberates others; and, as these others 
are themselves formed in character by such mode of upbringing to 
behave similarly in the future, the father here most significantly 
historically liberates as well. All utterly outside work-and-market- 
place sphere, collective proletarian political movement or assault 
upon capitalist ownership which preoccupy the Marxian viewpoint of 
human liberation. 
Indeed insofar as the way of domination here involves threat 
to well-being in the very process of putatively securing it, insofar 
as it shifts the area of concern from prudence with respect to the 
street to fear of the father's reprisals, and insofar as it fails 
thereby to provide for safe behaviour except within the area of the 
latter's sphere of enforcement, it is respectively inconsistent, 
distractive and ineffectual with regard to realization of the objective 
in question: let alone promotive of crucial carry-over difficulties 
of familial antagonism (all based on such parental frustration of 
children's human-essence realization? ), children's cognitive arrest 
(all based on such negation of practical explication opportunity? ) 
and so on. On the other hand, the way of liberation here is con- 
sistently solicitous of the children's well-being, maintains integrity 
in the sphere of concern, and provides by its logic of self-direction 
for safe behaviour without as well as within the adult's range of 
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discernment: let alone enabling crucial carry-over benefits such as 
familial harmony, children's cognitive development, and so on. In 
sum, the father's government here of his action by the principles of 
liberation rather than of domination involves a radical revolution 
in form of behaviour, while at the same time promoting thereby sys- 
tematically more efficacious realization of human survival objective 
than is afforded by the way of domination (not to mention crucial 
carry-over benefits rather than difficulties via the same revolution 
in grammar of action). Such a change can be generalized, I think, 
across the entire sphere of adult/youth relationship. For the very 
problems of cognitive immaturity and "reality principle" urgency which 
are I think the essential grounds for the claimed indispensability of 
the way of domination, are admitted to this case in the extremest 
form, and yet the situation in question is in no way less susceptible 
to more effective government by the principles of liberation for all 
that. 
If one allows that liberative revolution of the adult/youth 
structure of domination is both a socially easier and more historically 
effective revolution to achieve than of the work-and-marketplace, and 
that as I have briefly shown here even the most apparently difficult 
problem arising therein is more efficaciously resolvable by the way 
of liberation than the way of domination, and that as well almost 
every social member is in a position during his or her18 lifetime of 
18For reasons of economy, I have completely ignored reference 
here to the female underclass. But at least the following needs to contlý 
367 
effecting in praxis such revolution within the central social sphere 
of the family, the feasible pursuit of human liberation altogether 
outside the Marxian ambit of consideration is already largely clarified 
as individual project. 
As far as that more or less all-adult-male sphere of domination 
holding Marx's exclusive focus goes -- the work-and-marketplace -- 
here too our analysis of domination indicates praxis possibilities of 
liberative enterprise for the ordinary individual enabled by con- 
temporary, advanced technological context: without at all necessarily 
ruling out, I might add, the collective mode of action Marx'recommends 
in this connection but wrongly presumes to be uniquely effective. 
First of all, by the very way of liberation pursued in non-work-and- 
marketplace spheres of social intercourse to which brief illustration 
be said: 
1) Pursuit of the way of liberation of our so-called "ordinary man" 
with respect'to the female underclass is as rich in praxis possibility 
and import -- though for different reasons -- as with-respect to the 
youth underclass. 
2) Such pursuit in such respects obviously involves important "over- 
lapping". For example, by following the way of liberation with respect 
to youth, the man in question is at the same time necessarily following 
this way with respect to female youth: hence in this manner necessarily 
liberating members of the female underclass while liberating members of 
the youth underclass. On the other hand, by pursuing the way of liber- 
ation with respect to women (e. g. his conjugal partner), the man in 
question is at the same time promoting via "carryover" influence the 
liberation of youth (e. g. his children) whose upbringing is, as a matter 
of fact, largely in women's hands: hence in this manner, contingently 
liberating members of the youth underclass while liberating members of 
the woman underclass. The liberative enablements of the "ordinary man" 
are in these further ways importantly compounded. Should we desire a 
class-slogan to replace "Working men of the world, unite. You have 
nothing to lose but your chains", it might be "men of the world, lib- 
erate. You have nothing to'lose but the chains of your women and children" 
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is given above, indirect liberative subversion of the work-and- 
marketplace order of rule is already set in motion. That is, free 
youth must eventually graduate to the latter sphere already habituated 
in their formative years to the way of liberation: hence as such 
proximate liberative agencies in this sphere by their very character- 
structure and personal history. Indeed even if we do narrowly 
restrict with Marx our attention to the work-and-marketplace order 
of domination alone, it is difficult to understand how an historical 
perspective like his could fail to fasten on precisely this crucial 
if not indispensable long range strategy of human liberation. 
Then too, if our analysis of domination is accepted which 
holds domination by the form of social life to be the ultimate and 
primary framework of domination by which even the membership of the 
work-and-marketplace ruling-class itself is bound, whatever liberatively 
alters this form must at the same time liberatively alter that which 
it governs and underlies (i. e. the work-and-marketplace order of rule). 
And the individual, enabled by the contemporary technologically 
advanced milieu in which he lives, certainly would seem able to 
liberatively alter this form of social life if only insofar as, 
consistent with his survival, he ceases to collaborate with its given 
dictates and their collective enforcement. That such individual non- 
collaboration with the form of social life would in fact achieve a 
liberative alteration of the latter follows necessarily from the 
collaboration of this individual as constituent part of its collective 
mechanism: for formal domination is such by virtue of all society's 
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members imposing on each, hence even one of its members not so im- 
posing either on himself or others breaks this formal domination's 
universal hold, however, on the face of it limitedly. Certainly, 
as I've already argued, any such non-collaboration is difficult in 
the face of the universalized pressures of formal domination which 
not only come from without (e. g. social disapproval of inability to 
secure or increase ownership holdings as "failure") but from within 
(one's "social" self similarly castigating),, but it is nevertheless 
possible consistent with survival in the affluent milieu to which 
we are referring ("No-one starves here any more"). And certainly 
too, such individual non-collaboration is exceedingly rare if not 
unheard of: workers, petty-bourgeois and capitalists alike, attempt 
to protect their ownership holdings and to increase them by exchange 
for the highest exclusive payoff to self they can get, whether 
in money, status or whatever. (Even the Marxist worker presses for 
higher wages for himself = more money for himself = more command 
over other workers' labour-power past and present, in notable 
collaboration with the established form of social life: like Marx, 
so preoccupied with capitalist ascendancy that he fails to discern 
his own role in perpetuating -- while putatively attacking -- the 
very underlying way of life by which the former's rule is enabled). 
But again, despite all this, individual non-collaboration with the 
form of social life in question is possible, as I have here character- 
ized possibility: and indeed because of all this, such non-col- 
laboration would seem indispensable as well if the monolithic grip 
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of this form is to be even initially loosed from its collective hold. 
To thus cease in the work-and-marketplace to collaborate 
with the sovereign dictates of this form of social life -- or, in 
general terms, to cease to favour or disfavour action as it promotes 
or derogates from ownership protection/increase -- would enjoin 
of course a radical change in mode of job and consumer existence: 
a great wrench, from, and hence in, the established form of social 
life in the sphere where its underlying hold is most stringently 
given. Certainly speech itself, if not indeed mode of thought, 
would have to change its conventional pattern here: for example, 
no sort of collaborative respect for superiors, promotions, raises, 
wealth, etc. as such, and no sort of collaborative derogation of 
economic inferiors, social deviance, failure to advance, etc. as 
such either. And certainly both work-and-marketplace mode of action 
would have to alter radically too: both collaborative choice and 
pursuit of job-activftY'to secure ascendant salary, status, position 
etc., for oneself and collaborative consumption of status goods. or 
ownership-fawning media material. And so on and so on. A funda- 
mental change -- all of it consistent with one's survival -- would 
seem required just to cease personal collaboration with the form of 
social life underlying work-and-marketplace ruling-class domination: 
perhaps no less a fundamental revolution in way of life for the 
worker than the private or term monopoly owner who dominates him, 
and with whom he would -- in accordance with quite the same grammar 
of action governing the former -- seem readily disposed to exchange 
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position given the opportunity. That merely such individual non- 
collaboration with formal domination would break the latter's 
universal hold is not I think just a logical point of little social 
import. Rather such a "break! ' . seems in its societal repercussion 
to resemble in type that case of the fabled child singly refusing 
collaboration with the collectively enforced formal domination whose 
given dictate is that the Emperor indeed sports a suit'of clothes: 
the "break! ', that is, of a social spell whose binding of all begins 
to lose its hold with the clear dissidence of even the lowliest of 
its captives. 
Of course, as I have already indicated, none of this very 
perfunctory adumbration of the liberative enablement of the ordinary 
individual in the work-and-marketplace sphere is meant to imply the 
inefficacy of collective emancipatory action in this sphere. For 
it is the plainest recommendation of common sense that once under- 
taken the latter must diminutivize the former as effective force 
of this or any other sort of broad'social change. But what I am 
claiming here is that despite this the individual still has even in 
the work-and-marketplace his own sort of important liberative 
enablement qua individual, given that the underlying structure of 
formal domination here involves his own collaboration in its effective 
operation: an enablement which Marx altogether misses here and 
elsewhere in his blindness to the crucial personal dimension of 
both domination and liberation; and an enablement whose pursuit may 
indeed constitute an indispensable historical initiation of the way 
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of liberation in this sphere as well as others. However, so far 
as noný-individual or collective emancipatory action in the work- 
and-marketplace sphere goes, even here our analysis of domination 
indicates a rather different mode of such action than Marx himself 
spells out. That is, if It is granted as I have tried to show that 
there is a whole system of domination frameworks governing social 
intercourse of which the capitalist/proletarian structure of rule 
is only one, and (like all the rest of ruling-class structures) 
derivative from formal domination at that, then clearly collective 
emancipatory action appropriately takes many other forms than merely 
proletarians struggling against capitalists. Though such might indeed 
prove taxing to the Marxist intellectual who prefers struggle against 
the abstract enemy of the capitalist to struggle against, say, his 
immediate institution's hierarchial structure, still such polyversity 
of collective action would seem to foster an. adequacy of liberative 
enterprise which the Marxian program gravely lacks. And it would 
seem to promote as well a firmer consistency of collective liberative 
action which merely, proletarian organized movement against capitalists 
fails to achieve when, as is frequently the case in contemporary 
advanced technological context, such movement does not appear to 
work against capitalists or capital so much as against unorganized 
non-capitalists, and for thoroughgoing collaboration with the under- 
lying form of social life's principle of ownership acquisitiveness. 
In short, our analysis of domination has extra-Marxian implications 
for collective as well as individual liberative action in the 
. 
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work-and-marketplace. In allowing the latter it does not at all rule 
out the former, but on the contrary radically amplifies the scope of 
its appropriate undertaking. 
Speculative Postscript 
The quest for liberation has been underway since, as mythically 
remembered, Adam disobeyed God and Prometheus, Zeus or, literally put, 
man violated given rules of dominator proprietorship pretending to 
absolute status. From action in accordance with monopoly ownership 
and given dictate, to action in accordance with co-operative access 
and creative project -- such was the transformation momentously 
if momentarily effected by the fabled founders of Western man. 
However,, as the penalties of eternal "sweat of thy brow" to Adam 
and chains to Prometheus also mythically remind us, the way of 
liberation is but occasional episode in a general drama of domi- 
nation. In the archetypal memory of our race it works against the 
very order of things, and is fated to ruin. 
Such are the reminders of our most ancient accounts of the 
way of liberation. Yet the labours. of history to the present would 
seem contrarily and increasingly to enfranchise its possibility 
with a number of crucial and connected developments, most of which 
seem to be enabled by -- or variations on -- technological develop- 
ments. The major amongst these is not, as Marx held, the disciplining, 
organizing and uniting of workers by the production process itself 
763). For since this production process is owned and governed 
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according to Marx's owa account by capitalists, such "discipliningy 
organizing and unitLng of the workers by the production process itself" 
is by implication in terms of capitalist ownership and government and 
hardly thus worker-liberating (whatever Hegelian master-slave 
dialectical legerdemain may mislead us here). At best 
"the production 
process itself" eases, by its concentration of masses, collective 
organization -- as easily facist as communist -- outside 
it. Pather 
more significant technologically enabled developments contributing to 
the strength of possibility of the way of liberation in the contem- 
porary human condition, I should think, have to do with historically 
unprecedented upbringing modes, mass info rma tion-, 3,, t,,, 
v rse "lib- welfare schemes, cons ciousnes s-expanding drugS, ana 2P20 
1LIe 
-- 
eration" movements. But whatever the developments which may be said 
to promote the counter-mythic possibility of the way of liberation, 
and however much at the same time these and other developments may 
at the same time promise re-enfo'cCeMent of the way of domInatIon, 
this Possibility of hinnankind's liberation -- if also oj -its. 
greater 
, dominatIon -- would seem to have grown to maturity since those 
first 
fabled breaths of freedom from Adam and Prometheus. In a voT&, 'I 
suspect the long ownersh1p contest and way of domination Is to be 
decisively transcended by, or repressive of, the way of uberation 
in our time: Manichaean prophecy funded by such current 
ultimate 
polarities as globe-exploding bombs and mass-lib projects 
the extent 
I 
, accommodate of which the world has never seen nor can, I think, for -10. a7 
together. 
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There seems to be this long grown 
"Splie' in man expressed 
In the contrasting ways of domination and 
liberation. On the one 
hand are power to use or enjoy and exclude others from 
doing so, 
monopoly leverage, and enforced command. On the other, are power 
to use or enjoy and include others in doing so, co-operative access, 
and creative project. Mese ways'of domination and liberation, 
in turn, are reflected in contrasting ethics. On the one hatd 
are commands of property, authority and punishment. on the other 
are invocations of sharing, co-operation and artistry. The former 
of these ways/ethics is the coercive institutional side of hurnan 
life ("the rules of the game! ') and the latter Is the opened informal 
side of human life ("free time"). The historically enabled pos- 
sibility here is to cross over ways/ ethics /sides from the former to 
the latter, from domination to liberation. To trans-form. And this 
would seem to be, paradoxically, a full-time job -a so to speak 
second coming of humankind's form of existence through the providence 
of all-dimensioned practice. 
As philosophers since the beginning have suspected, there is 
a higher order than what greets us here. But it is formed, not 
found. And its call is everywhere. 
I 
